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"In consequence of the rationalization of the work-process the human qualities and 
idiosyncrasies of the worker appear increasingly as mere sources of error when 
contrasted with these abstract special laws functioning according to rational predictions. 
~ Georgy Lukács, 1023/1971, p. 89, emphasis in original. 
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Abstract 
This project represents a sustained critique of the reductive logic of rationalized 
healthcare delivery systems which reduces the individuality of both workers and patients 
to little more than problems for the system itself. Drawing on social theory and 
ethnographic data, I show that wherever clients’ needs or the caregiver’s empathic 
responses to those needs threaten the efficient working of the system, both are taken as 
aberrant, as “mere sources of error”.  
In contrast to this systemic dismissal of  workers’ empathic responses to the 
personal needs of patients, I consider the basis in moral philosophy for the view that 
workers’ caring impulses ground morality writ large and are essential in the provision of 
humane care. Hence, I argue, such feelings should be carefully heeded and cultivated 
rather than ignored and controlled. I also argue – in distinct opposition to modern 
managerial logic – that there are strong grounds, both moral and managerial, for less 
systemic control over caregivers’ time and practices. A  reduction in central control is 
important not only because adequate care is time-consuming, but because unstructured 
time and space are necessary for the development of the sort of caring attitude that is 
essential for humane caregiving practices. Time and space are also key for the cultivation 
of phronēsis, a form of wisdom that enables one to discern when a system, not a person, 
has gone wrong, and when efficiency must be sacrificed in the name of humanity.  
While such reflections apply to healthcare delivery systems generally speaking, 
the development of morally wise and caring workers is especially crucial for work done 
with persons suffering from severe and persistent mental illness (SPMI). Because such 
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persons have been thoroughly marginalized in society, drawing them back into a 
community of care is essential to meeting their needs. Based on my own ethnographic 
observations, I contend that the ethos of Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) 
represents a refreshing departure from the rationalized treatment modalities that prevail in 
modern psychiatric facilities. The program, however, is becoming increasingly 
rationalized as it enters the mainstream, bringing pressure for more detailed management 
of workers’ activities. The encroachments that are likely to follow from this 
intensification of management may well erode some of the most morally valuable aspects 
of ACT work. 
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Introduction 
 
“We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them”  
 
~  Connolly and Rionoshek, 2002, p. 175 
 
 “Alexandra's death, in the end, was much like her life - solitary, troubling and 
overlooked” (Allemang, 2009, F1). This is how journalist John Allemang leads his story 
of a woman he describes as forced to live independently in “an indifferent community” 
and, who, he is quick to add, was dead for a day or two before her body was discovered. 
As a features writer and columnist, Allemang knows how to zero in on details that will 
instantly catch a reader’s attention, and evoking a painful image of person dying alone 
and undiscovered for days fits the bill. We feel there’s something intrinsically wrong with 
consigning anyone to a solitary death.  
 This sense of what persons are owed likely underpins a basic inability to grasp the 
mindset of workers in US hospitals who reportedly ignored psychiatric patients dying 
right in front of them. In the first of two incidents taking place in 2008 Steven Sabock, a 
50 year old man diagnosed with bi-polar disorder choked to death on medication while 
nearby workers played cards and watched television. Several months later, at a different 
psychiatric ward Esmin Green lay on the floor dying, and the only attention she received 
during her 24 hour wait for a bed “consisted of someone’s prodding of her dead body 
with a foot” reported the Mental Health Weekly Digest (2008). 
 Such incidents tend to provoke calls for more regulations and greater control over 
healthcare practices and practitioners. In the story above it is noted that “these would 
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include raising standards and regulatory expectations, and identifying and funding pilot 
programs to demonstrate best practices in psychiatric emergency, inpatient and 
community-based care.” Meanwhile, Alexandria’s lonely death caused her sister to 
conclude that “what we need is a 24-hour care system that's regulated and controlled, 
where she's got security, where she can get her medications administered in the right way, 
where her day has some shape to it and she doesn't have to take on too much 
responsibility." 
A popular assumption is that both Alexandria and neglectful caregivers need 
better systems of management. No one quoted in Allemang’s article – not case managers, 
family members, lawyers, or her Assertive Community Treatment(ACT) outreach 
workers – suggested that a helpful factor would be a greater number of people in 
Alexandria’s life who, like her family, genuinely cared about her enough to support her 
and look out for her. This is true in spite of Allemang’s recognition that “if it weren't for 
the attention, protection and advocacy provided by her family, whose patience she tested 
almost daily and whose love she could never quite exhaust, perhaps she wouldn't have 
lasted this long.”1 To show the importance of such obligation, he notes that after helping 
to clean smeared feces from the walls of Alexandra’s room in a residence for the 
mentally ill, her sister asked "who's going to scrub the windows and the floors if the 
family doesn't do it … You can't stand the thought of your sister or your daughter sitting 
in that filthy room. You're doing it because you have to do it." 
                                                 
1 By all accounts, Alexandra was violent and difficult to deal with. She had threatened her own family members with a 
knife and was charged for assault after closing a car door on a stranger’s head and made death threats to housemates.  
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Even living in the kind of facility described by her sister, Alexandria would 
require people who cared enough about her to poke their heads into her room to see how 
she was doing and who similarly could not stand the idea of leaving her to languish in 
squalor. That no one mentioned this very obvious gap in Alexandria’s life is probably due 
to an implicit understanding that this is not something that social institutions are meant to 
provide. One cannot teach a person to care about another in the same way that one might 
impart a practical skill such as checking an IV or changing a bandage. We cannot make 
workers care on demand.  
In spite of this implicit understanding, people are still aghast when hearing about 
a more recent case where inspectors entered a US psychiatric ward for the elderly and 
found some patients covered in feces. Others were cowering and fearful and several 
patients reported that the staff were unkind. “At any given time,” during the visit, the 
inspectors wrote, “there were two patients crying”” (Conaboy, 2013). The president of 
the facility states that “a change in culture among unit staff is paramount,” hence 
managers decided to have workers go though “patient rights training, which included 
watching a four-minute video on empathy.” Such a minimal and inadequate response 
from the upper echelons suggests that a far more radical cultural shift needs to occur; one 
that includes both the administrative culture as well as that of workers dealing directly 
with patients.  
The suggestion that more intense management will somehow solve the problem of 
callous indifference from workers is a little mysterious. Closer monitoring and control 
over workers’ activities may result in a cleaner environment and timelier services, but it 
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will not cause staff to become more kind. In fact, I argue that exerting more control over 
the work process is not only ineffective here, but actually contributes to the problem by 
encroaching on the time and space necessary for bonds between healthcare workers and 
patients2 to take root. This is not to suggest that if workers are left to their own devices 
they are guaranteed to develop care for patients; rather, such moves need to take place 
within a workplace culture that explicitly prizes caring relationships and idealizes them 
within the professional sphere.  
It is important to realize that the ability to develop a caring relationship hangs 
crucially on the ability to see and appreciate another person’s uniqueness. For example, 
as a reporter intent on evoking our sympathies, Allemang knows precisely how to 
humanize his subject. Before he is more than a few lines into the story of her death, he 
tells his reader that “Alexandra Smith loved animals and showy jewelry, found 
companionship in coffee and cigarettes, adored Madonna's music and cherished the 
isolation of her tiny, private room.” This information is key and appears at the top of the 
story because these small biographical details tell us that this is a unique individual 
worthy of our care. With a similar point in mind, Elyn Saks, a law professor diagnosed 
with schizophrenia, asks people to “portray [people with mental illness] sympathetically, 
and portray them with the richness and depth of their experience as people, and not as 
diagnoses” (2012). As will be shown in later chapters, learning to see others in this way 
can reconfigure a person’s sense of what matters.  
Such personalistic forms of knowledge do not carry great value for those working 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that through this work I use “client” and “patient” interchangeably.  
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at an administrative level,  even in settings designed to provide professional caregiving. 
Bureaucrats who manage by numbers are poorly positioned to see clients as individuals. 
As a result they develop structures that severely constrain workers’ ability to meet their 
clients’ needs, a condition that ends by harming the worker as well. Given the frustration 
that so many workers experience in being barred from meeting patients’ all-too-evident 
personal needs, it should come no surprise that at least some workers resort to 
dehumanizing patients and become inured to their suffering.   
 
Trivializing the significance of relatedness and discourses on power 
When examining the emotional dimensions of social relations, one obstacle a 
researcher is apt to encounter is a subtle bias within academia and the professional sphere 
against representing interpersonal relations and feelings as legitimate objects of discourse. 
One of my informants featured in Chapter Four reveals the inferior status of such 
information in the context of public discussion. Beth, a nurse with an assertive 
community treatment team (ACT) was commenting on the influence of her parents on her 
work. “I guess I learned—this sounds so unprofessional—but to just kind of have a heart 
for people,” she said. On further questioning Beth explained that it was the expression 
“having a heart” that did not sound professional even if caring about one’s clients was 
important. “I don’t think any of us would say that in a team meeting,3 ‘having a heart.’ 
That wouldn’t stick to anything.” An interesting contradiction is at play here where the 
affective dimensions of the work are recognized as valuable and important, yet carry little 
                                                 
3 As I explain in greater detail in Chapter 4, ACT teams hold daily team meetings to get updated on the 
problems and progress of a roster of psychiatric patients the team for whom the team provides care.  
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weight in decision-making, nor should these be made explicit in the course of a formal 
discussion.  
The notion that a prohibition might exist against explicitly endorsing such values 
within professional contexts is borne out by Joyce Fletcher’s work which shows that 
relational work is often “disappeared” in the workplace (Fletcher, 1998). That is, in 
evaluating workplace performance, employers and employees alike systematically 
overlook the value of activities such as teambuilding, mentoring, and offering other forms 
of support to coworkers. Such activities, finds Fletcher, are neither cultivated nor 
recognized even though cooperative behaviour and friendly interactions are known to 
provide the glue that holds organizations together. As Mastracci et al, note, moreover, 
“emotional labour” or the ability to sense emotions in others and to respond appropriately 
is an essential skill, yet undervalued in service sector employees (2010, p. 124).  
Academia, it would appear, is not a particularly more hospitable environment for 
discourses on relatedness. Michael Hardt, who has been incorporating the concept of love 
into his political work notes “in many contexts, especially the normal university context, 
it’s very uncomfortable to talk about love. When I start talking about love, people start 
squirming in their seats, they think I’ve been around Italians too long” (Hardt, 2007). 
While talk of emotions is not well tolerated within certain intellectual spheres, Hardt’s 
example suggests that this attitude may well extend to the topics deemed worthy of 
scientific investigation. As psychologist Harry Harlow notes  
[t]he little we know about love does not transcend simple observation, and 
the little we write about it has been written better by poets and novelists. But 
of greater concern is the fact that psychologists tend to give progressively 
less attention to a motive which pervades our entire lives. Psychologists, at 
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least psychologists who write textbooks, not only show no interest in the 
origin and development of love or affection, but they seem to be unaware of 
its very existence (1958, p. 673).4 
 
  
As the offspring of healthcare workers, where my father was a psychiatrist and 
my mother a nurse, I have become sensitive to the relational and affective underpinnings 
of healthcare work. In light of this background, and the consequent knowledge I have 
gleaned regarding the difficulties of their jobs, I harbour both care and respect for 
healthcare workers generally speaking, and find myself concerned about their working 
conditions. This is especially true of mental health workers who are willing to take on 
what I see as a crucially important role in patients’ lives, but one that I myself could only 
assume with great difficulty. Undoubtedly, this attitude has coloured my analysis here 
and possibly opens me up to certain critiques. For example, in spite of borrowing from 
Foucault at certain points, I mainly focus on the emotional caring side of client/patient 
relations in lieu of a more critical analysis of the power deployed by healthcare workers.  
Arguably, ACT teams in particular can somewhat easily be conceptualized as 
agents of Foucauldian governmentality (Foucault, 1991). Being workers who bring their 
practice into the community, ACT workers admittedly draw out the long arm of 
                                                 
4 Harlow’s observations may appear dated, but a more contemporary example of an apparent aversion to 
sentiment in academic psychology is evidenced in Sebastian Kraemer and Jane Roberts’ introduction to a 
book on attachment theory. In making a case for the importance of personal attachments, the authors note 
that “there is a serious risk that some readers will recoil from the argument, as if it were merely an 
invitation to ‘love thy neighbor.’” The writers also take pains to distinguish their work from  “an appeal to 
sentiment” stressing that it is “quite the reverse.” Attachment theory makes a “serious contribution” they 
contend and is “hard headed stuff” adding that “if the notion of attachment means anything at all to the 
general reader it tends to conjure up a rather syrupy picture of loving contentment, such as a mother and 
baby enjoying each other’s company.” (1996, p. 6). It would appear that writers are anxious to position 
their work within the “hard” sciences as opposed to being perceived as champions of soft and syrupy 
sentiment, talk of which, or so they seem to assume, holds no rightful place in serious discourse.  
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surveillance into citizen’s private homes. Workers also monitor for deviant behaviour, 
stress self-regulation to clients, and endlessly strive to win patients’ compliance with 
treatment. Moreover, this is all done in the name of imposing a conception of normalcy 
upon patients’ behaviour. None of the data I present here is inconsistent with such a view. 
However, as I note in Chapter One, such approaches represent well-trodden terrain. I 
would also argue that analyses of power relations, or examinations of the tactics and 
strategies used to modify people’s behaviour, provides an incomplete picture of the social. 
For instance, ACT teams, as I shall show in later chapters, not only seek to manage and 
control clients, but they also aim to know and connect with patients as unique persons, 
and often seem to establish caring relationships along the way.   
Generally speaking, the need to connect and experience care and nurturance are 
important motivators of human behaviour that stand to become obscured if we are only 
looking at a field in terms of power relations. This latter sort of theoretical framework, in 
fact, can cause valuable knowledge pertaining to affective care to recede from view.5 The 
                                                 
5 Feminist philosophers have helped to drive home the point that we’re missing something crucial about 
human existence when we ignore the less strategic and more emotional side of social relations. A short 
story some use to show this is Susan Glaspell’s “A Jury of Her Peers,” that was latter adapted into the play 
“Trifles” (Hedges, 2002). In this story a farmer John Wright has been murdered and some men gather to 
investigate. Meanwhile, alongside them, their wives sift through very personal clues. Barren furnishings 
reveal a stingy humourless husband, a half cleaned kitchen tells them of the wife’s depression, otherwise 
immaculate stitching gone awry speaks to them of Minnie’s agitation. Then, the dead body of a songbird 
with a broken neck cinches the deal. They know Minnie killed her husband. The song bird, as it turns out, 
was one of the few things that brought her any joy. Having known the woman for years, they knew how 
John Wright had stifled her and robbed her of love and care. Concurrent to the women’s investigation, the 
men fruitlessly search for objective evidence of the murder, for instance the murder weapon, while 
dismissing or completely misinterpreting the same details the women find salient.  
Women are always concerned with “mere trifles” one of the men says in the story, which helps to 
encapsulate the dismissal of the special brand of knowledge the women deployed in search of answers. 
Another example of this dismissive attitude is Donna Haraway’s story about highborn women openly 
expressing their dismay while Robert Boyle slowly suffocated a live bird at a public demonstration of his 
vacuum. Boyle’s response to this was to hold demonstrations well past the hour when any wellborn lady 
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value of discourses on power is that these tend to invite critiques of oppressive or 
coercive social relations. Less, however, gets said about what should exist in place of this. 
Contributing to an alternative kind of discourse, one that reflects upon ideal social 
relations, strikes me as equally worthwhile, and hence I aim to do this here. None of this 
is contrary to critiques of power. Rather, I see it as complimenting such critical 
perspectives, or ones that so often point the way towards that which divides and conquers. 
My work, conversely, aims to shed light on factors that stand to strengthen, as opposed to 
those which dissolve, relationships and communities. 
 
Methodology 
It should be evident then that one of my main motivations in carrying out this 
work was to challenge the kinds of biases that drive talk of relatedness from the field of 
public, and especially academic, discourse. My primary question was whether 
rationalized modes of organization tended to squeeze the affective dimensions out of 
professionalized caregiving, especially within psychiatry, and, if so, what the moral 
implications might be. Is rationalized healthcare harmful to patients in some specifiable 
way? And what about the workers themselves? When healthcare is scripted by efficiency 
algorithms and “best practice” protocols, what remains of the satisfactions of caring for 
others that likely drew many to their careers in this field? The case of persons diagnosed 
with severe mental illness is of special interest, given the lack of elementary human 
                                                                                                                                                 
would be seen in public (1997, p. 27). Rather than entertaining the notion that the women might have seen 
relations that were genuinely amiss, they were merely excluded from discourse. 
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community that so many of them experience. Does highly rationalized care respond to 
this problem or serve only to deepen it further? Questions of this kind call for an 
interdisciplinary approach that draws on both critical social theory and moral philosophy, 
applying them in ways that can illuminate the results of observation from the ground 
floor of practice.  
My effort to understand the human effects of rationalization was most informed 
by the work of Max Weber. Like Weber, I have tried to examine the internal structure of 
rationalized systems and their general ideological consequences, while prefacing out, to 
some degree, questions about the particular political interests being served. I also draw to 
some extent on the work of other well-known critical theorists including Marx, Lukács, 
Marcuse and Foucault, as all have insights into the effect of highly rationalized modes of 
organization on social relations.  
My own focus, however, is both broader and narrower than that of most of these 
thinkers. It is broader in the sense that I am not concerned specifically with a capitalist 
context, but rather contexts that essentially rely upon standardized procedures to 
administer or medically treat large populations. However, my problem is also more 
narrowly defined in that I am asking about the negative impact on human relationships 
that such systems might have. Hence, while critical theory represented a starting point for 
my enquiries, I present my own formulation of the ideological parallels linking the three 
dominant forms of rational technologies, which are mass production, bureaucracy and 
science, as well as the consequences for human relationships in settings governed by 
these technologies. In order to demonstrate the converging impact of these technologies 
11 
 
on patients and workers in healthcare, I then turn to ethnographic research conducted in 
both general healthcare settings and institutions specializing in psychiatric care.  
In trying to theorize the moral contradictions at play in these settings, I soon 
realized that the problem had its counterpart in a divide between two very different kinds 
of moral theory. One of these is the rationalistic, universalist, rule-bound approach to 
morality that has dominated ethical debate in its various (and often conflicting) forms 
since the time of Kant and Bentham. This is the type of moral discourse that typically 
serves to guide and at times justify healthcare policies. The other approach is one that has 
developed much more recently in the field of care-based ethics, as exemplified in the 
work of Gilligan, Noddings and Dillon. While rationalistic ethics helps us to understand 
the moral reasoning behind the standardized procedures that inform most healthcare 
settings, care-based ethics shows us what those procedures invariably miss: the critical 
and irreducible importance of the personal encounter between caregivers and patients.  
In following these questions from the realm of theory into the arena of everyday 
life in actual healthcare settings, I wanted first of all to learn about the impact of 
rationalistic administrative systems on the quality of care as reflected in the experience of  
patients and caregivers. What harms, if any, seemed to arise from rules that suppressed 
personal connections between caregivers and patients? I also wanted to know whether 
workers themselves valued relatedness, and whether institutional settings gave rise to 
moral contradictions stemming from conflicts between a personalistic ethos and 
rationalistic demands. It was also important to try to understand what it was about their 
work that caregivers themselves viewed as morally worthwhile. 
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To throw light on these issues I began by reviewing a number of ethnographic 
studies of conventional healthcare in both general medical (Campbell and Rankin, 2006) 
and psychiatric settings (Rhodes, 1995, Letendre, 1997, Cleary 2004, and Donald, 2001). 
The results of this review are summarized in Chapter Two. It was in light of this 
background that I sought to understand the contrasting world of ACT, a more 
individualized approach to psychiatric outpatients that held out the hope of embodying 
some of the concerns at the focus of care ethics. 
While my decision to study ACT  was shaped partly by circumstance and the 
good fortune of a local ACT team prepared to host me as an observer for six months, I 
quickly realized that ACT was ideally suited to my research for three reasons. Firstly, a 
great deal of ACT work is focussed on the long-term maintenance of the therapeutic 
relationship with clients. Hence, there was reason to suppose that such caregivers would 
be apt to value relatedness, and might even have something to teach us about an ethics of 
care not yet fully captured by moral theorists. In such a vein, it was also possible that 
workers possess a fine-tuned understanding of what is required to form solid 
relationships. Such insights, in turn, might better reveal existing limitations imposed by 
institutional frameworks on relatedness, while also further informing work in care-based 
ethics.  
Secondly, ACT developed largely as a response to the shortcomings of 
conventional systems in providing a decent level of psychiatric care. Insofar as ACT 
represents a departure from standard psychiatric practice as well as a sustained attempt to 
provide individualized care, the program design offers an instructive response to the 
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limitations of rationalized healthcare systems. Finally, as I learned over the course of my 
research, ACT work is literally spreading across the globe and may well come to 
represent the future of psychiatric treatment for people diagnosed with severe mental 
disorders. Hence understanding the program and tracking its development becomes 
important in appreciating what may be at stake in this transformation. 
My approach to ethnographic research has been guided in large measure by the 
precepts of interpretive phenomenology as practiced by Patricia Benner and others 
(Benner, 1994, Smith et al, 2009, Lopez and Willis, 2004). This is a qualitative method 
used to observe a small number of informants which aims to understand another’s lived 
experience in her own terms. Given that ACT teams typically have less than sixteen 
members, this method was appropriate. Interpretative phenomenology requires the 
researcher to dwell empathetically and imaginatively in research participants’ 
experiential worlds while engaging in reasoning and analysis that aims to discern their 
practical concerns and lived experiences. A researcher aims to go in with as few 
preconceptions as possible in order to allow genuine patterns to emerge.  
Due to limitations imposed by the research ethics review board for the ACT 
team’s home institution, and in the name of patient privacy, I was not able to include 
observations of clients as part of my research. Hence, my observations were largely 
limited to interactions among workers in team meetings, and these were further 
supplemented with interviews near the end of my study period. Fortunately the team 
meetings proved to be an excellent and very natural setting for ethnographic observation, 
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and the exchanges that took place there turned out to speak directly to the kinds of 
questions guiding my research.  
Given that talk around a boardroom table is necessarily a limited way of revealing 
value, I also found it necessary to supplement my own observations with the findings of 
Paul Brodwin (2008, 2010, 2011), an anthropologist whose ethnographic study of an 
ACT team over two years fortunately extended to observation of the team’s interaction 
with patients in the field.  
 
Outline of the Argument 
In my first chapter I show how a worldview dominated by mechanistic logic 
strengthens an intellectual climate in which relational concerns are devalued. Rational 
technologies, or assembly-line styled processes, are colonising an ever-broadening share 
of the human services. One assumption of this dissertation is that rationalized systems are 
necessarily ill-equipped to accommodate human beings in all their complexity. 
Inevitably, particular persons each situated within their own unique particular contexts 
outstrip the resources of mechanistic apparatuses designed to work on a large scale by 
producing a limited range of outputs. When this occurs, however, the blame usually falls 
on the person rather than the system. 
Along with Georgy Lukács, I challenge the mechanistic logic that reduces persons 
to “mere sources of error,” and hold that instead we ought to cast a critical eye at the 
broader machinery that deforms workers in sometimes painful ways. As I shall show, 
there is a marked tendency in rationalized bureaucratic systems to assume that in the 
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event of a discrepancy between the system’s outputs and the requirements of particular 
persons, the fault lies with the person rather than the system. The same is true of workers 
unable to meet the demands such systems place on them. 
When we layer what I call the rational techno-scientific (RTS) paradigm6 onto 
such assumptions, then complaints of people being served by, or working within the 
framework of, such systems are apt to remain unheeded. This is especially true if their 
difficulties stem from concerns about the inferior quality of the human attachments they 
are capable of forming. As I shall describe at length, a paradigm which prioritizes 
economism and efficiency, objectivity, quantifiability, and standardization, but which 
deemphasizes interpersonal concerns, is very much at home within bureaucratic, 
productive and scientific spheres. Given the convergence of these three intersecting 
arenas in a wide range of healthcare settings, systems designed in the name of efficiency 
end up encroaching on the time and the space necessary for personal relationships – in 
other words, for the “caring” part of healthcare.  
In my second chapter, I showcase the human consequences of such influences by 
looking to ethnographies describing healthcare practices. Here it becomes apparent that 
the logic that locates persons as sources of error serves to “other” particular kinds of 
clients or construe them as less worthy of care and concern. Workers’ own empathetic 
distress, as it pertains to the harms produced by rationalized systems, tend to be 
minimized and similarly treated as a source of error. Meanwhile in psychiatry we see that 
                                                 
6 Rational in this term is meant to capture the emphasis this mindset places on 
instrumental reason, techno refers to the mechanistic view of nature, and scientific evokes 
the enormous importance of objective forms of knowledge for this worldview.  
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discipline becomes a key treatment modality for patients who are themselves 
quintessential sources of error relative to their rationally prescribed societies. 
In Chapter Three I engage in a moral assessment of the modern healthcare 
environments described so far. First, however, I show the deficiencies of a ratio-centric 
style of moral theorizing for navigating interpersonal relationships. I then advance a care-
based ethics to address the shortfalls of more conventional, and largely academic, ethical 
approaches. I also introduce a set of practices that will be used later to analyse ACT work, 
and which some theorists contend can, at minimum, inform a moral agent about the 
outline of an attitude consistent with care. In light of reflections from an ethics of care it 
becomes evident that imposing the technologies of mass production onto the provision of 
human services is intrinsically problematic. Meanwhile, relying exclusively on 
rationalistic moral theories, and hence failing to heed intensely felt responsibilities 
occasioned during face-to-face encounters, can create potentially painful paradoxes for 
workers. 
Finally, I seek to challenge the assumption that the suffering workers themselves 
experience in the course of their working day is a mere source of error. The empathic 
suffering of workers represents crucially important information for assessing the 
acceptability of rationalized technologies that we have trusted to determine care. Workers, 
I conclude, are a crucial first line of defense against systems that have gone morally 
astray. Ignoring their input and restricting their freedom to respond to others could 
potentially cause them to become inured to the suffering of their charges, or even the 
stunt the development of workers’ own moral wisdom.   
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Up to this point, however, I have only been assessing inpatient care. However, 
ACT, a treatment modality unlike anything that had come before now brings treatment 
into patients’ own homes and communities. As I show in Chapter Four, ACT work 
represents the vanguard of mental healthcare for those diagnosed with severe mental 
illness, and is hence an important area for any researcher aiming to provide a complete 
picture of the state of modern psychiatry. Meanwhile, the very need for this brand of 
program speaks to the deficiencies of population-based approaches for the provision of 
adequate human caregiving. At the end of this chapter I also describe the current state of 
ethical debates around ACT in order to better situate the morally-focused ethnography 
that follows. 
In Chapter Five I depart from standard critique and begin by highlighting certain 
valuable aspects of ACT work as seen through the lens of care ethics. As Fletcher’s work 
shows, such acts are liable to be “disappeared,” hence an analysis of this kind holds value 
while also showing us concrete examples of those aspects of the work worth preserving. 
It would appear, moreover, that these morally valuable aspects of the work are achievable 
in part because workers have the necessary authority, time, and space to carry their work 
out as they see fit. Despite such positive evaluations of ACT work, I shall also 
demonstrate that the RTS paradigm constrains ACT work in ways that ultimately cause 
workers to suffer. Having already argued in Chapter Three that workers’ own suffering 
matters deeply for our moral assessments of caregiving, and this is especially true if this 
suffering stems from a felt concern for clients’ wellbeing, I go on to examine other 
sources of defeat that ACT workers are prone to experience due to the limitations on their 
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ability to significantly improve their clients’ lives. My own modest proposal to address 
challenging working conditions is to encourage workers to also employ the space of the 
team meeting to arrive at a richly intersubjective and more nuanced understanding of 
their clients.  
Having shown how an emphasis upon the values of objectivity and quantification 
impinge upon ACT work by making an already difficult job more emotionally trying, in 
Chapter Six I draw my earlier discussions of reification, economism and efficiency as 
well as standardization back into my discussion to inform a prospective look at ACT 
work. In this chapter we see that clinical researchers are using the concept of “fidelity” to 
signify remaining true to an abstract model of ACT. By showing that this model has been 
designed primarily to achieve cost savings, I suggest that this use of the term departs 
significantly from an everyday use of the term implying loyalty to and support of a 
particular person.  
In fact in this chapter I suggest that if it becomes standard practice to employ 
scales devised to measure program fidelity, ACT teams may be altered in ways that erode 
some of the more morally valuable aspects of the work carried out by the team I observed, 
a team whose work is not currently subject to such assessments. Based on my arguments 
from Chapter Three, I conclude that if workers’ concerns go unheeded and the “fidelity” 
model remains unchecked by those situated at the ground floor of practice, we risk seeing 
ACT workers gradually turn away – like so many in other care settings – from the needs 
of their suffering clients.  
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It is important to acknowledge here that this thesis is not about individuals such as 
Alexandria directly, or even her family. Admittedly, it is vitally important that firsthand 
accounts of modern psychiatric care come to light and to hear from patients themselves 
about the quality of the care they receive in modern mass societies. Hence, it is not 
without reservation that I focus almost exclusively on the situation of healthcare workers 
in the following chapters. Current ethical restrictions relating to psychiatric patients’ 
capacity to consent, however, represent a systemic barrier for academic researchers 
interested in unearthing their stories. Moreover, issues related to the appropriation of 
marginalized voices mitigate against aiming to speak on behalf of persons diagnosed with 
SPMI. Fortunately, a growing consumer-survivor literature base exists that allows 
researchers to draw on the voices of clients themselves, and I have employed such work 
where appropriate in what follows.  
Finally, although patients do remain my central, albeit tacit concern, insofar as I 
strive here to identify and articulate conditions best suited for the cultivation of wise and 
caring workers who work with people such as Alexandria as well as other vulnerable 
persons. In psychiatry caring workers who are skilled at cultivating relationships are 
doubly important, given that a key deficit clients suffer from is an inability to relate to 
and connect well with others. There is something to be said then for nurturing modern 
care workers both for their own sake, and for the sake of their clients. To do this 
adequately, however, will require an understanding of professional caregivers’ unique 
situation if one wishes to grasp how workers can be pulled in different directions by 
competing demands and how such contradictions cause them suffering. Conflicted and 
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distressed workers likely do not make the best caregivers. There is a good chance that 
most people will one day find themselves occupying the role of a vulnerable other within 
a modern healthcare environment. Hence, we all ignore at our own peril the suffering of 
workers laboring under the conditions described in this work.  
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Chapter One 
Reification, the Rational Techno-Scientific Paradigm and 
Professional Caregiving 
 
“Is it not possible that science as we know it today, or a ‘search for truth’ 
in the style of traditional philosophy, will create a monster? Is it not 
possible that an objective approach that frowns upon personal connections 
between the entities examined will harm people, turn them into miserable, 
unfriendly, self-righteous mechanisms without charm and humour? ‘Is it 
not possible,’ asks Kierkegaard, ‘that my activity as an objective [or 
critico-rational] observer of nature will weaken my strength as a human 
being?” 
       ~ Paul Feyerabend, 1975, p. 154. 
 
Two Different Styles of Professional Caregiving 
In her 1995 work on care in an American nursing home, Nancy Foner’s describes 
two nursing aides with very different nursing styles. Ana Riviera is described as patient, 
soothing and kind; she is exactly the woman we might hope to see care for our aging 
parents. Ana stroked agitated residents to calm them, thanked and praised them and in 
general was caring and respectful towards her elderly wards. For instance, Foner 
describes the aide quietly feeding “a frail and weak resident, cradling her with one arm 
and gently calling her “Mama” as she coaxed her to eat” (1995, p. 62). “It’s not just a 
job,” says Ana. “Some of them are lonely. They have nobody; they need love and 
understanding” (p. 63). By way of contrast, Foner also observed Ana’s colleague Gloria 
James taunt, bully and ridicule patients in front of nurses, doctors, administrators and 
visitors. According to Foner, Gloria’s “tactics at meals were Gestapo-like” (p. 60). For 
instance, one day she was overheard telling one patient to “shut up and eat you. Eat. You 
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think I have all day for you?” Later another resident was placed on a toilet and when she 
complained Gloria “barked” saying “sit there. Just sit. I don’t care what hurts, just sit 
there. Sit down, don’t bother me about being ready”(p. 61).  
After the numerous historical reports of nursing home abuse cited by Foner, it is 
unsurprising to hear of clients receiving harsh treatment. What may give a reader pause, 
however, is learning that Gloria was “the nurse’s pet” (p. 58) and favoured by her 
supervisors. “She received the best evaluation on the floor and had privileges denied 
other aides. Indeed, when the two nurses were away from the floor, it was Ms. James 
whom they left in charge” (p. 61). According to Foner, supervisors preferred Gloria 
because “she was a fast worker. She finished her ‘bed and body’ work early and was 
punctilious about getting her paperwork done neatly and on time” (p. 60). Gloria’s fast 
and efficient working style extended to patient care, and she sought to hasten clients’ 
baths, meals, and apparently, bowel movements, to fit into pre-established routines. Ana, 
on the other hand, received numerous reprimands, mostly for circumventing bureaucratic 
protocols. Once she bypassed her supervisor and ordered supplies to reduce a patient’s 
discomfort, and other times made changes in routines in order to please her clients, 
prioritizing their needs over the requirements of the system put in place to manage 
clients. In spite of maintaining “a steady even pace throughout the day,” Ana’s 
paperwork was not always completed on time and her clients were often late to their 
scheduled 11:45 am lunch. “These are old people,” Ana explained, “you can’t rush them 
through, shove them this way and that to wash them. You have to be careful when you 
move them” (p. 64).   
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In spite of her empathy and demonstrated concern for the wellbeing of her 
patients, Ana ran into problems with her supervisor because she undermined the 
bureaucratic order structuring nursing home operations. “By placing the residents’ 
sensitivities and feelings before efficiency, she was, in effect, challenging the standards 
of her supervisor, the archetypical bureaucratic nurse for whom efficiency was all,” 
argues Foner. “If the rule stated that patients must be dressed in the dayroom by 11:45, 
then the nurse expected them to be there, even if this meant spending less time on such 
things as makeup” (p. 65).1  
As Foner tells it, these sacrosanct routines were derived from procedures 
implemented to constrain the unrestricted environments of the past that were reportedly 
rampant with abuse. Tales of such abuse provoked widespread calls for nursing home 
reform. In the face of a public outcry to reduce the suffering of the elderly, it would 
appear that highly rationalistic procedures were implemented in a bid to control the 
behaviour of workers and to manage client care. As Max Weber argues, bureaucracy “is 
the means of transforming social action into rationally organized action” (1923/1971, p. 
987, emphasis in original) which perhaps helps to explain why it will tend to be called 
upon to put new policy into effect. According to Foner, the bureaucratization of nursing 
home environments was something of a necessary evil insofar as an organized system 
helps to maintain standards of care and to limit negligence and abuse. She explains 
further that such bureaucratic operations “are governed by a system of abstract and 
impersonal rules applied consistently to particular cases. These explicit rules define the 
                                                          
1 One of Anna’s patients preferred being made up before leaving her room, which, of course, took time. 
Performing this extra service for the client had gotten Anna in trouble.  
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responsibilities of members of the organization and relationships among them. The rules 
are designed to ensure that tasks are done uniformly, at the right place and right time, 
regardless who is performing them” (Foner, 1995, p. 54). As such, bureaucratic 
governance can help to insure that all residents receive consistent, well-regulated care.  
An interesting reversal Foner observes, however, is that the very same system 
implemented to curb abuse also undercuts the provision of compassionate care. This is 
because as she notes, “at every level of the nursing department, efficiency and 
organization were valued over compassion to residents” (1995, p. 67). While Foner is 
probably right in her conclusions regarding bureaucracy’s impact on relational work, her 
focus is overly narrow. In industrial societies professional care also falls under the sway 
of two other rationalistic systems: science and mass production. Hence to properly 
understand the rationalistic forces shaping the culture of modern caregiving, we must 
examine all three domains.  
Hence, in Section I of this chapter, I examine the phenomenon of reification as it 
occurs in science, bureaucracy and industry along with the ideological implications of 
this phenomenon. In Section II I examine a set of values that are articulated in these three 
mutually reinforcing domains as they converge upon the provision of modern healthcare. 
The value set common to all three includes objectivity, quantification, efficiency and 
economism, and replication, prediction and control. I shall also note the manner in which 
a culture of discipline helps to support society’s reliance on rational technologies. In my 
third section I examine how the rational techno-scientific (RTS) paradigm emerging from 
the first two sections undermines direct human relatedness in caregiving settings. The 
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final section will show how and why human connectedness and other relational values 
are devalued by the relational worldview described here. As a result of the devaluation of 
caring work, healthcare systems are increasingly designed in ways that encroach upon the 
time and the space necessary for the development of trusting and nurturing relationships 
between workers and patients.  
Many of the thinkers whose work I shall employ here, including Georgy Lukács, 
Herbert Marcuse, Michel Foucault and Erving Goffman, tend to concentrate on the 
authoritarian aspects of reified rational technologies, and show how such structures 
oppress individuals and quell resistance to current configurations of power. Theorists of a 
more Marxist bent, such as Lukács and Marcuse, are primarily concerned with the 
manner in which ideology associated with rational technology reinforces a false 
consciousness in workers that, in essence, causes them to act against their own best 
interests. As with Marcuse, my work emphasizes the “overwhelming rationality in this 
irrational enterprise” (1964/2006, p. 34). What is of special concern for me is seeing how 
the maintenance of rationalistic systems tends to take precedence over an impulse that 
probably attracted many to the healing professions to begin with, namely the felt need to 
reach out to others, to nurture them and ease their suffering. For, as I shall show, the 
quality of relations between workers and clients is eroded when they are situated within 
reified organizational structures, and this is especially true in psychiatry given the 
conflation of discipline and treatment within the field.  
Admittedly, a substantial body of nursing literature exists that focusses on 
hindrances to nurse-patient relationships, because as Joan Liaschenko notes, in nursing 
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“the relationship is the vehicle for how the work gets done in the first place.” According 
to Liaschenko, however, “the majority of nurses articulate this relationship almost 
exclusively in interpersonal terms overlooking the role that macro-relationships hold in 
the structuring of micro-relationships” (2001, p. 129).  As such an examination of the 
broader systemic factors that help to structure the field in which practitioner-client 
relations take root represents a modest contribution to nursing literature as well. 
 
I. Reification: The Mechanistic Structuring of Healthcare 
Workers entering the field of professional healthcare encounter pre-existing 
bureaucratic and productive structures organizing their work, as well as an enduring body 
of assumptions, knowledge and established techniques derived from the sciences, 
especially the medical sciences. Even if some workers are not medically trained 
themselves, the odds are that they must answer to someone who has been, such as a 
doctor or a nurse installed to insure that the care provided is medically sound.2 With the 
turn towards neoliberalism, many healthcare administrators are also being encouraged to 
look to the managerial techniques developed by industry to organize leaner, more cost-
effective delivery systems. As Yasin et al note “the new realities of the healthcare 
marketplace are forcing healthcare decision makers to implement innovative operational 
philosophies, techniques, and tools that were proven in other industries to enhance the 
effectiveness of their organization” (2002, p. 268). As a whole, developments in 
                                                          
2 As many have claimed (Illich, 1975; Waerness, 1984, Hart and Wellings, 2002; Lane, 2008; Aho, 2008), 
a great many facets of human existence including mental health, sexuality, reproduction and aging have 
been medicalized, or have fallen under the purview of medically (i.e. scientifically) trained authorities.  
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healthcare are influenced by the scientific paradigm and the bureaucratic ethos, as well as 
by a value system inherent in capitalist mass production.  
One feature these three systems have in common is that they are highly 
mechanistic. Modern bureaucracies and mass productive techniques, for instance, are 
understood as forms of what Herbert Marcuse calls rational technologies. This is because 
both rely on largely automated and broken-down assembly-line-style processes 
predicated on the division of labour, while tasks are determined by pre-established and 
rationally derived protocols. According to Weber, in fact, a fully developed bureaucratic 
apparatus compares “exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of 
production” (1923/1971, p. 973). As with systems of mass production not only are 
bureaucracies guided by a mechanistic, or algorithmic logic, but Weber also notes 
improvements in the speed of operations, precision and continuity are gained at a reduced 
cost. 
Neither Weber, nor Lukács3 finds such parallels surprising given that both 
theorists see the mechanistic logic underwriting mass production as entailing its use in 
other parts of society. Lukács, citing Weber, notes “modern businesses with their fixed 
capital and their exact calculations are much too sensitive to legal and administrative 
irrationalities. They could only come into being in the bureaucratic state with its rational 
laws” (1923/1971, p. 91). Because the capitalist system is predicated on rational 
                                                          
3 In examining Weber and Lukács side-by-side various parallels become evident, for instance both remark 
upon a conception of a judge as a rationalistic “automatic statute-dispensing machine” (Lukács, 1923/1971) 
or “an automaton into which legal documents and fees are stuffed at the top in order that may spill forth the 
verdict at the bottom along with reasons,  read mechanistically from codified paragraphs” (Weber, 
1922/1979, p. 979). Both men also discuss the bureaucratic ethos I shall discuss later. This sort of overlap 
is unsurprising once one learns that the two were not only acquainted personally, but carried on a life-long 
dialogue with one another (Tarr, 1989, p. 131).   
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technologies of scale, it requires an organized, stable, and therefore predictable social 
environment. Hence, other forms of rationalistic, and mechanistic management begin to 
take root and dominate various aspects of society.  
The mechanistic logic characteristic of these first two systems extends all the way 
down to our very understanding of reality as revealed by the pursuit of modern science, 
and especially evidence-based medicine (EBM). As shall become evident, EBM aligns 
with a mechanistic worldview that envisions nature as a vast mechanism that can be 
coaxed to churn out her secrets in an orderly and predictable manner. Akin to 
bureaucracy and modern industry, EBM in particular represents an efficient form of 
knowledge production oriented to caregiving on an industrial scale.  
 
Reified Machinations  
The prevalence of mechanistic systems in the provision of mass healthcare 
supports Ursula Franklin’s contention that rationalized, broken-down technologies, have 
“spread like an oil slick”(1992, p. 27) in modern times. As Weber writes regarding the 
modern economic order, it 
is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine 
production which today determine the lives of all the individuals born into 
the mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic 
acquisition, with irresistible force (Weber, 1905/1958, p. 181).  
 
Given such a process of acculturation, Franklin may be correct when she contends that 
“production-based models and metaphors are already so deeply rooted in our social and 
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emotional fabric that it becomes almost sacrilege to question them” (Franklin, 1992, p. 
31).   
This sense of naturalness attached to rational technologies as the only proper basis 
for production and management likely helps to reify such structures, as does the enduring 
nature of institutions employing such techniques. As Lukács argues, a worker entering 
into a rationally organized workplace “finds it already pre-existing and self-sufficient, it 
functions independently of him and he has to conform to its laws whether he likes it or 
not” and can therefore only “look on helplessly while his own existence is reduced to a 
particle and fed into an alien system” (1923/1971, p. 89). We enter into a world ready-
made along such lines so that, as Marcuse argues, a certain “matter-of-factness” lends 
itself to the notion “that the machine is the factor and he [the person governed by rational 
technologies] is that factum” (1941, p. 91). In other words, the algorithmic processes 
derived from machine logic are necessary and absolute while humans are merely 
contingent means of facilitating pre-determined ends. 
Generally speaking, a rationalistic system is reified when its abstract phenomena 
and the rules governing such objects’ behaviour are taken to be more real, or of greater 
importance, than the unique circumstances or individual history of the particular entities 
described or managed in virtue of such schemes. In what follows I shall identify two 
kinds of reification, the first of which I shall call “conceptual reification” and the second, 
“systemic reification.”  Conceptual reification refers to the manner in which rationalistic 
explanatory schemes take on a more substantial reality than the world of everyday 
experience.  In this way abstract objects and quantifiable phenomena come to be seen as 
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reflecting the underlying organization of the universe. This form of reification is 
associated with the sciences. The second form, or systemic reification refers to the 
tendency to see the classifications, dictates and aims of rationalistic systems of 
management or production as taking precedence over the idiosyncrasies and needs of 
those being managed or served by such a system. As we shall see, these two forms of 
reification are closely related.  
 
Conceptual Reification 
If Plato’s theory of forms is any indication, the tendency to reify abstract 
phenomena is nothing new to Western thought.4 Historically speaking, the concept of 
reification first appears in Karl Marx’s discussion of commodity fetishism in Capital. In 
his discussion of commodity fetishism in Capital, Marx describes a process where certain 
contingent regularities in the marketplace come to be taken as objective types of 
phenomena akin to natural kinds. The phenomena that Marx zeros in on in particular in 
this discussion is, of course, the commodity. As Marx describes the commodity, it 
appears to modern men in the marketplace utterly divorced from the productive processes 
and social relations that give rise to a particular product. This is because all commodities 
enter the marketplace stamped with a price and are therefore taken to be commensurable 
                                                          
4 In the Phaedo all that counts as knowledge is knowledge of the forms, or those abstract objects distilled 
down to their eternal and unchanging essence and of which everything in the world is nothing more than an 
imperfect copy. For instance, that which is beautiful, Socrates tells Cebes, is so “only in so far as it partakes 
of absolute beauty” (Plato, Phaedo,100b). As with numbers such as the number two, which derives its 
meaning from the concept of duality, Socrates explains further, the only way that objects come into 
existence is in virtue of their “participation in the distinctive reality of that in which it participates” (101c). 
This shows one then, that the realm of concepts is on Plato’s account, that which is real.  
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and related one to the other. However, value, Marx notes, “does not have its description 
branded on its forehead; it rather transforms every product of labour into a social 
hieroglyphic” (Marx, 1867/1990, p. 166). In Marx’s view, the prices assigned to 
commodities are deceptively simple because they in fact represent a complex historical 
process that gave rise to systematized market exchanges as well as the amount of 
“socially necessary labour time”5 required to produce various kinds of commodities.  
The mistake being made by the economists of his day, argued Marx, was to view 
value as intrinsic to commodities rather than recognizing it as the result of a developing 
set of historically situated social relations that underlie production and market 
exchanges.6 Value then was thought to be something that a commodity has as opposed to 
representing something that men invest into products in virtue of their labour. Economists 
then take a bird’s eye view of the market that obscures the fine-grained relations 
underlying production and trade, favouring instead an analysis of abstract quantifiable 
categories of objects whose values are determined by supply and demand.  
“Reflection begins post festum, and therefore with the results of the process of 
development ready to hand,” remarks Marx, explaining how the market comes to be 
represented as something akin to mindless matter set in motion by mechanistic laws 
rather than as a set of social relations. “It is however precisely the finished form of the 
                                                          
5 This refers to an average amount of time it takes to produce something, and is something that men come 
to agree upon over time and the value becomes fixed (presumably until technological advances serve to 
shorten this amount of time, at which time we’d see this value decreasing). 
6 Customary practises, such as the trading of 3 ounces of gold for a particular amount of iron, for instance, 
become entrenched over time so that the value as quantified in the weight of the gold comes to appear as an 
intrinsic property of the iron. Marx also sees “socially necessary labour time”  incorporated into the concept 
of exchange value is what which is an average amount of time required to manufacture a product, and is 
something upon which producers and buyers come to agree upon over time and in virtue of social practices.  
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world of commodities – the money form – which conceals the social character of private 
labour and the social relations between the individual workers, by making those relations 
appear as relations between material objects, instead of revealing them plainly” (p. 169).  
The upshot of this statement is that the formulas devised by thinkers of his day to 
study the market “bear the unmistakable stamp of belonging to a social formation in 
which the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite, so that it 
appears to political economists’ bourgeois consciousness to be as much a self-evident and 
nature-imposed necessity as productive labour itself” (p. 175). In other words, the 
regularities of the market came to be seen as a natural state of affairs to which men must 
adapt themselves rather than representing a system that should be adapted to meet the 
needs of those toiling under its rule. 
 
Conceptual Reification in Psychiatry 
In so far as modern psychiatric diagnoses abstract away from the psychosocial 
factors that give rise to them, they are analogous to the economic concepts discussed by 
Marx. With the medicalization of mental illness, various thinkers (Horwitz, 2002, 
Greenberg, 2013, British Psychological Society, 2011) argue that many diagnoses are 
mistakenly categorized as discrete entities each sharing biological basis yet to be 
determined. Bracken et al describe the mindset characteristic of modern psychiatry as the 
“technological paradigm” in which psychiatrists broadly accept that “mental health 
problems can be mapped and categorised with the same causal logic used in the rest of 
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medicine, and our interventions can be understood as a series of discrete treatments 
targeted at specific syndromes or symptoms” (2012, p. 430).  
Given that mental illness is conceptualised as disease, Bracken et al also note that 
it is generally presumed that patients’ individual contexts, life history and experiences 
will be irrelevant to diagnosis. As such, these diagnoses may well be akin to the 
categories formulated by the economists of Marx’s day in that the complex psychosocial 
factors and social relations underlying certain observable regularities are ignored so that 
certain forms of distress or behaviour can emerge as distinctive kinds of disease. 
Draptomania, for example, or the tendency of black slaves to run away, is a favourite 
historical diagnosis that critics of psychiatry (Greenberg, 2013) often invoke to show how 
socially unacceptable behaviour tends to get labeled as pathological. ADHD, depression, 
and generalized anxiety disorder are more modern diagnoses that arguably follow a 
similar pattern. 
In medicine in particular, there is reason to suppose that the rise of evidence-
based medicine (EBM) and evidence-based practise (EBP) stands to amplify reification. 
In essence, explain Bracken and Thomas, EBM represents “the belief that medical 
practise consists of a number of different discrete interventions that can be compared 
with one another as to efficacy, cost and safety. Good ‘evidence-based practise’ involves 
using the interventions that are judged best by ‘consensus’ panels of experts” (2005, p. 
168). As such, not only may certain diagnostic categories be mistakenly represented as 
real discrete entities, but treatments that work for most people so described will tend to 
emerge as the treatment for particular disorders.  
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Systemic Reification in the Workplace: Sources of Error 
The concept of sources of error is key for this dissertation and is drawn from 
Georgy Lukács’ analysis of reified and rationalistic productive systems. Just as reified 
diagnostic systems abstract away from the particular characteristics and contexts of 
individual patients, so do such individual factors become secondary to the workings of 
the rationalized technologies employed for the purposes of mass production and mass 
administration. What I am calling “systemic reification” is a process first described in 
detail by Lukács, who starts with Marx’s conception of reification and applies it to the 
factory floor as it were. According to Lukács, reification occurs when the abstract objects 
and processes internal to rationalised systems for production of administration come to 
take on greater reality or importance than the individual people implementing that system 
so that humans rather than the set-up of such systems are apt to be represented as 
“sources of error” when things go awry. To Lukács’ insights I shall add that people 
served by said systems also stand to be reduced to mere sources of error within the 
framework of such systems.  
It is evident from Marx’s work how abstracting away from industrial labourers’ 
gritty and monotonous day-to-day conditions helps thinkers dodge questions about the 
exploitation of workers, since economic theory seems to presuppose that the value of 
labour, like other economic concepts are entities subject to impersonal forces such as 
supply and demand. The operations of the market appear as the product of immutable 
forces of nature and are treated as such. Following upon Marx’s work here, Lukács began 
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to examine the manner in which the highly organized and precise rationalistic systems 
underwriting mechanized mass production came to dominate the consciousness of the 
proletariat as well. As Lukács saw it, such productive processes along with the expected 
output of the system became reified. This is to say that the abstract system and its 
generalized categories are taken as givens, or come to take on greater importance than 
individual workers toiling in the factories. For Lukács, reification occurs when “a relation 
between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom 
objectivity,’ an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal 
every trace of its fundamental nature; the relations between people” (Lukács, 1923/1971, 
p. 83).  
Similar to the realm of Plato’s conceptual forms then, the meaningfulness of 
mathematically precise abstract objects gains ascendency in the workplace relative to the 
contingent details of historically situated people entering into such systems. For it is just 
such details that stand to complicate the process of categorization, enumeration and 
calculation required for mass production. The division of labour within such productive 
schemes means that workers occupy highly specialized roles defined in terms of their 
function within the overall work process. Those implementing and overseeing the 
process, moreover, will aim to control and quantify a worker’s output in order to match 
predictions regarding the quantity and quality of manufactured products. 
Within the scope of these highly organized technological apparatuses, argues 
Lukács, “the human qualities and idiosyncrasies of the worker appear increasingly as 
mere sources of error when contrasted with these abstract special laws functioning 
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according to rational predictions” (1923/1971, p. 89). In other words, qualities in a 
worker that interfere with the functioning of broader system will tend to be represented as 
defects. It is the worker who is assumed to have introduced “human error” into an 
otherwise perfect productive system because the system takes precedence over the needs 
and abilities of the workers. The onus will then be on the worker to modify and correct 
herself relative to the demands of the pre-existing mechanized process, rather than 
adapting the process to accommodate her particular dispositions or needs.  
It is important to remember that Lukács was mainly writing about factory labour, 
especially insofar as he was commenting on Marx. If one extends his arguments to 
rationalized human services, it becomes evident that the individual qualities of both 
workers and clients will tend to be represented as sources of error. This is especially true 
if the dispositions or characteristics depart from expectations derived from rationalized 
schemes and thereby threaten productivity. In my final section, I take up this further 
implication of reification in greater detail. Moreover, in my next chapter I provide ample 
ethnographic evidence of both clients and workers being represented as mere sources of 
error if the empathetic responsiveness of the former, or the particularities of the latter, 
impinge upon the efficient functioning of broader workplace machinations.  
 
II. The Rational Techno-Scientific Paradigm 
A Reoccurring and Mutually Reinforcing Set of Values 
Given then that we are examining mechanistic systems premised on large-scale 
uniformities, it ought not be surprising to see certain symmetries running through all 
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three spheres. In examining this triad of influences upon healthcare, in fact, I shall show 
how certain values are reiterated in each of these domains. A joint examination of these 
three domains will thus help to reveal how these systems stand in a relation of co-
production7 whereby the systems buttress and shape one another while the three 
discourses operate in tandem to strengthen a certain basic underlying set of assumptions 
about what matters. These mutually reinforcing presuppositions, combined with the 
enduring nature and social embeddedness of the rationalized systems being discussed, 
loop back to bolster the ideological impact of the overarching value set that I shall bring 
to light.   
 
Objectivity and Impartiality: Just the facts 
A worldview that grants primacy to the seemingly independent workings of 
industry, bureaucracies or nature, reduces the role of human agency to one of 
dispassionate observation and intervention.  Hence, the bureaucrat observes and carries 
out ordinances from above, the capitalist observes and tries to improve the bottom line, 
and the scientist observes and tinkers with the machinations of the natural world, and all 
three do so more or less dispassionately.  
For example, the ideal of a “good” (that is, ethical) bureaucrat  is one who applies 
the rules impartially. Weber argues of bureaucracy, that “it develops the more perfectly, 
                                                          
7 I am borrowing the term from science and technology studies. As Sheila Jasanoff holds “coproduction is 
shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and 
society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it” (Jasanoff, p. 2). This is a paradigm 
in which practise and the production of knowledge are viewed as intrinsically interrelated spheres of 
activity that coexist in a dynamic feedback loop where developments in one will tend to shape the other and 
vice versa.  
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the more it is “dehumanized,” the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from 
official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements 
which escape calculation” (Weber, 1922/1971, p. 975). As Luther Gulick argues, public 
administrators “are supposed to be smooth running machines … transmission belts” 
(cited in Mastracci et al, 2010, p. 127). Weber, similarly employs mechanistic imagery 
when he describes the quintessential bureaucrat as a “small cog in a ceaselessly moving 
mechanism which prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march” (Weber, 
1922/1971, p. 998). Under both descriptions one can see that the behaviour of 
administrators is determined by the system and as such, personal relationships and 
unpredictable emotional responses potentially gum up the rationalized systems of which 
individuals constitute mere appendages.  Weber contends, moreover, that the demand for 
“equality before the law” in the personal and functional sense—hence the horror of 
“privilege,” and the principled rejection of doing business from “case to case”” (p. 982) 
also help to drive the demand for impartiality in a bureaucrat. 
Such requirements for impartiality combine with capitalism’s need for a stable 
social environment. In line with such demands the bureaucrat sees it as his duty to put 
personal feelings aside so as to “adhere conscientiously and meaningfully to general rule 
as well as special directive, even and particularly if, they do not correspond to his own 
political attitudes. This is apprised as its special virtue by capitalism” (Weber, 1922/1978, 
p. 1415).  
Lukács, moreover, makes an interesting move when he marries Marx’s 
conception of alienation with Weber’s description of the bureaucratic ethos which 
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celebrates impartiality and detachment as moral virtues. In Capital Marx critiqued 
factories where the worker is “crippled to the point of abnormality” when he is 
“transformed into the automatic mechanism of a partial labour.” For Lukács, this 
disfigurement extends to the very consciousness of the bureaucrat, since “the more 
elevated, advanced and ‘intellectual’ is the attainment exacted by the division of labour,” 
the more profound is the crippling of the psyche. 
The specific type of bureaucratic ‘conscientiousness’ and impartiality, the 
individual bureaucrat’s inevitable total subjection to a system of relations 
between the things to which he is exposed, the idea that it is precisely his 
‘honour’ and his ‘sense of responsibility’ that exact this total submission -- 
all this points to the fact that the division of labour which in the case of 
Taylorism invaded the psyche, here invades the realm of ethics 
(1923/1971, p. 9). 
 
Where Taylor adjusted worker’s movements to better accommodate the requirements of 
the machine, the bureaucratic ethos requires the worker to adjust his moral outlook to 
accommodate the demands of the abstract mechanistic system of administration. 
According to Lukács then, even if an administrative worker’s body remains unaffected by 
the demands of his work, he is still mutilated by his working conditions. This is because 
he has internalized the importance of the requirements of the administrative machinery to 
such a degree that it comes to shape his very moral self.  
Hannah Arendt’s remarks regarding the Holocaust touch on this last point of 
Lukács’ when she notes that  
Much of the horribly painstaking thoroughness in the execution of the 
Final Solution—a thoroughness that strikes the observer as typically 
German, or else as characteristic of the perfect bureaucrat—can be traced 
to the odd notion, indeed very common in Germany, that to be law-abiding 
means not merely to obey the laws but to act as though one were the 
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legislator of the laws that one obeys. Hence the conviction that nothing less 
than going beyond the call of duty will do (1976, p. 137). 
 
If we move from the bureaucratic ethos to the virtues expected of a scientist, we 
shall find that the bureaucrat and the man of science are not so dissimilar. Just as the 
bureaucrat’s own psyche is expected to shape itself to reflect the ideals of the rational 
apparatus so that detachment and impartiality become part of his very moral code, so 
does a scientist’s integrity depend on bracketing out his own possible biases so that his 
cognitive faculties mirror nature in an objective and disinterested manner. “Science is 
cold, hard, impersonal, ‘objective’” notes Elizabeth Fee (cited in Code, 1991, p. 35).  
Feminist epistemologist Lorraine Code adds that in regards to knowledge 
“produced in seemingly objective ways,” 
Its alleged derivation from detached, pure thought permits it to claim 
superiority over modes of thought infected with emotional involvement and 
feeling. Out of this conception of the autonomy of scientific knowledge the 
conviction emerges that ‘real’ knowledge must be autonomous, detached 
from the subjective idiosyncrasies and circumstances of both ‘observer’ and 
‘observed’; abstract, independent and depersonalized” (1991, p. 35).  
 
In his capacity as a scientist, a practitioner is expected to strip away any trace of himself 
from his observations while remaining disinterested in anything but the truth, for as Fee 
notes, subjectivity is “regarded with suspicion, as a possible contaminant of knowledge 
production and one which must be governed with stringent controls” (cited in Code, p. 
34).  
Just as bias might distract a scientist from the pursuit of objective truth, so does 
partiality stand to deter individuals’ rational pursuit of their own objective self-interest 
under capitalism. There is reason to suppose, moreover, that medical practitioners are, at 
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least to some degree, influenced by the capitalist ethos given that the Ethics Primer of the 
American Psychiatric Association states that, “all medical services are dispensed in the 
context of a contractual arrangement between the patient and the physician.” (2008, p. 
84). Writers in Canada (Deber et al, 2005), the US (Andereck, 2007) and the UK (Leavey 
et al, 1989) have also remarked on the drive to situate patients as “consumers,” thereby 
reinforcing doctor/patient relations as market-driven entities. 
Weber, however, calls the rationalized economic structure underlying capitalism 
“an abomination to every system of fraternal ethics” (1922/1978, p. 637). This is because 
relations are determined by a market structure over which individuals have no control, 
but where the onus is upon each to honor her contractual obligations. Weber notes 
There is no possibility, in practise or even in principle, of any caritative 
regulation of relationship arising between the holder of a savings and loan 
bank mortgage and the mortgagee who has obtained a loan from the bank, or 
between a holder of a federal bonds and a citizen taxpayer. Nor can any 
caritative regulation arise in the relationships between stockholders and 
factory workers, between tobacco importers and foreign plantation workers, 
or between industrialists and the miners who have dug from the earth the 
raw materials used in the plants owned by the industrialists. The growing 
impersonality of the economy on the basis of association in the market place 
follows its own rules, disobedience to which entails economic failure, and, 
in the long run, economic ruin” (p. 585).  
 
As Weber’s account suggests, it is broadly understood that capitalism represents an 
impersonal system and our obligations to others, can, and sometimes must, be 
subordinated to the rational pursuit of economic interests. Because we are all trapped in 
the same system, there is a shared understanding of the manner in which other less 
rational considerations can lead to economic ruin. Within each kind of system, then, it is 
both reasonable and acceptable for individuals to distance themselves from the needs of 
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others. “It’s just business” says the Hooter’s owner to justify firing his pregnant cocktail 
waitress. “I’m just doing my job,” explains the security guard ejecting the homeless man 
out into the cold.  
 
Quantification: “That is Real Which Can Be Measured” 
It is interesting to reflect upon the common use of the term “it counts” to signify 
that something matters, as such an expression points to the cultural significance of 
quantifiability generally speaking. Any outlook that prizes objectivity will also tend to 
value quantification given that numbers do not lie, as it were, and thereby represent 
something upon which all rational agents can agree. Moreover, within a public sphere 
dominated by technologies geared towards mass administration and production, the 
ability to measure phenomena and their effects is of fundamental importance. Arguably, 
the importance of quantification finds its roots in scientific thought, is intrinsic to 
production and carries over into bureaucratic forms of management as well.   
On Isaac Newton’s mechanistic worldview phenomena that could not be 
measured “had no place in experimental philosophy,” a view that, according to Morris 
Berman, “has been the public face of modern science to present day” (1983, p. 43). The 
ontological significance of quantification also emerges from Max Planck’s truism “that is 
real which can be measured” (cited in Heidegger, 1977/1969 p. 169). This shows us that 
at the most basic level of investigation, anything that fails to lend itself to enumeration 
falls out of the basic fabric of reality.  Planck’s staunch empirical attitude spills out from 
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beyond the physical sciences and into administrative policy. According to the author of a 
textbook on health measurement  
Ensuring the quality of health measurements is supremely important, 
because decisions affecting the welfare of patients and the expenditure of 
massive public funds are based on the results of such measures; and pressure 
to monitor the outcomes of treatment is virtually universal (McDowell, 
2006, p. 704).  
 
Due to such pressures, a multiplicity of measurable constructs have arisen including 
social health, depression, anxiety, psychological wellbeing and quality of life (McDowell, 
2006) all of which are accompanied by instruments designed to assign a numerical value 
to these concepts. For it is not simply enough to say that people are feeling or living well, 
in order to be seen as referring to something real it must be possible to assign a numerical 
value to one’s claim. 
Psychiatry has seen a long struggle to situate itself as a legitimate science (Scull, 
1989, Shorter, 1998). According to psychiatrist David Healy, to this end, a shift occurred 
in the 1980’s that saw psychiatrists taking up instruments such as the Hamilton Rating 
Scale for Depression in their practice (2002, p. 288). Unlike the scales, timers or 
thermometers typical of the physical sciences, the instruments meant to take 
measurements in psychiatry typically take the form of a checklist or a structured 
interview. While Hamilton did not include specific questions for his scale (McDowell, 
2006, p. 371), others, for instance the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV 
(SCID) weigh yes/no answers to produce a score indicating levels of depression. Among 
the questions are items such “in the last month has there been a period of time when you 
were feeling depressed or down most of the day, nearly every day? (nearly every day? for 
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as long as 2 weeks?)” and “In the last month have you lost interest in things that you’d 
usually enjoy? (nearly every day? for as long as 2 weeks?)” (First et al, 1997). Answers 
to such questions are then weighted against criteria for a diagnosis. In this way, 
depression, as with other forms of diagnoses, has become, as per the demands of science, 
a real entity.   
With their emphasis on profit, producers are as beholden to numbers as scientists, 
and bottom-line thinking permeates industry through and through. As noted, the 
technologies of mass production rely heavily on calculability as a means of controlling 
output. As Mastracci et al note in fact, within the assembly-line mass productive 
techniques characteristic of Fordist manufacturing tradition, work was defined “according 
to what was measurable about a job” (2010, p. 126). Measurable, in this instance, refers 
to technical competence, or abilities that directly correlate with increased production in 
clearly quantifiable ways such as increased output or profits. This way of assessing what 
counts towards good job performance carries over into techniques of administration 
where, as we see in mass production, “civil service systems are built on a foundation of 
formal descriptions that specify tangible elements of each job” (Mastracci et al, 2010, p. 
128). As with production then, in a bureaucracy unless workers’ activities can be 
documented, enumerated and turned into a measure, it will hold little meaning. 
As Weber contends, at the broader organizational level  the existence of 
“calculable rules is the most important [element] for modern bureaucracy. The peculiarity 
of modern culture, and specifically of its technical and economic basis, demands this very 
“calculability” of results” (1922/1978, p. 975). In modern society, the core requirement 
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for the calculability of results is further demonstrated by the “audit explosion” described 
by Michael Power wherein public accountability is coming to be equated with a 
measurable value discernible via a mathematically derived auditing system that will often 
resemble a financial audit (Power, 1994, p. 13). Decisions about funding, moreover, will 
often be based on the outcomes of such audits.8 
Hence, the enduring pressure to produce quantifiable results often prompts 
institutions to embrace numerical targets. In 1994, for instance, Britain’s National Health 
Service defined three primary targets: “to improve significantly9 the health and social 
functioning of mentally ill people. To reduce the overall suicide rate by at least 15 
percent by the year 2000 and to reduce the suicide rate of severely mentally ill people by 
at least 33 percent by the year 2000” (Sabin and Daniels, 1999, p. 115).10  
 
Economism and Efficiency  
If quantifiable phenomena are all that is real, while an impersonal ethos carries 
the day, then instrumental reason takes precedence as the primary mode of reasoning 
within scientific and technological domains. As Hume argues, instrumental “reason is, 
and ought only to be, the slave of the passions” (1739/2011, 2.3.3.4) meaning that this 
                                                          
8 Wait times for hospitals, scores on standardized tests for students and the quality and quantity of 
publications for a university department are types of standardised measures that have been devised in order 
to audit the corresponding institutions (Shore and Wright, 2004). 
9 The fact the NHS did not provide a number suggests that the term is being used in its statistical sense. 
Statistical significance, moreover, need not be a major increase, but rather represents an level of increase 
high enough to demonstrate that the effect was not occasioned by mere chance, but was actually a result of 
an intervention. 
10 Each of these targets is readily amenable to quantification, and arguably, this is precisely why they have 
been selected. The first can be measured with rating scales, while demonstrating that the other two 
objectives have been achieved requires nothing more than a tally and statistical analysis of suicide rates.  
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form of rationality is incapable of generating values. Values are assumed by, and not 
derivable within, such a schema. Similarly for science, as moral philosophers are wont to 
remark, one cannot derive an ought from an is, meaning that rationalistic explanations of 
natural laws do little to inform one’s system of values.11 In a “disenchanted” world that 
construes the universe as mere matter in motion, it is very difficult to ground questions of 
value. However, if one’s primary concern is to alter numbers in a predictable way, a 
natural stance to assume is one in which ingenuity amounts to deriving simple and 
reliable shortcuts to quickly achieve particular ends. As such it ought not be surprising to 
see economism and efficiency emerging broadly endorsed values.  
In fact, it is also worth noting that such values are also as close to rationally 
derivable ones as could be hoped for within the framework of instrumental reason. Even 
in the sciences, economism and efficiency are key values reflected in the preference for 
simplicity in theories (Kuhn, 1977/1998, p. 105) and the celebration of Occam’s razor as 
a means of paring down superfluous theoretical entities. For, as Einstein puts it, “the 
grand aim of all science…is to cover the greatest possible number of empirical facts by 
logical deductions from the smallest possible number of hypotheses or axioms” (Einstein, 
quoted in Norman 2010, p. 50). Admittedly, it is not mysterious how such values might 
have risen to the surface as primary ones in modern capitalist societies given their role in 
the tremendous generation of wealth achieved in virtue of faster and leaner productive 
                                                          
11 For instance, research aiming to show that sociopathy , for instance, derives from an adaptive trait could 
not be used to advance the argument that we ought to value the sociopath’s behaviour. 
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systems. Nevertheless, whether the goal is production or explanation, economic 
constructs with maximum scope are the order of the day.12 
As Herbert Marcuse (1941/1982) has shown, these unequivocal virtues of 
capitalist production turn all too readily into a general ideology. Over time those values 
associated with the technological productive base come to appear as the very embodiment 
of reason itself. Hence, once efficiency and economism emerge as especially useful 
tendencies in the context of mass production, these become articulated as social values 
that rush in to fill the vacuum created in a world dominated by technological rationality.13 
The neoliberal tendencies that began taking root in the 1980’s served only to 
reinforce the translation of capitalist values into social values. The new neoliberal era, 
based on the work of economists such as Milton Freidman, was ushered in by leaders 
such as Brian Mulroney, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. According to David 
Harvey, proponents of the doctrine endorse “Adam Smith’s view that the hidden hand of 
the market was the best device for mobilizing even the basest of human instincts such as 
gluttony, greed, and the desire for wealth and power for the benefit of all” (Harvey, 2007, 
p. 20). While consumer choice, which may strike some as the empowerment of regular 
                                                          
12 As I shall show in Chapter Two, the same can be said of modern moral theories. 
13 Theodore Roosevelt’s historical comments about the patriotic dimensions of Scientific Management help 
to mark the transformation of these instrumental values into social ones. “Scientific management is the 
application of the conservation principle to production. It does not concern itself with the ownership of our 
natural resources. But in the factories where it is in force it guards these stores of raw materials from loss 
and misuse.  First, by finding the right material – the special wood or steel or fiber – which is cheapest and 
best for the purpose. Second, by getting the utmost of finished product out of every pound or bale worked 
up. We couldn’t ask more from a patriotic motive, than Scientific Management gives from a selfish one” 
(cited in Callahan, 1964, p. 20).  
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people, is taken to be the guiding principle for social welfare, the neoliberal shift has also 
resulted in the decentralization of government and a dismantling of the welfare state.  
Showing the emphasis being placed on economism and efficiency in virtue of 
neoliberal theory, Sue McGregor notes further that “this powerful ideology has gained 
the upper hand, persuading officials, parliamentarians and congress that states are 
inefficient and private markets are more cost-effective and consumer-friendly. The result 
is cuts to social spending, including health care” (2001, p. 83). According to McGregor, 
health systems in the UK, Canada, United States, Australia and New Zealand have been 
the most strongly impacted by neoliberal policies. She writes  
The neoliberal agenda of health care reform includes cost cutting for 
efficiency, decentralizing to the local or regional levels rather than the 
national levels and setting health care up as a private good for sale rather 
than a public good paid for with tax dollars. 
 
According to Thomas Osborne, in the UK both managers and doctors have been coopted 
to further the neoliberal agenda in health and he cites UK’s 1983 Griffith Report to make 
this point. A recommendation of the report, notes Osborne is to bring administrative and 
clinical reasoning into alignment.  
What is at stake is an effort to make truth administratively and economically 
efficient; to make, as it were, an economic rationality function as close as 
possible to the point of clinical decision itself. All the repertoires of ‘quality 
initiative’, ‘audit’ and ‘decision analyses’ that now pervade the Health 
Service also testify to this overlap between clinical and economico-
administrative functions (1993, p. 353).  
 
The point here is not the creation of profit, argues Osborne, but to imbue clinical 
rationality with administrative logic so that values such economism and efficiency come 
to guide clinical decision-making.  
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This blending of clinical and administrative rationality, moreover, is evidenced in 
efforts to map the techniques of capitalist mass production onto the provision of medical 
care to make the latter as efficient and economical as the former. According to Kujula et 
al, a significant body of literature exists that aims to borrow from techniques 
characteristic of industrial commercial process in a bid to streamline healthcare delivery. 
Similar to proponents of neoliberalism, Kujala et al celebrate the success of the capitalist 
system in holding that “with the proper adjustments and conceptual translations, several 
of the methodologies that have contributed to the enormous creation of wealth in the 
industrial world can also be applied to health care” (2006. p. 512). 
 
Standardization, Prediction and Control 
The sorts of techniques that Kujala et al are referring to involve implementing 
standardized productive processes within healthcare delivery systems. As in industrial 
production, administrators are better able to monitor and control resources if they insist 
that all relevantly similar cases receive identical forms of treatment or, as the medical 
jargon goes, follow the same clinical pathway. In industry, standardization is not merely a 
means of achieving efficiency it also affords a level of control that, should, in theory at 
least, allow for precise predictions. Meanwhile, as Kujala et al’s quote above suggests, 
the cultural acceptance of the legitimacy of industrial techniques stems, at least in part, 
from both the profit to be made from, and the dizzying array of human needs that can be 
met in virtue of, processes yielding uniform outputs. 
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In general, as much as industrialists, scientists or bureaucrats want quantifiable 
results, being able to predict the quantity and quality of these results is a key marker of 
substantive knowledge. Such a stance is not restricted to the physical sciences, as is 
evident from Goodwin and Guze’s famous proclamation in their textbook on psychiatry 
that “diagnosis is prognosis” (1996, p. 300). This statement implies that the classification 
of mental illness is utterly contingent upon knowing what effects it stands to occasion and 
a further natural step is to begin to classify ailments in accordance with the kinds of 
medications to which a patient responds.  
Ontology then, that is, the very manner in which we classify the objects of 
scientific discourse, relies upon being able to know how to cause each type to occur,14 
while also being able to consistently predict what further effects they will occasion. Not 
only do such classificatory practises presuppose that the natural world, like a machine, 
will reliably reproduce phenomena once we set it into motion in the right way, but 
prediction and control is essential to understanding within this paradigm, since 
operational definitions largely represent instructions for the production of a particular 
kind of phenomenon combined with reliable predictions of its effects. As Jasny et al note, 
in science “replication—The confirmation of results and conclusions from one study 
obtained independently in another—is considered the scientific gold standard” (2011, p. 
1225).15 Meanwhile, the need for replication can also shape one’s conceptual scheme as 
                                                          
14 It is worth noting here the fact that precise causal mechanisms cannot be described for mental disorders is 
an aspect of psychiatry that is apt to draw out charges that either the diagnosis fails to refer to a real entity, 
or that psychiatrists do not actually understand the phenomena they are describing. 
15 This quote appears in a special edition of Science dedicated to data replication and reproducibility, which 
further attests to the importance of these concepts in science. 
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is evident in the field of psychiatry. According to Mayes and Horowitz, in fact, one of the 
reasons psychiatric diagnoses have come to be conceptualized as discrete disease 
categories in the DSM is because researchers required precisely defined categories in 
order to be able to produce replicable studies (2005, p. 256).16 
 
Coalescing Scientific, Industrial and Bureaucratic Interests 
It is not difficult to see science’s inherent promise for the harnessing of nature 
combined with the drive towards replicable processes and predictable outcomes stands to 
be exploited by industry. This melding of interests, in turn, results in a relationship of 
coproduction between the two fields. Within the field of health, the rise of EBM and 
evidence-based practice (EBP) help to demonstrate this convergence of the methods of 
medical sciences with the purposes of industry.  
Regarding the prevalence of EBP Sandra Tanenbaum observes 
EBP is ubiquitous. It has a powerful presence in the clinical literature and in 
plans for improvement of professional education, health care management, 
and health policy making. One commentator finds that physicians “can’t 
kick over a bedpan without hearing the phrase ‘evidence-based medicine’ 
rattle out.” EBP is more than a version of health care practice, however. It is 
a movement, like the outcomes movement before it, of scientists, public 
officials, private payers, and advocacy groups that seek to establish a new 
knowledge regime in health services (2005, p. 163). 
 
The kind of knowledge that Tanenbaum alludes to here is primarily concerned with 
statistical regularities, since EBM is defined as "the use of mathematical estimates of the 
risk of benefit and harm, derived from high-quality research on population samples, to 
                                                          
16 If no one knows what anyone else means when they are conducting experimental research on depression, 
it will be very difficult to try to replicate findings. 
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inform clinical decision-making in the diagnosis, investigation or management of 
individual patients” (Greenhalgh, 2010, p. 4). Under such a paradigm “evidence which 
accrues from individual cases, from anecdote, from unusual or exceptional cases, these 
areas are ruled out of order”  notes Phil Barker (2000, p. 331). Instead, what counts as 
knowledge on this paradigm is data showing how most people are apt to respond to a 
particular intervention.  
The same kind of standardized, context-free knowledge that informs bureaucracy 
and mass production is also the goal of evidence-based medicine. In order to generate 
data that can be generalized to a sufficiently large swath of the population, in fact, 
randomly controlled trials (RCTs) have become enshrined as the “gold standard” in 
medicine (Barker, 2000, p. 331) for EBM and EBP. It is the randomness of a sufficiently 
large sample that licenses researchers to extend their findings with confidence to the 
remainder of a particular population. RCTs, moreover, are replicable, double-blind 
studies that compare treatments against a placebo, or treatments against one another in 
order demonstrate the efficacy of a particular agent or intervention. 
Due to the increasing reliance on EBM Healy argues that “clinical freedom 
became constrained by algorithms.” Diagnosis amounts to assigning an abstract category 
to a patient via a checklist, which in turn implies some standard form of treatment. Healy 
notes that Hamilton, who interestingly never employed the scale he developed in his own 
practice, commented on this use of RCTs and rating scales saying that "it may be that we 
are witnessing a change as revolutionary as was the introduction of standardization and 
mass production in manufacture” (Hamilton, cited in Healy, p. 288). 
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While industry stands to profit by marketing standardized treatments, EBP also 
represents a good fit for bureaucracies due to their requirement for control and 
predictable results. To achieve such ends, administrators can look to science to provide 
controlled algorithmic processes to underwrite the provision of human services. Perhaps 
it is the promise of such seemingly guaranteed outcomes that explain, as Latimer et al’s 
observation that within the publically funded Canadian mental healthcare system “there is 
virtually no limit to the cost of the medications that physicians can prescribe” while other 
types of interventions are severely limited (2011, p. 525). The growing reliance of 
psychiatric drugs may in fact, provide evidence of a comingling of interests, since a well-
trialed pharmaceutical affords a fixed cost as well as an economical and efficient way of 
providing treatment complete with precise instructions as to what can be administered 
and to who in order to generate a predictable reduction in a given construct. 17    
There is also evidence that the need for efficient, economical and predictable 
outcomes impacts the very manner in which science itself is pursued. Paul Montgomery, 
who was quoted in a university press release notes 
                                                          
17 Even beyond pharmaceuticals, the scientific method can offer administrators standardized processes that 
lead to predictable and quantifiable results. For example, if we look at a study described by Allan Horowitz 
comparing psychotherapy to pharmaceuticals, it should become evident how scientific studies can be 
directly translated into standardized interventions. The study was “was developed to approximate a “pure” 
scientific experiment with carefully delineated diagnoses, highly standardized treatments, and highly 
skilled therapists.”  There were two treatment groups and one control group and researchers “ randomly 
assigned 239 patients with “pure” cases of major depression to one or other of the … groups. (2002, p.199-
200). Importantly, moreover, “to control for factors such as the effect on treatment of personalities of 
therapists, all groups used a carefully standardized manual with specific treatment protocols.” Beyond 
experimental results, what such a study produces is a documented series of steps in a rigidly controlled 
process, a process that is controlled for confounding interpersonal dynamics. This means that in theory, 
anyone can implement said process in order to produce the same results among the target groups. It should 
be no small surprise that bureaucrats would gravitate towards such methods and begin to insist on EBP in a 
variety of domains given the need to produce the predictable and quantifiable results that organizations 
require if they are to justify their existence. 
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In this era of austerity, policymakers increasingly look for evidence of “what 
works” to ensure that revenue is well-spent on programmes that address 
issues such as poverty, mental health, crime, and drug use.  Evaluations of 
these programmes can be expensive.  When they are reported fully and 
transparently, they can help policymakers choose the most effective way to 
spend public funds; however, readers rely on reports of these studies in 
academic journals to effectively understand and use the research (Oxford 
University, 2013). 
 
There is good reason to suppose that “what works” means what will work reliably in any 
context. This is because Montgomery is commenting on a recent literature review (Grant 
et al, 2013) that found most of the psycho-social studies sampled failed to adhere to the 
Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) guidelines. CONSORT 
standards, moreover, are intended to shape reports so that readers may quickly and easily 
assess the potential for sampling bias and confounding environmental factors in order to 
better “appraise the validity and generalisability of trials.” 
Given that Grant et al recommend further dissemination of CONSORT 
guidelines, we may increasingly see the administrators’ need for standardization, 
prediction and control resulting in an increasingly standardized format for reports of 
scientific studies. Meanwhile the propagation of such guidelines may serve as reminder 
to researchers about the importance of generating maximally generalizable findings and 
thereby shaping both the methods they employ and the kinds of problems upon which 
they concentrate. 
Since EBM as well as the rational systems of administration and production are 
meant to be highly generalizable, it’s no surprise that techniques from one often cross 
over into the other. Moreover, given that they are interdependent domains with many 
points of overlapping interests, their requirements often shape one another. This 
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integration of interests and techniques should also serve to strengthen the ideological 
impact of overriding value structure reiterated in each domain. Meanwhile, living in a 
culture steeped in rationalized organizational structures may even serve to subtly 
reinforce the essentially mechanistic worldview characteristic of the sciences.   
 
III. Rational Technologies and Discipline 
One outcome of the drive to control and standardize work processes, is an 
increased need for workplace discipline, or the management of worker’s bodies. This is 
because tight control of industrial or administrative processes necessarily entails the 
control of people implementing such protocols. However, it unclear whether the drive 
towards the rationalization could be sustained were it not for a host of workers who, since 
childhood, have been trained within disciplinary apparatuses where obedience is 
celebrated as a primary virtue. Michel Foucault described such a system as a rationalized, 
hierarchical structure that identifies individuals, then places and monitors their bodies in 
time and space. Its aim is to instil obedience through surveillance, punishment and 
reward effected to train individual bodies and thereby optimize their measurable 
performance of particular functions (Foucault, 1977/1995). Eventually, if such systems 
are successful, individuals come to internalize the demands placed upon them and in so 
doing, can be relied upon to monitor their own behaviour and govern themselves 
accordingly.  
The functional roles for which people are trained are largely prescribed by the 
requirements of the various forms of rationalized systems administering modern life. 
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Schools, for example, are engineered to adapt individuals to workplace regimens that will 
one day require them to present themselves for a pre-established period of time, whether 
this be at an assembly line or a desk, and to obediently perform a particular set of 
functions as determined by one’s superiors. Hence, as with Weber’s “iron cage” of 
capitalism, the vast majority of members living in Western industrial societies have been 
born into, and are therefore acclimatized to, a world dominated by disciplinary structures.  
In Marcuse’s view, the imperative to adapt ourselves to predetermined processes 
in so many aspects of our lives, also impacts upon our conception of social harmony. 
Having a multiplicity of mechanistic systems dictating so many aspects of a person’s life, 
notes Marcuse, results in a generalized conception of good social relations in which 
“getting along is identical to adjustment to the apparatus” (1941/1982, p. 144). For 
instance, Gloria, the more abusive nursing aide Foner describes appeared to get along 
with her supervisors by meeting institutional demands for efficiency and punctilious 
paperwork. Just as workers are required to adjust themselves to match the requirements 
of a mechanized process and thereby cooperatively produce commodities or provide 
services, more broadly speaking, in a society dominated by various forms of rationalised 
technologies, Marcuse sees good social relations amounting to obedience to the dictates 
of rationally prescribed protocols that mechanically govern various aspects of peoples’ 
lives in a mass society.  
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Discipline and Havoc 
To explore the relevance of discipline for psychiatry it will be useful to examine 
the concept of havoc. “Havoc” is a term Erving Goffman (1969) employed to describe 
disruption of the social disorder occasioned by the mental patient, but which I shall 
expand upon somewhat in what follows. Such disruptions pose a special problem for 
psychiatric practise that occurs in a society rationally prescribed to the degree we see 
under modernity.  
According to Goffman, psychiatric patients typically call attention to themselves 
via the transgression of social norms, while the ensuing havoc effected by the 
transgression creates the need to isolate the person causing the disturbance from his 
social environment. In his work, Goffman stresses the extent to which social interaction 
is rule-bound. The rules that guide our behaviour are often implicit, and relative to both 
one’s social status and particular situation. According to Goffman, a “fine mesh of 
obligations” obtains in public places and “ensures the orderly traffic and co-mingling of 
participants” (p. 370). In other words, when everyone knows their place, fluid social 
relations occur. Hence while Marcuse depicts getting along as adjustment to the rational 
apparatuses, Goffman portrays it as adjustment to hierarchical social norms. 
On Goffman’s view, many, if not all, psychotic symptoms involve an overt 
flouting of social conventions associated with an individual’s social position within a 
particular context. “Mental symptoms,” argues Goffman, “are situational improprieties, 
and these, in turn, constitute evidence that the individual is not prepared to keep his 
place” (p. 368). According to Goffman often these improprieties are only subject to 
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informal means of social control such that those forced to interact with a mentally ill 
person lack any ritualized way to respond to offensive behaviour. Everyone knows to 
shake the extended hand of an acquaintance at a business meeting, but most will suffer 
utter confusion and uncertainty when a nude person on a subway approaches them in a 
similar fashion. There is no telling what a person might be capable of, onlookers realize, 
when the transgressions of another become grossly apparent and this in turn stands to 
provoke anxiety.  
As Goffman argues 
It follows that if the patient persists in his symptomatic behaviour, then he 
must create organizational havoc and havoc in the minds of members. 
Although the imputation of mental illness is surely a last-ditch effort to cope 
with a disrupter who must be, but cannot be, contained. This imputation in 
itself is not likely to resolve the situation. Havoc will occur even when all 
the members are convinced that the troublemaker is quite mad, for this 
definition does not in itself free them from living in a social system in which 
he plays a disruptive part (p. 369).  
 
Knowing that another person is mad does not free those looking upon displays of insanity 
because they remain constrained by social norms in their ability to respond. Moreover, 
the outburst they’ve witnessed can only serve to remind them that society’s bedrock of 
taken-for-granted social relations is not so stable after all. As Goffman, notes, within 
families, one who does not know his or her place can seriously undermine other family 
members’ quality of life.   
In the case of technologically-administered mass societies, the stakes are raised 
even higher, and it is not merely one’s taken-for-granted social reality, or even the ability 
of a family to function that depends on all members’ acquiescence to social norms. For, 
any form of technology geared towards mass production or mass administration is 
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predicated upon the existence of a populace that ‘knows its place.’ Any good terrorist 
knows that due to the sheer scale of the machinery required to service the masses and the 
magnitude of its scope of action, the smallest disruptive force stands to become 
enormously amplified. This is especially true in the case of multiple intersecting systems. 
Moreover, the very regularity and predictability of rationally prescribed apparatuses can 
themselves be exploited to maximise one’s impact.18 
For example, one small piece of malicious code introduced by a single renegade 
hacker could conceivably cripple networks spanning the globe. The way this is 
accomplished is by exploiting the very same standardized, logarithmic systems that the 
hacker aims to corrupt, in order to broaden the scope of the virus’ action exponentially.19 
“Progress and disaster are two sides of the same coin” holds Arendt (cited in Virilio, 
2007, p. 15), and as Paul Virilio’s work on accidents demonstrates, the modern 
conception of catastrophe is often associated with failures in technological apparatuses, 
such as hydro-electric dams or nuclear power plants, designed to service the masses. 
Indeed, the more elaborate and grandiose our feats of engineering (whether this be in 
architecture, production or administration) and the more their organization relies upon 
rote mechanized processes, the more vulnerable these are to small, but unexpected 
disruptions.  
                                                          
18 Just as James Holmes was able to consult a theatre schedule to select which showing of the 2012 Batman 
premiere would guarantee him a packed house for his shooting spree, other shooters exploit the predictable 
school schedules, or, more recently, that of the Boston Marathon in order to amplify the impact of their 
actions. 
19 9/11 is another obvious example of this, where the hijacking of a handful of airplanes, and collapse of 
two skyscrapers shut down air traffic across the globe, shut down the New York Stock exchange, and 
caused the Dow Jones to plummet (Makinen, 2011, C4). Every passenger who is x-rayed or effectively 
groped by a TSA agent today knows the effects of this action persist well into the present day.  
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It may be in fact, that the level of order and organization seen in a system is 
inversely related to the level of chaos that any one individual can introduce into said 
system. In a system that is already chaotic, for example, difference, or disruptions will 
hardly be noticeable. At the height of a full scale riot, for instance, a single rock 
shattering a plate glass window will have little impact on people’s consciousness and will 
warrant little response. The same act, however, carried out mid-morning in a business 
district will likely have a much greater impact and cause a far greater disruption.  
Foucault’s point then, made in his Madness and Civilization  therefore is well 
taken, which is that efforts to manage mental illness increasingly intensified along with 
the dawn of the age of reason (Foucault, 1965/1988). For, in all its unpredictability, 
insanity stands in opposition to rationality. Due to the pervasiveness and scope of 
technology, reason’s tool to manage the masses, unanticipated happenings hold that much 
more sway over collective destinies. Mass technologies therefore have a contradictory 
dual aspect in that they expand the dominion of reason over mass populations while 
simultaneously amplifying the potential effect of singular, localized and irrational 
elements. The precarity of a society made so vulnerable to small disruptive forces, and 
which a post 9-11 audience knows all too well, surely contributes to a growing tendency 
to isolate, manage and control psychiatric patients who for many, represent irrationality 
and dangerousness. 
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Discipline and Psychiatric Treatment 
The concept of discipline, then, is especially relevant to psychiatry. As Foucault 
notes, in the event that people cannot be made to adjust to one disciplinary system, other 
“isotopic” apparatuses are specially devised to govern and train such “residue” or those 
who remain unruly and unmanageable. Hence, for instance, highly organized prison 
systems are created for those who fail to adjust to the legal order, and schools for juvenile 
delinquents spring up for those who fail to adapt to traditional educational regimens. As 
for people deemed mentally ill, according to Foucault, they “are the residue of all 
residues, the residue of all disciplines, those who are inassimilable to all of a society’s 
educational, military and police disciplines” (2006, p. 54). Alternatively, to borrow once 
again from Lukács, people suffering from severe and persistent mental illness are 
quintessential “sources of error” given their global inability to adapt to the rationalized 
systems that dominate modern mass society. Due to their inability to assimilate combined 
with the cultural embedeness of disciplinary structures, it should come as no small 
surprise to see discipline emphasised in the forms of treatment provided for the mentally 
ill. 
Hospitals, in general, are not engineered specifically to train patients’ bodies or to 
instil discipline. Such institutions do, however, borrow many of the techniques developed 
from more paradigmatic disciplinary apparatuses including identification, panoptic 
surveillance, and the careful partitioning of time and space in order to more effectively 
manage bodies. To treat disease, argues Foucault, a hospital “must be a filter, a 
mechanism that pins down and partitions; it must produce a hold over this whole mobile, 
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swarming mass, by dissipating the confusion of illegality and evil” (1963/1994, p. 144). 
The treatment of the anonymous masses necessarily involves discipline that orders 
patients so that, to use contemporary jargon, their diseases might be efficiently 
“managed.” Open wards demonstrate the manner in which surveillance becomes the 
norm. Spaces are structured, as with Bentham’s Panopticon, so that a few can effectively 
monitor many.  
When we move into the psychiatric ward, the emphasis on discipline becomes all 
the more transparent. As Bonnie Burstow and Don Weitz note, many consumer survivors 
talk of forced incarceration in locked wards where their bodies are immobilized by drugs 
and where they must earn their “clothing privilege.” The authors add that “inmates are 
usually stripped of their clothes and forced to wear drab and dehumanizing hospital 
pyjamas which are invariably made so as to fit nobody at all” (1988, p. 24).  
The use of “token economies” takes this form of discipline even further, 
rewarding  desired behaviours with tokens that can be traded for goods or services in 
hospital as if to reproduce the society’s commodity structure.20  Furthermore, according 
to one advocate,  
Daily structure is also reinforced with the use of scheduling aids. Every 
morning patients update a large board in the living room that lists that 
day’s activities and times. Patients make and keep calendars in their rooms 
and are strongly prompted to use wristwatches. Activities are scheduled as 
regularly as possible to enhance routine. Indeed the patients’ day is 
somewhat like being in school, and patients often call activities “classes.” 
Far from cringing at this, we try to foster it. If a highly structured setting 
with bells, attendance records, and monitors is acceptable or even 
indispensable for us for 12 years of public schooling, why should such 
                                                          
20 Although the research cited here is from the 1980’s, the token economy are now seen as an established 
form of evidence-based psychosocial treatment and is one of 8 kinds of evidence-based practises 
recommended to treat people diagnosed with schizophrenia (Dixon et al, 2010).  
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structure suddenly take on an aversive connotation when used with patients 
who indeed behave like children? School it is, and the more the better (up 
to a point), where the curriculum is the living and coping skills needed to 
survive schizophrenia. (Gibson, 1986, p. 13). 
 
As we shall see in the next chapter, hospitals are becoming increasingly high-tech while 
moving towards the administration of efficient, rationalized, and standardized treatments. 
Under these conditions, patient compliance becomes all the more crucial considering the 
number of intersecting rationalized systems that come to bear upon, and which therefore 
stand to be disrupted in, the course of hospital care. As such, we can predict that an 
emphasis on the management and control of patient’s bodies should only become 
intensified as care becomes more procedural and algorithmic. 
 
IV. Implications of the RTS Paradigm for Relatedness 
Many of the theorists cited so far appear to be primarily concerned about the 
oppressive and authoritarian nature of disciplinary systems and rationalized technologies. 
Throughout the years, moreover, multiple critiques have sprung up that characterise 
psychiatry as a form of social control (Horwitz, 1982, Showalter, 1987, Conrad, 1992, 
Szasz, 1998, Chesler, 2005). In terms of the ideological impact of rational technologies, 
Marcuse makes much of the fact that rationalistic systems emerge as the very 
embodiment of reason so that dissent is cast as irrationality. While such critiques are 
important and often well-supported, by now these represent well-trodden terrain. 
Arguably, it was not merely a lack of critical thought that lay at the root of the 
systemic atrocities referred to, for example, in Arendt’s work on the Holocaust. In some 
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way, those involved in the Holocaust found a way to suppress their basis empathetic 
responses to other human beings in order to focus exclusively on the workings of broader 
reified systems. If we look to the impact of disciplinary systems, as well as the 
phenomena of “Othering” occasioned in reified systems, we can arrive at a partial 
understanding of how such organizational structures work to hinder empathy and mutual 
understanding in those being governed.   
 
Disciplinary Structures and Social Relations 
While Goffman tends to focus on the authoritarian aspect of psychiatric care, at 
points his work is suggestive of the manner in which an emphasis on discipline, for 
example, can have a chilling effect on interpersonal relations.  As he notes in looking at 
patients, constant surveillance and the strict enforcement of rules can create a state of 
“chronic anxiety” so that “the inmate may forego certain levels of sociability with his 
fellows to avoid possible incidents” (1961, p. 43) because breaking the rules might 
provoke punitive measures. The same chill on social relations Goffman describes here 
ought to also hold for interactions between clients of a system, and service workers who 
are equally constrained by rules. Workers themselves are subject to the anxiety-inducing 
surveillance and discipline from their own superiors which can only heighten tensions 
between workers and clients as workers fret over the possibility of causing “incidents” of 
their own.  
Meanwhile, we need only to consider the infamous Stanford experiments to see 
what happens to human relations when one group of people are delegated to monitor and 
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guard another group.21 Sherif Muzafer’s classic work also shows that minimal conditions, 
such as the arbitrary division of children at camp, can result in the formation of concepts 
of a in-groups and out-groups. (Sherif et al, 1954/2000). Other research suggests that 
people are less willing to attribute distinctively human emotions such as love, hope, 
resentment or contempt, for instance, to members of an out-group (Leyens et al, 2003). 
Hence, the manner in which disciplinary systems identify and organise clients and 
workers relative to one another stands to have a chilling effect on mutual perceptions and 
group relations. 
 
Sources of Error as a Distinctive Form of “Othering” 
Such observations go some way in explaining the process of exclusionary 
“othering” at play in the nursing home, for example, where Foner reports Gloria’s 
pejorative comments about patients (“a nasty pig,” “a pair of dingbats” , “a pain in the 
butt” and “a dirty disgusting woman. I wouldn’t let her into my house”) (1995, p. 61). 
Othering is a concept identified in the feminist literature and according to Lois Weis is a 
“process which serves to mark and name those thought to be different from oneself” 
(1995, p. 17). When othering takes on an exclusionary form it causes those marked as 
different to be marginalized. Typically, the concept has been examined in the context of 
race, gender and identity (Ahmad, 1993, Fine, 1994, Hall, 1999).  
                                                          
21 In 1971 Philip Zimbardo conducted a study in which a number of volunteers were designated as “guards” and others 
as “prisoner.” What was to be a 2 week study had to be stopped after six days when, as Zimbardo describes it “too 
many normal young men were behaving pathologically as powerless prisoners or as sadistic, all-powerful guards.” 
Although normal healthy volunteers were selected for each group “in less than a week there were no similarities 
between them” (Zimbardo et al, 1999, p. 202). 
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Certainly, this is a concept worth exploring as the othering of the Jewish people, 
where they were characterized as vermin or subhuman, contributed to the ability of Nazi 
supporters to inure themselves to such people’s suffering. The brand of othering I am 
examining here is quite different from forms identified in most of the literature because it 
does not rely on any of the usual causes of discrimination, and can stem purely from the 
set-up of a rationalized productive system itself. For instance, what is interesting about 
Gloria’s brand of othering is that it did not appear to be tied to these more common forms 
of discriminatory practises. Rather, as Foner puts it “she had no tolerance for patients’ 
resistance, which slowed her down” (1995, p. 60). That is, in all the aforementioned 
cases, Gloria’s disparaging remarks were reserved for residents who interfered with her 
ability to operate smoothly and efficiently.22 
Hence, just as worker’s idiosyncrasies, including her affective responses, are apt 
to be represented as nothing more than a source of error relative to a rationalized 
productive scheme determining their labour, the same can be said of clients who function 
as objects to be managed and processed by that system. Casting troublesome clients in 
the terms of the reified system and thereby reducing them to mere sources of error, fixes 
their status as an excluded other. As for the workers who might tend to view their clients 
in this fashion, when one is a mere particle, as Lukács puts it, introduced into an enduring 
monolithic structure, it perhaps ought not be surprising to see a worker identifying with 
the reified system over and above her clients. This is true even if doing so means that 
                                                          
22 The “nasty pig” and “disgusting woman” were being monitored a the lunch table, the “dingbats” were 
unable to move their bowels and the “pain in the butt” was falling asleep in her chair making it difficult to 
comb her hair.  
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clients are othered merely on the basis of having idiosyncratic requirements that elude the 
system’s design. For, it is worth noting that workers who prioritize the needs of 
individuals over and above the requirements of the system will also tend to be 
represented as sources of error, and hence subject to othering themselves, perhaps even to 
the point of getting fired. 
For example, according to Foner, “a major blowout” in the nursing home occurred 
when Ana ordered a pair of special gloves to reduce one resident’s discomfort. According 
to Foner, Ana’s “furious” supervisor informed her “you cannot order things for the 
patient. You can only do what you see in the care plan or you will get in trouble. I have to 
write it down in the care plan, that is the only way to get things” (1995, p. 65). As Foner 
explains it, a nursing aide’s primary obligation was to follow the care plan to the letter. 
The supervisor further stressed that without a note in the care plan other workers will 
simply throw the gloves away, which underscores the point that the plan is all that 
matters. Fetishism attaches itself to the document in such cases endowing it with the 
power to direct interactions between persons as though they were mere objects in a 
process.  
This emphasis upon the authority of a reified care plan calls to mind Viktor 
Frankl’s description of a scene from a Nazi concentration camp which he survived. 
According to Frankl, German soldiers who came to take the sick away used a list and 
even if a prisoner on the list had since died, his dead body was taken anyway and placed 
in the cart alongside the living. Frankl writes 
the list had to be correct! The list was the only thing that mattered. A man 
counted only because he had a prison number. One literally became a 
   68 
 
number: dead or alive—that was unimportant; the life of a “number” was 
completely irrelevant. What stood behind that number and that life mattered 
even less: the fate, the history, the name of the man. (1946/1997, p. 63). 
 
The list, the care plan, these are what must be correct, even if following these rationally 
derived directives mean that an ailing man is placed next to a rotting corpse or a nursing 
home client must endure pain and discomfort because a remedy is not marked in her file.  
In both cases, we see that for the person being directed by the system, his or her 
own idiosyncratic subjective responses will tend to represent mere sources of error if 
such experiences conflict with the outputs specified by the designers of the system. The 
only way to fit with the broader system will be to distance oneself from one’s own 
emotions so that they do not alter one’s behaviour. For instance, as Foner describes it “it 
pained Ana to see the resident uncomfortable and vulnerable to injury” (1995, p. 65). 
Apparently she, and others like her, must check their empathetic responses and stifle the 
desire to help another, if such ‘troublesome’ tendencies threaten to disrupt pre-established 
nursing home protocols. In my next chapter, moreover, we shall see psychiatric residents 
explicitly taught to manage their own empathetic responsiveness so as to meet the 
demands of sped up reified systems. I shall also describe Nurse Trudy, a worker who 
minimizes the importance of her concern for another because this affective response 
interferes with rationalistic demands of her workplace.  
 
Rational Technology, the Division of Labour and Proximity 
Even if the onus is upon those at the ground floor to work around their emotional 
responses when these create contradictions, typically they have little say in designing the 
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systems that organize their labour. As some contend, it may well be Ana’s proximity to 
the woman that causes the aide to experience such an acute empathetic response to her 
client. “It is possible that decisions that result in suffering are more easily made at a 
distance,” remark Peter and Liaschenko, adding that “it may be morally less burdensome 
to give the orders than to carry them out or to live closely with their consequences” 
(2004, p. 221). The division between intellectual and physical labour in the nursing home 
places Ana and the other aides in regular close proximity to the residents since the former 
tended all manner of bodily needs throughout the day. 
Often it will be the case that the designers of a system stand at a remove from 
both the people doing actual hands-on work and the people receiving services.23 For 
instance, an engineer who designs an especially ingenious and efficient productive 
system will not necessarily have any inkling of the mind-numbing boredom induced in 
labourers who are later introduced to carry out the piecemeal tasks prescribed for them. 
As such, decision-makers in charge of designing the systems that govern hands-on work 
may largely be spared from having to regularly witness the consequences of their 
decisions for actual persons because they have little occasion to experience the 
                                                          
23 Ethnographic work in the nursing literature may be telling in this regard. According to Austin et al, Jean, 
a hospital nurse, tells a story she claims “epitomizes” her relationship with managers. According to Jean 
one evening she was overwhelmed by a maelstrom of simultaneous and intense interpersonal encounters 
related to the admission of a woman with dementia. Not only did Jean need to calm the patient and the 
woman’s agitated family members, but paramedics jockeyed for attention as well, anxious as they were to 
leave the scene and return to work. “Amongst the turmoil,”  remarks Austin et al “Jean was relieved to see 
her administrator approaching from down the hall. When she reached the scene, however, the 
administrative officer walked around Jean, saying over her shoulder, ‘I’m going home; do your best,’ She 
hurried away” (2003, p. 181).  
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consequences of systems put in place. 24 In this way, Peter and Liaschenko claim they 
remain “detached from the implications of choices made and one can view people as ‘just 
numbers’” (2004, p. 221).   
 
Incommensurable Paradigms 
Even if an administrator were acutely aware of barriers to the cultivation of caring 
relationships in an institution, it is not clear whether she would be able to articulate why 
this matters in terms of the dominant rational techno-scientific paradigm previously 
discussed.  For, this is a worldview that serves to devalue the importance of our own 
affective responses along with other relational values. As I have been contending, people 
occupying managerial or policymaking positions are also subject to a particular kind of 
ethos that is reinforced in virtue of the re-articulation of several key values in science, 
bureaucracy and capitalist mass production. The resulting worldview and conception of 
what counts as real and what matters departs sharply from a standpoint that prioritizes 
relatedness and “caring work.”  
Celia Davies defines caring work as “attending physically, mentally and 
emotionally to the needs of another and giving a commitment to the nurturance, growth 
and healing of that other” (1995, p. 18). As Davies notes, such care involves both a 
                                                          
24 Interestingly, this division of labour is reflected in the pure sciences is as well, with the division between 
theoretical and experimental sciences remarked upon by Paul Feyerabend. “Many experimenters are 
suspicious of theory,” remarks Feyerabend. “They think they, not the theoreticians, are in touch with 
reality” (2011, p. 29). Probably this distrust comes as a result of seeing regular contradictions between 
theory and practise as witnessed by those with experience working with concrete phenomena. As 
Feyerabend notes, another class of scientific workers are the “curve fitters” who aim to adjust data so that it 
conforms with the predictions of the theory. “Often curve fitters abandon ‘raw data’ and replace them with 
the data suggested by the curve,” contends Feyerabend. As such then, the purveyors of high theory do not 
necessarily ever become aware of the small and regular discrepancies observed by experimenters.  
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commitment to sustaining a relationship, and “committed attending,” or striving to 
understand another well in order to adjust her care plan and environment. However, 
according to Benner, one must know of more than a person’s physiology to arrive at such 
an understanding, since it also requires apprehending another person’s “lifeworld,” a term 
that refers to a particular person’s embodied context as well as the manner in which she 
attributes meaning to her experience (2000, p. 6). One who is adept in this, notes Benner, 
will have achieved a state of phronēsis, a term borrowed from Aristotle and which refers 
to practical wisdom. Phronēsis is best conceived of as a skill acquired through practise 
(Little, 2001, p. 39) and mastery is gained when “one’s acts are governed by concern for 
doing right in particular circumstances, where being in relationship and discerning 
particular human concerns are at stake and guide action” (Benner, 2000, p. 9).  
My point is not that the paradigm of care is clearly at odds with the more 
rationalistic worldview I have been aiming to typify. For instance, in the nursing home, 
the kindness and consideration that Ana showed clients was by no means actively 
dissuaded. In fact, according to Foner, “workers who manage to combine efficiency and 
kindness are well-liked by their supervisors; inefficient, sloppy and abusive aides have 
trouble.”  I do contend, however, that a relational orientation is incommensurable with the 
rationalistic paradigm that embraces quantifiability, objectivity and detachment, 
economism and efficiency, and replication, prediction and control. The reason is that these 
two viewpoints ascribe meaning in different ways. 
In fact, I would suggest that as per Thomas Kuhn’s suggestion in relation to 
competing scientific paradigms (1962, p. 85), something of a gestalt switch is required to 
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move from one worldview to the other. Often in the course of a working day one must 
snap out of it, as it were, and break free of routinized directives guiding one’s behaviour 
in order to attend to another as a person. More importantly, at the level of policy or 
industry, it is typically not possible to adequately articulate the importance of human 
relatedness in terms meaningful within a scientifically informed worldview that prizes 
economism and efficiency, admits only quantifiable and replicable phenomena as real, 
and insists upon standardized processes to realize goals.  
 
The Devaluation of Caring Work 
Although many of those who write about nursing stress the importance of a caring 
attitude, Barker notes that “one apparent weakness of the concept of caring in 
contemporary practice is its apparent invisibility” (2000, p. 331). Paul England also 
argues that, in general, work that requires caring for others, or “interactive service work” 
typically sees a “pay penalty” relative to comparably skilled jobs (2005, p. 383). 
Meanwhile, when Goodwin and Guze deign to write about caring work, they remark 
“good nursing care is very important. A calm, sympathetic, reassuring approach can turn 
a frightened, combative patient into a quiet, cooperative one” (1996, p. 360). Here, care is 
not recognized as a way of being able to discern what treatment is most appropriate, as 
therapeutic in and of itself, nor as an intrinsically valuable and important aspect of any 
human interaction. Rather, a sympathetic and reassuring approach is only recognized for 
its instrumental value in providing a means of rendering the unruly patient into a 
compliant one.  
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As I have shown, the partiality required to show another care is viewed with 
suspicion by the bureaucrat, the scientist, and the competitor under capitalism, which 
begins to account for the devaluation of caring work. As Davies notes for example, 
“intimacy and the exercise of emotion are not part of the vision that is bureaucratic 
organization. Formality and distance are seen as the only route to a rational decision.” 
Davies sees this attitude running over into the impersonal stance evident in the “‘bedside 
manner’ of the doctor” who “keeps emotion firmly under control. Professionals offer a 
detached ‘understanding’ when clients, in what can be a highly charged context, 
frequently apologise for their fear and their tears” (1995, p. 25). Given the pervasiveness 
of the expectation for professionalism, a concept that is virtually synonymous with a 
detached demeanour, not surprisingly, an emotional responsiveness in a practitioner will 
tend be stigmatized. As Benner and Wrubel put it in fact, caring work represents 
something of “a cultural embarrassment” (1989, p. 325) for nurses. 
It is not merely the sense of propriety attached to distant and formal relations that 
serves to minimize relational concerns in executive-level discourse or policy-making. 
Care is also difficult to quantify from which it follows that within the discourse of 
science and technology, it effectively does not exist. Measuring care is difficult because 
different forms of observable behaviours are required to show care for particular people. 
Hence the concept is not amenable to any form of standardized measure. In fact 
standardized, and hence calculable, forms of “care” such as the flight attendant’s smile, 
or “have a nice day” mechanically uttered by the cashier become the hallmark of 
indifference due to their rote nature. 
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Given this antithetical relationship between care and measurement, then, at the 
level of policy or administration, levels of kindness and consideration shown to clients 
will tend to fall from areas that are of concern. Moreover, even if it were possible to 
reliably identify and measure a more kindly approach to a client, it will not be obvious to 
an administrator how to calculate the value this adds to services. For example, 
statistically speaking, there is no good reason to suppose that a doctor with a terrible 
bedside manner will see fewer successes repairing the hearts of patients over and above 
her more compassionate colleague. Rather, as we see with Ana Riviera, her concern for 
her client’s emotional wellbeing is what interferes with tasks such as bed and body work 
which are amenable to quantification.   
Understanding the importance of replication and standardization provides a little 
more insight into the question as to why human relatedness and interpersonal 
relationships represent constructs ill-fitted for the purposes of science and rational 
technologies. For, just as the quality of interpersonal relationships are difficult to 
quantify, so are they difficult to replicate, and as such are difficult to control. This is 
because close trusting relationships depend crucially on the idiosyncrasies of both parties 
involved, and most relationships are influenced by the context in which they take root.25 
Bonds also change over time so that the same action, take playful teasing as an example, 
can impact quite differently on a person depending on whether the relationship is new or 
                                                          
25 It is not uncommon, for instance, to form relationships with compatriots while abroad yet be aware of the 
fact that had both parties crossed paths in their home country, it is far less likely that they’d have found a 
reason to interact. The Capilano Bridge experiment also points to the sensitivity of relationships to context. 
Findings included the observation the fear and excitement men experienced while crossing a suspension 
bridge seemed to increase their attraction to a female researcher they encountered on the other side (Dutton 
and Aron, 1974).  
   75 
 
if it has had time to mature and develop. Arguably, establishing trust requires small risks, 
whether this be a joke, a private revelation, or a just a reassuring pat on the arm. 
However, rote standardized systems tend to be risk-averse and favour the tried and true 
over the new and unexpected. Meanwhile, for a scientist what this means is that it is not 
possible to observe bonds forming between people under controlled conditions, hence, 
neither can one engineer rote processes to implement such relationships. For, although it 
might be possible to replicate conditions that would guarantee a lack of human 
connectedness, it would be far more difficult to find any well-defined set of conditions 
that will guarantee bonds forming between any two parties selected at random.  
Certain phenomena that matter from an interpersonal perspective are also difficult 
to parse within the modern rational techno-scientific paradigm. In a world that prizes 
objectivity, one’s affective responses to another, for example, are discounted as a form of 
guidance as to how to proceed with that person. As Healy notes, in the early days of 
psychotropic drug trials, “a generation of older, analytically trained psychiatrists could 
feel the change in the "transference" relationships between them and their patients 
induced by psychotropic drugs” which in turn lead to further discoveries (2002, p. 288). 
Nowadays, however, such subjective forms of evidence fall well beyond modern medical 
science’s evidence base and would count for little. Nor, for that matter would a mental 
health nurse’s discovery that stroking the back of an agitated patient’s neck would calm 
him, something she discerned because she had seen his wife do the same. “It is not 
something they taught me at the school of nursing but it felt right and it worked” (Davies, 
1995, p. 21). 
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As Davies notes, such insights are gleaned in virtue of the “patient, minute and 
detailed observation that takes place in the sustainedly close relationship that the 
[healthcare provider] has with the patient” (p. 22). Typically, moreover, such exchanges 
of information occur in virtue of an intersubjective exchange of meaning that is difficult 
to articulate on a worldview that stresses the primacy of objective facts that exist 
independently of an observer. As Feyerabend writes 
I meet a friend. In a way I see our whole relationship written in her face. She 
looks different now from the way she looked to me when I first met her and 
she will look different again a few years from now. This look is not an 
objective fact. It does not sit on her face waiting to be discovered by an 
objective experimental procedure. It is part of our relationship and it 
involves me in an essential way. It is therefore not a scientific fact though it 
is more important to me than any scientific fact could ever be. However, it is 
not ‘scientifically important’ and if science takes over, not socially important 
either (2011, p. 95).  
 
Such intersubjective meanings are crucial for our intimate relations and are also 
key for adequately nurturing others. Seeing that a client who loves beauty treatments 
remains indifferent when she is offered a manicure can be as sure a sign of decline as a 
blood test for someone who knows the patient well. Sharing a laugh together, or perhaps 
just learning that a worker and client share a favourite song might build just enough trust 
so that a client reveals symptoms she’d previously been too uncomfortable to discuss. 
Understanding what a client values is the only way to infuse her with hope. Meanwhile, 
simply being able to connect with, and hence trust, a caregiver can be comforting and 
therapeutic in and of itself.  
“Most of us in our home know [the therapeutic value of sociability] instinctively,” 
argues Richard Titmuss, adding “but somehow or another it gets lost in hospital” (cited in 
   77 
 
Waerness, 1984, p. 195). Barker and Poppy Buchanan Barker also allude to the 
seemingly obvious importance of relational values in posing the rhetorical question  
who would consider seeking scientific proof of the ‘value’ of [caring] forms 
of human encounter – such as friendship, comradeship, loyalty, sympathy or 
love? These encounters have inherent value. When we experience them, we 
often are moved to tell others of the power that we experience within those 
relationships. Only a fool, with perhaps too much money, would commission 
a study of the value of such relationships” (2000, p. 252).  
 
What makes such research appear absurd is not simply the intrinsic value of relatedness, 
but also the sheer impossibility of describing relational values in terms the rational 
techno-scientific paradigm can grasp. Just as it is untenable to replicate and quantify the 
conditions giving rise to relatedness, so would attempts to examine the concept of care in 
terms of the values of economism and efficiency appear ill-conceived, if not completely 
contradictory due to the non-commodifiable status of human care.  
As it stands, the drive to care for others pushes back against values such as 
economism and efficiency and quantifiability. As Lukács argues, under rationalized 
productive schemes “time sheds its qualitative, variable, flowing nature; it freezes into an 
exactly delimited, quantifiable continuum filled with quantifiable ‘things’ … in short it 
becomes space” (1923/1971 p. 89). It is only possible to generate precise predictions if 
time is defined in term of quantifiable activities. Once such predictions have been made 
and entered into calculations regarding the work process, there is a certain imperative 
upon a worker to stay on schedule. Nurturing, however, takes time and as Karen Davies 
argues, processes that require caring work operate on their own schedule, making the 
time required to adequately tend to another difficult to anticipate, while human needs are 
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unpredictable (1994, p. 279). Unpredictable and time-consuming requirements undermine 
the standardized procedures in place to improve efficiency while conserving resources, 
especially human resources.  
This is not to say that healthcare provided within rationalistic systems is 
necessarily impersonal and detached, rather relational values are aspects of services of 
which “we cannot speak” in terms of the dominant discourse, and hence as per 
Wittgenstein’s famous truism, “must be passed over in silence.” Due to the invisibility of 
care within the dominant discourse, connections between workers and clients take root in 
spite of, rather than in virtue of, the systems implemented to deliver healthcare. This is 
because with no way to articulate the importance of relatedness, such systems are 
designed in ways that encroach upon both the time and the space necessary for the 
cultivation of sustained and trusting relationships between workers and clients.  
 
Encroaching on the Time to Care 
If relational values are squeezed out of the dominant discourse, so is the time 
necessary for the cultivation of human connectedness. Given the devaluation of care 
combined with the difficulties of advocating for relatedness in ways that are meaningful 
within the rational techno-scientific paradigm, relational work comes to be treated as a 
waste. In fact, according to one OR nurse who likes to accompany her patients in the 
operating room,  
this [administrative] person said right out to me, he said, “Well, I don’t see 
any value in what you do. You need to be in the operating room itself, 
getting things ready.” He feels that our patient contact is totally unnecessary 
and he’s not happy with it. 
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According to Weiss et al, although nurses viewed such activities “as essential to 
preserving the patient’s humanity and security in a highly threatening, highly 
technological atmosphere,” managers were looking to eliminate time for them, because 
they were “viewed as superfluous to the “real” work entailed in the actual surgical 
procedure” (2002, p. 104). Meanwhile, Weiss et al note, post-operative patients often 
wake “feeling helpless and confused.” According to one nurse, “sometimes they just want 
to hold my hand – that’s all they want to do. “I want to hold your hand.” I say, “You can 
have it for 5 minutes and then I have to run off to the next bed … we don’t really have 
the time to give the spiritual and psychological and emotional care that they really want” 
(p. 106).  
A look at managerial literature in healthcare reveals an emphasis on the economic 
use of time and helps contextualise Weiss et al’s research. In an article on time-based 
management (TBM) in health, Kujala et al draw parallels between health and industry. 
“Time,” they say,  “becomes a critical measure of competitiveness, comparable to 
traditional financial measurements,” because, among other reasons, “customers prefer to 
get their stuff (receive their goods) sooner rather than later” (2006, p. 515). In their article 
they recommend employing TBM to maximise productive activity within specific spans 
of time and thereby minimise “patient episode throughput times” or the total span of time 
encompassing diagnosis through to treatment.   
Kujala et al then apply machine logic to the operations of public health services 
and explicitly liken patients to objects on a conveyer belt. 
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A patient episode is analogous to a customer order-to-delivery chain in 
industry; a patient process is analogous to an industrial production process 
including resources and procedures. Consequently, the focus in healthcare 
should be on minimising non-value-adding time during the patient episode 
… Analogously to the Work in Progress (WIP) measure in manufacturing, in 
health care we suggest the Patient in Process (PIP) – concept. The focus and 
unit of analysis in studying PIP should be a patient episode (p. 516). 
 
In order to expedite such abstract PIP objects through the system, Kujala et al suggest 
dividing up the process into increments of “Administrative time,” “Waiting time” and 
“Diagnostic and care time.” Diagnostic and care time is then further parsed into 
categories. “Diagnostic time includes collecting and analyzing diagnostic information. 
Active care time consists of clinical interventions. During passive care time resources are 
not used actively, but the patient is under observation in inpatient units. Superfluous time 
is defined as “a medical diagnostic and care that is not based on official care process 
recommendation” (p. 519). As Weiss et al’s work demonstrates, and for reasons I have 
provided, time spent showing care for or nurturing patients has no place on this list. 
 
Encroaching on the Space to Care 
Space, as it is used in this work, refers to allotments of time that are not fully 
occupied with pre-determined tasks, and hence allows for spontaneous interactions. We 
see that in Kujala et al’s drive to eliminate waste, they simultaneously aim to cram scarce 
increments of time with maximally productive activities. As for the nature of such 
activities, as the authors further note “[a]n application of PIP-concept could provide an 
opportunity for healthcare managers to insist that medical professionals agree on standard 
processes, which are easier to manage and control” (p. 519). If Osborne is correct about 
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the drive to blend administrative and clinical logic, the objective here is to identify cost-
effective rote procedures that can be agreed upon in advance by clinicians and managers. 
Hence, while time to nurture clients is limited, whatever time is spent with a patient will 
tend to be dominated by pre-determined quantifiable activities amenable to managerial 
control.  
Relationships between workers and individual patients are entirely pushed out of 
such a conceptual scheme. Within the kind of framework put forth by Kujala et al, for 
instance, individual patients are conceived of as a mere component of the abstract unit 
that is the ‘patient in process.’ For in their analysis Kujala et al “assume that homogenous 
cases can be identified” (p. 521) to differentiate between different kinds of PIPs, and 
suggest adult depression, cataract and hip arthrosis among the possible groupings (p. 
514). Hence, patients themselves are more or less interchangeable so long as their “cases” 
match. Intimate knowledge of individual patients has no place on this scheme, and as 
such, there is no imperative to understand  them as persons either to diagnose them or to 
treat them. Diagnosis amounts to assigning an abstract category to a patient, which in turn 
implies a predetermined care plan.  
Not only does a reliance on standardized forms of treatment undercut any 
necessity to know a patient as a person, the emphasis on technique also interferes with a 
caregiver’s very ability to respond to a client’s personal needs. If the caregiver’s attention 
is fixed upon following a very specific technique and there is an imperative to keep to a 
strict schedule, it is very difficult to simultaneously attend to the people with whom one 
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interacts and to be responsive to their needs. As for the effect that the stringent regulation 
of caregiving work processes might have on care workers, Foner notes 
the sheer onslaught of rules has a numbing and demoralizing effect on the 
caregivers; it breeds cynicism about regulations and, for a few aides, 
contributes to a tendency to perform the job routinely and without feeling 
… One especially bitter and rather cruel aide tried to explain it to me 
during an interview. “You writing now,” she said. “If someone tells you 
don’t dot the i, it would make you tense. She then spoke of the nursing 
home. “And who suffer? The patient. You scream at a patient” (1995, p. 
74).  
 
The effects that systems of management have on workers is key information here 
not merely for its own sake, but also because clients are affected by proxy. As I have 
been aiming to demonstrate, the kinds of responses Foner describes here are products of a 
deeply imbued RTS paradigm and its structuring of the workplace. It is a workplace that 
squeezes out the time and space necessary both to form human connections, and, as I 
shall add in Chapter Three, to cultivate rich, nuanced and well-rounded moral practices.   
Before doing so, however, we  look to various ethnographies to deepen our 
understanding of the impact of reification and its associated set of values on 
professionalized caregiving. This will be my task in the next chapter, which will examine 
the role of reification and rationalization at the ground floor of practice, and especially 
the part that these forces play in reducing clients and workers to little more than “sources 
of error.” Generally speaking, it is important to ask if modelling public administration 
after mass production is an appropriate way of providing human services in spite of the 
obvious efficiencies and cost effectiveness such approaches achieve. Indeed, these very 
values of economy and efficiency may be little more than ideological reflections of the 
systems that brought them to prominence.     
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Chapter Two 
Rationalized Caregiving on the Ground Floor 
 
“What is remarkable as one looks back on this 200-year “history of reform 
without change” is how consistently those in charge of the system, indeed 
society as a whole, sought to deflect attention away from the horrors of the 
present by resurrecting the tales of the barbarities of the past. Indeed, it is 
perhaps not too much to claim that one of the main ideological tasks of the 
history of psychiatry has been to manufacture reassurance of this sort, 
supplying us with a seemingly inexhaustible store of exemplary tales to 
document the inhumanities of earlier generations and the heroic struggles 
through which we arrived at our present (relative) state of grace and 
enlightenment”  
 
~Andrew Scull, 1989, p. 306. 
 
 
Introduction to the Ethnographies 
 
Having delineated the co-productive and reiterative set of values rising out of 
reified productive, bureaucratic and scientific schemes, I now turn to accounts from the 
ground floor of medical practice to illuminate the way these values lead to the construal 
of both patients and workers as little more than “sources of error” relative to a reified 
system. Due to various constraints stemming either from the drive for efficiency or the 
set-up of increasingly rationalized systems, workers are deprived of the time or the space 
they require to adequately attend to their patients’ individualized needs. This lack of time 
and space appears to exacerbate the need for discipline, especially in psychiatry. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly then, we see workers seeing, or being taught to see, their own empathetic 
responses to such patients as something to be managed, controlled and even supressed. 
Interspersed, in these accounts, however, are glimpses into gaps in these systems, or 
84 
 
small spaces where unexpected connections between workers and clients can take root, 
the significance of which will emerge slowly as this thesis unfolds. 
The first ethnography I examine in Section I was conducted in a general acute care 
setting in order to demonstrate certain trends in healthcare generally speaking. In 
Managing to Nurse: Inside Canada’s Healthcare Reform, Marie Campbell  and Janet 
Rankin (2006) document the restructuring of Canadian hospitals resulting in a workplace 
that is becoming increasingly technological while sophisticated managerial techniques 
are being introduced to rationally govern the work process. Although reification stands 
out as a distinct phenomenon most clearly in Section III, it is also evident in the rationally 
organized hospitals described by Campbell and Rankin. Their work, however, most 
clearly demonstrates the ascent of economism and efficiency as primary values in health, 
as well as the influence of objectivity, quantification and standardization on the 
organization of the healthcare systems.  
After examining Rankin and Campbell’s work, in Section II I move into psychiatry 
and piece together a representation of the state of modern inpatient care. What emerges 
most clearly from this section is the problematic relationship between rationalized care 
plans and discipline as this pertains to the treatment of psychiatric patients. As with the 
general healthcare systems described in the previous section, we shall see that efficiency 
is becoming a guiding force in psychiatry. Meanwhile objective, and some say 
dehumanizing, diagnoses are used to generate rationalized treatment plans in order to 
hasten recovery times.  
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In my final section I examine Lorna Rhodes’ (1991) ethnography of an acute 
psychiatric unit (APU). Although the rationalized care plans and sophisticated managerial 
techniques evident in the first two sections are absent from this particular ethnography, 
Rhodes’ work is useful for the manner in which it so clearly isolates the phenomena of 
reification whereby we see workers wholeheartedly embracing a certain perceived 
function of the APU. They also take expediency as the guiding principle in their work. 
The end result of this is that patients become quite explicitly othered, or construed as 
sources of error. Moreover, while there is a subtle suggestion of this in my first section, 
in the APU we see empathetic responses to clients overtly construed as sources of error, 
or a mere hindrance, a mistake, because such responses interfere with productivity in the 
workplace. There is also evidence of the paradigm shift that can occur when workers 
begin prioritizing the needs of individual persons over the requirements of the institution. 
There is reason to suppose, however, that this shift only occurred because space existed 
in APU that allowed for such unlikely relationships to take root. 
 
I. Managing to Nurse: Rationalizing Trends in Healthcare 
I focus on this account because the writers describe new rationalized healthcare 
technologies in fine-grained detail, which helps to connect some very specific forms of 
control over nursing work with the erosion of the quality of interactions with patients. 
Moreover, their account reveals a subtle example of the relationship between reification 
and othering, or, in other words, the representation of patients as mere sources of error. 
We also see evidence of workers representing their own empathetic responsiveness as a 
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source of error to be modified if such affective states conflict with the demands of their 
jobs. This latter phenomenon becomes especially relevant in later chapters.  
This ethnography of Canadian hospital care was written by former nurses Janet 
Rankin, who began nursing in 1979, and Marie Campbell, who started in 1959. As shall 
be seen in Emptying Beds, Campbell and Rankin’s book shows that the scarcity of 
resources is an overriding concern for healthcare providers. The former book, however, 
features an ethnographic account of various forms of rationalized technologies being 
introduced to both manage hospital workers, and efficiently ration healthcare.  
The scarcity that modern administrators face is an artefact of the same neoliberal 
shift that reduced healthcare funding in the US. After Reagan’s funding cuts in the US, 
Canadians also saw their federal government back away from healthcare when Ottawa 
cut transfer payments to the provinces. Initially the federal government had covered 50 
percent of health costs, a number that was reduced to 10 percent by 1999 (Rankin and 
Campbell, 2006, p. 25). Hospital closures, mergers and staff reductions soon followed on 
the heels of these transfer payment cuts. Diminishing levels of service led to calls for 
healthcare reform to more efficiently utilize remaining funding. In order to accomplish 
this, policymakers and hospital administrators assimilated managerial processes 
developed in the private sector in a bid to improve the delivery of public healthcare.  
As Campbell and Rankin see it, the administrative culture in healthcare has been 
overrun by what they describe as “accounting logic” a paradigm that is nicely summed up 
in a quote from a chair of the Canadian Institute of Health Information: “if you can’t 
measure it, you can’t manage it” (Michael Dector, cited in Campbell and Rankin, p. 17). 
87 
 
Such a statement, moreover, evokes Max Plank’s “theory of the real” cited in Chapter 
One, or “that which is real can be measured.” As we shall see, in health it does seem that 
whatever cannot be counted does not count for much at all. As is evident from the 
authors’ description, reified measurements of both nursing labour time and bed 
utilization, combined with standardized treatments, are key elements in a system that 
reduces patients to quantifiable pieces of data waiting to be fed into an alien system 
designed to mend them. All such objective measures and technological apparatus is 
directed, as ever, at extracting maximum yields at minimum expense. 
Although Campbell and Rankin are describing general hospital care, as I shall 
show in the following section, such technologies are increasingly structuring psychiatric 
care, while undercutting relations between workers and clients. We also see the 
intensification of reification, wherein not only is the functioning of the system as a whole 
given priority over individual patients, but abstract categories derived from statistical 
generalizations are simultaneously emerging as more real than day-to-day observations. 
Nevertheless, these reified categories are used to create a system that structures nursing 
work so rigidly that workers are often forced to turn away from patients’ idiosyncratic 
needs. 
 
Economism and Efficiency Trumping Safety and Care 
According to Campbell and Rankin, as early as 1968, the same year that universal 
health care was legislated into existence, studies were carried out to describe and quantify 
nursing tasks. The goal of studies such as that done by the Saskatchewan Hospital 
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Systems Study Group (1968) and the Report of the Review of the Costs of Health 
Services (1970) was to break down the work done by nurses in order to make work more 
efficient and to cut costs. Already, according to Campbell and Rankin, those undertaking 
the studies were recommending that nurses were wasteful in the length of time they 
devoted to patient care. Before the advent of such research aimed at creating an exact 
science of nursing, and into the 1980’s, experienced head nurses were responsible for 
maintaining productivity and determining adequate staffing levels. During this period, 
although imprecise, “head nurses’ judgements about the intensity of any day’s work were 
the best source of expertise available” note Campbell and Rankin (p. 29) and as such, 
hospital administrators had little control over labour costs or nursing practices.  
When nurses were in charge of allocating time, patients themselves were their top 
priority. Rankin describes her own earlier training as a nurse 
 
In my own 1970’s diploma nursing education I recall being told that my 
first priority was patient safety. Avoiding risk to patients was always to be 
foremost in my attentions and plans. Once safety was attended to, I was 
instructed to attend to patient suffering and to provide comfort. Finally, I 
was told, I was to attend to efficiency – the most practical ways of 
accomplishing the work. I had to be organized, sequencing my tasks to use 
my energy sensibly to make sure I completed the required work in a 
reasonable amount of time. ‘Safety, comfort and efficiency’ became my 
organizing mantra (and likely the mantra of my nursing generation) for 
making nursing care decisions. 
  
According to Rankin, a tangible shift in the rhetoric occurred over the next 10 
years so that when she resumed her studies to upgrade her credentials, efficiency had 
become the reigning concept in the materials she encountered at school. A course on 
management was now a core course for a bachelor in nursing science, and during the 
course she was taught that efficiency was  
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a vital part of management. It refers to the relationship between inputs and 
outputs. If you get more output for any given input, you have increased 
efficiency … since managers deal with resources that are scarce – money, 
people, and equipment – they are concerned with the efficient use of these 
resources” (Robbins, 1984, cited in Rankin and Campbell, 2006, p. 147).  
 
Not only had such materials, as Rankin puts it, “taken on a new ‘business-like’ 
inflection,” but as she notes in virtue of such forms of interpellation “I was being 
involved in an efficiency that encompassed broader organizational considerations, in 
which I was being prepared to participate in various ways” (p. 148). That is, nurses were 
now being called upon to primarily “nurse the organization” rather than focussing 
exclusively on caring for patients and monitoring their own practice.  
  
 
The Science of Nursing time and the Set-up of Workplace Machinery  
By the time Rankin was pursuing her degree a more scientific approach to nursing 
administration had begun to emphasize objective measures for care time. The 1970’s had 
already seen moves in this direction with research conducted that aimed to precisely 
describe nursing tasks and classify patients, all with an eye to deriving objective 
measurements of “patients’ needs for nursing care” (p. 28). In other words the time that 
nurses took to treat different kinds of patients could be averaged out so as to provide a 
standardized amount of time that administrators could then use to determine staffing 
levels. “Once ‘needs for patients’ care could be conceptualized in commensurable terms, 
hospitals (and their expenditures on nursing care) would be less reliant on individual 
nurses’ judgements about the amount of care that should be provided” note Campbell and 
Rankin (p. 28). We can see, moreover, how the shift to more scientific conception of the 
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work process also moves decision-making out of the hands of nurses on the ground floor, 
and into the domain of managers working with abstract calculations.  
The result of such research has been an increasingly mechanized workplace. The 
patient classifications the authors discuss here are calculations of average times for 
discharge for patients suffering from particular disorders. “Clinical pathways” are also 
implemented, a technology reliant on EBM and which consists of sets of “best practices” 
that “establish, direct, and record (for monitoring variances) key interventions by all 
clinical staff occurring at timed intervals throughout a patient’s hospitalization” (p. 67). 
Precisely described procedures result from this process, which serves to direct nursing 
work and break down patient treatment into half-hour intervals. 
In Campbell and Rankin’s view, nurses have, for the most part, internalized 
managerial priorities and have taken it upon themselves to keep patients on track, and 
even monitor colleagues to ensure that they are heedful of clinical pathways.  
Adopting the mindset and undertaking the activities, nurses’ work along 
with the work of other involved practitioners accomplished the 
standardized length of stay … The clinical pathway technology organizes 
nurses to see and accept as a nursing concern the goal of [for instance, a] 
five-day hospitalization for joint replacement (p. 69, emphasis in original).  
 
Thus, as Campbell and Rankin note, “The nurses mindset as developed through clinical 
pathways ensures an organizationally correct course of action” (emphasis in original). 
Hence, not only are standardized times established for nursing tasks and patient recovery, 
but an assembly-line productive model that expedites treatment becomes the norm.  
Further instances of rational technologies structuring nursing work include the 
American MCAP™ program, which is admission, discharge and transfer (ADT) software 
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designed to maximise bed use. It does this by helping to regulate patient turnover and 
managing the allocation of beds to promote the most efficient distribution of this 
resource. With the help of this software, administrators assign incoming patients ‘virtual 
beds,’ or beds deemed likely to be free when needed and the onus is upon nurses to make 
it so at the appropriate time.1  
As a patient placement clerk describes it “We admit people but we [may] have no 
beds for them. They come in before the bed is ready for them. So, in the system we create 
this place called SDAs [Same-Day Admits]. They are fictional rooms” (p. 52). The 
system’s predictions, moreover, are made in virtue of calculations based on the 
categorization of patients, generalized estimates of nursing time, and treatment protocols 
previously discussed. Decisions are then made about discharging patients based on rooms 
that are free only in theory, and, as shall be demonstrated, these fictional rooms become 
more real than the needs of patients currently occupying them. 
Layers of administrative machinery are hence now set in place to ensure patients 
and healthcare workers alike take a fixed route of march through the system. While a 
statistically average hospital stay has become a reified measure, and therefore a fixed 
component in hospital administration, many other aspects of care are also weighed down 
by all the trappings of bureaucratic protocols so that even minor deviations are rendered 
complex and time-consuming. Moving a patient, for example, is not merely a matter of 
gathering up belongings and going into another room. Rather, this involves exchanging 
treatment information, organizing meal delivery, moving records, medications, and 
                                                          
1 One nurse interviewed by Campbell and Rankin noted that she had 3 patients allotted to a single bed one 
day a phenomena a hospital executive called “110 percent utilization” (52).  
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equipment. Hence, moves involve “not only the patient placement clerks and nurses, but 
also ward clerks, housekeeping staff, medical records personnel, dietary clerks and so 
forth” (p. 60), and are, as a result, highly labour intensive.  
 
The Weight of an Inflexible and Demanding Reified Apparatus 
Nursing, Rankin and Campbell contend, is not a piecemeal process composed of 
broken down parts. Rather, nurses are part of a larger team, and objective measurements 
of a particular task cannot account for time spent helping a colleague, making allowances 
for a new resident learning the ropes, unexpected ringing of call-bells or the 
unavailability of other workers. As Campbell and Rankin note, when a nurse’s work day 
is divided into half-hour intervals and nursing interventions are mapped out minute-by-
minute, being stopped by, or having to navigate around, say, worried family members in 
the hall, or seeing treatments interrupted by non-patients’ needs all begin to appear as a 
waste of “precious nursing time” (p. 152). 
At the intersection of all these precise calculations and carefully planned 
interventions lie the patients. As the authors note, the use of the technologies described 
thus far  
assumes that patients have standard needs and staffing levels are 
determined thereby. That is the dominating feature. The patient 
classification calculations establish standard amounts of time needed for 
nursing; staffing decisions made in response to those calculations require 
nurses to act as if their patients’ needs were indeed standard (p. 39, 
emphasis in original).  
 
In light of the severe time constraints under which nurses already operate, the simplest 
alterations then can become excessively elaborate and further limit any flexibility on the 
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part of nurses to work with ‘sources of error,’ or patients whose recovery times exceed 
the standardized recovery times, or who require something other than what is specified in 
their clinical pathway, such as a caress, some words of hope, or comfort.  
  “Ms. Shoulder” provides an example of the manner in which the highly 
organized system in place impedes a nurse’s ability to respond to unexpected needs. Ms. 
Shoulder had had surgery to repair a torn shoulder ligament and was due to be discharged 
at 11:00 am. “Precise discharge arrangements were made well in advance of the surgical 
procedure during her appointment in the preadmission clinic” note Campbell and Rankin 
(p. 46). In a bid to make her ‘check out’ time Ms. Shoulder had been struggling to wash 
herself with one arm immobilized. Nurses observed that she was pale, her skin was 
clammy, she complained of considerable pain and she began dry-heaving during the 
preparations for her discharge. Linda, her somewhat harried nurse, was splitting her time 
between Ms. Shoulder and another incoming patient suffering from a serious leg wound. 
Because there were no doctor’s orders for anti-nausea medication on Ms. Shoulder’s 
chart, and presumably there was no time to request the medication, “Linda looked at her 
watch (and seeing that it was close to 11 o’clock, the assigned discharge time) makes the 
decision to administer an antacid stating that she ‘hopes it will help’”(p. 48). After this 
hurried ad hoc treatment, Ms. Shoulder gets out of hospital just under the wire looking 
“decidedly unwell” and is sent home with a cardboard box on her lap in case she vomits 
on her way home.  
Because she is both limited by both time constraints and a pre-established 
treatment plan Nurse Linda cannot treat Ms. Shoulder qua Ms. Shoulder, or address any 
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of her particularities. Linda has only enough resources to treat the idealized patient so 
that all those qualities falling outside this category must be, for the most part, ignored. As 
Campbell and Rankin argue that “patients marginalized … when efficiency measures 
constitute them in terms of their cost-relevant parts. As whole bodies and as 
subjectivities, they become excess” (p. 173).  
 
Bed Blockers as Sources of Error 
Workers rendered powerless to respond to another’s need by the dictates of 
rational technologies and sped-up services may perhaps also assuage such difficult 
feelings by characterising the patient expressing them as undeserving of care. Based on 
Rankin and Campbell’s description of Alternate Level of Care (ALC) patients, it does 
appear as though such people tend to be othered by staff. ACL patients are those who 
deviate from the rationalized schemes devised to heal them, and who require forms of 
care that are not rationally prescribed. In hospitals contingencies sometimes arise such as 
a lack of support in the home, that mean treatment cannot be expedited. When this 
happens, patients are labelled ALC, which is a designation Rankin and Campbell had 
never encountered in their own time nursing. ALC indicates patients who no longer 
require acute care, but cannot care for themselves at home and therefore cannot be 
discharged until there is placement in either long-term care, an auxiliary hospital, or a 
complex continuing care facility. Through this designation, certain patients are flagged as 
less of a priority so that those patients who can be ushered through the system at top 
speed will be attended to first.  
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ALC is an official acronym, and represents a top-down designation flowing from 
management to the floor, where it appears on patients’ charts. In Campbell and Rankin’s 
view, the term is by no means a neutral one that merely serves administrative purposes. 
Rather, they contend that this designation impacts upon the way that certain patients are 
perceived, and that this perception impacts judgments about what such persons are owed. 
As Ian Hacking argues, “defining new classes of people for purposes of statistics has 
consequences for the ways in which we conceive of others and think of our own 
possibilities and potentials” (Hacking 1990, cited in Rankin and Campbell, 15). As 
Campbell and Rankin note, “applying this framework of cost relevance to actual people 
through the ALC-designation system requires nurses to think of people in its terms” 
(Emphasis in original, p. 86). In short, ALC-designated persons just are Lukács’ sources 
of error.  
To explain, in reality, ACL patients are simply those who must take a detour from 
routine clinical pathways. Yet, as Campbell and Rankin note, nurses often “failed to be 
convinced that ALC-designated patients actually deserved their care” (p. 84). When 
planning out their tasks, many nurses say that ALC patients have to wait, explaining that 
“they’re not as sick as the other patients and I have to decide I have to look after the sick 
ones first.” Another nurse restates the issue as: “I focus on the assessments of the 
treatments of the acute patients first.” Nurses and other workers, also tend to classify such 
patients as “bed blockers” (p. 86) or “inappropriate” (p. 85). Once again, it is the patient 
who is presumed to have gone wrong if their presence obstructs the smooth functioning 
of an abstract system predicated on average, standardized recovery times. On paper the 
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healthcare apparatus appears to be a smoothly functioning, well-oiled machine. Life, 
however, has no obligation to conform either to mathematical predictions or the 
algorithmic depiction of complex processes. Patients have varying levels of cognitive 
abilities, emotional and physical level resilience, and their own unique mitigating 
circumstances.  Campbell and Rankin however, point to a sensibility held by nurses 
wherein the shape of the system is what ought to determine who is served by it, which 
once more speaks to the phenomena of reification. “Patients’ needs, they [the nurses] 
seemed to be saying, should match what is offered, instead of the other way around” (p. 
84).  
Workers also actively seek to limit their involvement with such patients. In fact, 
one nurse admitted to Campbell and Rankin that her colleagues would haggle during 
morning bed assignment meetings in an effort to limit the number of patients who 
represented “inefficiencies” due to age, social circumstance or high needs for care. Such 
patients are problematic for workers because the software used to manage beds also 
functions as a form of surveillance by generating monthly reports of “off-index” or “lag-
days,” and doctors and nurses bear the brunt of responsibility for minimizing these (p. 
102). The nurse above describes the effect this has on workers and how it serves to define 
them negatively. 
 
Each month all the clinicians and the physicians wait with bated breath to 
see how many ‘off-index’ days we had. The implication being of course 
that the doctor is a ‘bad’ doctor if he has too many off-index patient days 
and that the clinician on the ward is not doing the job of ‘moving her 
patients out’ appropriately if we had too many ‘off-index days’ (p. 103).  
 
97 
 
Importantly, age differentials are not factored into standardized recovery times, 
and often ALC patients are the elderly and frail. That is, they are patients who typically 
require longer recovery times and more nursing time as well. As Ana stated in Chapter 
One, “you can’t rush these folks.” Hence, in spite of being indexed as requiring less 
nursing labour, ALCs are, in reality, difficult and time-consuming to care for. As one 
nurse describes it 
They take a lot of time because they are old, and most of them are really 
dependent. I mean, that’s why they can’t go home because they need all 
this help … I do use a different mindset with these people. I feel sorry for 
them. There’s not a lot we can do for them here. Sometimes they stay for 
weeks, and you can just watch them slipping away. They lose their 
confidence. We watch them get increasingly withdrawn … I try to make 
sure they get up in the chair and have some sort of stimulation. I mean we 
should be dressing them and everything, but it’s difficult. We’re just not 
set up for that sort of thing here (p. 84).  
 
The impact on staff that the presence such patients might have does not seem to be 
something that is often considered. One cannot help but wonder if it is not easier to view 
such patients as inappropriate and underserving rather than bear the guilt and sympathies 
incurred in those who must watch them slip away because no one has the time to offer 
them care.  
 
The Management and Control of Nurses’ Empathetic Responsiveness 
Just as the system demands a worker to think of patients in its terms, so will it 
tend to shape her view of whatever sympathies they evoke in her, especially if such 
responses run counter to the demands of rational technologies. Given both the scope and 
the weight of the pre-existing apparatus directing their work, coupled with the prevailing 
RTS paradigm holding sway over modern administrative practises, a nurse’s own 
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affective responses must seem insignificant by comparison. One nurse notes regarding an 
initiative to make laparoscopic gallbladder surgery a same-day procedure: “I think it’s a 
major surgery and I think they can benefit from an overnight stay. However, if I take on 
that role, that is the nurse coming out in me” (p. 56).  
The speaker here seems to minimize the importance of her own conception of 
patients’ wellbeing relative to the demands of the organization, because as Campbell and 
Rankin hold, part of “her job is to override such concerns.” According to Campbell and 
Rankin, administrators see nurses’ concern for their patients as something to be managed 
and contained. As in the APU, workers’ concern for patients seems to be construed by 
administrators as irrational. As one administrator puts it, “our nurses will often find 
reasons why the patients need to stay, frankly, some reasonable and some unreasonable, 
but that they do tend to be protective here” (p. 56). In the face of such attitudes, nurses 
learn to manage their own affective responses in order to remain in alignment with 
institutional priorities. 
 Likely, there is some relationship between administrators’ view of nurses’ 
empathy as a factor to keep in check, and nurses’ subsequent turn away from the face of 
suffering observed by the authors of this ethnography. Campbell and Rankin’s 
description of an interaction between nurse Trudy and a patient’s weeping spouse helps 
to demonstrate how in dismissing the importance of their own emotional reactions to 
suffering, especially suffering to which they are powerless to attend, nurses may also 
come to discount the importance of the needs being expressed by another. Trudy had 
already admitted that the wife of a particular patient was likely “in over her head” when it 
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came to caring for her elderly, incontinent, yet soon-to-be discharged, husband. Mr. 
Jones, the patient, underwent major surgery to have his prostrate gland removed. His 
nurse notes that it is day 7, which means that his treatment should be finished according 
to clinical pathways. Things seem to be on track for his release: his stitches are clean, he 
is dressed, cleaned up and ready to go until, that is, he wet himself due to complications 
from the surgery. Now the patient must be changed and put in an adult diaper, and 
becomes irritable and uncooperative as a result (p. 72). 
Standardized allocations of nursing time will fail to account for such contingent 
events. Given the tight budgeting of time, a hectic and rushed mood is created, leaving 
Trudy, the nurse responsible for discharging the patient, even less able to deal with what 
comes next. That is, Trudy must also provide aftercare instructions to the patient’s 
overwhelmed and crying wife. During the conversation between Trudy and Mrs. Jones, 
the latter admits that even before the surgery, she had been having a difficult time coping 
with her husband. The nurse herself had witnessed fear, confusion and combativeness in 
the patient during his hospital stay and could therefore appreciate the wife’s situation. 
Trudy’s attention at the time, say Rankin and Campbell, was largely on controlling her 
own desire to rush through her presentation of post-operative instructions for the wife. 
Her time here is so crammed with predetermined tasks, that she is incapable of fully 
concentrating upon and attending to the person before her.  
This encroachment on the space that might allow Trudy to treat Mrs. Jones 
caringly is exacerbated by the encroachment of the time she has to carry out her work. In 
Trudy’s view, taking the time to relay instructions and trying to arrange better homecare 
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is all she can do for Mrs. Jones. Trudy sees her own hands as tied given that incoming 
patients required five beds, and only two were free at the time. “It’s already too late, you 
see” Trudy says regarding the possibility of keeping the patient in hospital longer. “The 
bed’s already booked … the pressure is on” (p.73).  
As Campbell and Rankin note, the nurse appears to have accepted the 
requirements of the organization, allowing these to overrule her judgement as a nurse. In 
their book, Campbell and Rankin are primarily concerned about nurses being forced to 
work in ways that run counter of their professional standards. However, the situations 
selected by the writers also involve cases in which normal empathetic responses to 
another person must be suppressed in order to accommodate the demands generated by 
the rational technologies dictating treatment. The writers note that Trudy has accurately 
identified an important aspect of Mr. Jones’ recovery that conflicts the ‘virtual’ 
representation of care, but the fact that the man’s primary caregiver is overwhelmed and 
requires nurturance herself does not compute within rationalistic schemes used to 
generate care plans. 
As Trudy’s statement below demonstrates, the nurse downplays the significance 
of Mrs. Jones’ suffering while simultaneously rationalizing her own inability to respond 
to the distressed woman 
I can’t hang onto him because his wife got teary. So I mean, you just kinda 
kindly bundle them out the door and keep your fingers crossed that home 
care will catch up with them, and then you start looking after the next one. 
And let’s face it, it might feel like hell, but that’s not our job. I mean, it 
might not look like it’s very caring, but it’s just not an efficient use of 
resources to hang onto this patient for another night because his wife is 
having trouble coping. There are all these other patients waiting for 
surgeries to think about (Campbell and Rankin, 74).  
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In this statement, Trudy seems to be trying to convince her listener, if not herself, that no 
real contradiction exists despite the fact that she is standing at the crux of a paradox. That 
is, she is part of a highly organized system that is designed to heal people, and yet she is 
precluded by its very design from being able to tend to the individual needs of those, 
including patients’ family members, that she encounters face-to-face in the workplace. 
Trudy’s own distress, occasioned by her failure to respond to the suffering clearly 
written upon Mrs. Jones’ face, is automatically discounted. This feeling ‘like hell’ is 
characterised as extraneous to her proper functioning as a nurse. Trudy’s attitude towards 
her own subjective state is understandable considering the ontological priority discussed 
in Chapter One that the medical sciences give to objective and quantifiable phenomena. 
Moreover, as Campbell and Rankin note, more broadly, nurses such as Trudy have 
constructed their “understanding about competent nursing practice within the scarcity and 
rationing practices of contemporary health care reform and hospital restructuring.” 
Hence, rather than attending mainly to the person in front of her, “the nurse’s job is to 
think of ‘all those other patients waiting for surgery” (p. 74). This last form of 
justification will become especially relevant in the following chapter, which I shall begin 
by taking a closer look at Trudy’s dilemma here.  
For now I shall note that as the statement “it might not look like it’s very caring” 
reveals the possibility that Trudy’s lack of responsiveness might represent a genuine 
failing is characterized as a mere matter of appearances. It is nothing more than an 
illusory problem. What counts here is efficiency, and what are real are the demands 
stemming from rational technologies structuring her work. Hence the moral failing Trudy 
102 
 
experiences simply cannot be what it seems. There would be a significant cost to 
addressing such a paradox, moreover, given that the statement “I feel bad for Mrs. Jones” 
would hardly cut it with administrators if Trudy were to try to argue for an extended stay. 
Hence, the paradox is effectively dissolved by downplaying the significance of Mrs. 
Jones’ suffering, and Trudy’s own response to it. 
 
II. Contemporary Psychiatric Inpatient care 
It might be argued that nurses such as Trudy have not primarily been trained to 
cope with other people’s emotional distress and that that psychiatric workers take this 
aspect of their caring duties much more seriously. After all, psychiatric wards are apt to 
draw people whose primary complaint is psychological distress, even to the point where 
some will be suicidal. However, if we look at the daily practices of inpatient psychiatry, 
we see many of the same rationalized techniques being implemented to provide quick and 
expedient care. 
In this second section I aim to construct a picture of contemporary psychiatric 
practices based on a wealth of ethnographic data primarily found in nursing literature. As 
the selections from this literature suggest, rationalistic and expedient forms of treatment 
pose a special problem for psychiatric care because compliance is especially crucial for 
the implementation of tightly controlled and regimented care plans. As a result of this 
need for patients’ compliance, we shall see that discipline and control, as well as the use 
of drugs, persist as enduring aspects of psychiatric treatment and hence perhaps 
undermining worker/client relatedness.  Moreover, given both the cutbacks in nursing 
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staff and the evidence-based culture that dominates thinking around care, most 
psychiatric patients also receive impersonal care. Here, too, healthcare workers are often 
forced to ignore clients’ needs, and many suffer as a result. 
 To start with, it will be useful to describe the nature of modern inpatient 
psychiatric wards. Mental hospitals today are considerably smaller than the vast asylums 
of the past (Thibeault et al, 2010) and stays are considerably shorter, lasting weeks or 
days as opposed to months or years (Cleary, 2003, Quirk et al, 2006).2 Quirk et al, 
moreover, have described modern psychiatric facilities as “permeable,” meaning that the 
abrupt disconnect Goffman observed between the environment inside and the world 
outside no longer holds. Patients entering mental wards today are generally in close 
proximity to residential areas and are more able to move in and out of the building during 
periods of hospitalization (2006, p. 2110). 
Generally speaking, moreover, the story being told in the psychiatric nursing 
literature is the same whether we look at Canada (Austin et al, 2003), Norway 
(Hummerlvoll, 2001), Australia (Cleary, 2003, 2004), New Zealand, (Fourie et al, 2005), 
the US (Donald, 2001, Shatell et al, 2003), and the UK (Ford et al, 1998). That is, 
industrial countries are seeing cutbacks in mental health resulting in staff reductions so 
that nurses have less and less time to spend with patients. As Michelle Cleary, the author 
of an ethnographic study of Australian psychiatric nurses, notes 
Nurses spoke about the constant pressure to meet the unrelenting demands 
‘now’, feeling ‘squeezed like a sponge’, being ‘pulled in different 
                                                          
2 In fact a recent advertising campaign by Centre for Mental Health and Addiction reads: “What you need is 
a night out” which is meant to capture common uninformed perceptions of mental illness. Below this text is 
written “or, in some cases, a 21-day stay,” pointing to the trend towards shorter treatment times (Subway 
advertisement. Toronto, ON. Observed June 27, 2012). 
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directions’ and being ‘run off’ their ‘feet’. Nurses said they were ‘stretched 
to the limit’ and identified their work as ‘emotionally draining’ and 
stressful. They spoke about feeling ‘exhausted’ and being ‘unable to think’ 
by the end of the day. Moreover, abuse of nurses by patients was 
considered relatively commonplace. One nurse told how she had already 
been ‘punched’ and ‘hit’ that morning (Cleary, 2004, p.55, emphasis in 
original). 
 
As this last statement would suggest, psychiatric nurses deal with a greater 
number of unruly patients than other nurses and probably see more havoc erupting in the 
course of their day. Cutbacks and hospital bed closures, in fact, have raised the threshold 
for conduct deemed worthy of hospital admittance. As a result more acute (Cleary, 2003) 
and more dangerous (Currier and Allen, 2000) patients are concentrated in remaining 
hospitals. According to nursing professor Len Bowers, ‘the admission of people suffering 
from severe mental disorder implies that the ward and its multidisciplinary team are faced 
with the task of managing behaviour which has been found intolerable in the everyday 
world outside …  Even within the tolerant environment of the psychiatric ward, the 
disruption created by some disturbed patients is difficult to manage, and psychiatric 
nurses talk about these patients as ‘management problems’ (2005, p. 234-235). 
 
Rational Technologies in Psychiatry 
However, while patients are more difficult to control, treatments are coming to 
resemble rational technologies. Campbell and Rankin note that in Canada “even patients 
experiencing mental health illness are grouped and categorized to determine ‘optimum’ 
(efficient) lengths of hospital stay that can be defended as evidence based and quality 
assured” (2006, p. 75). Moreover, according to Alistair Donald, an American psychiatrist 
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and anthropologist, in the US “madness has become an industrialized product to be 
managed efficiently and rationally in a timely manner as it passes through the hands of 
clinic workers” (Donald, 2001, p. 435).  
According to Donald, the assumption that mental illnesses are specific 
biologically-based diseases has led to the view, promoted by proponents of managed care 
in the US, that “the practical treatment of each mental illness can be rationalized and 
streamlined and made economically efficient” (p. 429). Hence, for example, anyone 
diagnosed with major depression with psychotic features is likely to be met with an 
optimal recovery guideline (ORG), one of a whole series of  “rational templates for the 
treatment of specific illnesses” in which people fitting a particular diagnosis receive more 
or less identical interventions.  
As Donald describes it, our hypothetical patient may well be treated using a step-
by-step  
plan of action for a 4-day hospital stay in which a patient who is admitted 
on day one for suicidal or otherwise harmful behaviour to himself, and 
who shows other signs of recurrent major depression and/psychosis, is 
turned by day four into a person who is able to cope with day-to-day life, is 
not suicidal, and may be released to his home (p. 433). 
 
As Donald points out such plans consist of evidence-based practises that in turn, are the 
result of population-based research. Doctor V, the medical director of a Managed Care 
organization calls this approach an “algorithm of care” adding that “what people will get 
is treatment that has been proved effective in large numbers of people and which will 
hopefully lead to the (better) health of the population at large” (p. 430). In other words 
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the hope is to transform the individual by means of something akin to an industrial 
process designed for a general type or category of patient. 
 
Rational Technology, Havoc and Discipline 
Given the well-known propensity of psychiatric patients for creating havoc, a 
special problem is created for caregivers implementing carefully timed, rationalistic plans 
aimed at shortening treatment times. As with regular hospital settings, getting patients out 
the door remains a priority, but more standardized and rationalistic procedures are being 
implemented in order to achieve this. As Alexander and Bowers speculate, this means 
that “ward rules may be implemented rigidly because patients are expected to comply 
rapidly with the treatment regimen so that they can be discharged” (2004, p. 623).  
This speculation, moreover, is borne out by psychiatric patients’ descriptions of 
their hospital stays. According to one study of 38 admissions to two Montreal psychiatric 
wards, patients were struck by rules and restrictions unique to psychiatric units, such as 
locks on doors, and the confiscation of clothing and belongings. “Furthermore,” Letendre 
observes that patients “must submit to the regulation of everyday life imposed by the staff 
as regards times to get up and to go to bed, meals, hygiene, periods of activity and 
inactivity, permission to leave the ward or the hospital, etc…”(1997, p. 290). Moreover, 
71 percent of patients who had been optimistic that psychiatric staff could help them saw 
their hopes disappointed. “When faced with staff’s authoritarian attitude, which focusses 
on applying rules and controlling symptoms through medication while excluding any 
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possibility of establishing a truly therapeutic relationships, disappointed respondents tend 
to become distrustful of staff members” (p. 292).  
By and large then, Letendre’s subjects saw staff as rule-enforcers and themselves 
as “being treated like children” kept in the dark about treatment decisions (p. 293). As 
former psychiatric patient Judi Chamberlin describes her reaction to stays in hospital “I 
hated the regimentation, the requirement that I take drugs that slowed my body and my 
mind, the lack of fresh air and exercise, the way we were followed everywhere” 
(Chamberlin, 1998, p. 49). However, if people are in hospital in the first place because 
they have demonstrated a marked inability to adhere to social norms, then getting such 
individuals to acquiesce to hospital discipline may seem especially problematic. It should 
come as no surprise then, that drugs are typically the first-line of treatment for patients 
coming into mental wards (Fabris, 2011) as well as a primary treatment modality 
(Letendre, 1997).  
 
Medication as Discipline 
At least some patients, moreover, see medication itself a punitive measure aimed 
at controlling disruptive behaviour. According to one patient in a British study “all of a 
sudden bang, and if you do something like [express anger] that you’ve got to be careful 
or you get an injection. You have to be careful how you behave” (Alexander, 2006, p. 
549). However, in order to have a disciplinary function, drugs need not be a punitive 
measure, but may represent a means of rendering a patient compliant and amenable to 
treatment. Given the broader institutional context in which psychiatric drugs are 
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administered, it is open to debate whether they are medicines for diseased minds or more 
of a “chemical restraint,” as Fabris (2011) contends.  
Fabris is a scholar who has been forcibly medicated in the past. He notes that 
“treatment is defined by clinicians, who tell patients that medicine will calm us and get us 
ready for the community as best as possible. Assumedly, medication would work in a 
shorter time than psychological treatment or social support alone” (p. 54). In observing a 
woman medicated with a first generation antipsychotic (FGA), Fabris notes “she is so 
passive, so amenable to the plans that others make for her, that she relents easily” (p. 49). 
The writer also cites research demonstrating that FGAs were found to render patients 
“less troublesome in a hospital context, but who were, it was conceded, not fit for 
release” (Glick and Margolis, cited in Fabris, 2011, p. 52). However, Fabris notes that 
research from the 1970’s also showed that such patients failed to thrive in the community 
and remained a burden on their families.  
As for the presumably more efficacious and improved second-generation 
antipsychotics (SGAs), research has shown such medication to be better than FGAs  “in 
the treatment of acute agitation” (Yildez et al, 2003, cited in Fabris, p. 51), which speaks 
of a tranquilizing effect. However, high rates of non-compliance with the reputedly new 
and improved atypical antipsychotics such as risperidone and olanzapine, speak against 
claims of greater efficacy for such drugs. A recent review of the literature showed 
compliance rates to be only marginally better for SGAs, while non-adherence rates for 
FGAs ranges from 24 – 90 percent depending on the study (Voruganti et al, 2008). In 
fact, one 18-month study comparing FGAs and SGAs saw 74 percent of all subjects 
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dropping out before the trial could even be completed (p. 135). If people do not like these 
drugs, they will not take them, and if they will not take them, then the scientific data 
supporting their efficacy is misleading at best.  
Moreover, as Lentendre’s research demonstrates, when patients are entering 
hospital, many are not looking for medication. Those patients who were forcibly 
medicated (23% of 47 admissions) “perceived medication as an aggressive intervention,” 
while those entering for the first time (21% of 47) say “having medication prescribed to 
them comes as a shock.” Even those patients who recognize that medication alleviates 
symptoms and prevents relapse complained that medication “numbs the brain” while 
producing a long list of unpleasant side effects such as “overall loss of ability to do 
things, general paralysis, hyperactivity, somnolence, dry mouth, tremors, nausea, blurred 
eyesight, spasms, major weight gain, etc …” (Letendre, 1997, 291).3 
There is little reason to suppose that such attitudes are an important factor for 
those providing care, however. According to one forcibly medicated patient, “nobody has 
ever asked me why I have been crazy and mad when coming to the hospital, they have 
just injected Cisordinol [an FGA], telling me that ‘this is no family therapy.’” The 
authors of the study in which this patient is quoted also note that when they compared 
patients’ and nurses’ perceptions of forced medication, “most patients expressed an 
awareness of having a mental health problem, whereas most nurse statements are 
concerned with patients demonstrating a changed behaviour” (Haglund et al, 2003, p. 70). 
 
                                                          
3 Various clinical trials have shown weight gain for 50 – 80 percent of subjects, while there are accounts of 
10 patients developing diabetes, or seeing symptoms exacerbated with SGA therapy (Lieberman et al, 
2000).  
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Factoring in Staffing Cuts and Time Constraints 
Given what appears to be a widespread aversion to psychiatric medication, any 
preference for such therapies derives from a source other than patients themselves. To 
understand why workers might be the ones most in support of medication, however, it is 
important to understand the context in which they work. The unpredictability of clients, 
coupled with seemingly ever increasing demands for efficiency heightens the stress of 
those, such as nurses, who work most closely with clients. According to Cleary,  
 
This unpredictability of the unit was reflected in the commonly used 
metaphor ‘touch wood’ and the gesture of touching wood. Nurses 
explained this as ‘anticipating’, the need to ‘be prepared’, and having in 
the back of your mind that all ‘hell might break loose’. Not knowing who 
the next person would be and when they would walk through the door, and 
dealing with unexpected and challenging patient behaviours as well as 
situations, all contributed to this unpredictability (Cleary, 2004, p.55).  
 
Meanwhile, in Norway, a psychiatric nurse admits  
 
On and off I worry about going to work, you never know what will happen 
… and if something happens, if I can rely on getting some help to solve the 
problems. It is so stressful, we have too many things to do in a short time 
(Hummelvoll and Serverinsson, 2001, p. 20). 
 
Given the numerous competing demands on a nurse’s time, one ought not wonder why 
many want to see clients pacified with medication. As one RN in a study of New Zealand 
nurses explains 
Some of the doctors are reluctant to treat the new admissions . . . and they 
say things like ‘Lets just assess them for a few days.’ Lets not. If you have 
someone come in who is psychotic, who’s frightened and paranoid and are 
bashing the wall down or hitting their head against the wall, I don’t want to 
assess them for three or four days. I want them treated (Fourie et al, 2005). 
 
It is unclear how a nurse can hope to attend to frequent outbreaks of havoc while 
also fulfilling her numerous other equally time-consuming duties. As we have seen, 
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nursing time is increasingly controlled in order to maximize productive activities. 
Meanwhile nurses are also responsible for charting, discharge planning and transfers, 
accompanying patients to court, electroconvulsive therapy or other appointments, 
communications with external agencies and patients’ families, team co-ordination, and 
numerous other tasks identified in ethnographic literature on psychiatric nurses (Cleary et 
al, 2011, Cleary, 2004, Deacon, 2003). As such, drugging patients is necessary if nurses 
are to satisfy the role allocated to them within efficiency-oriented healthcare regimes. 
 
Impersonal Psychiatric Care 
Seeing the RTS paradigm structuring work then appears to entail the requirement 
to exercise control over patients’ bodies, meanwhile, this approach to treatment and 
disease also renders care impersonal. As Phil Barker contends, the worldview associated 
with an evidence-based culture “urges us to swap our ideas of crafting care around the 
unique complexity of the individual, for a generalisation about what worked for most 
people in a study, which he adds “demolishes [nurses’] traditional practise” (2000, p. 
332). Similarly, in regards to patients subjected to treatment plans designed for a mass 
population, psychiatric nurse Richard Lakeman argues that, “public mental health 
services tend to involve people with complex needs, multiple problems, and uncertain 
diagnosis” (2008, p. 321). Population-based research, meanwhile, will tend to wash out 
contextual factors that might skew results and limit generalizability. 4 “Whereas,” 
                                                          
4 It is striking how closely research for evidence-based medicine resemble the methods of mass production. 
Certain standardized (i.e. replicable double-blind studies) methods are employed in order to generate a 
product (in this case, findings) that are maximally generalizable to as many members of the population as 
possible.  
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Lakeman argues, “practice is concerned with specific individuals” (p. 322). In Lakeman’s 
view, the “background noise,” that tends to distort or bias generalizable findings, is 
crucial for psychiatric care. For example “a person who has a depressed mood may have 
reasonable concerns about losing a job, foreclosure on a mortgage, and an impending 
acrimonious divorce.”  
Such factors, however, are not necessary for the purposes of psychiatric diagnosis, 
which will, in turn, determine treatment modalities. In the US, DSM diagnostic categories 
are used for this purpose and to satisfy the bureaucratic requirements of insurers. As 
nursing professor Beverly Hall notes, given the turn to biological accounts of mental 
illness, it is widely held that one needs only a narrow understanding of a patient since 
only the observation of the symptoms of the disease are required to classify a person. Hall 
argues 
positive aspects or strengths of the person are ignored in the diagnostic 
scheme, which focuses narrowly on problems defined from biochemical or 
psychodynamic perspectives. The result is a contrived and sanctioned 
dehumanization of the person during the diagnostic process. Prognosis arises 
from diagnostic categories that do not take into account personal differences 
and contextual factors, forcing competing social, economic, and cultural 
factors that might be considered as foreground to recede into a very obscure 
background … These descriptions are so standardized that they can be 
published in a manual for all practitioners and for use with all patients, 
regardless of culture, language, or personal characteristics. They can be used 
in this form because they flow from the assumption that diagnosis can be 
achieved almost entirely from outside the person.  
 
According to Hall, this view of mental illness further objectifies patients 
because diagnosis  
separates the knower from the known, because it invites the health 
professional to focus on the diagnosis rather than the person with the 
diagnosis. By categorizing aspects of the person (eg, the mind, the emotions) 
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as a disease, the whole person can easily be viewed and then treated as a 
disease, reflected in the phrase, "She is a schizophrenic." (1996, p. 16).  
  
On such an approach to psychiatric care, the person has shifted from a complex, 
meaning-rich individual to an illness category with an identifiable proximal cause. 
Emotions have become things. Treatment has become an algorithm. “Under the guise of 
EBP,” contends Lakeman, “practitioners of all kinds can be reduced to gatekeepers, data-
collectors, and guideline followers, and the patient to a standardized case to be managed 
rather than a person to be engaged with” (p. 323).  
Elenor Longden’s surprise on meeting a psychiatrist who sought to relate to her as 
a person is evidence of the detached level of care psychiatric patients receive as a result 
of such attitudes  
The very first time I met him he said to me, “Hi Eleanor, nice to meet you. 
Can you tell me a bit about yourself?” So I just looked at him and said 
“I’m Eleanor and I’m a schizophrenic.” And in his quiet, Irish voice he 
said something very powerful, “I don’t want to know what other people 
have told you about yourself, I want to know about you.” It was the first 
time that I had been given the chance to see myself as a person with a life 
story, not as a genetically-determined schizophrenic with aberrant brain 
chemicals and biological flaws and deficiencies that were beyond my 
power to heal. Previously I’d been told by a psychiatrist that I would have 
been better off with cancer as it would have been easier to cure (Longden, 
2010, p. 256). 
  
As Letendre’s research suggests, moreover, patients do not enter hospital looking 
for diagnosis and medication; they come in looking to talk. “I thought I could have 
regular, individual talks with the staff on the ward,” says one disappointed patient in a 
different study. “I was hoping to find some help to find some new tracks in life” 
(Hummelvoll and Severinsson, 2011, p. 21). In a study of milieu experiences, researchers 
found that when they tried to discern how psychiatric patients experienced the 
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environment of an acute psychiatry ward, subjects mostly tried to talk about relationships. 
“It is person-to-person interaction on the inpatient unit that creates meaning for the 
patient. In other words, when asked to talk about the environment, patients wanted to talk 
about interaction” (Thibeault, et al, 2010, p. 216).  
This theme also surfaces in studies of patients’ perceptions of quality care. In one 
survey of inpatients and outpatients all those interviewed agreed that a warm helping 
relationship, and being understood by one’s therapist were crucial components of quality 
care. Subjects also said that they needed time to open up, and many saw therapists as 
rushing the work. The authors of the study note that “according to the patients’ 
perception, the therapists were convinced that they should be efficient and ready to act, 
but the patients did not share this belief” (Johansson and Eklund, 2003, p. 242). 
Meanwhile, the most popular response from another set of psychiatric patients identified 
“accessibility” as an important aspect of good care. “It means so much, just knowing you 
can ring and talk to somebody.... You may not have to go there; perhaps they can give 
you advice over the phone” says one interviewee, explaining the importance of just 
having someone to talk to (Schröder et al, 2006, p. 97).  
It is unlikely, however, that patients will form supportive relationships with 
psychiatrists. Many of Letendre’s subjects, for example, said they waited days to see a 
psychiatrist, and even then, the visit was brief and doctors mostly spent their time 
administering a questionnaire (Letendre 1997, p. 292), which speaks the limiting effect of 
objective diagnoses on client/patient relationships. There is reason to suppose that such 
brief and impersonal encounters may be a fairly typical experience. In fact, psychiatrist 
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Albert Kushlich describes himself and his colleagues as “hit and run” likening 
psychiatrists to “DC-10’s: flying in and out of the clinical settings; offering direct care for 
10 minutes” (cited in Barker, 1999, p. 82).  
 
Workers Responses to Patient’s Unmet Needs 
Regular workers then, who are more regularly exposed to patients, cannot help 
but bear witness to what seems to be a deeply felt need for connectedness over and above 
rationally prescribed treatments. As one nurse describes her response to her current work 
environment 
It’s like working in a warehouse; people are just locked up. They’re not 
really treated psycho-socially from what I think they need. And they’re just 
given all these medications, try this, try that, you know just take a pill. I 
really feel like I don’t know any of these people; I know a name, a 
diagnosis, I know a med I’m giving them, but other than that I don’t really 
have a lot of time to learn these people. So I feel that a whole part is gone, 
and that was actually part of one of the biggest rewards in working here 
many years ago, was the relationships. I really got to know people, over a 
long period of time and got to make changes with them; people actually 
did change. (Donald, 2001, p 43).  
 
Hence, some workers are saying they feel disconnected from their clients due to 
impersonal treatment regimens, and express regret at their inability to effect significant 
change in people’s lives. Meanwhile bearing witness to suffering they cannot alleviate 
causes outright anguish for others. Jean, a Canadian nurse helps to relay the sort of 
suffering that she, and others in her field, experience due to the constraints under which 
they aim to provide care. One night, says Jean, she “froze in her tracks” while walking 
out to her car after work. This is because she heard “one of the patients scream, scream 
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his head off.” According to Jean the patient was an elderly man who will likely die in 
hospital. Jean knew he was not screaming for medication, he had received that already.  
 
He is screaming because of what she describes as mental pain. His pain, 
his suffering touches her. As Jean listens to the man who is crying out, she 
is aware that there will be no one going to him, comforting him: She 
knows the nursing staff will not have time tonight. Even acutely ill patients 
cannot be spared much time. There is too much to do, she says. If one 
patient takes an extra five or 10 minutes the staff will never catch up. 
Death is coming, if slowly, for this man and Jean suspects, expects, that his 
death will be a horrible one. For her a horrible death is a lonely one. Like 
many of the others here (warehoused here, she says), he is essentially 
alone (Italics in original, Austin et al, 2003, 180). 
 
As with Nurse Trudy, the environment in which Jean works appears to be taking a heavy 
toll on her due to her empathetic responsiveness, which may be why, as we see in the 
next section, workers are explicitly encouraged to suppress or control such impulses in 
order to better accommodate the demands of a reified system. 
Before turning to my last ethnography it is worth remarking that even if nurses are 
being run off their feet and work within a paradigm that fails to ascribe therapeutic value 
to relationships, this does not entirely preclude connections forming between them and 
clients. However, it appears that the more meaningful connections are apt to take root 
within those small spaces that permit for spontaneous interactions between workers and 
clients. For example, one patient describes a nurse who came into the patients’ lounge to 
watch a reality TV show along with patients. As he tells it, “it wasn’t just the patients 
watching the TV and the nurses behind the station, you know? Because there is this social 
line.” According to the patient, this action resulted in a conversation with a third person 
present at the time about what it was like to suffer from schizophrenia. “There’s a lot of 
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mystery there and I think that interaction at a special level made all the difference in the 
world” (Thibeault et al, 2010, p. 221).  
The sense of specialness attached to such interactions, however, helps to illustrate 
their departure from the norm. Christine, another patient being treated for severe 
depression, relates the following story 
B (nurse) was wonderful. She sat on the bed and she cuddled me. She 
rocked me like a child. I can see it as clearly… and she patted me and did 
all those sorts of things. And that moment in my time meant more to me 
than anything else. Meant more to me than any words, anything at all 
(Moyle, 2003, p. 105).  
 
Subjects in the same ethnography, however, also described being yelled at by nurses and 
other staff, while others noted that an entire day could pass without them seeing their 
primary nurse. Not surprisingly then, patients designate certain workers as “one of the 
special ones” meaning these are nurses with whom the patient can relate. Given the 
harried atmosphere of the psychiatric ward, it would appear that only borrowed or stolen 
amounts of time and space allow for such interactions to occur. Such is the case, 
however, in permeable institutions where administrators seem to accept high turnovers in 
staff as the norm, while also relying heavily on casual labour (Quirk et al, 2006, p. 2110). 
It would seem that under such conditions workers are conceived as little more than 
interchangeable units in the rational delivery of care.   
  
III. Emptying Beds: The Work of an Emergency Psychiatric Unit 
If the previous ethnographies provided subtle evidence of the lack of value placed 
upon relatedness in modern healthcare environments, the next (Rhodes, 1995) lays the 
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claim bare. Here, we see how a reified conception of an organization’s function coupled 
with the intense need to speed people through the system results in the explicit othering 
of mental patients and the overt denunciation of the importance of workers’ empathetic 
responsiveness. Evidence of such consequences of the rationalization of human services 
is perhaps more subtle in previous sections, whereas the phenomena of othering and the 
suppression of empathetic responsiveness is plain to see in the grittier-sounding, more 
anarchic environment described by Rhodes.5  
Part of the reason work in the acute psychiatric unit (APU) was conducted at a 
relative breakneck speed, was that the resources of the ward were sufficient only for the 
quick containment of havoc rather than representing workers with the means to providing 
treatment. The first thing to notice about the APU is that it lacks the sophisticated 
managerial techniques and rationalized technologies described in the previous sections. 
In fact, the APU was decidedly anarchic compared to the more controlled hospital 
environments previously discussed, which, as we shall see, opened up unexpected 
opportunities for relationships to take root, relationships moreover that appear to effect 
something of a paradigm shift described in Chapter One where one’s perceptions switch 
from privileging reified work processes to seeing another as one with whom one might 
connect. What is interesting about Rhodes’ account for my purposes, is how the role of 
the APU becomes reified such that it’s overarching goal – the quick and expedient 
dispatching of patients – was not only accepted by workers, but even embraced. The 
                                                          
5 Rhodes’s descriptions are more evocative of a frontline military unit during war time than they are of the 
seemingly controlled and tightly managed hospital environments described so far.  
119 
 
needs of the people moving through this system, moreover became secondary to the 
overarching imperative which was, as the book’s title would suggest, to empty beds.  
 
A Brief History of the Douglas Center and APU: From Oasis to Filtering Device   
The Frederick Douglass Community Mental Health Center, the site described by 
Rhodes which was built in the mid-1970’s (Rhodes, 1995, p. 1) and appears to have been 
explicitly designed to provide a space for psychiatric clients to connect with their broader 
community but would stray from the original intentions of the center’s designers due to 
funding cuts. Originally, for example, the APU had been conceived as an informal 
treatment facility or as Director of Emergency Services Ben Caldwell puts it, “a crash 
pad” (p. 85). The idea was to provide prompt and expedient care to people in crisis, but 
without removing them from their family or their own neighbourhood. As for the broader 
facility, planners had hoped to include a swimming pool and an auditorium in order to 
draw in members of the community at large, and thereby provide an “oasis of mental 
health” with an open door policy.  
 The finished product, however, disappointed many. One of the building’s original 
planners walked through the building after it was constructed saying it lacked “the 
warmth [we had planned]; it was like a mental hospital” (p. 87). According to Rhodes, 
the move away from original intentions also involved a shift towards becoming a 
bureaucratic entity or a hospital with a more traditional workplace hierarchy. In the early 
days before the Douglass Center was built, workers, some of whom would later end up as 
staff in the APU, were already providing mental health services in the community. 
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According to some, their workplace was non-hierarchical and egalitarian, and they did 
not dispense a great deal of medication. Many even went out into the community to care 
for people. “She was right there in the middle of people’s lives,” Rhodes writes of one 
such nurse interviewed. “Free to come and go when needed and to solve problems in 
whatever way possible.” As Sally Morrow, who later would work as a screening nurse, 
states, “that was my idea of community mental health” (emphasis in original, p. 84). 
When the center was finished, however, Ben explains how so-called “indigenous” 
workers, who’d been ensconced in the broader community became “colonized” and 
turned into “regular hospital employee[s].” A ‘regular employee’ Rhodes’ explains is one 
that is “bureaucratized, and set to the mindless processing of patients” (p. 88). Hence, 
where practice had once been shaped by clients’ needs, with the establishment of the 
Douglass Center, workers’ roles were now determined by the requirements of the 
organization. For staff this meant that forays into the community were halted, and the 
center’s focus shifted to being a medicalized inpatient facility. “The paperwork has 
increased,” commented Sally, a screening nurse who’d witnessed the changeover. She 
also adds that “in the old days we didn’t have medication to dispense. Most of the 
patients were in real crisis; we dealt with it by intervening, talking, brief therapy, and 
sending them to clinics. Now medicine is more accessible. But very often medication is 
not always indicated. Some of the residents rely on the prescription pads … [before] we 
didn’t pump them full of crappy meds” (p. 89). 
According to Rhodes, there was constant pressure on the nine beds that existed on 
the ward along with “the constant threat of a bottleneck within the unit that would make 
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beds unavailable to “emerging patients.”  As Sally explained it, the Douglass Center had 
become more accessible to people who used to cope on their own, but who now 
threatened to clog the system. At the same time, people all over the city were being 
dropped off at the APU. “The police and other agencies are more aware of the Douglass 
Center. The whole city thinks we should be all things to all people.” The kind of patients 
who landed in the APU, moreover, were those found smearing feces, claiming to be God 
or undressing in the street. In other words, people flagrantly wreaking havoc.  
Given this context, the sort of work that was possible with patients was limited. As 
staff saw it, patients “climbed the walls” and a primary task was “to get them off the 
walls”” (p. 37). To such an end, psychoanalysis was not an option, as it would be overly 
time-consuming. In general, Rhodes notes “they [the staff] did not allow theoretical 
speculation to take them very far from the practical realities – the patient’s medication, 
potential for disrupting the ward, and options for discharge. Separation problems were 
interesting, but separation for the unit was paramount” (p. 64). Medication, perhaps then 
represented the most efficient way to alter patients’ disruptive behaviours in order to 
quickly eject them back into the community.  
Thus, the APU evolved from a crash pad into a frontline buffer standing between 
patients wreaking havoc in the community and the scarce longer-term beds upstairs. By 
the time Rhodes began conducting her ethnography, she saw that the “the APU staff dealt 
immediately and directly with acutely disturbed patients, medicating them, secluding 
them if necessary and getting to work quickly on the task of getting them out” (p. 36). It 
was this particular understanding of the APU, moreover, that, based on Rhodes’ account, 
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seems was taken utterly for granted or reified such that clients’ particular needs and 
workers’ own responses to their charges became of secondary importance to this 
perceived function of the ward. 
 
Reification: Filtering the Teeming Masses 
A view of the APU as a screening device to filter out inappropriate admissions is 
concretized in a statement made by Ben. “Only when the bacteria become virulent and 
invasive do we have to call on the APU to neutralize the “unwelcome invaders,”” he said 
to Rhodes (p. 47). Evidently, those patients who could be stabilized and released quickly 
were akin to an invasive infection. No doubt, the scarcity of resources informed his view 
here, a view that prioritized the needs of the organization to such an extent that those 
whose needs it cannot meet are characterized as pestilence.   
As Rhodes notes, numerous researchers have documented the pressures on 
workers in healthcare facilities that are “swamped” with new admissions yet lack 
adequate bed space and staff to accommodate the teeming numbers of patients. At some 
point along the way the historically contingent factors that gave rise to this situation seem 
to have been forgotten. As such the APU’s current configuration was normalized to the 
degree that it shaped workers’ normative evaluations of the unit. In other words what the 
ward could provide patients became what it should provide while also serving to fix ideas 
as to what kind of patients ought to be served by the facility.  
Even Sally, who said she missed the old days of the Douglass Center, now felt the 
ward ought be a quick “in and out place.” She explains further that  
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the whole hospital is full; now what will I do over the weekend? The APU is 
misused when it is treated like a haven; we should give the patients meds 
and let them sit out in the lobby for an hour or so and send them home if 
they get better, not just let them in. That’s what I’ll have to do anyway over 
the weekend (p. 58).  
 
As for patients deemed appropriate, they were those highly acute cases requiring 
emergency containment (p. 56). That is to say, only the sort of patients for whom the 
APU could provide were thought to belong on the ward. This was despite the fact that 
numerous distressed people were beating down the doors looking for some kind of help. 
Regardless of such demonstrated need, the notion that the APU ought to be adapted 
rarely seems to have been entertained, which speaks to the ideological impact of 
reification. The notion that the APU could ever be ‘all things to all people’ was simply a 
nonstarter. Instead, the APU and all its limitations represented the gritty reality to which 
people entering into the system were forced to adapt.   
 
Ethos of Efficiency in the APU 
The most obvious way workers adapted themselves to the requirements of the 
apparatus was by thoroughly embracing the value of efficiency to swiftly discharge 
patients. As Ben notes, for him “everyone is an inappropriate admission. I don’t admit 
patients, I discharge them” (p. 41). This view of the role of APU moreover trickled down 
to regular staff, leading Rhodes to observe that their main objectives were to ““place,” 
“dispose of,” “dispatch” or “turf” patients” (p. 31). “We discharge in 10 days,” notes 
Ben, “so we won’t be tempted to treat them and screw up” (p. 40). Sam, the head 
psychiatrist adds  
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On the APU, quick treatment is part of the job. We don’t pretend to 
ourselves or the patient that we are providing complete treatment; I say to 
patients, “You’re not getting treated here.” One patient said to me “You’re 
here to expedite, not to alleviate.” I said, “You’re 100 percent right” (p. 
58). 
 
The story of “God, who took Trailways,” demonstrates how the imperative to 
empty beds played out on the ward. God, in this case, was a woman named Marilyn 
Nolan who Rhodes describes as “penniless, psychotic and friendless in a strange city” 
and who was admitted to the APU after becoming violent on a public intercity bus 
heading to Midway City, US. Instead of treating Nolan –  she was a voluntary patient 
who could not be forcibly medicated – staff engaged in a bit of detective work all with an 
eye of getting her out the door as soon as possible. It was soon revealed she had a doctor 
and a social worker in New York.6 In other words, Nolan was someone else’s problem 
and could be expediently dispatched as a result.  
In no time at all then the “quiet, neat middle-aged woman with an unassuming 
demeanor” was summarily dispatched to New York by bus. Rhodes notes that staff were 
racing against time, worried that her symptoms would flare up again and interfere with 
the travel plans made for her. At one point a social worker in New York even asked for 
the process to be slowed down, which made Sam exclaim “she thinks its short notice! 
Now my idea would be to call the doctor there after she is on the bus … we can write in 
the aftercare note: “Appointment made with Doctor X”(p. 35). According to Rhodes, 
Nolan never made it to New York. It would seem she fell through the cracks, and “[n]o 
                                                          
6 Rhodes does not identify the city of the Douglass Community Mental Health Center, hence it is unclear 
how far away it was from New York City.  
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one ever found out what happened to her, though she lingered in the memory of staff as 
“God who took Trailways’ (Rhodes, 1995, p. 36).7  
As the cavalier treatment of Nolan demonstrates, caring for, or nurturing patients 
was not an important job requirement. Instead, workers tended towards an instrumental 
stance and embraced the cognitive puzzle-like aspect of the work that involved sorting 
patients and engineering potential placements. “Sometimes I feel like a detective,” 
explains Robert who as a social worker played a key role in placing clients. Clients would 
be sent on to jails, hospitals, boarding houses or shelters, depending on the fit between 
the client and available amenities. For staff, the long-term institutions were an idyllic 
remnant of the past given the current shortage of space at such facilities.  
Finding a placement then was a strategic endeavor that involved not only a 
working knowledge of available resources, but also a certain amount of deviousness and 
cunning. Improvised unorthodox ‘treatments’ might be employed, such as the “VIP 
treatment” to hurry patients out the door. A patient receiving the VIP treatment was 
secluded in his room, put on a 1200-calorie diet with no salt and denied cigarettes (p. 
143). “Anything that might open up a place was considered, and subterfuge was 
sometimes a necessary part of the game,” notes Rhodes (p. 68). “It’s a shifty game,” says 
Sam, “and you have to seize opportunity as it arises” (p. 55). 
                                                          
7 This story is evocative of Foucault’s discussion of Bosch’s “Ship of Fools” which depicts a group of mad 
men sailing off to sea in a small boat. According to Foucault, this painting is one of “many signs that the 
expulsion of madmen had become one of a number of ritual exiles” (Foucault, 1965, 10). Madness was a 
sign of impurity and sin, and like the sea in its unreason and turbulence. Hence, Foucault suggests it would 
have seemed natural to those living in these times to cast out the insane by ship leaving it to the “breathe of 
God to bring it to port” and otherwise purify the tainted souls onboard (12). Similarly, APU staff was keen 
on making patients someone else’s problem.  
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Sam’s comments suggests that he finds little reason to question the drive to 
expediently discharge patients. On the contrary, he seemed to embrace this mandate and 
concentrated on quantifiable results. For example, he would sometimes announce 
“scores” or the number of beds they’re recently cleared. “We’re down to five,” Sam 
might cry out. “We’re in good shape” (p. 60). Then, on one occasion after successfully 
placing several clients he exclaimed “this is how we will save the hospital!” (p. 61) 
demonstrating the sense of importance associated with keeping a certain number of beds 
free as well as the primacy of the institutional framework as that which needs saving, as 
opposed to the patients moving through the place.  
Rhodes makes sense of this unmitigated appreciation of efficiency by noting that it 
represented one of the sole domains where workers have any hope of demonstrating 
competence so as to take pride in their work. The overwhelming needs of patients and the 
scarcity of hospital resources meant that effecting quick discharges was the only area in 
which workers could be efficacious. As I note in Chapter One, however, competence has 
long been equated with efficiency within workplaces that have evolved under capitalism. 
Efficiency then is also a socially sanctioned value, so there is reason to suppose that the 
broader cultural context in which they are embedded also helped to shape workers’ value 
system. That is, supervisors and workers alike appear to be buying into a logic that 
asserts that being a good worker amounts to producing fast and quantifiable results and 
adapting themselves to a system that demands they achieve more with less.  
 
Sources of Error: Empathy as Pathetic and Pathological  
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Such adjustments to the apparatus, however, required not only competence in the 
“shifty game” of placing clients, but workers were also expected to modify their own 
affective responses to clients. Underscoring the sense that those entering into the 
workplace encounter a pre-existing reified mechanism, Ben noted that the APU was “a 
machine needing periodic adjusting. You do things but you don’t know if they’ll work 
out. Understanding (e.g. of patients) turned out not to be it” (p. 53). Moreover, as this 
statement makes clear, connecting with patients holds little value in a system engineered 
to get them out the door as quickly as possible. In fact, if one’s overriding objective is to 
discharge patients then attachments stand to largely hinder one’s efforts.8  
  Workers, moreover, who resisted the taken-for-granted state of affairs on the 
ward tended to be the ones represented as the problem, rather than the reverse. For 
instance, Sam notes of one new nurse that she “always wore white and wanted to be a 
nurse but it was pathetic to see her try to reconcile role and place, always outraged, 
everything was wrong, the patients were not treated right. She got into a big fight into 
something trivial” (p. 26). Noting the nurse’s alleged overreaction here seems to be an 
attempt to construe her as the irrational element in the system, or the source of error. This 
is in spite of the fact the APU saw a high turnover of nurses, according to Rhodes, which 
                                                          
8 The lack of value placed on building relationships with patients was also apparent from Paul’s experience. 
Paul was a mental health worker who spent most of his time at work in close proximity to patients. He 
remarked “I used to do things for the patients [during the early days of the unit’s existence], like playing 
guitar, getting cigarettes for them, singing. But since we got no recognition for it, we stopped. Nowadays 
the patients don’t get nothing but a bed and three lousy meals” (p. 90). Paul’s statement here helps to 
demonstrate the primacy of the productive ethos over and above a standpoint that might privilege 
relatedness. On the former scheme, relational work, or connecting with patients, receives no recognition 
and is effectively disappeared. 
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may well indicate that there is a problem with the work environment, as opposed to 
individual workers.  
Meanwhile the devaluation of the caring work for which the nurse seemed to be 
advocating is evident in Sam’s dismissal of her efforts as “pathetic.” It is only when the 
workings of the APU are taken utterly for granted that responsiveness to patients 
becomes a source of error to be remedied in workers, rather than an expected response 
when face-to-face with a person in need. As we see, here, the gritty reality of the day-to-
day workings of the ward was the immutable state of affairs, or a hard truth that had to be 
faced and which held little room for niceties such as compassion and care.  
Not only was the understanding of patients and interpersonal connections viewed as 
superfluous, but workers were also actively discouraged from giving play to their own 
empathetic responses to those coming onto the ward. Senior staff, in fact, tended to 
dismissively parse newer workers’ desire to help patients as “rescue fantasies,” which 
suggests these were defects in the worker in need of a remedy. As Rhodes notes: 
part of the task of teaching on the unit was to show students how not to 
take the viewpoint of the patient … Efficient practice (in fact any practice 
at all) required that staff create distance from patients and from their own 
feelings (p. 103 – 104).  
 
To this end, residents were told by staff to aim for emotional distance from clients. “The 
farther you get from patients (the more) you can show you’re an empathetic person but 
the closer you are the less you can be good,” explains Ben (p. 102), a statement that 
makes most sense when one recalls that “good” in the context of the APU means being 
able to get rid of patients quickly.  
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Sam taught this lesson to Renee, for instance, when the new resident became 
upset about the treatment of a patient who had been put into seclusion. Seclusion, notes 
Rhodes, was to prevent harm to self and others, while “as a “monastery” it disciplined 
them and attempted to turn their attention inward” (p. 22). The patient placed in isolation 
had kicked at the door causing Renee to remark, “what do you expect? They [the 
patients] are always frustrated. No one goes to them when they come to the window. I 
would be frustrated” (p. 104).  
Sam, in his supervisory role, however, reinterpreted Renee’s taking up of the 
man’s perspective as part of the patient’s symptomology, a move that comes close to 
configuring Renee’s empathy as pathological. “He’s a borderline,” replied Sam. “He’s 
good at inducing identification. You are identifying with him and rightly so.” In Sam’s 
view, isolation was an ideal form of treatment since the frustration evoked in the patient 
served to make him show his true colours as borderline, while also creating sufficiently 
high levels of discomfort in the patient that he’d finally do whatever it takes to leave. As 
per Osborne’s observations in Chapter 1 regarding the co-optation of physicians by the 
neoliberal agenda, Sam appears to have so thoroughly blended therapeutic and 
administrative logic such that the objectives of treatment and the maintenance of the APU 
apparatus fall into perfect alignment.     
In light of the normative expectations associated with the fully-formed apparatus 
into which they were introduced, entrants tended to modify themselves accordingly. This 
is evident from the manner in which new residents were quick to eschew their seemingly 
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naïve humanitarian concerns in order to embrace the ward’s ethos. As one resident 
explains  
Sam’s task is not to be a magical, accessible therapist. He showed me that 
you can do more by not throwing patients into a vat of goodness and trying 
to straighten everything out for them, which was what I thought mental 
hospitals were all about … Getting rid of them is the point: What are you 
going to do with them?” (Rhodes, p. 57).  
 
 
Othered due to the Ethos of Efficiency  
Not only did workers modify themselves to fit into the machinery of the ward, but 
Rhodes’ work also makes it plain that the nature of the work also influenced their 
perceptions of patients. Patients were often conceived of in terms of the extent to which 
they either facilitated or impeded to overarching project of creating available bed space. 
For instance, one resident described his reaction to an 18-year-old young woman whom 
he’d initially been excited to help. After she lapsed into a depression, however, the 
student said “I kept talking to her. And she kept withholding information and was very 
uncooperative. So my attitude about her changed and I didn’t really care about her much” 
(p. 56). Withholding informative and a lack of co-operation are factors that stand to 
extend a patient’s stay, which may well account for the negative attitudes the patient 
evoked.  
In general, moreover, a patient’s capacity to undermine fluid work processes 
came to be projected upon her and conceptualized as a fixed internal disposition rather 
than the external consequence of her particular situation. Patients for example were 
characterized as “difficult” not due to their behaviour per se but because they were 
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elderly and senile, which made them not only “inappropriate admissions” (p. 74) but also 
extremely hard to place. There were also the “despised repeaters” one of which was 
described by Sam as “horribly antagonistic” and “disgusting” because the patient would 
“whine and elicit dislike” during his frequent and intense attempts at getting readmitted 
(p. 100). The term ‘disgusting’ was regularly applied to such patients judging from 
Rhodes’ account. In one conversation in which the social worker had labeled a patient as 
such, one resident proceeded to remark to another “your job is to get that piece of shit out 
of here” (p. 134).  
Something that will tend to intensify the othering that occurred on the APU would 
also be what Rhodes describes as a “residue of incoherence,” demonstrated by patients. 
This expression signifies patients psychotic, and therefore alien inner experience that 
others have difficulties fathoming. It is one thing to empathise with and acknowledge the 
humanity of a child crying over her broken finger. It is quite another to appreciate the 
personhood of, and identify with, someone who plays with his feces and “claims to be a 
doctor responsible for the fate of the world” (p. 36). In sum, as Sam noted, new workers 
had to learn that “we were not so nice and patients weren’t nice and weren’t appreciative” 
(p. 26). However, it is possible that a more leisurely approach with patients, one that has 
the time to patiently attend to unfamiliar mindset, could lend to the dissolution of the 
residue of incoherence that workers encountered some patients. Sam, however, appears to 
view patients’ less agreeable characteristics as an immutable state of affairs rather than 
considering whether such attitudes might stem partly from a set of contingent contextual 
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factors shaping mutual perceptions, and therefore, relationships between clients and 
workers.  
 
Paradigm Shifts: Gaps in the System Open up Spaces to Connect 
This is not to say that every patient passing through the APU was dehumanized 
and objectified. Sometimes closer relationships between workers and clients did manage 
to take root. What is remarkable about these relationships is their transformative effect on 
caregivers’ perceptions of the APU. That is, coming to care for an underserved patient 
worked to throw the reified system into sharp relief revealing its flaws and contradictions. 
Once the person and the legitimacy of his needs are taken for granted, contradictions can 
only be resolved by looking to the system designed to provide care.  
Such a shifting perspective takes time, however, and in the course of Rhodes’ 
study, such exceptions occurred only when, despite staff’s best efforts, their contact with 
a particular patient persisted over the course of weeks or months. One striking example of 
this involved Charles Judge (nicknamed “The Judge”) an alcoholic who suffered 
permanent brain damage from drinking. A nursing home worker dumped Judge at the 
ACU and absconded before the elderly man could even be processed and presumably 
rejected as an inappropriate admission by the ward. The origin of the behavioural 
problems that had provoked the nursing home worker’s own act of subterfuge were 
organic and more a matter of cognitive impairment than a psychiatric problem. Sam 
summed up the difficulty they faced as follows: “the medical establishment says he’s 
psychiatric, psychiatry says he’s medical … The Department of Mental Health says it 
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doesn’t matter what you say because we are implementing deinstitutionalization as a 
policy” (p.79). The upshot here was that Judge was virtually impossible to place, and 
remained in the ward for months under an unofficial status. 
According the Sam, at first “Judge was defined as offal – the piece of shit in the 
game of hot potato, or hot shit, among parts of the system. Whoever got stuck with him 
would be the person who takes care of the shit.” Eventually however, Sam admits, “he 
became human to us” (p. 79). In virtue of Judge’s continued presence on the ward, 
Rhodes observed that staff became more attached to him and characterized him as a 
“pet.” They seemed to start to enjoy the Judge’s personality, and according to Rhodes, 
took pride in accepting various quirks such as wandering, fits and babbling. Walter, the 
resident in charge of his care had initially been annoyed by Judge’s presence on the ward, 
but over time became more empathetic and responsive and eventually commenting that 
“an old folks home is not good for him, no one would joke around with him.”  
Another example of staff’s changing attitude came from Sam. “Judge would play 
in the bathtub which endeared him to us. At first it was seen as a behaviour problem 
because he didn’t want to get out, but we redefined it that he enjoyed it and started 
putting him in there to play and sing” (p. 78). Such shifting perspectives of one person 
also served to spark a more global shift of consciousness. “Gradually,” Sam notes, the 
fact that no other place can deal with him becomes the system’s fault. We perceive the 
awfulness of the system instead of his awfulness” (emphasis added).  
 Certain so called “beloved repeaters” (p.100) also served to raise staff’s 
awareness of a system in which needs outstripped resources. Patients who were more 
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lucid and affable could grow on staff, and form reciprocal attachments with workers over 
the course of their frequent readmissions. Rhodes notes 
The return of patients brought into constant awareness the inability or 
refusal of families, other institutions, community care facilities, or 
homeless shelters to take care of people who were clearly in need. It often 
seemed that to staff that, as in the case of Judge, the game of “hot shit” 
ended at the doorway of the APU. Because repeating patients were well 
known to the staff as individuals, the extent to which their needs were not 
met by the available resources became very clear (p. 120).  
 
The formation of such connections, however, was merely an accident of 
circumstances and due to gaps in the broader network of services in which the APU was 
meant to figure. For it is only in virtue of such gaps that patients would continually 
reappear on the doorstep of the APU looking for sanctuary, nurturing and comfort. 
“When I’m here I feel like I have friends” remarked Keith Holmes, a frequent admission, 
adding that while in the APU “the outside world seems far away” (p. 132). According to 
the APU counsellor, Holmes was “cuddly” and “Like Ponce de Leon, looking for true 
love” (p. 143).  
Meanwhile, Sam’s contact with Holmes triggered the psychiatrist to entertain a 
preconception of the broader role of the APU. Instead of Ben’s notion of the APU as a 
screening device, Sam began to wonder if staff might not provide people like Holmes 
with “approval, love and reliable relatives” while also constituting a proxy for a state 
asylum with “the city as grounds.” In other words, Holmes was free to roam the city, 
maintain an apartment, visit his mother, but when things got bad again the ““warmth” of 
the APU enabled him to regain his equilibrium and, briefly, to try again” (p. 135).  
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The Space for “Strange Flowers” to Grow 
It is worth stressing then that it was due to flaws in the system, rather than a 
product of its design, that such relationships could take root at all. What was interesting 
about the APU was the fact that, broadly speaking, its operations appeared to lie beyond 
the scrutiny of upper management. Some felt that administrators maintained an “active 
ignorance” of the ward (p. 31) and Sam likened the ward to a sewer. “As long as we work 
OK she can pretend we’re not here,” he said of a particular administrator. “But when we 
get stopped up, the whole place stinks!” (p. 53). Most of the workers seemed to share the 
sense that upper management preferred not to know what actually went on in the APU. 
Staff also regularly sought to skirt or otherwise subvert the demands of paperwork 
designed to structure care, but which seemed laughably out of touch with the reality of 
the APU.9  
It is probably the case that anarchic environment of the APU allowed staff to 
attempt many unorthodox interventions and to employ various dubious tactics in the 
course of their work. Workers were largely winging it and making it up as they went 
along. The overarching imperative to free beds did serve to structure the workplace, but 
only by providing a concrete goal. As Rhodes notes, insofar as workplace discipline 
went, “in their push to get patients out, the staff resembled school children rushing 
against the clock to finish an exam” (p. 172).  
                                                          
9 For instance, staff were required to fill out Patient Plan for Treatment (PPT) forms with areas in which to 
fill in different components of patients that bore little relation to work done on the unit. Rhodes records a 
conversation around such a form. “Sam is telling new students how to fill out the PPT. He says of the 
section “strengths”: “Sometimes we have to struggle to come up with any strengths!” Then he comes to 
“psychotherapy.” Roberts makes a noise. Sam: Don’t choke! Robert: Short term (p. 112). 
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Rhodes also likens the staff to workers hurrying due to an assembly-line speed up, 
but this is probably less accurate given that Douglass centre staff had the freedom to 
develop spontaneous, creative, and unorthodox solutions to seemingly impossible 
problems.  For example, staff once sent a telegram to a patient with delusions of being a 
secret agent. The telegram ostensibly came from the “central agency,” and directed the 
patient to get a job, stop carrying weapons and maintain a low profile in the community. 
He was also informed that his pay would arrive in the form of disability benefits. The 
patient, delighted to be hearing from his superiors, obliged, and was not seen in hospital 
again. Staff agreed that “The Secret Telegram” had to be kept secret from administration, 
which made the social worker called to sign for it nervous to do so (p. 164). Interestingly, 
then, it was not any established methods or procedures that allowed staff to arrive at this 
unique intervention. Meanwhile, as Sam notes, “we have looked for strange flowers here, 
in such an austere and ugly place” (p. 165). 
While some might find such a lack of supervision morally problematic, I hope to 
show in my following chapter that we have much more to lose if we deprive care workers 
of the space both to spontaneously interact with clients, and to exercise their faculties of 
moral judgment and discernment. So far in this chapter I have brought out how 
rationalized healthcare systems bent on efficiency impinge on the quality of personal 
connections between workers and clients. The moral significance of this observation, 
however, may not be readily apparent. ‘So what?’ a critic might ask, adding that so long 
as rationalized and efficient services result in a more equitable and economic distribution 
of scarce medical resources, this trade-off is worthwhile.  
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As I demonstrate in the following chapter, however, a reconfiguration of the field 
of moral discourse to accommodate the insights of care-based ethics shows what is at 
stake in barring workers from attending to their clients’ particularities and delivering 
empathic care. In this chapter I also consider the harm such restrictions can inflict on 
workers themselves, which may go so far as to compromise their own moral development 
and even inure them to the suffering of others in general.   
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Chapter Three 
Workers at the Crossroads of Competing Moral Paradigms 
 
“What about those ingredients of our humanity, what about compassion, love 
and personal understanding, which are mobilized only by the sight of a human 
face and which die when confronted with generalities?”  
 
~Paul Feyerabend, 2011, p. 11  
 
Introduction: A Return to Trudy’s Dilemma  
To begin this chapter on moral theory, I shall return briefly to Campbell and 
Rankin’s description of Trudy the nurse from the previous chapter.1  Readers will recall 
that Trudy stood at the crux of a moral paradox when she came face-to-face with the 
suffering of an overwhelmed and overwrought Mrs. Jones. Trudy’s visceral, felt moral 
impulses seem to have come into conflict with the demands of an impersonal, universal 
moral system that emphasises justice as a primary moral value. While “it might feel like 
hell” to ignore Mrs. Jones’ call for support and comfort, Trudy eventually decides “I 
can’t hang on to him because his wife got teary” (p. 73). Trudy thus minimizes the 
significance of both Mrs. Jones’ distress and her own response to the woman’s suffering. 
The contradiction is then effectively dissolved by denying that it even exists. “It might 
not look like it’s very caring,”  Trudy comments, effectively admitting to a sense of 
wrongdoing while immediately dismissing this as a mere matter of appearances. Readers 
acquainted with the many challenges facing healthcare institutions today might well see 
grounds for endorsing this second, dismissive assessment.  
                                                 
1 (See: pp. 91 -95) 
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 By the end of this Chapter, however,  it should be evident that Trudy is facing a 
genuine moral paradox. In weighing “all those people waiting for surgeries” against Mrs. 
Jones’ needs in the present, Trudy’s reasoning is consistent with rationalistic conceptions 
of morality that dominate ethical discourse today. As she notes, “it’s just not an efficient 
use of resources to hang onto this patient another night because his wife is having trouble 
coping.” Efficiency here is equated with the equitable distribution of resources, since it 
promises a means of providing medical services to a broader pool of people. Hence, 
personal feelings aside, Trudy seems to be saying that the right thing is to uphold 
standards that make work more efficient so that healthcare remains universally 
accessible. However, as I intend to show later in this chapter, the Trudy’s moral 
uneasiness cannot be so readily dismissed.  
Conventional moral theorizing today is framed as a matter of sound reasoning, and 
providing individualistic nurturance to others does not rank high on its list of priorities. 
However, an alternative conception of morality that expands upon our obligations will 
help to articulate the morally problematic elements of modern healthcare regimes. These 
appear at exactly the points where rationalistic ethics of healthcare policy collide with 
norms that guide us in our interpersonal face-to-face relations. The present chapter is an 
attempt to understand this fundamental conflict and its implications in healthcare settings.  
Section I considers the traditional rationalistic approaches to morality that have 
influenced healthcare policy and which I argue are best suited to guiding social and 
institutional policies as opposed to our more intimate relationships. 
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Section II describes a contrasting care-based ethics, situating it within moral discourse, 
and then combining it with Robin Dillon’s further conception of care-respect to 
problematize impersonal forms of professional caregiving. This section also considers 
various practices to adequately perceive another, or a skill-set that also help to flesh out 
what it means to adequately grasp another person’s individuality. Section III examines 
Levinas’ description of the sense of responsibility that is occasioned when we approach 
concrete others in the way that Dillon and others endorse. For my purposes, this sense of 
responsibility is important in two ways. First, it is immediate and non-rational, and 
secondly its call is so singular that ignoring it can only be experienced as a moral failing.  
Section IV considers the painfully frustrating situation of workers placed at the 
crossroads of the pull of the concrete other and an implicit requirement to engage in 
rational moral deliberation. My aim here is to evoke potential frustrations workers might 
experience in order to bring out the harm done to those caught in such binds. Then, in 
Section V I shall seek to show how failing attend to workers’ suffering may eventually 
blind them to the suffering of others while also potentially stunting the development of 
their moral wisdom. Workers, I shall conclude, need time and space to not only to 
cultivate caring relations with clients, but also to develop a sufficiently ethical practice.  
It should be noted that a disparate group of thinkers are joined here to promote a 
particular view of ethics that links feminist ethicists of care with the ethical theory of 
Emmanuel Lévinas. The aim is not to promote a Levinasian ethics, however, but to 
provide a fuller, more comprehensive view of the ideal ethical relation I am seeking to 
promote. That is, not only do I argue for a care-based ethics, but I also seek to describe 
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the phenomenological impact of caring for concrete particular others. For it is only in 
understanding how one experiences care stemming from an appreciation of another 
person’s uniqueness, that one can adequately grasp the dangers of supressing people’s 
felt sense of responsibility for concrete others.  
 
I: Rational, systemic and universal approaches to morality 
 For the sake of exegesis, I will begin then by examining Kantian ethics and 
utilitarianism, which are two prevailing systems within the Anglo-American 
philosophical tradition. The utilitarian’s central concern to increase general welfare 
certainly influences many healthcare policies. The principle-based accounts of moral 
theorizing arising from a Kantian approach also influence the field of modern discourse, 
as is evidenced by the tendency, popularized by Beauchamp and Childress (2001), to 
resolve bioethical quandaries by recourse to the principles of beneficence, non-
maleficence, justice and especially autonomy. After presenting a brief description of 
these two foundational approaches to moral theorizing, I shall further analyse them in 
relation to Margaret Urban Walker’s “theoretical-juridical model” (TJM) of morality. In 
so doing, I hope to better reveal the suitability of such systems for guiding institutional 
conduct. For, modern moral systems are analogous to rationalized administrative 
technology in so far as such abstract moral systems represent an efficient means of 
deriving moral outcomes for large populations.  
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God, Reason and Morality 
 As far back as Aeschylus’s Oresteia Western culture has demonstrated a yearning 
to resolve moral disputes without resorting to violence and bloodshed. Arguably, learning 
to settle differences peacefully is a basic requirement for the formation of any 
civilization. For without arbitration, social stability is constantly threatened by eruptions 
of violence due to the sort of cycle of anger and vengeful violence that Aeschylus 
stressed in his trilogy of plays. In the Oresteia we see a father, Agamemnon, sacrificing 
his own daughter and thereby provoking his wife Clytemnestra to murder him. 
Agamemnon and Clytemnestra’s son Orestes is then called upon to exact his own 
revenge upon his mother, who he murders in the second play of the trilogy. In 
Eumenides, the third play in the Oresteia, the furies are single-mindedly pursing Orestes 
intent on exacting their bloody revenge for Orestes’ act of matricide.  
 In these plays this endless cycle of bloodshed and revenge points to the need for 
humans to approach conflict in a reasonable and civilized way, which requires us to 
transcend our overly passionate and primitive natures, as represented by the bloodthirsty 
furies (Aeschylus, Collard Trans., 2002). As Kant will later put it, man has a duty to 
strive to “raise himself from the crude state of his nature, from his animality” (1797/1964, 
p. 45) by realizing his rational nature. The desire to use reason to avoid violent 
disagreement is also evident in Plato’s writing as he notes that differing opinions on “the 
just and unjust, the fine and shameful, the good and bad” often give rise to anger and “our 
becoming enemies to one another” (cited in Nussbaum, 2001, p. 106 -107). Plato goes on 
to contrast this with disagreements that arise in mathematics, where we need only count 
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things up to “quickly be released of our differences.” The way to resolve such disputes 
then is by aiming for consensus among men in virtue of cool-headed and rational 
assessments of evidence and arguments. 
 
Kantian Moral Theory: Universality and Reason 
 Given the growing need for secular morality in his day, it is no surprise that 
Immanuel Kant developed a moral system firmly grounded in reason. In fact, according 
to biographer Manfred Kuehn (2001), Kant’s famous emphasis on autonomy in moral 
matters, or a man’s right to rationally assess matters for himself, was at least in part a 
response to Pietism, which favoured blind obedience over critical thought.2 Undoubtedly 
Kant would concur that in being self-evident to all rational persons, reason, rather than 
divine commands revealed to a faithful few, is the superior arbitrator in moral 
disagreement. Broadly speaking, moreover, a Kantian moral system will refer to a 
collection of rationally discernible and unyielding moral principles that govern right 
action. 
If, morality is not a code of conduct issued by a god, then Kant must say how it can 
have authority over all persons. Typically, we do not suppose, to use one of Kant’s 
examples, that the prohibition against lying applies to you but not to me. Rather, if lying 
is morally wrong, then it is wrong for all, and not just some. Moreover, if morality is 
                                                 
2 According the Kuehn, many Konigsberg Piestists, who educated Kant in his earliest years, agreed that 
“[w]hile the schoolmaster who seeks to make the child more learned is to be commended for cultivating the 
child’s understanding, he has not done enough. He has forgotten his most important task, namely, that of 
making the will obedient.” Kuehn notes that Kant described the reliance upon God for moral decision-
making as “servile” and found the view that only a supernatural force could save a man to be repugnant (p. 
52). Instead, a mature Kant embraced the view that a man should think matters through for himself rather 
than mindlessly obeying the dictates of dogma, and is evident from his essay “What is Enlightenment?”  
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something that applies to all persons equally, then there must be a discernible reason for 
this. Kant notes 
Everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i.e., to be the basis 
of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, 
the precept, "Thou shalt not lie," is not valid for men alone, as if other 
rational beings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other moral 
laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must not be 
sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he 
is placed, but a priori simply in the conception of pure reason (1785/1895, p. 
4). 
 
Hence, an underlying assumption driving Kant’s enquiries is that if morality applies to all 
persons, and there is good reason for it to constrain our actions, then we must be capable 
of rationally apprehending moral truths.3  
 Kant emphasises rationalistic morality to such an extent, in fact, the he sees moral 
action generated by desire as less valuable than that which is motivated by duty alone.4 
Kant’s views here accommodate the intuition that sometimes the most moral thing to do 
in a given situation is also the course of action we like the least, meanwhile one who is 
especially moral has the ability to override her personal desires and carry out her duty. 
For instance, it would certainly be easier to slip antipsychotics into the food of floridly 
                                                 
3 While such an assumption may itself be an article of faith, it is very difficult to engage in human affairs 
without giving it some credence. The level of uncertainty that would arise if we could not know that action 
x is objectively the right thing to do would likely cripple fluid social relations. Medicine, for example, is a 
statistical science hence neither its diagnoses nor its treatments are guaranteed. Yet even if one cannot be 
certain of the efficacy of an elected course of treatment, at least a medical professional should be able to 
know when she is behaving morally. The possibility of rationally discernible moral principles offer such 
reassurances. Being able to act on principle, moreover, is often the only approach that will allow one to 
negotiate morally ambiguous situations or to explain and justify disappointment or harm others might 
experience in virtue of our decisions. Broader fairness often looks like personal injustice from a self-
interested point of view, and the absence of an existing principle to which an agent might refer can leave 
her at a loss to explain why another has been harmed by her decision.  
4 Hence, giving to charity because it makes me feel good about myself is less worthy than forcing myself to 
do so out of a sense of duty.  
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psychotic patients, but a caregiver’s knowledge of a duty to inform ought to compel her 
to tell her patient what he is ingesting.  
As such then, Kant seeks to captures the intuition that moral principles are absolute 
and necessary prescriptions of behaviour while his recommendation that we step outside 
our own interests and universalize particular courses of action coheres with the sense that 
moral principles apply equally to all moral agents. It is due to these rationalistic 
underpinnings for morality, moreover, that Kant places a high value on the value of 
autonomy evident in his second formulation of the categorical imperative (CI).5 Kant’s 
second formulation of the CI is “so act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person 
or that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only” (p. 56). In 
other words Kant is saying, don’t use other people to further your own ends, which many 
will agree, is fundamental for morally sound relations.  
For Kant the rational being’s capacity to set her own ends represents an end in 
itself, meaning it is intrinsically good (p. 35), meanwhile establishing good will is “the 
highest practical destination” of reason (p. 21). It follows, then, that manipulating another 
person, and thereby bypassing their rational choices is morally wrong not merely for 
subverting an intrinsically good capacity, but also because this stands to hinder that 
                                                 
5 In the Groundwork, Kant formulates the CI, or “the supreme principle of morality” in three different 
ways. “The three modes of presenting the principle of morality that have been adduced are at bottom only 
so many formulae of the very same law,” writes Kant (p. 65). The connections between and priority of the 
formulations is a matter of some dispute, but have little bearing on my discussion here. Moreover, 
regardless of how the formula of humanity fits with Kant’s other 2 conceptions of the CI, it is worth noting 
that this formulation provides the foundation for Kant’s later and more substantive discussion of ethics in 
“The Doctrine of Virtue” which was the second part of “The Metaphysics of Morals.”  
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person’s moral development via the rational establishment of a good will. 6 The value of 
autonomy, or alternatively, respect for persons, therefore figures prominently in Kantian 
moral philosophy. However, as I shall show shortly, because rational capacities so 
thoroughly ground Kant’s conception of autonomy, we are left with a somewhat barren 
conception of respect for persons on his account. 
 
Utilitarianism: The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number 
 
 The importance of respecting personal autonomy persists well into our present day. 
In fact respecting other people’s choices can often counteract what might be understood 
as certain excesses of utilitarian impulses. In direct opposition with deontological theories 
such as Kantian ethics, utilitarianism is wholly preoccupied with consequences of 
actions, so that the moral value of an action can be assessed by looking at its effects. 
Hence, important individual rights we might want to assign on principle stand to be 
trampled in name of general welfare within a purely utilitarian moral scheme. In spite of 
such conflicts, the principle of utility, or what Bentham simply dubbed “the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number”7 (Atkinson, 2006, p. 20) remains a predominant 
guiding force in the moral evaluation of laws and policies today. This is probably because 
                                                 
6 The capacity to set our own ends and to act on principle makes all persons intrinsically valuable, and, one 
might infer, this is because persons are capable of discovering morality. Interfering with any other person’s 
ability to reason for herself and make her own choices stands to impede her ability to recognize and respect 
moral law and thus seriously undermines the moral project writ large. In line with this reasoning Kant’s 
third formulation of the CI states “every rational being must act as if he were by his maxims in every case a 
legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends” (p. 68) which suggests that moral agents are not 
merely responsible for themselves, but also for the state of morality generally speaking.  
7 Bentham is reputed to have come up this famous phase after reading Priestly’s Essay on Government. “I 
cried out like Archimedes, as it were in an inward ecstasy, Eureka!” recalls Bentham of his epiphany 
(Atkinson, 2006, p. 20).  
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this theory aligns with the intuition that the best course of action is that which makes the 
world a better place for as many people as possible.  
 What is interesting about utilitarianism is the manner in which the theory renders so 
basic an intuition into an objective looking calculus. Bentham explicates the principle of 
utility in the following way: “[n]ature has placed mankind under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to 
do, as well as to determine what we shall do” (Bentham, 1843/1970, p.11). Bentham’s 
version of utilitarianism, also known as hedonism, is somewhat simplified in identifying 
pleasure with utility and pain with harm. Other utilitarians, however, might equate utility 
with welfare, meanwhile harm can conceivably include states that are not, strictly 
speaking, painful. Once such matters are settled, such a system could conceivably realise 
Plato’s aforementioned desire for a system of value that allows us to count things up “and 
quickly be relieved of our differences.” For, if all agreed that it was wrong to cause pain 
and right to cause pleasure, then morality could be a matter of comparing the amount of 
pain an action produces to its associated amount of pleasure and select for the course of 
action that maximises pleasure overall.8  
                                                 
8 Bentham, moreover, was interested in devising a precise and scientific-looking calculus to facilitate such 
derivations. In An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham’s utilitarian treatise, 
he catalogues types of pain and pleasure while also tallying up 42 different kinds of circumstances that 
stand to impact a man’s capacity to experience either sensation.8 A man’s strength, for example, can impact 
how much pain he can stand, and this argues Bentham “can be measured with tolerable accuracy” by which 
he means seeing “the weight or number of pounds and ounces he can lift with his arms in a given attitude” 
(1879/1970, p. 54). Arguably in identifying these circumstances Bentham is looking to control for 
extraneous variables affecting a person’s state of happiness (i.e. the independent variable), and thereby 
generate more accurate predictions about the consequences of one’s actions on the mental states of others 
(i.e. the dependent variable). As such, with notions of value fixed this way, moral deliberation is reduced to 
instrumental reason in virtue of being quantifiable (and therefore objective) while moral outcomes are 
made predictable.   
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 As we saw above in the case of Trudy, she turns to utilitarian reasoning in the 
course of her deliberations when she starts weighing the welfare of all those waiting for 
surgeries against the welfare of the weeping spouse in front of her. Generally speaking, 
the drive towards efficient and economical healthcare systems is consistent with 
utilitarianism. In his ethical analysis of efficiency in health, for example,  A. J. Culyer 
compellingly argues that if we grant universal entitlement to healthcare and assume that 
“the objective of health services is to maximise the impact on the nation’s health of the 
resources available,” then we must conclude that making services more efficient is 
morally good because in doing so we insure that the benefits of such services outweigh 
the costs (1992, p.7). Given that standardization is so thoroughly associated with 
efficiency in modern time, then according to Donald, the implications of this line of 
reasoning for American psychiatric practise are that 
managed care has furthered its influence by insisting that actual clinical 
practice be rationalized in a standardized manner in an attempt to streamline 
practice and psychiatric action according to specific diagnoses in order to 
make practice efficient. Efficiency as a notion has therefore and for the first 
time entered into psychiatric action as a moral good (2000, p. 429). 
 
 As for the neoliberal turn that has seen reduced healthcare budgets worldwide, such 
a move also coheres well with the tremendous value placed upon respect for persons and 
autonomy as evidenced in Kantian ethics. For, as advocates of consumer choice to drive 
and direct the development of medicine seem to hold, the best directions in health will be 
arrived at when rational agents are given the ability to select among their available 
options, rather than having particular forms of care foisted upon them by centralized 
agencies.  
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A Morality of Administration: the Theoretical-Juridical Model of Morality 
 Having briefly considered the origins of rationo-centric moral theories and their 
potential relevance to healthcare, I now turn to some important critiques of these ethical 
systems. To arrive at this point, it is worth highlighting first how it is that such systems 
are better suited for the purposes of policy and governance than they are for providing us 
with guidance in our personal relationships. To show the role that rationalistic moral 
theory plays in administrative systems, I draw on Margaret Urban Walker’s (2007) 
analysis of  what she calls the theoretical-juridical model (TJM) of morality. According 
to Walker, Kantianism and utilitarianism both fall under this model of morality, which 
Walker contends has “prevailed as the template for “serious” or “important” moral 
theorizing in ethics, especially in  America, in the twentieth century” (p. 22). Within such 
theories, continues Walker, “the moral agent in action resembles a judge, manager, 
bureaucrat, or gamesman, exercising patterns of judgment appropriate to legal, 
institutional or administrative contexts,” and many moral theories including 
utilitarianism, deontology and contract theories fall under this model.  
 According to Walker, proponents of the TJM are apt to hold that “a moral theory is 
a consistent (and usually very compact) set of law-like moral principles or procedures for 
decision that that is intended to yield by deduction or instantiation (with the support of 
adequate collateral information) some determinate judgment for an agent in a given 
situation about what is right, or at least morally justifiable, to do” (p. 43). That is, moral 
theories on this model are intended to confer certainty about right action not only for 
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ourselves, but for others as well. Brad Hooker explains this function of a principled 
morality . 
One of the things a shared commitment to morality needs to do is provide 
people with some assurance that others won’t attack them, rob from 
them, break promises to them or lie to them … knowing that people have 
certain moral dispositions can give us added assurance about how they 
will behave. (2000, p. 16).  
 
Few people need to know that our mother endorses the principle ‘do not kill’ in order to 
predict that she will not murder us in our sleep. Nor, for that matter, do we look to a close 
friend’s sense of duty to keep promises to know that he will be there at 6 pm as planned. 
If Hooker and Walker are correct that much of the utility of moral theory lies in allowing 
us to make predictions, then these are predictions about self-interested strangers, and not 
our closest friends. 
A careful analysis of certain qualities that Walker ascribes to TJM theories helps to 
further demonstrate that what we are looking at a morality appropriate for governing 
larger populations. As Walker points out, modern moral philosophy fashions itself as “a 
moral science seeking the covering laws that explain the outputs of an idealized 
internalized system” (p. 71). As such, morality is an instrument meant to generate right 
action, and moral deliberation is largely a procedural affair. The real challenge for moral 
philosophers is to tinker with the theory’s fundamental axioms so that right action is 
consistently generated via rational processes such as derivation, calculation or 
instrumental rationality.  
It is not difficult to see the appeal of such rationalistic approaches for a public 
morality. If deliberations are grounded in reason, then the outcomes should be as 
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predictable as 2 + 2 = 4, or as unassailable as the assertion that something cannot be both 
red and not red simultaneously. If morality is universal it must be transparent.  As 
Nussbaum observes in relation to a utilitarian approach,  
if we set ourselves to gauge, in each situation, the quantity of a single value 
and to maximize that, we eliminate uncertainty about what is to count as a 
good activity. Choosing what to do becomes a straightforward matter of 
selecting the most efficient instrumental means to maximization, not the far 
messier matter of asking what actions are good for their own sake. And 
measurement, being precise, will also deliver a definite verdict about the 
instrumental alternative, by a clear public procedure anyone can grasp (2001, 
p. 109).  
 
While contemporary moral systems enable agents to be publically accountable to 
other rational agents, in order to effectively govern, theorizing must also be expedient if it 
is being carried out on behalf of the multitudes. As Walker notes, the TJM approach 
favours theories that are compact, that is, since moral theories are modeled on scientific 
theories, philosophers will aim for a minimal set of foundational axioms to explain the 
broadest possible range of moral phenomena.9 Once again, this calls to mind the reigning 
values of economism and efficiency in science, bureaucracy and production, values that, 
as I discuss in Chapter One, are as close to rationally generated values as one could hope. 
Within morality we see a drive towards a system that not only produces certain and 
predictable outcomes, but is efficient as well in aiming to broaden the scope of its 
coverage while employing a minimal set of resources. A potentially dizzying array of 
moral quandaries in mass society becomes much more tractable if we can distil these 
down to a restricted set of competing principles, or better yet, a singular moral 
                                                 
9 Given the conception of ethics as a science, the widespread use of thought experiments to falsify moral 
theories comes as no surprise. 
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imperative. Cognitively speaking, moral reasoning of this sort stands to be not only less 
costly, but also less time-consuming, for instance in employing moral principles. As 
Bentham argues “a principle is but a word … Cut down to a principle, a rule has a name 
by which it may be spoken of and called to mind without loss of time. You have thus and 
without quackery, the Iliad in a nutshell” (Bentham, cited in Bahmueller, 1981, p. 187).10  
Moral knowledge is also represented as universal, or as consisting of  “a timeless, 
contextless pure form of moral knowledge” in which “differences among the positions 
one may occupy within them can only provide occasions for different applications of core 
or essential moral knowledge which itself remains the same” (Walker, 2007, p. 9). As 
such, “the right equipment tells one what is right to do” as opposed to one’s station in life 
or one’s form of life. This impersonal conception of morality then aligns with egalitarian 
underpinnings of democratic mass societies, in which all persons are owed equal 
consideration under law. Because, as Walker notes  
[The] picture of general formulas applied to particular cases projects a 
stylized and reductive logic of moral judgment, pressing moral consideration 
toward abstraction. Superfluous detail must be cleared away so that cases 
can be sorted into broad types that figure in the formulas that unify the moral 
field. This guarantees uniformity in judgment and action across cases” (p. 
59).  
 
As with mass administration, glossing over contextual details is yet another factor 
that helps make moral theorizing more efficient, as the consideration of contextual details 
will tend to call for longer periods of deliberation. Hence, just as we see with the reified 
productive systems described in the first chapter, much contextual detail or idiosyncratic 
                                                 
10 Although Bentham was writing about principles for the management for poor houses here, we can still extrapolate 
from this to moral theorizing, where, for instance in bioethics, we see a tendency to reduce the field of discourse to 
principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, justice and autonomy. 
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autobiographical detail becomes, to use Lukács phrase “sources of error,” in one-
decision-fits-all approaches. Pragmatically speaking, if one is making decisions that stand 
to impact a multitude of lives, say legalizing abortion or euthanasia, contextual 
information or biographical details of the populace will not be readily accessible. 
Considering the claims of abstract persons based on the relative weight of equally 
abstract principles is what makes these sweeping decisions tractable.  
 
Critiques of the ‘one-size fits all’ approach to morality 
 According to Walker most modern moral philosophers would be apt to respond to 
her depiction of contemporary morality by saying “well yes. If course. What else could 
(or should) moral philosophy do?” 11 The seeming naturalness of this approach, I argue, 
stems at least in part from its suitability for the requirements of mass governance, 
requirements that by now strike many as both natural and necessary. However, as the 
work of moral particularists such as Johathan Dancy (2004), Margaret Little (2000) and 
David Bakhurst (2000) brings to light, a systemic approach to morality that aims to 
generate decisions for all, fits no one particularly well.  
 According to such philosophers, it is always possible to find exceptions to universal 
moral principles, while the resultant ceteris paribus clauses that get tacked on to 
principles and rules start to look like so many Ptolemaic epicycles12 along with an 
implicit admission that what matters most to good moral deliberation is the context in 
                                                 
11 It may not be evident from my description of her work, but Walker is aiming to critique such systems. In 
her view morality is regularly negotiated and changing, while from the standpoint of lived reality, moral 
obligations are also determined by one’s standing in the social hierarchy.  
12 In order to square the Ptolemaeus’ geocentric model of the solar system with actual observations, 
astronomers added epicycles, or small orbital detours to the orbits of the various planets rather than 
challenge the model. 
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which such decisions occur.13 As others argue in fact, adhering too closely to moral 
principles  can lead to great harm. In an age when “a man of principle” is taken to be 
synonymous with being moral, C.H. Waddington notes, “the wars, tortures, forced 
migration and other calculated brutalities which make up so much of recent history, have 
for the most part been carried out by men who earnestly believed that their actions were 
justified, and indeed, demanded, by the application of certain basic principles in which 
they believed” (cited in Bauman, 1993, p. 68).  
Aside from questions regarding the overly strict application of moral principles, 
another problem seems to be that when principles take precedence, flesh and blood 
people tend to drop out of the picture. As Michael Stocker argues in relation to dominant 
moral theories, 
What is lacking in these theories is simply—or not so simply—the person. 
For love, friendship, affection, fellow feeling, and community all require 
that the other person be an essential part of what is valued. The person—
not merely the person’s general values nor even the person-qua-producer-
or-possessor-of-general-values—must be valued. The defect of these 
theories in regard to love, to take one case, is not that they do not value 
love (which, often, they do not) but that they do not value the beloved 
(1976. p. 459).  
 
Love, Stocker argues, might be valued say from a utilitarian perspective because it 
increases pleasure. Engaging in a relationship for this purpose, however, is not love since 
the other is merely valued for being a container for pleasure, rather than for being 
                                                 
13 To show this, David Bakhurst, has suggested that at first blush, a man giving a gift to a young women 
that might be seen as generous and kind. In such a case, notes Bakhurst, the fact that the man is sexually 
interested in a young woman would not be morally relevant in and of itself. Nor would it matter if the man 
were a Catholic priest. Taken together, however, these two features will carry moral weight. According to 
Bakhurst, this helps to show that there is a potentially infinite number of features, or combinations thereof, 
that might be morally relevant in any given situation. Constructing moral principles that will help us 
anticipate such factors is therefore impossible since there is no way to predetermine how various features 
will interact (Bakhurst, 2000, p. 163, n. 12).  
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himself. Similarly, he argues, most would feel somewhat deflated on learning that the 
friend visiting us in hospital does so strictly out of a sense of duty. “Surely something is 
lacking there,” argues Stocker, “lacking in moral merit or value” (p. 462). This, however, 
runs in distinct opposition to the sort of view espoused by Kant, who, as we have seen, 
held that one ought to be motivated by duty or the rational recognition of moral laws 
rather than mere sentiment.  
 
II: Personalistic Obligations to Concrete and Particular Others  
If we are only to employ the resources of rationalistic, abstract moral systems 
described so far, it will not be immediately clear why the impersonal healthcare systems 
described in Chapter 2, or the necessity for workers to quell their empathetic responses is 
morally problematic. Certainly othering can be construed as a problem on a rationalistic 
moral view, but only if this results in an unjust allocation of resources or a sufficiently 
sweeping reduction in general welfare. Meanwhile, both principle-based theories and 
utilitarian ones are preoccupied with duties that we owe all persons, and are hence under-
equipped for telling us what we owe to the highly individual concrete others we meet 
face-to-face in the world. Such theories are especially deficient for describing appropriate 
relations with vulnerable others requiring our nurturance and support. As I hope to show, 
an ethics of care is better suited to provide workers with guidance when it comes to the 
delivery of human services to vulnerable others. In fact I shall argue later that insisting 
strictly upon rationalistic moral theories for deliberation can be harmful to workers as 
well as patients. To begin to make these arguments it shall first be necessary, for the 
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purposes of exegesis, to describe care-based ethics and situate it within the broader field 
of feminist moral discourse in the following section. 
 
Gilligan’s Care-Based Ethics  
 Carol Gilligan’s work “In a Different Voice” is notable for proposing both the 
existence and legitimacy of an alternative moral outlook to the detached and impersonal 
moral systems previously examined. This is a form of moral reasoning that she originally 
attributed to women and which holds that connecting with others and sustaining 
relationships is at least as morally valuable as respecting their autonomy or otherwise 
employing principle-based reasoning for deliberation. Her work has thus helped to 
showcase the importance of care and relational concerns for morality and thereby 
broaden morality’s discursive landscape.  
 In Gilligan’s day, moral philosophers were, as Walker observes, largely white 
males who proposed moral systems that embodied “a highly selective view appropriate to 
certain kinds of relationships and interactions in certain public, competitive or 
institutional venues. These are traditionally contexts of male participation and authority, 
symbolically associated with the masculinity of men privileged by class and race as well 
as gender” (1982, p. 60). In light of this, it is reasonable to doubt that even the best 
relationships borne within characteristically adversarial contexts will tend to be 
paradigmatic of morally ideal interpersonal relations. Gilligan’s work suggested the 
context of close caring personal relationships provided a worthier model from which to 
derive our moral ideals.  
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Gilligan arrived at this conclusion after conducting research that demonstrated that 
women’s moral deliberation differed from men’s. At the time she was a student of 
developmental psychology working with Lawrence Kohlberg on moral development in 
children. In his research, Kohlberg outlined six stages of moral development with the 
apex being “the universal-ethical-principle orientation” 14 or the ability to make rational 
and impersonal judgments based on abstract principles, universalized conceptions of  
justice and respect for persons. According to Gilligan, however, fewer women than men 
seemed to arrive at this stage of moral development, stuck, as they were, at stage 3 (p. 
18), because they emphasized interpersonal concordance. At this stage, “one earns 
approval for being nice” (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1977, p. 55). Gilligan notes 
At this stage [three] morality is conceived in interpersonal terms and 
goodness is equated helping and pleasing others. This conception of 
goodness is considered by Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) to be functional in 
the lives of mature women insofar as their lives take place in the home. 
Kohlberg and Kramer imply that only if women enter the traditional arena 
of male activity will they recognize the inadequacy of this moral 
perspective and progress like men toward higher stages where 
relationships are subordinated to rules (stage four) and rules to universal 
principles of justice (stages five and six) (p. 18).  
 
The deficiencies that many women saw on entering the male-dominated arenas however, 
ended up being in the cool and detached moral stance expected of participants in the 
public sphere rather than with their own brand of moral theorizing.  
                                                 
14 Kohlberg describes this stage as “right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical 
principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and 
ethical (the golden rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At 
heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights and of respect for the 
dignity of human beings as individual persons” (Kohlberg, 1977, 55).  
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 As Gilligan sees it, the alternative morality she associated with women is one that 
values strong relationships and where “care becomes the self-chosen principle of a 
judgment that remains psychological in its concern with relationships and response but 
becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation and hurt … This ethic, which 
reflects a cumulative knowledge of human relationships, revolves around a central 
insight, that self and other are interdependent” (p. 74). Meanwhile, Gilligan reversed the 
then reigning logic of moral maturity in noting that “[t]he discovery now being celebrated 
by men in mid-life of the importance of intimacy, relationships, and care is something 
that women have known from the beginning” (p. 17).  
While some feminist scholars have rightly challenged Gilligan on anti-essentialist 
grounds (Code, 1991, Tronto 1987, 1993) others note that associating care primarily with 
women runs the risk of perpetuating the patriarchal domination of women by relegating 
women to secondary care-taking roles in society (Bartky, 1990). As Code notes, however, 
on the whole “feminist endeavors to revalue connectedness and caring nonetheless retain 
a strong appeal in disconnected and generally uncaring mass societies, governed by 
principles of instrumental reasoning” (1991, p. 93). Moreover, work in this vein has 
inspired a flurry of feminist critiques of conventional rationalistic moral thought while 
opening a space to explore the moral significance of caring human relationships. 
As the dust of such debates has settled somewhat many care-based ethicists will 
agree with Nel Noddings, who holds that, of all relations between persons, caring 
relations are ideal and those behaviours stemming from a caring attitude are those which 
one should strive to emulate. In Noddings view, spontaneous natural forms of care and 
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our desire to remain related give rise to a moral evaluation of the goodness of care, and 
which in turn occasions a moral imperative, or “a commitment to behave in a fashion 
compatible with caring” (1984/2013, p. 705). As to the nature of this obligation, she notes 
“I am obliged  … to accept the initial “I must” when it occurs and even to fetch it out of 
recalcitrant slumber when it fails to awake spontaneously” (p. 702), meaning that one 
must try to care even when one may not be so disposed and, at the very least, behave in 
the manner of one who does care.15  
   
Respect for “me-ness”: Care Meets Respect  
 Having a solid understanding of care-ethics and how it departs from conventional 
rationalistic moral theorizing, one may then draw Kant’s notion of respect into a care-
based ethos. As I shall show, doing so stands to problematize standardized systems for 
the delivery of professional care. Before making this argument, however, I must 
introduce Robyn Dillon’s notion of care-respect (1992).  
 As noted, the concept of respect derived from the Kantian formulation of the 
categorical imperative is to treat persons as ends-in-themselves. This idea Robin Dillon 
contends is “widely regarded as the pre-eminent statement of the principle of respect for 
persons” (1992, p. 113). Arguably, there is something compelling about Kant’s notion 
here, as it implies that all persons are intrinsically valuable, and hence ought not be 
manipulated, used or otherwise harmed in the pursuit of our own ends. If we go with 
                                                 
15 That is to say that even if one cannot muster up the affective dimensions of care, one can aim to manifest 
the four elements that Tronto argues constitute ideal caring practice. The first of these elements is 
attentiveness, or remaining alert to the need of another. Secondly, one must take responsibility to meet 
these needs. Thirdly, one must possess the necessary competence to provide the care another requires and 
finally, one must be responsive to the perspective of the one being cared for (Tronto, 1993, p. 165).  
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Dillon, however, and scratch below the surface of this formulation of personhood, we 
find a rather bare conception of what it is about persons that is due this universal call for 
respect. The problem is that, on Kant’s account, what makes a person worthy of respect is 
her status as a rational autonomous agent.16  
To explain the significance of this last point further, if the value of persons hangs 
on their ability to make rational choices, then it follows that respect largely amounts to 
relying on reason to change other people’s point of view, and failing that, our most 
binding duty is to stand back and leave it to others to make up their own minds. As Kant 
puts it, respect involves “constraining myself within certain limits in order to detract 
nothing from the worth that the other, as a man, is entitled to posit in himself” (Kant, 
1797/1964, p. 117). As Code notes regarding this conception of respect “[i]n its emphasis 
on impartiality and neutrality, it treats persons as indistinguishable and interchangeable; 
indeed, in the moral domain, it requires agents to overrule specific claims of loyalty and 
affection in the interest of treating all ‘individuals’ alike” (1991, p.  97) or to put it more 
colourfully, it “flenses the individual down to the bare bones of abstract personhood” 
(Johnson, 1982, cited in Dillon 1992, p. 117). It is this concept of a person, and the 
associated importance of autonomy some argue, that “shrivel[s] our sense of obligation” 
so that for instance, “physicians who, far from treating us paternalistically, treat us 
impersonally and distantly, respecting our autonomy but nothing else” (Callahan, 1984, 
p. 41).  
                                                 
16 Violations of mental patients’ preferences are not uncommon, in fact, if it is determined that they lack 
autonomy insofar as the concept is contingent upon the ability to make rational decisions. However, if we 
are relying upon autonomy to determine appropriate treatment of such persons, something of a lacuna 
exists when it comes to determining an appropriate attitude. 
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As it stands, for instance, one espousing a Kantian notion of respect would have 
difficulty countenancing patient Jean Dann’s complaints about an eye surgery she 
underwent.  
I was shocked that the doctor did not speak to me, either before or after the 
procedure. He was very rough in adjusting the head rest and I actually had 
a sore neck after the operation. I also had a very painful eye abrasion. 
During the procedure (I unfortunately was awake) he talked about his 
daughter's university challenges with no apparent concern or interest for 
me … I felt like simply a number with no concern, on behalf of the 
physician, for my well being … I … hope that eventually doctors (I am 
generalizing) will be educated to realize that they are dealing with people 
with feelings. We need to be treated with respect.17  
 
A Kantian could very well argue that there are no clear signs in this account that the 
physician failed to respect his patient. Respect for a Kantian would amount to abiding by 
the patient’s decision to have the surgery once she has been provided full information, 
and by not trying to coerce her decision-making in any way. Attending to her emotional 
needs during the surgery, on the other hand, falls beyond the scope of prescriptions 
derived from Kant’s conception of respect.  
As with Dann, others will intuitively understand that treating someone like a 
number, or even as a container for abstract personhood, lacks respect. There is something 
more to persons than their rational faculties and respect for them means we care about 
their unique life history, particular sensitivities and emotional dispositions. Respect also 
means that one works to understand that from such factors follows a standpoint that is 
necessarily different from one’s own. In my encounter with another there is a certain 
onus upon me that calls me to attend to and discern that person’s uniqueness, and true 
                                                 
17 http://patientsassociation.ca/story/patients-educating-doctors-jean-dann 
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respect lies in my awareness that she is not like all the rest. If Dann’s letter is any 
indication, many would agree that reducing anyone to a category represents a failure to 
see her respectfully.  
It may be that this conception of respect is missing from Kant’s work because as 
Robert Paul Wolff contends “despite his overriding concern for moral matters, Kant 
seems never to have asked himself the fundamental question, what is it for one man to 
stand in a real relation to another man” (Wolff, cited in Code, 1991, p. 75). Kant’s 
attitude regarding the expression of sympathy for someone who has suffered misfortune, 
for instance, is telling in this regard, given that he characterizes such sympathy as an 
“insulting kind of beneficence” that further “is called softheartedness and should not 
occur at all among human beings” (1897/1964, 34 – 35).18 It is unclear, however, why 
such cool, unsympathetic relations should be taken as morally superior. 
What is missing here is a notion of respect that includes recognition of, and concern 
for, what Dillon describes as “our individual and human ‘me-ness’” (1992, p. 105). 
Dillon’s formulation of care respect then, captures the further requirements for a truly 
respectful, and hence more morally valuable, relationship between moral agents. In her 
work she attempts a “conjugal bonding; a union of two apparently dissimilar modes of 
what Nel Noddings calls ‘meeting the other morally,’ a wedding of respect and care” (p. 
106). While Dillon agrees that respect is an attitude that should be universally accorded 
to persons, she aims to incorporate insights from care ethics in order to add flesh to the 
otherwise “flensed individual” of abstract personhood. Dillon’s conception captures the 
                                                 
18 The underlying notion here is that the man’s rational faculties are left intact, hence an unfortunate person retains his 
moral worth and is owed an attitude of unequivocal respect, not sympathy. 
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sense that what we should respect in others is not merely their rational capacities but also 
their concrete individuality, or their ‘me-ness.’ “We are, on the care respect approach, to 
pay attention not only to the fact that someone is a ‘me’ but also to which particular ‘me’ 
she is,” argues Dillon (p. 118). On this view we owe others a certain level of 
attentiveness so that we may discern who they really are.  
The upshot of work by thinkers such as Dillon, Code and other feminist 
philosophers is that considerations revealed by care ought to figure into our moral 
deliberations and our conception of respect. Code, for example, proposes friendship as 
the best model for morally superior relationships. According to Code, partial 
relationships have been viewed as anathema to good moral theorizing, however, she 
argues that  
there is no reason to believe that the claims of friendship will blind a 
responsible agent to considerations of fairness and justice; whereas, on the 
contrary, an impersonal obsession with fairness and justice, as matters for 
impartial adjudication, often blinds people to the specific concerns of 
particular persons or groups. In short, there is no prima facie reason 
against granting priority in moral deliberation to the quality of 
relationships (1991, p. 97).19  
 
Rather than operating merely as factors that cloud our objectivity, the emotional 
underpinnings of some relationships may actually enable others to better see what 
                                                 
19 In using friendship as her model, moreover, Code aims to emphasize an attitude of detached compassion. This stance 
is detached in that it is not overly controlling, and is similar, she argues, to the attitude of a good caring therapist to her 
client. 
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constitutes justice for a particular person.20 As Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell 
describe the type of relational model such thinkers promote: “the standpoint of the 
concrete other requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual with a 
concrete history, identity and affective emotional constitution … In treating you in 
accordance with the norms of friendship, love and care, I confirm not only your 
humanity, but your individual humanity” (1991, p. 87, emphasis in original).  
 
I-Thou: Ideal Encounters Between Subjects 
 Another way of understanding this highest form of human relatedness that such 
feminist philosophers advocate is in terms of the I-Thou relationship featured in Martin 
Buber’s work (1923/2000). I-Thou refers to the participatory attitude assumed by the I 
when she relates to another subject qua subject. This relation stands in distinction to an I-
It relationship, which is a relationship in which the I experiences, imagines, observes or 
otherwise represents an object. In the I-Thou relationship we are not confronted with a 
butterfly bounded by the glass of consciousness, pinned down by attention and parsed 
into genera, species and kingdom, then stripped of its qualities altogether to be reduced to 
mathematical formulas. Rather the I-Thou is understood as pure unmediated 
responsiveness, and, in a comment that is evocative of Kant, is a relationship in which 
                                                 
20 Take the mother who can only send one child to college, her decision can only be informed by her intimate 
knowledge of the two children. If she cares deeply about their flourishing, her decision will be based on which child 
will thrive in college as opposed to some universal conception of justice. Code also extends this notion of a more 
friendly attitude as superior to the neutral, unbiased objective stance favoured in the sciences. She discusses female 
scientists Anna Brito, Rachel Carson and Barbara McClinstock noting that they resist seeing knowledge merely as a 
means of control, let objects speak for themselves and are open to particularities while seeing the irreducible 
complexity in nature. As scientists, they also experience a sense of responsibility towards their subject. “The nearest an 
ordinary person gets to the essence of the scientific process,” declares Brito, “is falling in love” (cited in Code, 1991, p. 
152).  
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“[e]very means is an obstacle,” for “only when every means has collapsed does the 
meeting come about” (p. 26).  
Unlike Kant, Buber does ask after the ideal relationship between two subjects. For 
the latter, the pinnacle of relatedness is achieved when the only reason we interact with 
the other is because she is a subject, and for this alone she is owed our care and attention. 
This sort of relation comes alive when say, two old friends talk late into the night, 
enjoying an indeterminate open-ended conversation with no purpose in mind, and which 
meanders over the course of the evening so that both parties lose sense of place and time. 
When they relate to one another as subjects, neither is assessing the other or weighing her 
attributes, so all-engaging all-consuming is the spontaneous and reciprocal flow of 
conversation. Indeed as Lévinas writes of such moments of relatedness “[t]he best way of 
encountering the Other is not even to notice the colour of his eyes! When one observes 
the color of the eyes, one is not in social relationship with the Other” (Lévinas, 1985, p. 
85).21  
 If we look to psychiatry, it is evident that a “good” professional approach to 
practice is one that suppresses I-thou relations in the interest of quick and efficient 
diagnosis. Take for example, the following description of an effective intake interview: 
Except for open-ended questions at the beginning and specific questions at 
the end, history taking should flow easily and casually, as in a 
conversation. Patients should be permitted to talk about what they want to 
talk about, but they should be gently guided back into channels that 
provide information the examiner requires for a diagnosis. From the 
minute the patient walks into the examination room, however, the 
examiner’s mental “computer” starts making decisions. How is the patient 
dressed and groomed? Does the patient have a normal gait and range of 
                                                 
21 Conversely, observes Lévinas “You turn yourself to the Other as toward an object when you see a nose, eyes, a 
forehead, a chin, and you can describe them” 
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motion? Is the patient hostile or friendly? How old does the patient appear 
to be? Based on these first impressions, the interviewer starts narrowing 
the diagnostic range. The examiner’s choices about probable diagnoses 
will determine which areas to emphasize and which to omit or skip over 
entirely. The examiner’s mind, indeed, functions as a computer. By the end 
of the interview—if it is successful—the choices will have narrowed to one 
or a few” (Goodwin and Guze, 1996, p. 316). 
 
The form of interaction recommended here is virtually the antithesis of the I-Thou 
relationship. There is no mutual intersubjective exploration in this interaction. Rather, the 
diagnostician is told to emulate a machine that takes in objective data and spits out a 
classification. The patient here is merely subjected to an efficacious algorithmic sorting 
procedure that has no room for the open-ended spontaneity that the I-Thou relationship 
demands. Nor is there evidence of any willingness to meet and acknowledge aspects of 
another that outstrip our prior knowledge, and thereby seek to expand our understanding.  
 
The Problem for Impersonal Care 
 
 On traditional accounts of morality objectifying others is only significant if the 
stereotypes we form result in unjust treatment of a particular group. For instance, Rankin 
and Campbell are careful to show how the ALC designation not only results in mildly 
disparaging and dehumanizing labels such as “bed blocker,” but that this also results in a 
unjust reduction in such patients’ welfare because workers perceive them as less 
deserving of hospital resources. Hence, even on traditional accounts of morality, 
institutional frameworks that encourage such forms of othering are morally problematic 
since this is likely to result in unfair treatment of a select group.  
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As I have been suggesting, however, it is possible to take this line of argumentation 
further than rationalistic ethics can take us. Which is to say that we owe it to others to see 
them as they truly are, and not merely as they have been construed within the rationalistic 
organizational structure of reified systems. We owe it to them to care about their personal 
wellbeing. Claiming an equal footing for rights both to personalistic consideration and 
autonomy within our conception of respect aligns with intuitions that there is something 
fundamentally wrong about treating people like numbers even if we are not violating 
their right to make their own decisions. In other words, care respect helps to capture 
intuitions such as Dann’s cited above, that we owe something more to all persons, and 
especially to those who depend on us.  
Importantly, moreover, such a view has more radical consequences for moral 
assessments of rational technologies that achieve efficiency in virtue of standardization. 
If one takes care respect seriously, then one will see any system as morally problematic if 
its first priority is to classify persons for the purposes of processing them. Rational 
technologies are not value-neutral insofar as persons are narrowly represented as objects 
defined in terms of their functional roles within such systems and managed accordingly. 
Rather, at their very core such technologies are morally flawed when implemented in 
systems serving or managing persons. This is not to say that such approaches to 
management and production are morally impermissible. Rather, I suggest that just as 
violations of a person’s autonomy require some form of justification, so should 
systematized protocols that eschew the subjectivity of individual persons and reduce 
them as types to be acted upon algorithmically. 
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Currently, such considerations do not appear to factor into discussions entertained 
by those, such as Kujala et al from Chapter One who, with their ‘patient in process’ 
timesaving schema, actively endorse the use of mass-production techniques to manage 
patients receiving healthcare. Furthermore, the need to adhere to standards for efficiency 
pulls workers away from efforts to achieve a rich and nuanced understanding of clients. 
Advocates for efficiency may well dismiss such an effort as an unaffordable and needless 
luxury. However, if we accept the right of each person to be understood and appreciated 
as an individual, then we can see that workers are being barred from offering their clients 
the full respect they deserve. This is especially true in the case of many mental healthcare 
workers, if patients’ residue of incoherence is apt to lengthen the amount of time workers 
require to achieve an understanding of their clients. As I shall argue below, this 
restriction is demonstrably harmful to many healthcare workers.  
 
The Vulnerability Principle 
An objection to the argument above is that the moral imperative to respect others in 
all their uniqueness applies only in the restricted sphere of friendship and intimate 
relations and not to everyone we encounter. It’s not clear that we are morally obliged to 
engage the humanity and individual personhood of retail clerks or our fellow passengers 
on the bus. Whatever its intrinsic merits, however, this objection does not apply to 
healthcare settings, where the relation between caregiver and patient is far more than a 
fleeting encounter between strangers. At a minimum, sustained bodily proximity brings 
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its own form of intimacy and, as Doka et al note, “crisis situations can intensify human 
bonding” and call for behaviour communicating care (1994, p. 346).  
More importantly, however, as Robert Goodin, argues, we have more 
responsibilities to those who are more vulnerable to the consequences of our decisions 
and behaviour. Even if you have not chosen to be another person’s protector, argues 
Goodin “the simple fact that a person is very vulnerable to you imposes on you special 
responsibilities in respect to him” (1985, p. 38). As Goodin further notes, this principle is 
intuitive and helps to explain why, for instance, many find it especially abhorrent to 
exploit cancer patients “willing to grasp any snake oil offered to them” in order to make a 
profit. Such an understanding of the moral authority of vulnerability also helps to explain 
why when reflecting upon “infantile docility and juvenile dependence … there is no viler 
crime than to abuse them, [and] there is no greater cruelty than to ignore them” (George 
Bernard Shaw, cited in Goodin, p. 37). 
While certain behaviours are apt to be condemned in the context of an 
asymmetrical relationship, other positive duties will be called for, and I would contend 
that these include an obligation to act in a manner that is compatible with caring. Those 
who are frightened, anxious or disoriented by the technological environment of the 
hospital, for instance, may be especially sensitive to, or alarmed by, brusque or 
impersonal treatment from a healthcare worker. As we saw previously, for a psychiatric 
patient simply having a nurse leave the nursing station to come watch TV by his side 
seemed to make all the difference in the world.  
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Due to the significant impact that caregivers can and do have on the wellbeing of 
their charges, something more is owed to the patients than that which is due to 
anonymous strangers we encounter in the course of a day. As Tronto’s work suggests, 
there is a certain onus upon a caregiver to be attentive to the ways in which a dependent 
other stands to be especially vulnerable to her actions and how he might best flourish 
under her ministrations. The only way to arrive at such knowledge, however, is in virtue 
of an understanding of the charge’s individual dispositions, sensitivities and particular 
context; namely, her ‘me-ness.’   
 
Doing Justice to the Other: The Praxis of an Ethics of Care  
 It will be useful for a moment to step back from moral theory in order to introduce 
some specific practices conducive to arriving at a more complete appreciation of another 
person’s “me-ness.” As we shall see, however, a description of these practices also serves 
to flesh out the nature of care-respect. After an examination of these recommendations 
for arriving at the special brand of knowledge required to care for and nurture others, the 
constraints under which healthcare workers currently operate become all the more 
obvious. As for the practices themselves, the ones I have selected to discuss here are Iris 
Murdoch’s conception of “loving attention,” as supplemented by Nussbam’s 
recommendations regarding imaginative reconceptualization,  and Maria Lugones’ 
description of “world travelling.” These practices will also prove to be useful tools for a 
positive assessment of ACT work observed in Chapter Five. As we shall see, ACT 
workers enact the techniques described, which I argue contributes to an attitude 
consistent with care-respect.  
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 To start, I shall mention that Dillon herself looks to Iris Murdoch’s work on “loving 
attention” to expand upon the notion of attentiveness required to reveal the uniqueness of 
the other so as to arrive at their “me-ness.” Loving attention is the effort to counteract 
“states of illusion” regarding the nature of others that are “convincingly coherent, but 
false pictures of the world.” (1970, p. 36). To counteract such misconstruals Murdoch 
stresses the need to patiently attend to others and characterises the act of will required for 
this as “obedience to reality” (p. 41). Murdoch argues that “as moral agents we have to 
try to see justly, to overcome prejudice, to avoid temptation, to control and curb 
imagination, to direct reflection.” According to her, will influences belief by effecting a 
“sustained attention to reality.” (p. 39).22  
In other words, as Nussbaum puts it, there is an onus on moral agents to make 
themselves persons “on whom nothing is lost” (1985, p. 516). The idea here seems to be 
that we are morally obliged to remain alert to the finest of details if they lead to a fuller, 
richer and more nuanced understanding of another person. Nussbaum’s work on what I 
have called “imaginative reconceptualization” moreover, supplements Murdoch’s 
arguments regarding the need to give others loving attention. What Nussbaum adds here 
is the observation that it takes an act of imagination to find new ways of conceiving old 
faces, and to stretch our preconceptions of the other. 
                                                 
22 Murdoch’s example of this involves M, a mother-in-law, and D, M’s daughter-in-law. In this scenario we 
see that M privately harbours negative attitudes towards D, while her public treatment of D is nothing shy 
of commendable. Months pass, and D has either died or moved away for good. In the interval M, realising 
that she may be biased, reassesses her attitude towards D and comes to see her daughter-in-law in a new 
light. A young woman who previously seemed “vulgar,” “undignified,” “noisy” and “juvenile” re-emerges 
in M’s mind as one who is “refreshingly simple,” “spontaneous,” “gay,” and “delightfully youthful.” (p. 
22). M here has done something worthy of moral praise, and in Murdoch’s view, that was to focus loving 
attention on D “the patient eye of love,” argues Murdoch is what will reveal the reality of another. “M 
knows what she is doing when she tries to be just to D, and we know what she is doing too.” (p. 39). 
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 Nussbaum supports her arguments about the importance of imagination for this 
process with an example from Henry James’ novel The Golden Bowl,  in which a father 
compares his daughter to some wondrous sea creature. This creature is described as 
“consciously floating and shining in a warm summer sea … buoyant among dangers, in 
which fear of folly, or sinking otherwise than in play, was impossible.”  The father here 
employs his imagination to conceive of his daughter’s sexual maturity and her newly 
awakened passions in order to come to terms with her freedom and her to choice to move 
away with her lover Amerigo (p. 519). The creative component of loving perception, 
then, calls for the development of untried analogies in order to reconceptualise the 
other.23  
In light of Nussbaum and Murdoch’s discussion here, it becomes evident why the 
paradigm shifts that took place in the APU with regards to the Judge and Holmes were 
worth remarking upon. Granted, characterizing the Judge as a “pet” bordered on 
dehumanizing, however, it was still the case that annoying characteristics such as a 
reluctance to leave the bathtub were reconceptualised as endearing and delightful. In 
other words, the Judge came to be conceived not as offal, but as someone workers could 
care about. In so doing, they were able to take in and appreciate facets of The Judge’s 
personality that made him unique, while also providing them a means to increase the 
patient’s level of enjoyment by leaving him in the bath to play and sing.  
                                                 
23 It does seem, moreover, that one of the great advantages of finding new analogies is that these bring out certain 
features, making them seem more salient than they might have seemed before. For instance, when Hannah Arendt 
(1976) conceives of Adolph Eichmann as a bureaucrat, aspects of his personality that were not as obvious spring to the 
fore, such as his mindless adherence to rules and obedience to authority. Such features, however, would not stand out, 
on the other hand, were we to simply dismiss Eichmann as an essentially incomprehensible psychopath or as some kind 
of demon. 
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 Conceiving of Holmes, as “Ponce de Leon in search of true love” also represents an 
effort to, as per Nussbaum’s recommendations, imaginatively reconceptualise the patient 
in order to understand him better. Rather than representing nothing more than a despised 
repeater, he was actively likened to an idealistic explorer bent on an impossible quest. 
Such a move, moreover, on the part of the APU counsellor may well have helped to 
reveal Holme’s individuality, or what made him special. Such an observation helps bring 
us to Nussbaum’s point that doing justice to another when we represent her seems to 
require more than just a steady focused gaze; achieving this also requires an act of 
creativity.24  
Responsible vision also requires “world travelling.” As Maria Lugones shows, 
understanding others adequately is also to know that they are multidimensional beings 
who inhabit different worlds. This observation brings us to the second practice of 
relatedness: Maria Lugones’ conception of “world travelling.” A healthcare professional 
must be finely attuned to this fact given that a clinical context or institutional setting is a 
world in which many will find themselves ill-at-ease if not bewildered. Outsiders, notes 
Lugones, “can only be known to the extent that they are known in several “worlds” and 
as “world travelers” (Lugones, 1987, p. 327) which is to suggest the way some present 
themselves while inhabiting an alien world says very little about them as persons.  
Furthermore, on Lugones’ view we ought to avoid becoming overly comfortable in 
our own world and so occupied with personal concerns that we fail to venture into a 
potentially frightened and vulnerable reality inhabited by another. This is because world 
                                                 
24 For those who might lack for creativity, Nussbaum recommends literature as a device to stimulate our 
imaginations. 
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travelling stands to reveal to a medical practitioner, for instance, that she in is a position 
to offer reassurance and comfort. Hence one must extend oneself into the world of the 
other, rather than assuming he knows how to conform to ours. “The reason why I think 
travelling to someone’s world is identifying with them,” argues Lugones, “is because by 
travelling to their “world” we can understand what it is to be them and what it is to be 
ourselves in their eyes” (p. 326 emphasis in original) and, I would add, it is only in 
knowing how that other represents us that we know how to respond to them 
appropriately.  
 Travel to the world of another, argues Lugones (and this may seem alien to many 
professional contexts) requires a certain playfulness, by which Lugones means a sense of 
patient exploration and, most importantly, the openness to, and anticipation of, surprise. 
She aims to evoke this attitude by describing a certain game she enjoys, and which is 
significant due to its spontaneous and non-competitive nature. The game involves 
cracking open rocks down by the river. “I pick up a stone and break it and run toward the 
pieces to see the colors. They are beautiful. I laugh and bring the pieces back to you and 
you are doing the same with your pieces. We keep on crashing stones for hours, anxious 
to see the beautiful new colors. We are playing” (p. 326).  
There are no rules for this game, nor are participants “wedded to a particular way of 
doing things,” while there is a simple state of openness to whatever comes next. And 
while Lugones aims to evoke the relaxed state of mind that best facilitates wonder, I 
might add that the attitude taken towards the rocks also provides us with a useful 
metaphor. That is, through the course of this game one approaches the rocks in a state of 
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wonder, and rather than viewing them merely as a means to an end, or one like all the 
rest, one is prepared to be surprised and even delighted by the beauty we find inside.25 
People, of course, cannot simply be cracked open by force, which is why small talk and 
forays into humour are not frivolous meaningless activities in a professional interaction. 
Rather such activities encourage a relaxed environment that may help another open up 
and reveal some of her world to us. As Bonnie Sturm notes, the psychiatric nurse’s use of 
humour is “an understated skill … which can develop the therapeutic relationship. This is 
clearly related to the development of rapport” (2009, p. 20). 
 Engaging in the practices described is a time-consuming affair that requires 
patience, a leisurely attitude, and the ability to act spontaneously. If we are to admit that 
care-respect is an attitude owed to persons, and especially to dependent and vulnerable 
others, then it follows that systems that encroach on the space and the time necessary to 
engage in such practices are morally problematic. For instance, something is wrong 
when, as one nursing aide describes it, at work she is “running a marathon” and adds 
“there’s never any time to stop either and just talk to the people and treat them like 
people instead of messes or bothers.” Meanwhile, a casual nurse, who sees “a stream of 
unknown faces day after day,” likens herself to more of a machine than a person (Austin 
et al, 2003, p. 181). As was evident with Trudy in relation to Mrs. Jones, being harried 
for time, and preoccupied with the task of relaying aftercare instructions makes it 
virtually impossible for the nurse to simultaneously do justice to Mrs. Jones. It seems 
almost absurd under the circumstances to demand that Trudy attend to the woman 
                                                 
25 Having played this game myself as a youngster, I can attest that wondrous unexpected colours and 
sparkled textures sometimes exist inside the plainest-looking river rocks. 
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lovingly and travel to her world. Hence, while Trudy experiences an impulse to care 
about Mrs. Jones, she is deprived of the ability to act on this impulse or to provide the 
woman with individualistic care. In this respect she has no alternative but to act in a way 
that dehumanizes her patient.  
 
 
III. The Majesty of the Face and Attendant Responsibility 
 
 Thus far I have been promoting a care-based ethical position that sees care-respect 
as obliging caregivers to treat others in a way that is consistent with care, while also 
respecting their autonomy. An essential characteristic of care, moreover, is a recognition 
of another person’s individuality. Arriving at this me-ness, it would appear, requires the 
patient attentiveness of loving perception as well as the application of our imaginative 
resources to stretch, as it were, our own pre-conceptions of the other. Lugones, moreover, 
reminds us that the subjectivity of the other is what matters for relatedness, and we only 
begin to grasp the full scope of another person’s interiority when we engage in world 
travel, or aim to grasp how the unfolding of selfhood is context dependent. That is, it is 
important to understand that the other is not a static being, but someone who changes 
depending on the social context and her location in both time and space.   
 Striving, in this way to see others as they truly are by resisting easy classifications 
and concentrating on their subjectivity brings us close to a form of perception that 
Emmanuel Lévinas has described as seeing the Face of another. In Lévinas’s philosophy 
the term “the Face” is laden with meaning and refers to more than phenomena or a visual 
representation of the face of the Other. “The face is signification” explains Lévinas. 
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Signification without context. I mean that the Other, in the rectitude of his 
face, is not a character within a context. Ordinarily one is a “character”; a 
professor at the Sorbonne, a Supreme Court justice, son of so-and-so, 
everything that is one’s passport, the manner of dressing, of presenting 
oneself. Here, to the contrary, the face is meaning all by itself. You are 
you. In this sense one can say that the face is not “seen”. It is what cannot 
become a content, which your thought would embrace; it is uncontainable, 
it leads you beyond (1985, p. 86). 
 
“You are you,” writes Levinas, which is highly suggestive of Dillon’s notion of “me-
ness.” While Dillon’s ethics of care-respect differs in some ways from that of Lévinas, 
this similarity has an important implication: to see another person as Dillon, Murdoch and 
Lugones seem to recommend is, as Lévinas shows, to experience a potentially 
overwhelming sense of responsibility for that person.  
 This sense of responsibility is overwhelming in the sense that most other abstract or 
rational considerations fade into the background relative to the felt responsibilities we 
experience for one whose Face we truly see.  What lies beyond the face is limitless 
difference that we can never adequately contain with our categories and it is this 
otherness to which we are beholden, or as Lévinas puts it “held hostage.” Once the face is 
revealed, he adds, we shift from a mode of being-with, to the existential mode of being-
for. As Lévinas writes, “to recognize the other is to recognize a hunger. To recognize the 
Other is to give,” (1969, p. 75). As we shall see, for my purposes, it is the non-rational 
nature of this experience of responsibility that is significant. 
 As Per Nordvedt contends regarding nursing for instance, “caring practices … 
involve a concrete normativity, a sympathy between bodies, an experiential encounter 
with moral properties” (2001, p. 117). What Norvedt alludes to here are the special 
obligations we are apt to experience when we meet individuals in a caregiving setting. As 
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we reflect on the differences between a sense of general obligation to others, versus the 
experience of encountering concrete others who seek or depend on our care, the non-
rational nature of this sense of responsibility should become more intuitive. For instance, 
it is easy to mercilessly apply rules to a person one has never met, but then, imagine she 
emerges out of abstraction and becomes a beseeching and concrete presence at one’s 
office door. Where before she was a number on a spreadsheet, she erupts into the 
concrete world in all her particularity, upsetting one’s neat and tidy preconceptions. At 
such a point, moreover, one’s felt sense of responsibility, or conception of what she is 
owed, is apt to change.  
 When we reach out to the other it is “to give to the master, to the lord, to him whom 
one approaches as “Vous” in a dimension of light” (1969, p. 75). As the editor of Totality 
and Infinity notes here, “vous” in French is “the “you” of majesty, in contrast with the 
“thou” of intimacy.” There exists a reversal of the logic of authority in Lévinas, however, 
since for him the face derives its authority not from strength or force, but from its 
nakedness and vulnerability. 
The skin of the face is that which stays most naked, most destitute. It is the 
most naked, though with a decent nudity. It is the most destitute also; there 
is an essential poverty in the face; the proof of this is that one tries to mask 
this poverty by putting on poses, by taking on a countenance. The face is 
exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to violence. At the same time, the face 
is what forbids us to kill (1985, p. 86). 
 
It is difficult to shoot a person in the face, and more so while looking him in the eyes, 
which helps to make Lévinas’ claims about the authority of vulnerability more intuitive. 
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As Lévinas notes, the imperative not to kill “can also be explicated much further: it is the 
fact that I cannot let the other die alone, it is like a calling out to me” (1998, p. 104). 26 
 
A singular Sense of Responsibility as Occasioned by the Face of the Other 
 The second aspect of Levinas’ discussions of the Face that is significant for my 
purposes is the singular nature of this felt sense of responsibility. To fully encounter the 
vast and fragile humanity of another person, is to assume the responsibility to heed her 
call. It follows then that a failure to respond to that call will evoke a sense of defeat at 
having failed the other. The reason is that for Lévinas this responsibility for the Other is 
“mine and mine alone”. 27  “My responsibility is un-transferable, no one could replace 
me” he argues. Someone else may give an elderly woman his seat on the bus, but this 
does not entail that I ought not have offered mine. From my own subjective point of 
view, I am now responsible for the one who is now standing as well; for as Lévinas 
contends in a formulation of the “the Jewish conscience” that he sees as universal, “all 
men are responsible for one another and “I more than anyone else””(1998, p.107), and 
this is because I am also responsible for others’ sense of responsibility.  This 
                                                 
26 It is probably our understanding of the primal call, moreover, that lends to a sense of pathos to stories 
such as Alexandria’s who, in spite being surrounded by people, remained undiscovered for days after her 
death. The may also explain why, as we saw in Chapter Two, it is especially painful for workers to watch 
ACL patients slipping away from a lack of care, and why Jean’s anguish is so readily understandable once 
a reader learns about the screaming patient who stopped her dead in her tracks in the hospital parking lot. A 
patient, she adds, that will probably die a “horrible” and “lonely” death in hospital. 
27 Hence, a notable dissimilarity between Lévinas’s ethical relation and Buber’s I-Thou is that for Buber, 
the I-Thou is a dialogical relationship while the ethical relation does not rely reciprocity. As Bauman 
explains “I-Thou has an ‘address response’ structure, a structure of ongoing conversation … if I treat you 
as Thou rather than It, it is precisely because I stipulate (expect, work towards) being also treated by you as 
your Thou” (1993, p. 49). In regard to Buber’s work, Lévinas writes that “according to my analysis, on the 
other hand, in relation to the Face, it is asymmetry that is affirmed: at the outset I hardly care what the other 
is with respect to me, that is his own business; for me, he is above all the one I am responsible for” (1998, 
p. 105).  
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“responsibility is what is incumbent on me exclusively, and what, humanly, I cannot 
refuse … I can substitute myself for everyone, but no one can substitute himself for me” 
(1985, p.101). This last point is important because understanding this helps to emphasise 
the manner in which turning from the responsibility occasioned by the face-to-face will 
always be experienced as a moral failing, a failing that I shall argue, stands to harm 
workers. 
 The immediacy, intensity and singular sense of onus occasioned by the Face all 
speak to the need to enable workers to engage in those practices aimed at cultivating 
relatedness described earlier. This is because although proximity may evoke a felt sense 
of responsibility in another, the Face provides little by way of instructions as to how to 
act on behalf of that person.28 This unspecific call of the other can only be met in virtue 
of the painstaking activity of slowly discerning another person’s me-ness, if a moral 
agent is to have any hope of meeting those needs for which, however unwillingly, she has 
assumed responsibility. Being able to act appropriately on behalf of another, however, is 
only part of the story as to why the responsiveness described by Levinas holds moral 
relevance. It is also important to consider the damage that might be done to workers who 
are forced to ignore the call of the suffering other. 
 
The Moral Impulse 
 At this point, I shall briefly argue for the great importance of this awakening of a 
visceral sense of responsibility before I move on to consider the potentially grave 
consequences that can arise when workers are commanded to supress the urge to serve 
                                                 
28 Do not kill me, or do not let me die alone are not especially specific commands. 
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the other. The raw unmediated glimpse of the vulnerable other sparks what Zygmunt 
Bauman dubs the “moral impulse” or an unconditional need to serve the other. This 
reaching out to the other is effected before we were even aware of the urge. As Lévinas 
contends, this felt visceral sense of responsibility is akin to being held hostage, which 
suggests that this impulse is not ours to command. It is prior to rational deliberation, and 
is not a means to an end. It can inspire acts of intense bravery, as when rescuers are 
moved without a second thought to rush into churning rivers or burning houses. It is also 
behind the sense of shame occasioned when one dodges the outstretched hand beseeching 
us for money, glancing shamefully away from a pair of eyes bespeaking need. We may 
succeed in rationalizing away the sometimes gut-wrenching sense of moral failure that 
arises when we refuse the call of the other, but reason neither causes us to hear the call in 
the first place nor is it what makes the call so hard to resist.  
The moral impulse is not necessarily good or moral, but it is of tremendous 
importance according to Bauman. In fact, he sees it as the ground of ethics. “Taking 
responsibility as if I was already responsible is an act of creation of the moral space, 
which cannot be plotted elsewhere or otherwise. The responsibility which is taken ‘as if it 
was already there’ is the only foundation morality can have. A frail foundation, one must 
admit. But here you are: take it or leave it …” (1993, p. 75). For, if we are in an ethical 
relation with the other, and staring into the face of suffering, the question is not “why 
should I be moral” but rather, “how can I not be?” since we cannot ignore the other’s 
need written so plainly on her face, or deny our own responsibility to her. Noddings 
seems to agree with Bauman on this point when she argues that morality is predicated on 
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caring wherein “we accept the natural impulse to act on behalf of the present other. We 
are engrossed in the other”(1984/ 2013, p. 701). She adds later that the moral view “is the 
rational attitude built upon natural caring” (p. 707). The moral impulse is what 
commands our attention to the other signifying a need so that reason can step in to best 
determine how to best craft a response.29 
 However, it is just this impulse, this tenuous foundation for morality, that workers 
are either taught to manage and suppress, as in Rhodes’ APU, or whose importance 
becomes minimized as we saw with Trudy. Given both the devaluation of relational 
concerns described in Chapter One combined with the dominance of rationalistic moral 
systems, it may be very difficult for workers to articulate the significance of the visceral 
or felt sense of responsibility they are apt to experience in the course of face-to-face 
interactions. If, however, workers are being asked to ignore the very spark of morality, 
the reasons for doing so need to be especially good. Meanwhile, as I hope to show in 
what follows, if we wish the reduce the harm that may be incurred on workers, the notion 
that rationalistic principles can lead us astray must remain a live possibility, and 
especially when these are systematically conflicting with the duties occasioned by the 
face-to-face. 
 
                                                 
29 What is there, moreover, apart from the suffering in the face of the Other to tell us when our principles 
have gone wrong? Take the Kantian who refuses to lie, and therefore directs a murderer to his neighbour’s 
door. The true test of his act is likely not a test of logic. What will be more telling is whether he can stand 
look into his friend’s eyes, or perhaps those of the man’s grieving family, and say in good faith he did what 
he had to do, and is therefore absolved of responsibility. As Trudy puts it, doing so would be apt to “feel 
like hell” and, if like many, the man of principle balks at thought of this, we have as much reason as any to 
suppose our principles are leading us astray. For a morality that makes it difficult to face our fellow human 
and meet her gaze contributes little to social harmony.  
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Responding to the Face of Suffering and Universal Ethics 
 Anesthesiologist Ian Nesbitt’s immediate response, and subsequent misgivings, 
when confronted with a dying elderly burn victim helps to show that when a tension 
exists between the demands of the face of suffering and universalized ethics, sometimes 
the only decent response involves setting aside one’s principles.30 However, articulating 
why this is the case outstrips the forms of justification provided by any rationalistic 
principle-based morality. As Nesbitt describes it, a woman came in to hospital “a vivid 
patchwork of red and black from ankles to neck, surrounded by a miasma of singed hair 
and charred flesh” (2002, p. 1122).  Seventy percent of her body was covered in 
agonizing burns and she had waited several hours to be discovered. Due to the extent of 
her injuries and her advanced years she had little hope of recovery, hence, doctors 
decided to give her opiates for the pain and to let her die. “My most meaningful 
contribution to her care,” writes Nesbitt, “had been to talk softly to her as I prepared to 
anaesthetise her: "Think of something nice to dream about, we're just going to drift you 
off to sleep and get you sorted out. You're going to be all right.” 
 Nesbitt entertains moral doubts, however. “I lied to her,” he writes, “and would do 
so again in similar circumstances. Should I? Would you? Can lying to patients 
sometimes be the right thing to do? Or does this story illustrate a lingering paternalism 
and arrogance that doctors may have when dealing with patients? I have no easy answers 
to those questions, and suspect there aren't any.” Such was Nesbitt’s letter to the British 
                                                 
30 Nortvedt mentions a case where felt obligations will understandably have a greater pull on practitioners 
as when, despite a previously stated mandate not to provide “extraordinary ventilatory assistance” to a 
particular patient, once the man and his family present “at the hospital … struggling for his life, what could 
the doctors and nurses do other than offer him repiratory assistance? (2001, p. 116).  
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Journal of Medicine. One respondent to the letter comments “It is inappropriate to lie in 
any given situation. Concealment of the whole truth may be an acceptable alternative” – a 
pithy two-line response that seems to minimize the drive Nesbitt must have experienced 
to offer solace to someone who had just lived through an extended period of intense 
agony. How can he truly be there for her, we might ask, if an abstract moral principle 
counts for more than her immediate suffering?  
Although our rationalistic universal moral systems may be well-equipped to level 
the playing field for moral agents, their utility for discerning an appropriate response to 
suffering in the face of the other is, at best, underwhelming. As Arthur Kleinman notes, 
“one is surprised to find so many professional ethical volumes in which [“suffering”] 
does not even appear as an entry in the index.” He adds “ethical systems that leave the 
problem of suffering (and related concepts of tragedy, endurance, and courage) to 
particular theological or poetical traditions do not adequately engage the human core of 
illness and care” (1995, p. 50). This omission of suffering from ethics, however, may be 
due to the difficulty of articulating the visceral, immediate and non-rational experience of 
responsiveness and responsibility occasioned by the face-to-face. This is especially true if 
one is working within the confines of rationalistic moral systems. Such systems are 
woefully inadequate for capturing either the power and significance of the face-to-face 
relation or the force of its gravitational pull: the responsibility for the other that binds us 
to her. 
 
 
 
 
185 
 
IV. Workers at the Crossroads of Hidden Paradoxes 
 
In case there might be doubt as to whether care workers find these sorts of 
paradoxes troubling, one need only look to the growing literature on moral distress in 
nursing to see that many are terribly conflicted about their work. According to Austin et 
al moral distress is described in the literature in the following way: 
The state is experienced when moral choices and action are thwarted by 
constraints include frustration, anger, helplessness, despair and/or betrayal. 
Moral distress arises when one must act in a way that contradicts personal 
beliefs and values. It is uneasiness about not doing all that one could to 
fulfill one’s moral obligations. There is a sense of being morally 
responsible, but unable to change what is happening. Nurses who are 
acting in a way that is contrary to personal and professional values or who 
are unable to translate moral choices into action feel like their integrity is 
in jeopardy. Nurses suffer anguish at such times and the consequences can 
be profound and lasting (2003, p. 178).  
 
Granted,  judging from the literature, the term “moral distress” is multifaceted and in 
some respects may serve as a catchall to describe all and any conflicts nurses experience. 
Distressing factors are said to include  “physicians, nurse administrators, hospital 
policies, and laws or lawsuits” that undercut their ability to adequately care for patients. 
However, at least some nurses see moral distress as being occasioned by an inability to 
offer personalistic treatment to patients. According to one 1993 study, nurses said “they 
were concerned with the basic lack of human dignity shown to patients.” The authors of 
the study go on to note that nurses used terms such as “nightmare,” “grief”, “heartache”, 
“miserable”, “painful”, “sad, and “ineffective” to describe their responses to such 
situations (Holly, 1993, cited in Austin et al, 2003). Yet another study revealed that a 
particular group of nurses who saw morality as essentially grounded in care all left 
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nursing. Interestingly, those oriented towards rationalistic accounts emphasizing justice 
appeared to find the work tolerable enough to remain in the profession (Millette, 1994).31  
 Given the very existence of this burgeoning discourse, there is something to be said 
for turning the gaze of care respect towards those caught between the demands both of 
particular concrete others and universal principles, and for acquiring a rich and detailed 
understanding of their complex situation. As Dillon argues “[i]n acknowledging human 
limitedness, imperfection, and continual construction, care respect also comprises 
acceptance of frailty, patience, and lenience  … as well as responsiveness to each other’s 
needs” (1992, p. 121). Whether one is a patient or a administrator, the important thing is 
to see that real moral ambiguity exists when situations arise that involve a conflict 
between care for the concrete other and more abstract moral demands, and to have 
genuine empathy and understanding for those making decisions under such 
circumstances. In what follows, I shall attempt to evoke a deeper understanding of the 
experience such conflicts might occasion in workers situated in highly rationalistic 
healthcare settings.  
 The self-assured approach of the respondent to Nesbitt’s letter suggests that there 
may exist a subtle prohibition of even addressing the kinds contradictions I seek to bring 
to light, and this prohibition could cause workers harm. The conflict for care workers that 
I am aiming to unearth here cannot merely be reduced to a conflict of moral principles. 
Rather the conflict is between the felt pull of the concrete other and a general expectation 
that moral quandaries be settled by means of rationalistic principle-based deliberations. 
                                                 
31 The sample size of the study was small and involved 17 nurses in total. Seven showed a preference for a 
care-based morality while 9 favoured a justice-based perspective.  
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This is a conflict that may be especially frustrating for some workers, because it may be 
next to impossible to openly address or even to acknowledge its existence. 
 To show what I mean here, I shall turn to an article by Brit Mari Ákerlund and 
Astrid Norberg (1985), who examine the effect of what they describe as “double binds” 
faced by 40 care workers whose jobs include force-feeding clients suffering from severe 
dementia. As I shall argue, presupposing, as Ákerlund and Norberg seem to do here, the 
primacy of a principle-based system for good moral reasoning may cause workers harm. 
Before making this argument, I shall describe the broader context of the article.  
Ákerlund and Norberg use of the concept of a “double bind” in their paper largely 
amounts to a misappropriation of the term. It is worth noting that Bateson et al introduced 
the concept to refer to a form of communication in which an individual is presented with 
two contradictory demands as well as an injunction against addressing the contradiction 
(Bateson et al, 1967). Commanding a child to “speak when he is spoken to,” while also 
teaching him not to talk back to adults can be construed as a double bind, especially if 
pointing out the contradiction will only be viewed as impertinence on the part of the 
child. At base then a double bind is one in which a person is “likely to find himself 
punished (or at least made to feel guilty) for correct perceptions, and defined as “bad” or 
“mad” for even insinuating that there should be a discrepancy between what he does see 
and what he “should” see” (Watzlawick, et al, 1967, p. 213). Arguably, the only thing 
188 
 
more frustrating than encountering an irresolvable paradox is encountering said paradox 
but being forbidden from admitting that it even exists. 32  
 According to Ákerlund  and Norberg, many workers are anxious and conflicted 
when cognitively impaired and non-communicative elderly patients press their lips 
together and refuse food. The paradoxes that writers reveal in the course of their 
interviews are explained as arising from conflicts between rules, such as ‘keep the patient 
alive’, ‘don’t cause him suffering’ and principles such as ‘autonomy’ and ‘beneficence.’ 
Meanwhile, Ákerlund  and Norberg admit there is no real prohibition from meta-
communication about such conflicts; rather, it is simply that such discussions do not tend 
to occur. (1985, p. 214). Hence, their work fails to capture the most painfully frustrating 
dimension of a genuine double bind: the injunction against addressing the paradox. 
 The way to alleviate anxiety, the writers contend, is by puzzling out the problem at 
the level of abstract moral theory as evidenced by their prescription of a more organized 
and systematic approach. 
In order to solve the double bind conflict [and thereby reduce workers’ 
anxieties about feeding], the care workers must be able to 
metacommunicate about the conflicting demands. They must be able to 
decide which demand is to be given priority. An essential part of this 
process is to understand the different logical levels of these demands. An 
ethical model or theory would be needed to rank the priority of 
contradictory principles (p. 215).  
 
Determining the priority of moral principles, the writers maintain, is a theoretical issue. 
Hence, they seem to presume not only that rational deliberation should suffice to reassure 
                                                 
32 There is little reason to suppose that double binds induce schizophrenia as had been hypothesized in 
Bateson’s day, nevertheless this dysfunctional form of communication can be, to use the term colloquially, 
maddening.  
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workers of the rightness of their actions, but that this weighing out of principles can 
guarantee that they will get it right. Notably, Ákerlund and Norberg conduct their 
analysis in light of Kolhberg’s conception of moral development and hold that in order to 
make a mature decision  one would have to  take the two ethical ‘rules’ into consideration 
such as ‘Keep the patient alive’ and ‘don’t cause him suffering.’ ” 33 (p. 212) and assess 
their relative importance.  
One subject, however, described her experience with force-feedings is as follows 
When I started to work here we had quite a few patients who were difficult 
to feed. Some we didn’t feed. I found it quite horrible to feed. You pry a 
little with the spoon … It is terrible. It is the worst that can happen. I try to 
withdraw tactfully … I feel a coward to withdraw and not do it. I still don’t 
like to feed … The only thing is a pair of scared eyes above the nose … 
Sometimes they don’t want [to eat]. You know they need it. I am not the 
type who tries to make them finish the dish. I have never done that … Most 
of them have reached the stage when they are not hungry … I feel as if the 
patient is worth something more than someone just sitting there feeding 
them … It can’t be pleasant for the patient (cited in Ákerlund and Norberg, 
212). 
  
On the one hand, the subject, who I’ll dub “Subject L” for purposes of clarity, says she 
feels herself to be a coward, perhaps for her own inability to set aside her own seemingly 
irrational affective responses in order to uphold universal impartial rules such as ‘keep 
the patient alive.’ On the other hand, she also seems to be struggling to articulate 
something that could hearken towards the non-rational nature of Lévinas’s ethical 
relation occasioned by her experience of the wordless authority of the face holding “a 
pair of scared eyes above the nose” and which is “worth so much more than someone just 
                                                 
33 The writers also make a bewilderingly circular claim when they approvingly describe Kohlberg as one 
who “regards morality as the individual’s optimal conditions for morality, a quality reached at the end of 
adolescence” (214).  
190 
 
sitting there feeding them.” So much more, she seems to say than a person just doing her 
job. Is this not perhaps an awareness of the majesty of the Other and the state of “being-
for” it induces in us?  
 It is possible that what this description most vividly captures, in fact, is what 
Lévinas and Bauman see as the highest form of morality, the raw awakening to the Other 
which Bauman suggests is sure to occasion anxiety.34 He writes 
To be frank, [the primacy of the face-to-face] is not the kind of foundation 
ethical philosophers dreamed of and go on dreaming about. It leaves quite 
a lot to be desired, and this is perhaps why the seekers for the building site 
of Law prefer to look the other way. No harmonious ethics can be erected 
on this site – only the straggly shoots of the never ending, never resolved 
moral anxiety will on this soil grow profusely. This foundation promises 
anything but architectural harmony and the residents’ peace of mind. And 
yet it is this moral anxiety that provides the only substance the moral self 
could ever have. What makes the moral self is the urge to do, not the 
knowledge of what is to be done; the unfulfilled task, not the duty correctly 
performed. ‘But it all adds up to the fact that a person can never be entirely 
sure that he has acted in the right manner,’ concludes Løgstrup (Bauman, 
80).  
 
Ákerlund and Norberg however do not seek to interpret the subject’s statements outside 
their efforts to distil what the she says into sets of competing rules. Rather, the writers see 
Subject L as having an “ethical standpoint [that] may seem teleological but a closer 
analysis shows that it is not based on moral reasoning, but is more a question of a strong 
defense against intimacy with the patient.” Ákerlund and Norberg do not expand on this 
last point but add that such workers find their jobs quite difficult and “had a minimal 
ability to metacommunicate, probably due to their deficiency in their capacity for moral 
reasoning.” Importantly, on Kolhberg’s conception of morality, this is tantamount to 
                                                 
34 The fact that the patients in this case suffer from dementia, and hence have difficulty stating their own preferences, 
brings to the fore the anxiety occasioned by a responsiveness to the Other. 
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saying these subjects are morally immature. However, while Ákerlund and Norberg 
cannot make sense of the Subject L’s statement within a rationalistic construal of 
morality, Lévinas may be better able to identify what the worker is struggling to 
articulate here. In fact it seems that the subject has communicated her standpoint, but 
because it is not couched in a language of principles, it seems to bypass the 
commentators’ understanding.  
 
A genuine double bind? 
 The question remains, however, how is Ákerlund and Norberg’s attitude here 
harmful to workers? The response is that in their apparent inability to fathom morality as 
stemming from anything other than rational universal principles, Ákerlund and Norberg 
may themselves be helping to perpetuate double binds for workers. As their response to 
Subject L reveals, they readily judge workers for giving too much sway to the face of the 
other in their deliberations. They seem to hold that a caregiver who responds to the call of 
someone’s suffering acts unethically if, in doing so, he contravenes the universal 
requirements of an impartial and impersonal moral system. Yet, if he doesn’t act, if he 
fails to use his power to meet the demands of the other, he will similarly experience a 
moral failing, a failing that is his and his alone. 
Two factors stand to cinch the binding power of this paradox. Firstly, a prohibition 
against addressing this paradox would require questioning the taken-for-granted 
supremacy of universal, impartial and rational moral systems. Even questioning morality 
this way, however, can, as we just saw, be taken as a sign of amorality or moral 
immaturity. What one “should see” in such cases, thinkers such as Ákerlund and Norberg 
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seem to hold, is a moral dilemma to be puzzled out at the level of abstract theory. 
Someone who only sees the Face and experiences the powerful singular sense of 
responsibility the other evokes is at risk of being dismissed as morally deficient. Feeling 
compelled to supress this moral call, on the other hand, puts the worker in a painful 
situation, one in which she finds herself forced into moral failure no matter what she 
does. For if it threatens their status as genuine moral agents in the eyes of onlookers, few 
workers would dare rise up to say that this very real pair of frightened eyes I see before 
me throws all of principled rule-based morality in doubt. Having no way then to 
communicate such conflicts can only make the situation all the more difficult and 
frustrating. 
The second factor that makes meta-communication regarding the paradox difficult 
is the near impossibility of adequately explicating the non-rational and visceral 
experience of the ethical relation within the confines of a rationalistic moral system. 
Given this potentially frustrating paradox, Subject L’s avoidance of feeding may be less 
“a strong defense against intimacy with the patient”, and more a consequence of a double 
bind that Ákerlund  and Norberg themselves perpetuate. 35 For, rather than risk either 
failing the other or failing to maintain one’s status as a genuine moral agent, many 
                                                 
35 Watzlawick, et al discuss three typical responses to double binds, with one being a retreat from 
communication and contact with others altogether. Another involves an obsessive search for clues that 
might resolve the paradox. However, because there is an unspoken prohibition against addressing the 
paradox itself, “he will eventually be forced to extend this scanning for clues and meaning to the most 
unlikely and unrelated phenomena.” A final reaction is to “choose what recruits quickly find to be the best 
possible reaction to the bewildering logic, or lack of it, to army life: to comply with any and all injunctions 
with complete literalness and to abstain overtly from any independent thinking” (218). Certainly when 
considering professional caregivers, we would prefer that they neither retreated from their clients, nor 
became blindly obedient automatons.  
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workers might, as Subject L seems to do, aim to retreat from the situation altogether in 
order to avoid such a painfully frustrating and seemingly irresolvable paradox. 
 
 
V. Agamemnon’s Sacrifices: Further Consequences of Suffering 
 Admittedly, retreat from the situation is not the only way to respond to such 
difficult conflicts. Another option is to dissolve them by turning away from the face of 
suffering. Martha Nussbaum’s discussion of Agamemnon’s sacrifice in the Oresteia 
illustrates this point clearly.  A seer tells the king that in order to get his ships moving to 
Troy he must sacrifice his own daughter Iphigenia.36 Agamemnon weighs his piety and 
the lives of many against the life of one, and after agonizing over the monstrous choice 
he must make, submits to the sacrifice. His biggest mistake here, however, is in failing to 
realise that that which is necessary is not always right.  
 In relaying this story, Nussbaum highlights Agamemnon’s attitude after the 
decision has been made, which is to wholeheartedly embrace the rightness of his action. 
“It is right and holy that I should desire with impassioned passion the sacrifice staying the 
winds, the maiden’s blood” Agamemnon declares boldly (cited in Nussbaum, 2001, p. 
35). Nussbaum further describes the scene after the decision is made. 
Her prayers, her youth, her cries of ‘Father’ counted as nothing treating his 
daughter, from then on, as an animal victim to be slaughtered … 
Agamemnon commands the attendants to lift Iphigenia ‘like a goat’ in the 
air above the altar. His only acknowledgment of her human status is his 
command to stop her mouth (Nussbaum, 36).  
 
                                                 
36 Agamemnon is going to war against Troy to reclaim Helen who was stolen by Paris. Artemis has 
becalmed the ships enroute and must be appeased.  
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Nussbaum holds that there is something repellent about Agamemnon’s attitude here. It is 
bloodless and cold, and he acts as though by ‘placing himself under the yoke of 
necessity’ he is cleared of his responsibility to his daughter. It is worth adding that when 
he looks at her he is blind to the accusation and the suffering inscribed in her face, nor 
does he perceive the majesty of her Otherness; he sees a goat. It is not hard to understand, 
however, how someone who ‘slips his neck through the yoke strap of necessity’ might 
lessen his inner turmoil by affirming to himself the rightness of his choice. However, it is 
only by reducing his daughter to an animal that he can succeed in this.   
“A proper response, by contrast,” argues Nussbaum, “would begin with the 
acknowledgment that this is not simply a hard case of discovering truth; it is a case where 
the agent will do wrong” (p. 42). One can understand, however, how one might be 
tempted by the dichotomous nature of reason when approaching such a decision, as it 
promises us that something can be right or wrong, but not both, and hence presents such a 
case as soluble.  Our minds rail against the painfulness of uncertainty and reason provides 
the balm for this suffering, but the price is the denial of reality. In fact a cost greater than 
a distortion of reality is incurred here, however, for Agamemnon also sacrifices his own 
humanity when he chooses to look upon his daughter as an animal for slaughter.  
  The relation between the face-to-face relation and the moral impulse helps to 
explain why Agamemnon might seek to reduce one he harms to what Lévinas calls 
“sameness,” or some discrete category that eliminates all uncertainty as to how to 
respond to the face before us. The Nazis reduced the Jews to vermin, that is, to something 
less than human to justify their extermination. Meanwhile, no one wants to see the 
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suffering in the faces of say, Eichmann or his ilk. For, to see the Face of the Other is to 
experience a sense of responsibility for the Other; the need to ease that suffering. Better 
to look past their faces and conceive of them as a monsters or psychopaths than to risk 
experiencing any disconcerting sense of obligation that arises when we bear witness to 
the naked skin of destitute faces. For, as noted, the moral impulse is not rational, it would 
have us attend to the suffering of, and have care for those who stand to harm us and 
others. However, the power of its call is such that sometimes the only way to resist 
feeling responsible to the Other who we must harm is by blinding ourselves to both their 
humanity and their status as persons worthy of either moral consideration or care.37  
In light of such reflections it is worth considering whether healthcare workers are in 
danger of becoming inured to their patients’ suffering. For such a response could 
represent a means of avoiding painful feelings of uncertainty, guilt or shame that 
inevitably arise when one fails another. As for whether workers’ distress eventually 
causes them to become inured to face of the suffering, we need only look to the othering 
that occurs in environments where workers appear to have little power to determine 
patients’ course of care, for example Rhodes’ “pieces of shit”, the “dingbats” in Foner’s 
nursing home or with ALC patients on acute care wards. As Nortvedt argues  
If concrete moral responses and relationships are commonly violated, if 
nurses [and other care workers] frequently have to violate the integrity of 
                                                 
37 Intuitively speaking, when people are asking of us more than we want to give it's easier to villainize them 
or view them as flawed somehow than to deal with the guilt we might experience from denying their 
request. To wit: the man begging for change will get characterized as a "worthless bum," the telephone 
solicitor a “mindless automaton,” demanding teachers might be called Nazis. Even in intimate 
relationships, when someone asks for more than one is prepared it’s very easy to just dismiss them as too 
needy and avoid putting the very hard question to ourselves as to whether we're living up to our obligations 
to the other.  
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particular clients due to a lack of time and resources, insensitivity to concrete 
personal destinies will increasingly become a moral option (2001, p. 117) 
 
Before this issue can be taken seriously, however, the tremendous importance of 
respecting and cultivating the bare human impulse to care for and nurture others must be, 
acknowledged. However, while care and compassion ought to be recognized as guiding 
forces, determining when responsibilities occasioned by the face of another should win 
out over general principles or policies is no easy matter. In view of this difficulty, I will 
argue that the best way to insure that systems are operating in an ethically sound fashion 
is by cultivating morally wise workers. Unfortunately, the rationalized systems employed 
for management and morality threaten to stunt the very moral wisdom that need to 
safeguard the integrity of our caregivers and their workplaces. 
 
Blinded by Care 
 
 In order to appreciate the importance of moral wisdom for caregivers, it is essential 
first to recognize that the cultivation of care does not represent a moral cure-all. As 
Bauman points out, “virtually every moral impulse, if acted upon in full, leads to immoral 
consequences (most characteristically, the impulse to care for the Other, when taken to its 
extreme, leads to the annihilation of the autonomy of the Other, to domination and 
oppression)” (1993, p. 11). A chilling example of the oppressive side of care devoid of 
broader concerns related to justice comes from Steppe’s (1992) account of nurses 
working under the Nazis in WWII. Nurse Pauline Kneiβler, who perhaps possesses little 
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sense of irony, writes from her prison cell after the war that “I am being accused of 
murder, I beg the court for justice.” Kneiβler explains herself in the following manner 
No one can blame me because the laws of the Third Reich, which were not 
perfect, were not a matter for a nurse. At the bed of a patient there is a 
doctor who is superior to the nurse. It’s his decision whether or not to 
prescribe a chest compress, an enema, heart medication, or a sleeping pill. 
In this case it was mercy killing. I never understood mercy killing as 
murder. I believe that only those who have sympathy and who can 
sympathize can understand this. There were people who could no longer 
be helped – mentally or physically … An additional point is that only 
hopeless cases came to my ward. I beg you to consider all of this (Steppe, 
1992, p. 750).  
 
It would appear that Kneiβler cares so much for her patients she feels compelled to end 
their lives entirely, which is as oppressive as one can get.  
 According to Hilde Steppe, nursing was seen as a womanly profession in Nazi 
Germany because officials held woman should only work at jobs that prepared them for 
“the future biological or spiritual role of motherhood” (p. 748). From this we can infer 
that nurses were encouraged to give free reign to their caring impulses in the course of 
their work. Anna G, another nurse described practises of euthanizing patients. 
Patients who were strong enough sat themselves up in bed; we laid an 
extra pillow under the heads of the others in order to lift them up a little. In 
giving them the dissolved substance I proceeded with great compassion. I 
had told the patients earlier that they had to have a little treatment. 
Obviously I could only tell this little tale to patients who were conscious 
enough to understand. In giving them the drink I took them in my arms 
and caressed them. If they did not empty the glass, for example, because it 
tasted bitter, then I encouraged them by saying they had drunk so much of 
it, they should drink the rest of it because otherwise the treatment would 
not be complete. Some of them were so persuaded by my encouragement 
that they finished the glass completely. With others, we fed them by 
spoonfuls. As I said before, the way we proceeded was determined by the 
patients’ behaviour and condition (Steppe, 1992, p. 751).  
 
Such an example does much to highlight the importance of respect as an intrinsic part of 
the equation that yields the morally superior attitude that is care respect. As Steppe notes, 
198 
 
the nurse in this example adheres to a principle of “loving care.” She is both attentive and 
responsive to her patients’ needs, and she adapts herself to their individual requirements. 
However, while she may have been present to patients’ immediate suffering as she 
soothed them towards their deaths, both the importance of their autonomy and a broader 
grasp of justice seem to be absent from her moral outlook.  
It is interesting to note, in fact, how a potentially touching description of gentle care 
becomes perverse when we draw back and situate it in its wider context. Just as most 
cannot escape the gravitational pull effected by our face-to-face encounters, neither can 
we deny that we co-exist in mass societies, the mere fact of which obliges us to be 
concerned with questions of social justice and general welfare. Admittedly, attentiveness 
to partial relationships can draw one’s focus away from the needs of people one has never 
met. This can occur when we suppose, as Anna G seems to, that caring for the other in 
the present moment compensates for being party to a larger monstrous injustice. A more 
mundane form of injustice can be seen whenever partial leanings result in placing 
disproportionate value on the wellbeing of a favoured patient at the expense of others 
equally deserving.  
 
Blinded by Obedience 
It is important to note that many of the nurses in Steppe’s research fell back on the 
defense that they were just following orders. We see elements of this in Kneiβler’s 
statement above, meanwhile Anna G explains 
Through the long years of being a nurse, practically from my childhood 
on, I was brought up to be completely obedient and discipline and 
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obedience were the highest commandments in nursing circles. We all, 
myself included, viewed the orders of a doctor, head nurse or ward nurse 
as something that should be absolutely followed, and did not or could not 
decide for ourselves if these orders were legitimate or not (p. 751).  
 
Such a conflation of obedience with goodness is anathema to good moral reasoning, 
since it undercuts the development of moral perception, or one’s ability to recognise for 
oneself the morally salient aspects of a particular situation. As Bauman argues, 
“uncertainty rocks the cradle of morality, fragility haunts it through life” (1993, p. 77) 
adding that good moral practise  “can never placate itself with self-assurances, or other 
people’s assurances, that the standard has been reached. It is ultimately, the lack of self-
righteousness, and the self-indignation it breeds, that are morality’s most indomitable 
ramparts” (1993, p. 81).  
 While modern healthcare settings work for benign rather than evil ends and do not 
make a fetish of discipline or obedience, they still rely on rationalized systems that 
require a high degree of worker subservience. As I argued in Chapter One, concentration 
on rote procedures can undermine workers’ ability to form relationships with clients, but 
it is also possible that a concomitant emphasis placed on compliance serves to deter 
workers from subjecting their own actions to serious moral scrutiny. That is, at least 
some may rest easy with the potentially false assurances that someone up top has thought 
through all the relevant details related to the moral status their work. Given their 
proximity to patients, however, I argue that workers themselves represent the best first 
line of defence against systems that have gone astray. The reason frontline care workers 
occupy such a role is that their particular situation gives them the clearest view of the 
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human consequences of decisions made higher up, while their proximity to individual 
clients raises the chances of a compassionate response to what they see.  
   
Luke, the Morally Wise Janitor: a Further Argument for Space 
The ability to think for oneself and accurately judge when rules should be bent to 
accommodate individual needs can only arise if a worker is provided with the space to 
develop her moral faculties. Hence, the detailed control of workers’ conduct not only 
limits their ability to recognize morally significant situations, it may also stunt their 
development of moral wisdom. Although there is not much room for error in modern 
risk-averse professional environments, as Barry Schwartz’s (2011) work suggests, the 
space to make mistakes is essential for the kind of learning that leads to phronēsis, or 
practical wisdom. In Schwartz’s view, phronēsis is the ability to adapt one’s knowledge 
to particular situations in ways that yield the best possible outcomes.  
Schwartz’s description of a janitor shows how the appropriate treatment of others 
essentially relies on the freedom to act spontaneously. According to Schwartz, Luke 
worked in a hospital and was cleaning the room of a young comatose man. After 
finishing the task, the janitor encountered the patient’s father in the hall. The father had 
not seen the janitor cleaning his son’s room and so admonished the worker for this 
alleged oversight. The janitor nearly responded defensively, but in the end decided to just 
clean the room again. Luke remarked, “I cleaned it so that he could see me clean it … I 
can understand how he could be. It was like six months that his son was there. He’d be a 
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little frustrated, and so I cleaned it again. But I wasn’t angry at him. I guess I could 
understand” (2011, p. 7).  
In Schwartz’s view, the fact that hospital custodians’ work was not closely 
monitored was what gave them the freedom to behave humanly with patients and their 
families.  
They were not generic custodians; they were hospital custodians. They saw 
themselves as playing an important role in an institution whose aim was to 
see to the care and welfare of patients. Though the literature suggests that 
the way to promote such behaviour is by expanding the work role, their 
employers did no such thing. What they did do is avoid excessively close 
supervision and an increase in job demands, so that Luke and his colleagues 
had the time and the space to expand their jobs on their own (p. 7) 
 
Given that their minds were not occupied with a series of set tasks, workers such as Luke 
were able to focus on other people in order to appreciate their idiosyncratic needs and 
thereby discern the most appropriate course of action.  
 
Space for the Cultivation of Phronēsis 
While I have repeatedly suggested that workers require the necessary time and 
space to form connections with clients, it is also the case that openings to exercise their 
faculties of moral discernment are also required for the development of moral wisdom. 
As Schwartz argues, people need to make mistakes and learn from these if those people 
are ever to achieve the state of “phronēsis”38 that enables them to discern the right action, 
at the right time, and in the right place. In Luke’s case, this meant allowing his empathy 
                                                 
38 Phronēsis here is being used in the Aristotelian sense of the word and means “practical wisdom.” This is 
a form of knowledge that includes moral knowledge and is more akin to a skill or an art requiring practice 
than it is a form of factual knowledge (Little, 2000). Epistemologically speaking, the term captures a state 
of “knowing-how,” as it were, as opposed to a “knowing-what.” 
202 
 
and compassion to guide him in his interactions while appreciating the grieving father’s 
own particular context in order to know how to act. Tuning up wise networks to arrive at 
this state of wisdom, contends Schwartz, “requires varied experience – trial and error—
with feedback, and not the same experience over and over again” (2011, p. 10). Seeing 
when a rule does not work is equally essential to wise action because it highlights the 
circumstances that can render standard practises ineffective. By contrast, anyone 
preoccupied with adhering to existing sets of rules is less likely to see their limitations.  
To make a case for the detrimental effect of an emphasis on rule-following, 
Schwartz looks to a 2001 study of wildland firefighters. In the study it was noted that 
workers’ survival rates decreased as the list of workplace ordinances went from 4 basic 
rules in the 1950’s to 48 items over the years. The shorter list, argues Schwartz meant the 
workers were open to learning from experience, and were more apt to improvise in order 
to adapt to particular situations and extenuating circumstances. 
But when general rules morph into detailed instructions, formulas, and 
unbending commands the important nuances of context are squeezed out. 
Weick concludes that it is better to minimize the number of rules, give up 
trying to cover every particular circumstance, and instead do more training 
to encourage skill at practical reasoning and intuition (p. 10).  
 
Clearly, when it comes to developing moral wisdom, a different skill set is 
required, but the need for trial and error remains. In Luke’s case, Schwartz suggests that 
the custodian’s ability to discern which of his emotional responses would lead to optimal 
outcomes was critical in guiding him towards an appropriate action. Luke had 
experienced a flash of anger and defensiveness, but appears to have learned that allowing 
compassion to guide him through this particular interaction provided a better course of 
203 
 
action. “Luke’s emotions were not random – unstable and uneducated. He was 
compassionate about the right things and angry about the right things. And he had the 
self-control, the emotional-regulating skills – to choose rightly” argues Schwartz (p. 9).  
 Emotions on Schwartz’s view, are not experiences to be suppressed and ignored 
lest they blind one to one’s duty. Rather, moral action is a matter of cultivating emotions 
so that the most appropriate ones are given free rein to motivate action. As Chris 
Gastmans argues, emotions play two further roles in the provision of ethically informed 
nursing practice (and this will hold for any type of caregiving work). Firstly, emotional 
responses tend to draw attention to morally salient details of a situation, whether this is 
disgust at the abuse of a senior or outrage at the machinations of a system that 
consistently neglects and underserves patients suffering from SPMI. Secondly, being 
emotionally attuned to a client and showing the appropriate emotion under particular 
circumstances is key for communicating to a patient that one cares about her (2002, p. 
502 – 503).  
 A complete moral education for care workers would include learning which 
responses to heed and under what circumstances, and perhaps even instilling a response 
to situations that had previously been overlooked at morally relevant. As various 
philosophers contend (Nussbaum, 2003, Ben-Zeev, 2000, Roberts, 1988, Goldie, 2000, 
Helm, 2007, Lacewing, 2005) emotions have an evaluative function and hence carry 
information about our environment in relation to our ends. As such, then, emotions are 
things that can be tutored and educated, given that they sometimes carry false 
information. However, any such education must be closely engaged with practice, since it 
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is only in dealing with concrete others that we encounter the feelings we must to learn to 
assess, navigate and act upon to provide sound and compassionate care.  
The hope here would be to make room for workers such as Trudy to be able to 
discern all morally salient aspects of a situation while also providing them with the 
freedom to consider the possibility that “feeling like hell” represents a morally salient bit 
of information, and may well constitute a worthwhile reason to slow things down in order 
to adequately provide care for Mrs. Jones. The end goal is to cultivate wise workers who 
can be trusted to spot inevitable exceptions to standardized protocol, or to know when 
rules underwriting the relentless drive for efficiency must be bent or broken in order to 
preserve both their own and their patients’ humanity. 
As Bauman’s work suggests, making the space for workers to develop their own 
brand of ethically informed practise is an inherently risky proposition, as we can never be 
sure we’ve got it right. Moreover, as Schwartz suggests, to learn well, mistakes must be 
made. However, as the growing literature on moral distress indicates, mistakes are 
already being made at the level of policy if both patients and caregivers are suffering 
from a lack of the attentive personal care that should be everyone’s due. In light of such 
suffering, coupled with the importance of developing moral wisdom through practise and 
improvisation, there are strong moral grounds for administrative policies that ease 
constraints on workers’ time  and open the discretionary space they need to acquire and 
apply moral wisdom. 
Although there is no easy way to strike a hard and fast balance between the 
requirement for the fair and equitable distribution of health resources and the obligation 
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to provide personalistic treatment,39 one thing is certain: the participation of 
compassionate and morally attuned frontline workers is essential to the process. As 
Nussbaum argues 
the relation between compassion and social institutions should be a two-way 
street: compassionate individuals construct institutions that embody what 
they imagine; and institutions, in turn influence the development of 
compassion in individuals (Nussbaum 2003, p. 405).  
 
It is those working at the ground floor who are best positioned to see suffering and 
understand patients’ personal and emotional needs. Information derived from face-to-face 
encounters is crucial for knowing how to provide decent care, and for this reason care 
workers should be directly involved in shaping policy. While one cannot expect workers 
engrossed in the immediate needs of particular others to fully grasp the big picture or the 
claims of administrative justice,  it is also clear that policymakers, themselves isolated 
from knowledge grounded in personal encounters, often fail to see what is needed for 
effective and compassionate care. 
 In this chapter I have drawn on a moral perspective enriched by an ethics of care to 
raise questions about the limitations of highly rationalized, efficiency-based systems  for 
the delivery of care to vulnerable persons. I have argued that, to the extent that such 
systems supress empathic moral responses to the needs of patients, they may do real harm 
to patients and healthcare workers as well.  The point is that such concerns ought to 
figure into policy-level decision-making regarding the structuring of healthcare. The need 
for such information for the development of sound policy will reappear in the proposals I 
                                                 
39 Nortvert struggles with this very problem, and suggests either the articulation of positive duties to 
provide a “decent level of care” or negative ones specifying which values “ought not under any 
circumstances be overridden when caring for patients” (2001. P. 119). 
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make in Chapter Five regarding the current structuring of ACT work, and especially in 
Chapter Six where I examine current trends influencing the future directions for ACT.  
Thus far, however, I have only examined the moral limitations afflicting inpatient 
caregiving work that is either grossly under resourced, as in the APU with its nine beds, 
or which is carried out within intensely supervised and rationalistically controlled 
settings, as in the first two ethnographies discussed in Chapter Two. However, there is 
another approach to psychiatric care that is explicitly designed to avoid the most obvious 
defects of these two settings while offering more discretion to caregivers. This the 
program for psychiatric outpatients known as Assertive Community Treatment, or ACT. 
The rise of ACT teams can be understood as a direct response to the 
deinstitutionalization of mental healthcare and the need for an effective way of working 
with patients living in the community. The ACT program reflects an understanding of the 
limits of rationalized approaches to psychiatric care and was designed as a means of 
tailoring support for particular patients. Hence, ACT work is highly personal work, and, 
as I shall argue in Chapter Five, in many respects ACT workers' practice shows clear 
affinities with an ethic of care. In order to place our examination of ACT in its larger 
social context, however, we must first understand its origins and development. This will 
by my concern in the next chapter.  
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Chapter Four  
Assertive Community Treatment -- Its Origins and Moral 
Context 
 
Riddled by psychotic illnesses, abandoned by the systems that once 
pledged to care for them as long as they needed care, they are … the 
detritus of the latest fashion in mental-health policy … It is extraordinary 
how immune we have become to their presence. Where we might have once 
felt compassion, revulsion, or fear, now we feel almost nothing at all”  
 
 ~ Paul Appelbaum, 1987, p. 34.  
 
In the 70’s when you got discharged from a psychiatric hospital you were 
lucky if you got hooked up with a psychiatrist or a social worker. Then they 
would give you, and I know this from experience, an hour appointment in 
their office. But then, it often didn’t include all the things that happened 
outside the office. You know I did some public speaking and usually I say,” 
who are you going to call at 2:30 in the morning? It won’t be your 
psychiatrist, it won’t be your social worker. They’re not going to be 
there.” 
 
  ~Chris Buckley, ACT worker/former psychiatric patient. 
 
 
 
Introduction: From wholesale to just-in-time productive methods 
Long gone are what Andrew Scull describes as “mammoth institutions, huge 
custodial warehouses” (1989. p. 305) housing anywhere from 1000 psychiatric patients 
and staff in England, to upwards of 4000 in some American asylums. Even then, 
interestingly, the ethos of mass production was influencing the provision of care so that 
those described by Foucault as “the residue of all residue,” were raw material to be 
processed by a great machine. This is evident from W.A.F Brown’s observation in 1859, 
that due to the size of such institutions, “all transactions, moral as well as economic, must 
be done wholesale," since their "number renders the inmates mere automatons, acted on 
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in this or that fashion according to the rules governing the great machine” (Brown, cited 
in Scull, p. 305).1  
As we have just seen, a shift towards rational standardized treatments based on the 
objective classifications has moved us away from seeing masses of patients languishing 
in the asylums of a bygone era. This is the era of just-in-time manufacturing after all, and 
the use of warehouses is obsolete. Nevertheless, both these approaches are meant to work 
on a mass scale. Nowadays, it is simply the case that we see smaller numbers moving 
through the institutional machinery at any given time. Meanwhile, sorting is an efficient 
procedure requiring little understanding of a person while their subsequent care is sped 
up exponentially in order to accommodate the multitudes waiting for care. Hence, while 
there are differences between these two approaches, neither seems to have served 
psychiatric patients particularly well. 
ACT work, however, is something different as it marks the venturing out of 
professionals from the confines of institutions and out into their clients’ homes. The fact 
that ACT work marks a significant departure from the type of psychiatric practice we’ve 
seen through history, or even in modern institutions today, makes it an important area of 
study. Furthermore, the program is interesting for my purposes insofar as it was 
developed as a response to the sort of impersonal treatment seen, for instance, in the 
                                                          
1 Nor are the mentally ill liable to be typified by experts as “more shameless and filthy in their conduct than 
so many monkeys “displaying a “revolting indecency and obscenity,” (Mercier, 1890, xiv). Mercier, a 19th 
century lecturer on insanity, did not hold an attitude that was particularly unique for his time. As Colin 
Samson notes, during this period other physicians and experts ascribed “an animal nature” to patients 
calling them “disgusting and dirty creatures of base biological motives, lacking the most fundamental 
powers of self-restraint.”  Meanwhile, for the price of admission, members of the public were able to tour 
asylums where inmates would be put on display like animals in a zoo (Samson, 1995, p. 57). 
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APU, and which caused so many patients to fall through the cracks following 
deinstitutionalization.  
As I shall show in this chapter, ACT was created specifically to provide more 
intense individualized support for patients, and relational work lies at the heart of the 
ACT ethos. In fact, as I shall demonstrate in Chapter Five, ACT work is consistent in 
many ways with the care-based ethos advanced in the last chapter. Before conducting a 
moral assessment of this kind of outreach work, it is first necessary to situate it 
historically and explain the nature of the program. Section I outlines the origins of ACT 
as a response to the less than optimal state of community mental healthcare following 
deinstitutionalization. In Section II I move on to explain the ACT model and the extent to 
which relational work lies at its core. Finally in Section III I examine the current state of 
debates around ACT work and show that there is room for further ethical analyses.  
 
I. From Long-term Wards to ‘Crazy in the Streets’ 
 In the mid - 1950s Erving Goffman began researching mental hospitals for his 
highly influential work “Asylums,” and looked to institutions that had not changed much 
from the early 1900s (Grob, 1994). Goffman’s depiction of modern custodial psychiatric 
institutions was bleak. In Asylums Goffman compared mental institutions to other types 
of detention such as prisons or concentration camps in which inmates are separated from 
the rest of society and stripped of their outside identity so as to be reconstituted as a 
mental patient. Goffman also saw patients subjected to humiliation, non-negotiable rules 
and restrictions, hostility and oppressive power relations (Goffman, 1961). His work then 
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would be a highly influential force for justifying the shutdown of a great many such 
institutions.2 
Various factors are regularly cited to have contributed to this enormous shift in the 
treatment of the mentally ill including the introduction of chlorpromazine (Thorazine) in 
the 1950s, which instilled a certain level of optimism regarding the treatment of even the 
most severe cases of mental illness. This, in turn fueled hopes that patients might one day 
be made well enough to return to the community (Grob, p. 230). Meanwhile, Thomas 
Szasz, who argued that mental illness was a myth and treatment nothing more than social 
control (Szasz, 1974) was also gaining recognition, as was the work of R. D. Laing who 
held that so-called insane behaviour was actually an appropriate response to a 
pathological society (Laing, 1967/1990).  
The 1960s were also seeing the eruption of an anti-establishment ethos coupled 
with sustained critiques of cultural influences encouraging conformity. Given these 
intellectual trends many would have been inclined to turn on an institution such as 
psychiatry that both assumed a position of authority and included practitioners who 
sought to control and modify behaviour deemed abnormal. With the civil rights 
movement coming into full swing, moreover, freedom was in the air, as it were. As Paul 
                                                          
2 The book Shrink Resistant, a collection of Canadian consumer survivor stories from the 1960s through to 
the mid-eighties, does much to confirm Goffman’s observations. In this book, psychiatric inmates reveal 
how wearing clothing was often conceived of as a “privilege” on a mental ward. As Ketu Kingston 
describes it, “[t]he nurses scolded “Now you know you haven’t earned any privileges yet—you are to wear 
the pajamas we give you!”” According to Kingstu, she was issued  
 
an ugly lime-green pair of pyjamas, at which point I turned them inside out and 
wore the bottoms on my top and the tops on my bottom. Whiffling down my 
bottoms, they gave me a needle. NOT APPROPRIATE (an all-powerful phrase 
which was a rationale to keep you in your place and earned you a lengthier stay if 
ignored, I soon discovered)” (Burstow and Weitz, 1988, p. 256).  
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Appelbaum notes, civil-libertarian attorneys armed with a set of values in which 
“individual autonomy was paramount,” launched numerous challenges upon statutes 
concerning involuntary commitment. Once the dust from these legal battles settled, 
psychiatric patients could only be committed involuntarily if they posed a demonstrable 
danger to self or others (Appelbaum, 1987, p. 34 - 35) a standard that appears to become 
increasingly difficult to reach.3 
All of these factors contributed to the mass exodus from institutions in 
industrialized countries. In the US, Medicaid was launched in 1965, which provided 
federal funds for community psychiatric treatment, while long-term institutional care 
continued to be covered by the states (Stein and Santos, p. 10). As a result, individual 
state-funded asylums rushed to offload the costs of treatment to the federal government 
by moving patients into the community. The threat of being locked away in an asylum 
indefinitely is a thing of the past in Canada as well and between 1960 and 1976 the 
number of beds in Canadian mental hospitals dropped from 47,633 to 15,011 (Wasylenki, 
Goering, & MacNaughton, 1994, p. 346). Meanwhile, in the US 400,000 patients were 
released from mental hospitals between 1965 and 1975 (Stein and Santos, p. 10).  
The generalized downsizing trend in the provision of inpatient care only gained 
momentum over time, but was not matched by significant increases in community 
supports. For instance, when Ronald Regan assumed office in 1980, only 650 community 
                                                          
3 In a recent story in the New York Times, Robert Davies, executive director for mental health services in 
New Jersey was interviewed and described cases in which clients could not be committed. The reporter 
writes “a man who was convinced that aliens were on the roof and that bugs were coming out of the walls 
and who would not sit on furniture but only lie on the floor was not committable. Neither was the man who 
refused medication and mutilated his own testicles. Nor the woman who wouldn’t eat because she believed 
the C.I.A. was trying to poison her. “It is unbelievable the condition of people who are found not to meet 
the standard,” Davison says.” (Interlandi, 2012). 
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health centers had been built, a number much lower than the 2,000 that John F. 
Kennedy’s administration had, in 1963, mandated be in place by this time (Grob, p. 281). 
One result of this this lack of funding was the “revolving door syndrome” so vividly 
captured in Rhodes’ ethnography of the APU. This syndrome refers to the behaviour of 
those “despised repeaters” who after being swiftly stabilized in hospital and released, turn 
up again days, weeks or months later looking for care, and this was largely due to a lack 
of supports in community. 
In Canada, a similar situation obtained. 
As in the United States, initial enthusiasm for deinstitutionalization 
dampened with the awareness that many discharged patients were leading 
impoverished lives in the community, swelling the ranks of the homeless 
and those in jails. In response, in the 1970s provincial governments began 
to flow funds to community mental health programs. Despite ongoing 
interest in enhancing community supports, this sector of the mental health 
treatment system remains underfunded, consuming only about 3% of 
provincial mental health budgets in 1990 (Wasylenki, Goering, & 
MacNaughton, 1994, p. 346).  
 
Pat Capponi, a Canadian consumer survivor describes the situation of 
many at this time. 
Imagine being told over and over for years that you have to be locked up. And 
then some clown is standing there talking about how it’s time for you to go; being 
in hospital isn’t good for you … This hospital, this staff, the patients and the 
people you’ve been locked up with for years have become closer than the siblings 
you no longer remember, but no one seems to mind that for a second time you’ve 
been surgically removed from your family. No one talks about missing you. No 
one addresses the fears that are churning up in your guts. Seventeen years later, 
bloated by meds and starchy foods, in donated clothing, with a cough that can be 
heard four floors up, they send you out. No nurses, no shrinks, no clean sheets, no 
full meals, no daily ration of tobacco – you have to swallow this thing called 
freedom (1992, p. 29).  
 
Capponi was both institutionalized and lived in the halfway homes that sprouted up to 
accommodate the tide of patients moving into the community. After being released from 
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a mental hospital in and around 1980, she recalls meeting Gary. Gary had been in an 
institution for 17 years before suddenly being released. “Yep,” he told her, “They sent me 
there from training school. Then the assholes give me a bus ticket and an address and I 
wind up in this house” (Capponi. 1992, p. 27). In the house there were as many as four to 
a room, and it lacked laundry facilities. The bathroom door did not lock and was always 
busy, so bathing was not possible. “Not to mention that there was no plug for the tub, or 
hand soap, or towels, or curtain, or mat” notes Capponi (p. 26).  
 As for the services that were supposed to be in place in the community for 
former mental patients, according to psychiatrists Roger Peele and Paul Chodoff, many 
patients would find themselves turned away from agencies meant to serve them (1999, p. 
427). As Peele and Chodoff describe it, the nature of bureaucratic systems is such that a 
major concern is to avoid being embarrassed by the acts or omissions of a constituent 
department. In other words what leaders want most from their mental health departments 
is silence, as this equates to a lack of public scrutiny.  
 This objective, moreover, is most easily achieved with a narrower mandate and 
clients who are most easily helped. Peele and Chodoff note 
 
When the disabled psychiatric patient moved from the public state mental 
hospital to the community, the responsibility for that patient, at best, is 
moved from one agency to many: departments of housing, welfare, 
vocational rehabilitation, recreation, etc., all striving to narrow their 
accountability, with predictable unfortunate results for discharged patients, 
many of whom fall between the cracks” (Peele and Chodoff, p. 427). 
 
Appelbaum sums up the end result of such government downsizing 
alongside changes to civil commitment when he observed in 1987 that 
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chronically mentally ill people constituted “an inescapable presence in urban 
America,” where they could ever be found living in subway tunnels and parks or 
left to “die in cardboard boxes on windswept streets.” “Dying,” as psychiatrist 
Darryl Treffert puts it, “with their rights on” (Treffert, cited in Appelbaum, 
1994, p. 30).  
 
II.  ACT: Committed Relationships in the Community 
As deinstitutionalization was in full swing in the late 1970’s three psychiatrists 
who were sympathetic to the anti-authoritarian ethos that had been gaining momentum in 
their day were also becoming familiar with the revolving door syndrome that plagued 
Rhodes’ APU. In light of these factors, Leonard Stein, Mary Ann Test and Arnold Marx 
strove to address the situation of patients diagnosed with Severe Prolonged Mental Illness 
(SPMI) in a way that did not require institutionalization. As they saw it, if it was neither 
ethical nor affordable to house patients with severe mental illness, then the time had 
come to take psychiatry into patients’ communities and into their very homes. 
Today, the quintessential ACT client is a person with some form of debilitating 
psychosis who has spent 50 days or more in hospital per year, lacks stable housing and 
enjoys few “natural” social supports by way of family or friends. People, in other words, 
who in earlier times would have been committed to long-term asylums, and who were 
abandoned during the era of deinstitutionalization. Since the inception of ACT, Stein, 
Test and Marx focussed on patients diagnosed with some form of SPMI and who tend to 
vacillate between a stable phase and an “out of control” phase characterised by 
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“psychosis with delusions, hallucinations, and bizarre behavior” (Stein and Santos, 1998, 
p. 41).  
ACT’s originators recognized that such individuals require a high level of 
support, not just because they are vulnerable to stress, but because they have difficulty 
relating to others, poor basic coping skills and difficulty transferring learning into 
different domains (p. 42). Such deficits often bring multiple failures leading to a 
downward spiral that ends in relapse and another admission to hospital. Given this 
vicious circle, Santos and Stein note regarding the shift from asylums to short term 
hospital stays, “what was accomplished was the replacement of one inadequate mode of 
care … with another (p. 41).  
A large part of the problem for such patients is that SPMI is marked by a 
persistent inability to cope with the demands of a complex modern society coupled with a 
high level of vulnerability to the stress occasioned by the effects of this inability. In this 
way, those with SPMI can become “sources of error” in the rationally organized systems 
they rely on for housing, healthcare, income support, work and the like. The vulnerability 
ascribed to patients, moreover, is perhaps more of a reflection of the interdependence of 
these numerous systems wherein failing to maintain one’s position within one, causes the 
rest to come crashing down like a set of dominoes. Relapse leading to a long hospital 
stay, for example, could lead to eviction, which in turn could mean that disability cheques 
must be rerouted, phone calls confirming medical appointments missed, work days lost 
and so on, so that the resulting levels of stress from the ensuing collapse would be 
overwhelming for most people, not merely the mentally ill. The highly bureaucratized 
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environment that governs most our lives is taken for granted and normalized, while those 
unable to meet its demands are pathologized.4 
ACT’s creators also recognized that the standardized treatment plans offered by 
bureaucratized community mental health centers at this time were no better in providing 
treatment for patients diagnosed with SPMI. A whole host of circumstantial factors could 
interfere with a patients’ ability to conform to such plans, such as a patients’ inability to 
navigate public transport, as well as anxieties around meeting and confiding in a new 
clinician. Rather than writing such patients off as “unmotivated” Stein, Test and Marx’s 
strategy for working with people persistently falling through the cracks was to eschew 
standardized approaches altogether in favour of  highly individualized care. To this end, 
they sought to “tailor programming to individual needs” and prescribe “regularly updated 
plans that incorporate clients’ changing situations and their wishes.” It is “critically 
important,” Stein and Santos note in regards to history taking, to learn clients’ attitudes 
towards earlier forms of care and their preferences (p. 75). Hence, gaining a client’s trust 
and getting to know him well is crucial on the ACT model.  
To better achieve such goals and to tailor treatment to clients’ actual lives, in the 
1970’s the originators of ACT proposed to move hospital staff into the community and be 
made available to patients twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Patient programs 
were to be individually based on an assessment of particular patients’ coping skill deficits 
                                                          
4 Given this, it is interesting to speculate whether the poorer outcomes for schizophrenia in industrial 
societies (Hopper, 2003, p. 62) have more to do with the fact that the deficits associated with the illness are 
far more evident, and represent far more of a liability within an environment imbued with highly structured 
rationally organized systems designed to govern virtually every aspect of functioning within industrialized 
mass societies.  
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and requirements for community living. Most treatment took place in vivo – in patients’ 
homes, neighbourhoods, and places of work where workers taught and assisted patients 
with their activities of daily living such as laundry upkeep, shopping, cooking, restaurant 
use, grooming, budgeting, and use of public transportation.  
Stein and Santos note, “rather than being consistent with the traditions, 
philosophy, and practice of the field, the ACT program was incompatible with them ... a 
hundred years of hospital treatment, as the primary locus of care for persons with serious 
and persistent mental illness, was challenged” (Stein and Santos, 1998, p. 36). As a 
resident at the time, Stein was keen to go “against the current” of contemporary 
psychiatric practise. Both he and Marx had completed their residency under the tutelage 
of professors who opposed the biological turn in psychiatry, favouring psychosocial 
perspectives instead. Thomas Szasz was also a regular visitor to the University of 
Wisconsin, where the two completed their early training, and his views were echoed by 
Dr. Seymour Halleck, a popular lecturer in the department. “This was during the 1960s,” 
write Santos and Stein, adding that it was  
a heady time, when being anti-establishment was becoming very much in 
vogue. Given this strong antimedical bias, coupled with very strong beliefs 
that the mentally ill were unjustly incarcerated in mental hospitals, it is not 
surprising that, upon Dr. Ludwig’s departure [a former director of the special 
treatment unit interested in inpatient care], Drs Stein and Marx were primed to 
do community instead of hospital psychiatry (Stein and Santos, 1998, p. 17).  
 
As Stein and Santos tell it, hospital management saw plans of venturing out to work 
in the community as a radical departure from routine inpatient practises and therefore 
resisted early proposals. The authors explain 
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The idea was not congruent with the traditions and practice of the mental 
health sector. In fact, it was directly contrary to usual practices and 
inconsistent with the usual procedure of the health business environment. 
Its course was hazardous and its survival was tenuous; it was rarely 
nurtured or protected financially. Its growth was not encouraged by 
administrators, clinicians, or academicians (p. 34).  
 
In spite of the initial barriers erected by administrators, however, Stein, Test and Marx 
prevailed. They rented a house in downtown Madison as their base of operations for the 
program “Training in Community Living,” the precursor to ACT. Marx died in 1975, and 
the other two carried on work that would culminate in a distinctive treatment model that 
is currently being adopted across the globe.  
 
III. The ACT Model 
In their how-to-guide for ACT teams, Assertive Community Treatment for Persons 
with Severe Mental Illness (dubbed the “Act Bible” by one of my subjects), Stein and 
Santos describe their program model extensively. At the core of ACT work is the 
“continuous care strategy” that eschews quick fixes and looks instead at establishing “a 
lifelong supportive relationship” with clients. Santos and Stein note 
Such a commitment provides an anchor in the community for people in a 
pattern of repeated hospitalizations and failed living arrangements. The long-
term trusting relationship with the team becomes a vehicle for change in and 
of itself (Stein and Santos, p. 50). 
 
The therapeutic relationship, then, is seen as central to ACT work, and maintaining this 
relationship is a clear priority.  
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The authors also hold that workers must be broadly involved in clients’ lives and 
that no arbitrary time constraints5 limit the duration of treatment. “ACT research clearly 
showed that services may have to be provided over long periods of time and, in some 
cases, a lifetime,” note Stein and Santos (p. 48). ACT workers should broadly focus on 
all other aspects of patients’ lives and strive to become the “fixed point of responsibility 
for all aspects of the person’s life that affect his or her stability in the community” (p. 
47).  
One way to insure a patient doesn’t fall through the cracks between service 
providers is to provide as comprehensive a set of services as possible, while taking 
responsibility for the rest. As such team members are not simply responsible for 
delivering meds, but also for helping clients with tasks related to maintaining a life in the 
community, such as managing housing, setting and attending medical appointments, and 
maintaining finances. Workers also provide substance abuse counselling and 
transportation when needed. Apart from providing support in a variety of domains, 
monitoring is also a key aspect of ACT work “to be aware of relapse as early as possible, 
so that rapid intervention may be employed to avoid a full-blown psychotic episode” (p. 
47) and thereby avoid a hospital admission. To this end, workers must be familiar with 
each clients’ distinctive signs of relapse.  
                                                          
5 For instance, one approach was to shift patients away from supportive facilities at predetermined 
intervals. Hence a patient would move from a hospital to a ¾ way house for a set period of time, such as 6 
months, before he is again moved into a halfway house and so on, in an attempt, or so it would appear, to 
wean him off supported living. These fixed time periods may seem arbitrary to a caregiver looking at a 
particular client’s situation. However, from the perspective of a policymaker or funding agency, it is clear 
that predetermined periods of time allow for better calculations and predictions of costs.  
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Typically, moreover, ACT teams will have a team leader who is someone other 
than the psychiatrist.6 However, Santos and Stein’s conception of an ACT team is that 
decision-making is shared, so the team leadership should be “egalitarian in nature” (p. 
66). Each regular member, moreover, acts as the “primary” for up to 10 clients, meaning 
that she is the “primary point of contact” 7 for those clients (p. 49), and, according to my 
own observations, will tend to have a greater say in decision-making in and around them. 
The primary is also responsible for formulating a treatment plan and presenting extended 
updates to the rest of the team every six months or so. However, the authors stress that 
“the responsibility for the total client caseload is shared by all, even though persons on 
the team serve as the primary contacts for the team” (p. 71) so that over time clients know 
all staff members and vice versa.  
  Contrary to the suggestion that the “assertive” in ACT refers to an imperative to 
aggressively control clients, Stein and Santos explain that “it dictates that the team must 
be assertive about knowing what is going on with clients and acting quickly and 
decisively when action is called for.” As for the notion that ACT workers aim to control 
clients, they add “the major goal of ACT is to help clients live successfully in the 
community, and the beauty of living in the community, as contrasted with living in an 
institution, is that clients are in control of their own lives” (p. 75).    
 
                                                          
6 The authors’ anti-establishment roots show when they suggest that psychiatrists might have “difficulty in 
finding a comfortable place in the team hierarchy” because most “are uncomfortable having a nonphysician 
as their “boss.”” They note further that this is “as much a cultural and political problem as a clinical one” 
(p.60).  
7 Santos and Stein shy away from the term ‘case management’ since this objectifies people as cases to be 
managed and suggests “passivity on their (the clients’) part in the treatment process” (p. 49).  
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IV. Ethical Responses to ACT 
In their work, Stein and Santos also emphasize the need for workers “to accept – 
and to believe to the core of one’s soul—that ACT clients are first and foremost citizens 
with all the rights and responsibilities of citizenship,” adding that due to their disabilities, 
these citizens see some of the greatest levels of discrimination in society. “The struggle to 
help them live successfully in the community is as much a civil rights issue as a clinical 
one” (p. 77), contend Stein and Santos, demonstrating the centrality of community 
integration not only as the guiding purpose of ACT work, but also for conceptions of the 
program as an essentially moral enterprise. 
Although Stein and Santos’ may have a stated respect for clients’ civil rights, 
some patients do perceive the service as oppressive. That is, clients are not always 
pleased by attention from ACT workers. One client interviewed by Jay Watts and Stefan 
Priebe for example comments that he is ‘just trying to work out how I can stop them 
seeing me now. I don’t have a choice, they just come. They don’t listen sometimes. 
They’ll change some appointments but won’t change them all” (2002, p. 449). In general, 
ACT is not without its critics, and is seen by some as overly paternalistic and as an 
infringement upon clients’ rights and freedoms.  
Such critiques, however, are not particularity broadly based. Despite the existence 
of a voluminous body of empirical studies in the literature, ethical examinations of ACT 
are reportedly been few and far between (Watts and Priebe, 2002, p. 442). As Appelbaum 
and Stephanie Le Melle note, moreover, criticisms of ACT mostly concern coercion 
(2008, p. 459). ACT workers face an acute paradox, argue Watts and Priebe, in that “the 
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model has the therapeutic aspiration of increasing personal autonomy, yet the program 
aims to engage people whose actions exemplify that they do not want to be involved with 
psychiatric services” (2002, p. 442). Jeffrey Stovall succinctly captures this paradox by 
asking, “is treatment that won’t go away ethical?” (2001, p. 140).  
According to Brodwin, moreover, patients’ autonomy and the value placed upon 
fidelity to those in need constitutes an “ethical plateau,” a term Brodwin borrows from 
Michael Fisher (Fisher, 2003) to describe a particular configuration of technologies, 
institutions and ideologies that shape particular fields.  
An ethical plateau operates as a legacy of the past in the present. It extends 
its influence forward in time by establishing an armature of notions about 
right and wrong that subsequently gets reproduced in other settings, in 
other registers, and in the voices of actors (clinicians, patients, advocates, 
policymakers, etc.) who enter the scene long after the original debates have 
faded away” (Brodwin, 2008, p. 137).  
 
In the case of ACT, the legacy to which Brodwin refers are the debates discussed above 
between civil rights lawyers defending patients’ autonomy, and opposing concerns raised 
by legal scholars such as Appelbaum, aghast at the gross levels of neglect of the mentally 
ill in society during the period of deinstitutionalization. As a result, the field of discourse 
largely sees a tension between the value of autonomy versus “fidelity” to clients.  
To see how this plateau plays out in the literature, one can examine firstly the 
work of Tori Gomory, who contends that ACT is paternalistic and harmful. Gomory 
argues that the program is overly focussed on a biomedical approach and is inherently 
coercive. He cites instances of workers ordering patients out of bed to go to work to 
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support his claims and also looks to the work of a “close associate” of Stein and Santos, 
who writes 
Paternalism has been a part of assertive community treatment from its 
very beginning.... In the early stages of PACT,8 consumer 
empowerment was not a serious consideration.. it was designed to "do" 
for the client what the client could not do for himself or herself. Staff 
were assumed to know what the client "needed." Even the goal of 
getting clients paid employment was a staff driven value that was at 
times at odds with the client’s own preferences.... A significant number 
of clients in community support programs have been assigned a 
financial payee … This kind of coercion can be extremely effective.... 
Obtaining spending money can be made dependent on participating in 
other parts of treatment. A client can then be pressured by staff to take 
prescribed medication … the pressure to take medication can be 
enormous....While control of housing and control of money are the most 
common methods of coercion in the community other kinds of control 
are also possible. This pressure can be almost as coercive as the hospital 
but with fewer safeguards. (Diamond, cited in Gomory, 1999, p 7 - 8). 
 
Gomory also examines instances of suicides that have occurred among patients of ACT 
teams and asks “can such coercive scrutiny be counter-therapeutic?”  He then suggests 
that patients may be “managed to death, but no one is likely to sit down and spend … 
time discussing your experiences, thoughts, feelings and reactions” (Mosher and Burti, 
1989, cited in Gomory, 2001, p. 183).   
 Others argue, however, that there is little evidence to support claims regarding 
coercion, nor are there higher rates of suicide among ACT clients. Clients consistently 
report high satisfaction levels with ACT service across studies, while yet further research 
shows that few clients describe ACT teams as being overly coercive (Appelbaum and Le 
Melle, 2008, p. 459). As for ACT teams that are coercive, one response from advocates 
of ACT is to stress that such teams have departed from the ACT model (Krupa et al, 
                                                          
8 Program of Assertive Community Treatment. 
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2005, p. 23). ACT originators Test and Santos, meanwhile admit that in its early days, 
ACT was overly paternalistic, and that health practitioners did assume that the staff 
“knew best.”  They add, however, that  
Fortunately, the courageous voices of consumers, along with years of 
experience, have led us to see the enormous strengths of persons with 
mental illness. The assertive community treatment model has evolved 
into one of ongoing collaboration with consumers in making and 
reviewing decisions about goals and methods. The model will continue 
to improve only when we work in partnership with consumers (Test and 
Stein, 2001, p. 1396). 
 
In fact one recommendation of Stein and Santos is that teams include a peer counsellor 
on staff, which is to say someone who has herself experienced SPMI and has been 
through the system. One might hope that the presence of such persons on teams helps to 
curtail abuses of clients.  
Meanwhile, some clients’ reports of ACT make it difficult to accept depictions of 
ACT as more aggressively coercive than a consistent source of material and social 
support for people in need 
I was living in the streets all over the country… all I had was the clothes 
on my back. And they got me into a little trailer, they got me food, they 
got me money assistance, and then I just kinda worked my way up. I 
have a nice home now, it took me a long time…During the whole time 
they were very, very, very supportive… It was very enjoyable and they 
helped a lot. If I had any problems, if it wasn’t going good – they were 
right there, and they got me through a lot. If it wasn’t for the ACT team, 
I’d be living under a bridge... ACT team was one of the best things that 
ever happened to me in my life… it was the first real help I ever got… 
practical, physical help. Being there for moral support… If I needed 
hospitalization they were there, and they would come and check on me. 
One of the best things in my whole life! (McCall and Wakefield, 2012, 
p. 32).  
 
225 
 
Relationally speaking, moreover, there appears to be much to be said for ACT 
since, as research has shown, “clients long to connect not only with their case managers, 
but also to the social world” with some ACT clients saying the program provides them 
with just such a conduit (Buck and Alexander, 2006, p. 472). To illustrate the value 
clients place on their relation with workers, researchers cite a subject describing a time 
when he was fearing an eviction. 
She comforted me and explained that they would probably not throw me 
out but that they would need to give me notice. She was there for me, not 
for her job or the system, but because she wanted to be” (p. 476).  
 
These relational aspects of ACT work has caused some to aim to reconfigure the field of 
moral discourse related to community treatment. Psychiatrist Richard Christensen, for 
example, argues that the reigning virtues that should guide community psychiatry ought 
to be compassion, as marked by an involved understanding of patients and a willingness 
take their pain seriously, humility, without which practitioners can become “inflated with 
self-importance and oblivious to the possibility that our decisions may be hurtful or even 
downright wrong,” and fidelity to clients, or a refusal to abandon people who refuse 
treatment (Christensen, 1995, p. 1217). 
 Given that ACT is coming to represent an increasingly dominant treatment 
modality for persons diagnosed with SPMI, a claim that is well-supported in Chapter 
Six, moral evaluations of the program are especially valuable. Furthermore, to date, 
and possibly due to the relative newness of the program, ACT has yet to be thoroughly 
morally evaluated in the literature. As we have seen, moreover, current moral evaluations 
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focus largely on those concepts such as autonomy and consent, which are largely 
associated with contemporary rationo-centric moral theories.  
In keeping with the moral outlook advanced in Chapter Three then, I shall go 
against the grain, as it were, and attempt a moral ethnography of ACT through the lens of 
an ethics of care. In Chapter Three, I endorsed care-respect as the ideal ethical relation, 
while noting that an essential feature of this attitude is a recognition of another person’s 
me-ness. Arriving at this me-ness, as was shown requires the patient attentiveness of 
loving perception as well as the application of our imaginative resources to stretch, as it 
were, our own pre-conceptions of the other. Lugones, moreover, shows us that attention 
to the subjectivity of the other is what matters for relatedness, and that it is important to 
understand that the other is not a static being, she changes depending on her location in 
both time and space, and her subjective experience will change accordingly. 
The results of my ethnography suggest that, in contrast to the disengaged, rule-
bound approach to treatment found in so many psychiatric settings,  the daily practices of 
ACT teams begin to approach the alternative conception of morality advanced in Chapter 
Three. Certainly its workers enact many of the relational practices described there and 
generally seem to speak of their clients in both a caring and respectful way. Moreover, 
the othering described in hospital environments is only conspicuous in its absence from 
the discourse of team members. These differences, it would seem, represent good first 
steps on the road to the cultivation of an attitude that is consistent with care, which would 
be the bare minimum for assuming an attitude of care respect.  
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As I shall try to show, the daily practices of ACT teams also include some 
elements that go beyond those usually found in accounts of care-based ethics, though 
they help to build the imaginative sympathies that make care respect possible. Here I am 
thinking of a certain kind of  storytelling often seen in team meetings, which appears to 
stretch participants’ understanding of clients, while also reinforcing the subjectivity and 
agential nature of those being described. Many of these stories seem to be of a kind that 
contributes to the cultivation of genuine fondness or care for each of  these individuals by 
situating him or her as ‘one of ours.’  
As I noted in my introduction, in conventional mental health settings acts of this  
nature are often “disappeared,” in either being trivialised or not acknowledged at all. 
Hence, there is value in bringing them to light and seeing how certain phenomena emerge 
as morally salient and even praiseworthy when situated within a paradigm that privileges 
a caring attitude and concern for “me-ness.’ Nevertheless, ACT work is challenging 
work, and we also see that it can cause workers to suffer from a sense of futility. This 
response is likely a direct reflection of the situation facing the people they serve – a fact 
that calls for limits in what we expect of these workers, while pointing to the need for a 
workplace structured to accommodate the emotional challenges they invariably face.    
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Chapter Five 
A Moral Ethnography of ACT 
 
“I often think a lot of the clients don’t have advocates or family members saying they 
deserve better. Some do, but there are very few. Family members are supportive but 
can realize how our hands are tied in a lot of ways. It is rare, and a lot of clients don’t 
have advocates and I think ‘ok, our job is to advocate for them.’ We are the people 
who see them and get the glimpse into that life. But then you are advocating against 
yourself in a way. You are saying ‘yes you need more things, you need a better life, but 
I can’t do that for you.’”  
  ~Rose Neilson, ACT worker 
 
Having described the history, purpose, and structure of ACT, as well as the 
contemporary state of ethical debates around such services, it is now time to take a closer 
look at the actual practices of workers. As I showed at the end of the previous chapter, 
there is still room for further ethical analyses of ACT work. Hence, after describing the 
particular team I observed and its daily functions, as well as the nature of my research 
and its guiding questions in this chapter I will conduct a moral ethnography of ACT from 
the perspective of care ethics. Section I presents the ACT team I observed and describes 
the nature of the research conducted. In Section II I highlight central aspects of the work 
which tend to be undervalued both under the RTS paradigm described in Chapter One 
and under the rationalistic conceptions of morality described in Chapter Three.  
The most important result of my research was the relative absence of  the 
“othering” so prominent in most conventional mental health settings examined earlier. 
Rather, as I note in Section II, ACT workers appear attentive to clients’ uniqueness. 
Team members engage in “world-travelling” as a matter of course, and are responsive to 
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clients’ individualized needs. As I shall also argue, the central role of storytelling as the 
dominant medium for communication about patients helps to keep othering tendencies at 
bay. In light of all these factors combined, we see workers demonstrating an attitude that 
is compatible with Dillon’s conception of care-respect1 and consistent with the kind of 
openness to a person’s otherness advocated by feminist care-ethicists described in my 
chapter on moral theory. 
While ACT workers do exhibit a caring and respectful attitude towards their 
clients, they are also constrained by certain rationalistic requirements built into their 
mandate. As anthropologist Paul Brodwin (2011), notes, pressures upon ACT workers to 
produce quantifiable signs of progress results in a narrow conception of particular clients 
and limits the fullness of ACT workers’ accounts of such clients. Here, as I argue in 
Section III, elements of the RTS paradigm described in Chapter One re-enter the picture 
with predictably negative effects. Beyond hindering client/patient relationships, the 
pressure for a “narrative of  progress” can easily lead to a sense of futility among workers 
and, beyond that, can cause empathetic suffering in workers due to constant reminders 
that clients’ lives will never change.  
Their own empathetic suffering does not appear to have inured workers to the 
suffering of their charges, and this is probably due to the development of certain tactics. 
After examining further aspects of the job in Section IV that can cause workers to suffer 
due to their inability to respond to the call of their patients, in Section V  I describe 
                                                 
1 I am not licensed to conclude that workers do show their clients care-respect because I was not able to 
observe them in the field. Having only observed discourse in team meetings, I can only conclude that the 
way they speak about their clients together is suggestive of this attitude.  
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tactics workers employ to push back against pessimism and despair. As we shall see, 
some of these tactics crucially depend on having the time and the space to conduct their 
work as they see fit. Finally, in Section VI I suggest that a fuller appreciation of the 
intrinsic value of unearthing clients’ stories and thereby achieving a rich and nuanced 
understanding they provide might ease the sense of futility such difficult work is apt to 
occasion. This recommendation yet again reinforces and reiterates earlier calls in Chapter 
Three to provide workers with the time and space necessary to cultivate caring and 
respectful relations with clients and to ethically enrich their practices.  
 
I. Sunnydale Hospital ACT Team 
Data Collection, Research Questions and Ethics 
Over the course of my research I took detailed field notes on 42 morning meetings 
of the ACT team over a six-month period, attending two meetings per week. These 
meetings, which might be likened to hospital rounds, took place for at least one hour at 
the beginning of each regular workday, Monday – Friday at 8:00 am. One of the two 
meetings I attended each week was specially designated to focus on a “clinical situation” 
or on complicated issues ranging from technical problems to ethical quandaries. 
Sometimes such a situation would be selected in advance by a team member, while at 
others team members would reach a consensus about what to discuss during the allotted 
time. I endeavored to attend that meeting. At the end of my six-month observational 
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period, I also recorded and later transcribed semi-structured interviews with 11 of the 13 
core workers.2  
Before the research began, I made a presentation to the ACT team stressing that I 
was interested in their everyday ethical behaviour. Given that relational values are said to 
drive much of the work of ACT due to the need to preserve a long-term therapeutic 
relationship, I wanted to see whether connectedness with clients did indeed take center 
stage in their work. Where such values did appear, I hoped to learn how they were 
expressed and how these played out in practice. In other words, what could ACT team 
show us about maintaining supportive and enduring client/patients relationships? Finally, 
I also remained alert to ethical dilemmas that might arise due to workers’ commitment to 
relationships with clients while working under the rationalistic requirements of their 
institution. Here my concern was to understand how workers navigate this difficult 
terrain.3  
Having heard my presentation, team members then took an anonymous vote on 
whether the research should proceed with the stipulation that the group had to be 
unanimously in favour for this to occur. After the vote was taken, each team member 
signed a consent form vetted by both York University’s research ethics board and the 
employees’ own research ethics board. The form guaranteed workers’ anonymity and 
                                                 
2 Of the core workers, I was unable to schedule an interview with Guy, the recreational therapist, or Henry, 
the head psychiatrist. 
3 Given that I was only privy to talk among team members over the course of my research, this last 
question, although perhaps most interesting, was the most difficult to answer. Navigation of competing 
obligations is something that is more apt to occur in the field as opposed to phenomena  that is apt to be 
revealed in the course of a team meeting.  
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their right to withdraw from the study at any time. All names appearing below are 
pseudonyms that were also used during the process of data collection.  
Core Team 
Talia Powell: Team leader/Social worker in her mid-30s. Had been with the team eight 
years having started as an intern out of school. Talia was generally conscious of keeping 
things moving along, especially if things got a bit boisterous, but would indulge in the 
odd dry remark or funny anecdote.  
 
Stephanie Silver: Social worker (speciality in addictions) in her early 30s. She was 
completing her MSW and working full time and had been with the team for 3 years. She 
was a vocal participant in team meetings who laughed easily and would tease other 
members including the psychiatrists.  
 
Otto Ball: Psychosocial psychiatric rehabilitation therapist (BA in psychology and post 
grad specialization in psychiatric rehabilitation) in his late 30’s. Otto had been with the 
team for 9 years. In meetings Otto demonstrated a concern to preserve relationships with 
other agencies as well as the therapeutic relationship with clients. 
 
Trevor Moore: Occupational therapist in his late 20’s who has worked with the team a 
little over a year. He was in the same program as Rose. Guy, another team member, 
openly dubbed him Clark Kent due to his conservative looking presentation.  
 
Rose Neilson: Occupational therapist around Trevor’s age who has been with the team 
1.5 years. Rose appeared a bit hesitant to voice her opinion in team meetings, although 
her interview revealed her to be very articulate and thoughtful. She also seemed to be 
emotionally impacted by her clients  
 
Greg Anderson: Social worker. He was in his mid-20’s and had worked with street-
involved youth before starting with the team a month into my research. Greg was less 
outspoken during meetings, but was getting accustomed to the team and his new job at 
the time. 
 
Beth Carpenter: Nurse. Beth was in her early 20’s and was the youngest member of the 
team. She had been with the team just over 1 year. Beth was the only other non-
Caucasian member of the team apart from Peter.  
 
Diane Palmer: Nurse. Diane was in her late 30’s and had been with team a little over 2 
years. Diane, as Beth said, ‘has a heart.’ She genuinely seems to care for her clients and 
was most outspoken when it came to injustices suffered by them.  
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Chris Buckley: Peer support worker. Chris is a consumer survivor with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. Chris was in his 50’s and has been with team 10 years occupying .6 of a 
position. He was rarely in team meetings due to the fact that he is part time. He also 
suffered from insomnia so he tended to take evening shifts.  
 
Peter Layton: Peter is one of 2 part-time psychiatrists with the team. He is non-
Caucasian and also works on an Ethic-specific ACT team. Peter was thoughtful and 
articulate and during their interviews, most of the team members flagged his 
contributions as especially valuable. He is respectful of other team members and is highly 
diplomatic. He is not without an apparent sense of humour, but he jokes less than Henry. 
 
Henry Murphy: Head psychiatrist who has been with the team for over 10 years. Henry 
will tend to take over from selected chairs during meetings and will move things along. 
Henry has been with the team since the beginning and is also the director of the 
Westview Hospital inpatient unit, such that there is an onus upon him to keep beds free. 
This causes conflicts with other team members who sometimes press to have certain 
patients hospitalized but who meet resistance from the psychiatrists.  
 
Guy Dawson: Recreation therapist. 40’s and longstanding member of the team. Guy was 
tremendously fit (he’d recently competed in an Iron Man competition) and appeared to 
have a lot of energy. Guy had recently had a client throw hot coffee in his face while 
another wanted to include Guy in her will but was disallowed from doing so.  
 
Gail Powers: Nurse in her early 20’s who was quiet and soft spoken. Although her 
mother was a nurse, her parents do not support her work because they feel it is too 
dangerous. As a result, she does not feel that she can talk about what she does to her 
family or spouse and doubted she would be on the team much longer.  
 
Tammy Hanson.  Nurse in her mid-20’s. Tammy left the ACT team to work in geriatrics 
shortly after my research ended, hence I didn’t interview her. I did go out to job-shadow 
Tammy one day. She seemed blasé when one client out on a front stoop ignored her, and 
noted that at least he wasn’t flipping her the bird or yelling ‘fuck off’ as was generally the 
case.  
 
Transient members: 
 
Peggy Smith: Resident. Peggy started her rotation shortly before my research 
commenced and ended while I was there. She joked regularly with the team (and often 
shared humorous asides with Henry) during meetings and made occasional side 
comments to me.  
 
Audrey Jones: Resident. Audrey was on the same rotation as Peggy. Audrey was more 
reserved than Peggy and I saw less of her in meetings.  
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Virginia Alexander: Twenty-something recreational therapy student doing a placement 
and working under Guy.  
 
The Work 
The primary goal of the ACT teams is to facilitate community tenure for 
psychiatric patients. To aid in this all workers outside of the two team psychiatrists, 
regularly visited clients in their homes, shelters or at the office depending on a client’s 
living situation. Occasionally, a psychiatrist would go to a client’s home to assess 
whether they should be admitted to hospital. Residents, however, were expected to do 
regular home visits just as other staff members did. At the time the research was being 
conducted the team was serving 88 clients. Outside of the team leader, physicians and 
residents, each team member is the “primary” for up to ten clients. Although one worker 
served as a client’s point-person, as it were, most members of the team also worked with 
that client.4 A key aspect of the work is the delivery of medication. All workers delivered 
oral medications but only nurses and physicians administered depot injections (IMs). 
Nurses, OT’s and social workers also tried to interact with and monitor clients during 
visits and reported on their presentation at team meetings.  
Beyond medications, however, and as per the ACT model, client interventions did 
not appear to have a standardized pre-determined form. During my job shadowing, 
Tammy, a nurse, mentioned that she planned to visit a boarding home to help a client 
clean her room. Troubleshooting with clients around bedbug extermination was another 
                                                 
4 The standard practise for ACT teams is to have all workers who are not physicians work with all clients. 
However, this was flexible, when, as was the case with the team I observed, a particular client asked to 
limit his exposure to female staff because he found the contact too sexually arousing.  
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task that frequently came up in team meetings. Rose also mentioned mopping floors and 
giving clients showers. According to Stephanie, who called herself “a glorified life 
assistant, … I’ve helped people clean houses, I’ve helped them bathe, helped get people 
to appointments, I’ve cancelled family visits, I’ve helped with medication. You name it, 
there’s a lot to be done. “  
 
Clients and Their Living Conditions 
The vast majority of the team’s 88 clients suffered from some form of psychosis, 
and I was informed by Talia before my research began that whatever form the mental 
illness took, it was debilitating. According to Rose, their clients were “the sickest, the 
ones you typically see that are disheveled, stained, incontinent, hair is matted.” Work was 
carried out in the inner city of a large North American metropolitan area, and when she 
went into people’s homes Stephanie characterised herself “as wading through 
cockroaches or bedbugs … not able to shake people’s hands because they have scabies.” 
In one team meeting, Talia reported seeing bedbugs on the stairs of one of the boarding 
homes that housed a number of the team’s clients. Many clients lived in the sort of 
boarding homes described in Chapter Three, with as many as four to a room, while others 
lived in low-income apartment complexes. A few were homeless and others stayed in 
shelters. During my brief stint job-shadowing, I noted that the many clients were housed 
in stark, dank, utilitarian structures where the halls smelled of urine.  
 
The Team Meeting 
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“If the ACT team is the heart of the ACT program, the daily team meeting is its 
nerve center” note the originators of ACT (Stein and Santos, 1998, p. 98). A single white 
board on the wall provides the focal point of meetings. It is divided into 8 or 9 sections. 
Front and centre is the ‘agenda.’ The agenda is a numbered list of items to be discussed in 
the morning meeting. All team members can enter items onto the agenda, and this is done 
in a seemingly haphazard manner with say, #4 entered on some days even though there is 
no #3 entry. There is also an FYI section.  Up top are small boxes labelled: “Inpatients.” 
“Patients in hospital.” “Crisis.” “Incarcerated.” A box at the bottom right contains: 
“Waitlist.” Above this is a box for patients due to have blood work.5 Below the agenda at 
the bottom is a box for “Reminders” (usually work-related items, picnics, etc…), “To be 
charted,” and “Discharges.”  
Generally, workers saw the meeting as a venue for the straightforward exchange 
of information and strategic planning. As Stephanie describes it, the function of the 
meeting is  
to communicate the administrative stuff we have to do … we have to know 
an awful lot of what’s going on in [patients’] lives from family, to 
medication to you know, and if that communication isn’t always ongoing 
something is going to get missed and it happens because we are human. 
And you forget sometimes …  Ideally what is supposed to happen, if I go 
out, or another one of my teammates goes out to see somebody it’s 
supposed to be like the client is seeing the same person. That we all have 
the same information. That’s what it means to have a team-held caseload. 
So yeah the morning meeting is to make sure that everybody is on the same 
board, or the same page rather. It’s also to brainstorm and come up with 
suggestions about where to go with somebody. To get support with ‘I’m 
really frustrated and I’m not quite sure what to do.” So it’s communication 
and planning.  
                                                 
5 Patients on Clozapine have to get blood tested regularly because the medication is associated with 
agranulocytosis, a blood condition that can make patients more vulnerable to infection. Patients must have 
their blood examined every 2 weeks. 
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Team members all take turns chairing, and before the agenda is tackled on-calls 
are announced. The team has a pager and one person is always on-call. That person then 
reports on any communications that occurred during the night or early morning. After on-
calls are reported all voicemail messages are relayed to the team. After this the chair 
moves the meeting through the agenda items. Some items are just things that are being 
flagged and other items call for problem solving. Every so often in meetings primaries 
will present a service plan for a client, which is a report that includes a client’s history, 
past interventions and client goals, which the team then discusses. I was able to observe 
three service plans being presented in the course of my study. Finally, if agenda items are 
covered in enough time, the team conducts a weekly review in which they move through 
a list of patients’ names while various workers contribute whatever bits of news or 
information come to mind concerning that client.  
At team meetings medication was the most common topic of discussion, 
appearing around five times per meeting. Sometimes the conversations were about how 
to win a patient’s compliance with medication, but often they were about whether a 
patient was taking his medication, whether housing staff were prompting him to do so, or 
whether the medication needed to be adjusted. Workers spent little time discussing 
delusions except perhaps to mention that someone was still complaining that “Barack 
Obama was living inside her.” Rather than discussing symptoms of mental illness, 
something that seemed more intriguing to the residents, workers by and large focussed on 
troubleshooting the concrete problems of daily living. In fact, after medication, the 
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second most frequently discussed area was housing. Issues related to housing arose an 
average of three times per meeting in relation to different clients, and of the 42 meetings I 
observed, only three saw no mention of housing. Bed bugs were frequently mentioned 
both because clients were regularly dealing with infestations, and because several bed 
bugs had also been spotted in the office. Diabetes, or discussion of blood sugar levels in 
patients, was also a reoccurring theme in meetings – hardly surprising given the 
association between certain atypical antipsychotics and type 2 diabetes.6  
 
The Recovery Board 
Off to the side of the white board is a stand with a large pad of paper. On it team 
members note client victories large and small (mostly small). The recovery board is an 
innovation of the team studied, and is not part of the ACT model. Below is an example of 
a recovery board 
June/July recovery notes  
 
A: voluntarily chose to do laundry 
B: recognized need for assistance with budgeting sat down to create June budget. 
C: completed bail program 
D: wants to “mix up” exercise program 
E: meeting long term goal of getting glasses. 
F: new shirt, disposed of old shirt. 
G: heart is healthy. 
                                                 
6 Items that saw little discussion included diagnoses and symptoms, discharges, finding employment for 
clients or drug and alcohol abuse. In this vein, however, there was virtually no talk of finding work for 
clients, which is notable for the fact that this was a major preoccupation for ACT originators. As for patient 
discharges, discussions arose in relation to 3 different clients, two such discussions ended inconclusively, 
and the third client was traded for a client on a different ACT team because the client had moved quite far 
away. Moreover, although the team had a dedicated addictions counsellor, there was very little observable 
strategizing around clients’ use of illicit drugs or alcohol. On various occasions someone might make a side 
comment about a patient’s use of crack, and during interviews workers noted that one area of frustration for 
them was drug use among clients, but workers did not discuss ways to curb clients’ addictions. 
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H: “Today was the best day of my life.” Heard no voices during July 7/09 (all day). 
 
Recovery notes are typed up at the end of each month and placed in a visible spot in the 
communal office.  
 
Office Layout 
All the doors in the office had coded locks on them. The bulk of the staff (apart 
from the psychiatrists and Talia) shared an office separated into cubicles. Talia, the team 
leader, had her own office, and there were two spare offices. One of these was used by 
the psychiatrists when they held clinical meetings with patients. There was also a laundry 
room and washroom back in the office. The meeting room, which is where the meetings I 
observed took place, has a large glass window and a large boardroom table. It separates 
the communal office space and Talia’s office. In the communal office space all staff 
members other than the psychiatrists, residents and Talia, have their own cubicle with a 
desk and a phone.  
 
Atmosphere and Team Dynamic 
Friendly chitchat and banter tended to occur in the meeting room shortly before 
meetings got underway. Meetings were typically fairly formal and team members 
appeared cognizant of time constraints and the need to stay on track. No overt disputes 
were observed during meetings, and there was room for humour which seemed to cut 
back on formalities. Henry, the head psychiatrist and some other team members made a 
number of jokes during meetings.  
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From all reports, a somewhat different dynamic operated within the communal 
office space. While workers used a communal office space for regular work activities 
such as charting, and contacting clients and agencies on behalf of clients, most of the 
team members used the term “vent” to describe a regular activity that occurred there. The 
communal office space belonged to the regular workers and they used the space to share 
their frustrations and to strategize in the event that they disagreed with the decisions of 
the psychiatrists. In the event that workers sharing the communal office felt they weren’t 
heard, as Stephanie explained, “that’s when we would go back [to the communal office], 
and sitting about the desk and you know, have a good bitch about it or something like that 
and try to strategise about how we’re going to re-present our case.” 
Team members also mentioned regular occurrences of practical jokes in the 
communal office. For instance, shortly after Greg started work, team members gave him 
a “squishy ear.” As Greg recalls  I walked up to my desk, I see my phone ringing and I 
see it’s Guy’s name comes up. I’m like, ‘he’s 2 feet away, why is he calling me?’ So I 
pick up the phone and it’s covered with hand sanitizer. Alternatively, workers sometimes 
made funny flyers or put up humorous pictures on each other’s computers. As Stephanie 
notes, 
It’s kind of the game around here … I left my computer on and someone 
went in to change my computer wallpaper. So when you turn your 
computer on, it’s like oh my god, it’s a man who is standing in a pair of 
leopard print bikini with the watch! With the watch! Like seriously, why 
are you standing there looking at your watch? He’s got the best mullet as 
well too, and the moustache .. So harmless fun stuff like that. Oh and I 
came in not long ago my phone was locked in my cupboard and my keys 
were gone so I couldn’t get to my phone. I noticed it quickly. But, the plan 
was had I not noticed it, someone was going to call me so my phone was 
going to be ringing from my cupboard and I couldn’t get at it. 
 
241 
 
As Otto noted in his interview, the practical jokes functioned as a team-building device 
that helped to make new workers feel welcome and part of the group. 
 
II. Morally Salient Aspects of Sunnydale ACT Work 
A Eulogy for Tom “Kodak” 
To contextualize the moral aspects of my ethnography it will be useful to 
highlight a somewhat exceptional moment in a team meeting given that it helps to bring 
out morally salient details of ACT work, as analysed from the perspective of a care-
ethicist. Moreover, I shall return to this story at the end of the chapter in making the case 
for my own modest proposal for ethically enriching ACT practices.  
One night Tom died in his sleep. When team members got the news of their 
elderly long-time patient’s death, Rose, who had taken the call, left the meeting room in 
tears, and was followed out by her concerned colleague Guy. An awkward silence 
followed and team members appeared unsure how to proceed given that the regular 
business-like flow of the meeting had been interrupted. It became evident that something 
outside their routine business was called for in this instance. Eventually, team members 
acted as most people would under such circumstances, and began telling stories about 
Tom. As we shall see, the sharing of small anecdotes was a common practice in ACT 
meetings, so ultimately, team members were on familiar ground. Over the next few 
meetings Tom’s story would unfold such that details of his life, his funeral, and even the 
people there, would enter into the team’s shared lore regarding the man.  
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In the first brief conversation that occurred, small details began to emerge: Tom 
had lived for many years in a warehouse converted into an open-concept supportive 
housing facility, a facility that represented a first stepping-off point for people getting off 
the streets. ‘It makes me strong,’ Tom was reported to have said of his housing, while 
expressing a desire to stay where he was in spite of deteriorating physical health requiring 
higher levels of support. Tom also loved St. Patrick’s Day, which had just passed, and it 
appeared that the client had managed to celebrate one last time. “He died with dignity,” 
noted Beth once the storytelling had wound down, marking a shift back to the team’s 
regular discussion. For the next fifteen minutes, the remaining team members returned to 
their regular discussions of various clients’ issues. As the meeting came to an end, Guy, 
who had returned without Rose, noted Diane had left. “She didn’t want to be here. She 
broke down.” Team members proceeded to return to the subject of Tom and his life. It 
was briefly mentioned that Tom had been friends with the city’s mayor. Team members 
had originally assumed this was one of the client’s many delusions, until, that is, they saw 
an article written by the mayor’s assistant describing the impact Tom had on their office.  
The next day 
After regular discussions of patients ended more was said about Tom. Team members 
speculated whether it would be appropriate to write an obituary for the client, or perhaps 
submit something to his blog. It became clear that the story of Tom being friends with the 
mayor was part of the team’s established lore. 
Talia: I want to tell the story about calling the Mayor’s office.  
 
Stephanie: We thought Tom had delusions about being friends with the mayor. Through time we 
found this is true. More the mayor’s assistant [who Tom was friends with]. Tom gave him our 
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contact details. That’s how we found out he wasn’t delusional. Turns out the assistant wrote an 
article about Tom so I called the mayor’s office. He said ‘I was the one who wrote the article on 
him. It’s so fascinating that he came from the family he did, the Kodaks.’  
 
Peggy: Oh! He didn’t know it was a delusion?  
 
Stephanie: I am 98 percent sure. He talked about Kodak and Tom’s claim to the Kodak millions. 
He said ‘it’s so amazing that Tom, coming from the background he did, chose to live as he did.’ 
 
Peter: The article might be in his file. He had different levels of delusions. Owning Kodak was 
peanuts compared to being the Tsar of Russia and the new President of the American Republic. 
He didn’t say the significance of St. Paddy’s Day. Just that he was a diehard.  
 
Talia: His worker was out on St. Paddy’s day trying to win Tom a new hat.  
 
Peter: If there was a lot of alcohol, my money is that there would be a lot of respiratory 
depression. The coroner will be able to tell. 
 
Stephanie: Well, he wanted to die [where he was] and have one last St. Paddy’s Day. 
 
Peggy: It sounds like it was peaceful. 
 
Talia: So more to come on Tom in the next few weeks. 
 
Two weeks later 
The team received an update about Tom’s funeral, which Gail, a team nurse, had 
attended.  
Gail: Ok, Tom’s funeral. They got up and told the most interesting stories.  
 
Henry: Did you get up and tell a few stories?  
 
Gail: No, I was embarrassed by the stories. 
 
Henry: It actually wouldn’t be appropriate. I’m sure he didn’t give his consent for us to tell stories 
at his funeral. What kind of stories, tell us. 
 
Gail: There was a priest standing there. This woman said every time I saw Tom I would lift my 
shirt and he would say ‘that is worth one cigarette.’ One lady was giving the finger to another 
during the service. There were a lot of alcohol-related stories.  
 
Trevor: I’m sure Tom would have loved that.  
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Henry: What about the family? No one knows? Did he write a will? I thought a guy like him 
would have written an elaborate will, given it all to the Kremlin or something.  
 
These relatively exceptional moments within the meetings the ACT team 
observed help to fully reveal some of the more humanistic elements that arise out of this 
form of treatment. Rose and Diane’s grief help to demonstrate the workers’ attachment to 
their clients. The exchanges also help to bring out the team’s longstanding knowledge of 
those they work with, a familiarity with clients’ contexts, and a fine-tuned attention to 
their particularities. While the following account is of necessity based mainly on team 
meetings rather than field observation, it nonetheless shows that ACT work is of a highly 
personal nature. In any case, it should be clear that the kind of talk about patients that 
takes place in these meetings stands in sharp contrast to the standardized, efficient and 
impersonal treatment of patients previously described in institutional settings.  
 
Practices of Relatedness in Vivo 
ACT clients stand at the intersection of a variety of bureaucratically administered 
systems. They receive money from government agencies while public trustees, who meet 
with clients once a year, are often appointed to manage clients’ finances. Meanwhile, 
public housing facilities dictate the terms of many people’s living conditions. A 
significant part of ACT work then, is helping clients negotiate this labyrinth of 
impersonal bureaucratic systems by helping clients fill out forms, escorting them to 
appointments and contacting public trustees on their behalf. As will emerge, ACT work 
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stands out against these other agencies because of the quality of the interpersonal 
relationship that forms between the team and clients.  
 
We Are in this For the Long Haul: The Longitudinal Approach 
One of the most significant factors in the establishment of a trusting relationship 
between team members and clients is the duration of treatment. Team members had a 
great deal of history with many clients. Henry, who, as noted, had been with the team 
from the beginning, had the longest memory of various patients and the following 
exchange reveals the kind of knowledge acquired by observing patterns in patients over 
time. Below, the team was discussing a particular patient who was showing signs of 
stress because she’d recently been assigned a roommate. The patient was not coming to 
the door and Rose reported the “she didn’t look particularly great all bundled up in her 
winter coat.” 
Henry: Having known patient for 12 years, over time she has become more vulnerable. Clearly 
she needs to be in a place where they supply food. 
 
Diane: But if another person hadn’t moved in! 
 
Henry: This has been happening for the last 2 years. She is clearly less responsive to treatment 
than she used to be. 
 
Peggy: Does she have delusions as well? 
 
Henry: Yes.7 My plan is to re-evaluate her financial capacity. We should contact the sister who 
would be very much in favour of her living elsewhere. Problem is there is no power of attorney 
for finances.   
 
Diane: My thinking is she doesn’t need a nursing home. 
                                                 
7 Henry’s one-word reply here helps to demonstrate my point regarding the limited discussion of 
psychiatric diagnosis and symptomology. Peggy, a resident, is interested in the nature of the patient’s 
illness. However, in the context of the morning meeting, Henry remains focussed on more concrete 
problems such a finances and living arrangements.  
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Otto: She rejected other options. 
 
Henry: There is a number of legal domains. Financial capacity which we assess on admission. 
There is a separate domain for discussions of housing. This requires power of attorney. She has to 
agree to stay there. She doesn’t realize she is incapable. It would be better if housing would evict 
her8 and we could go from there.  
 
Otto: What happens if no family member wants to take responsibility? 
 
Henry: Then we can’t do anything, personal care is only for a family member or friend. We have 
to call the sister. Sonya is fiercely independent and has been in hospital more than she has been 
out. She gets reasonably well in hospital. 
 
Peggy: have her meds changed? 
 
Henry: No it’s the structure. The other issue is she smokes less. She is on a depot [injectable 
medication] and while she is not great with oral meds, we have that much. When we first took her 
she was taking courses at the university taking German philosophy. She was reading Hegel – her 
marks weren’t great. She has had quite a decline. 
 
Peter: Last time we tried she was 2 weeks in hospital. She did very well. If you want to do it you 
should do it fast. When she is well and not well she is two different people.  
 
Certainly, this extended relationship represents a significant departure from the 
brief treatment periods described in Chapter Three. As we saw with Douglass Center 
workers, for instance, personal longstanding knowledge of clients was only gained by 
accident, whereas for ACT workers this has been the norm. Another case helps to 
illustrate the importance of this knowledge and how it can be put to use. In one meeting, 
Diane noted that a client’s apartment was beginning to smell. Talia turned to Trevor to 
explain why this was especially worrisome. 
Do you know her history? In previous years a sign she wasn’t doing well 
was that she would start to jar and contain feces and urine. Once there was 
so much build-up of methane gas there was an explosion risk. The alarm 
bells Diane is talking about is a risk. 
                                                 
8 It was interesting to note that the team often exploited other more impersonal agencies to preserve their 
relationships with clients. It was better for the relationship if bad news was not coming from team 
members. 
247 
 
 
The team’s memory can also serve to reconfigure misconceptions of a patient that could 
be formed on the basis of textual documentation alone. For example, in one discussion of 
Jim, it was noted that the client first came into contact with the team after being 
convicted of “assault and possession of a bag of guns.” Rose, who had not had much 
contact with the client laughed when she heard this. 
Talia: Just to flush out the story. Dave is a dumpster diver. He was diving and found antique 
guns. They weren’t functional and couldn’t be fired. He found the bag and he is a hoarder and 
brought them back and when he was confronted by the police they found the bag. He was charged 
with stolen weapons. He didn’t do any jail time but does have this scary sounding … 
 
Rose: Maybe we can change the word to “antiquities.” 
 
The longstanding relationship also contributes to a sense of patience with clients. 
That is, if things are not going well with a particular client, or workers are not sure which 
way to turn, then, they might remind one another, as Talia did in one meeting, that “we 
are in this for the long haul.” In this case, Talia was referring to difficulties in placing a 
new client, Sophie. Talia was suggesting here that the team would be there to provide 
ongoing support even if their current efforts were to fail. Trevor, who was the patient’s 
primary worker, was having a difficult time determining the best housing for the client in 
question. 
 
Henry [to Trevor]: Are you feeling burdened? 
 
Trevor: I’m feeling lost, I just don’t know what to do with this woman. 
 
Henry: This is where the team approach helps. We have a long-term memory of past successes. 
 
Peggy: This is on a weeks-to-months timeline. You have to look at the bigger picture. 
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Henry: ACT changes over time. 
 
Talia: Each time we try, she might move further along.  
 
As such, the pressure to effect fast and efficient therapy evidenced in forms of hospital 
care in Chapter Two is largely absent from ACT work. Freedom from this particular 
brand of workplace stress, moreover, could help to explain why the sort of othering seen 
in the APU and in Rankin and Campbell’s work was not observed among members of the 
Sunnydale ACT team. That is, workers were not being regularly frustrated in their ability 
to implement efficiency schemes as mandated by their employer and hence might have 
been less inclined to project deficiencies of the system onto clients. Instead, workers were 
able to adopt the more leisurely attitude Lugones sees as essential for “world travelling.” 
 
Sexy Time: Travelling to the World of the Other  
As I note in Chapter Three, Lugones’ conception of world travelling represents an 
important way of connecting with others whereby one must be attuned to the fact that 
people change in relation to their environment and are multidimensional beings. 
Travelling to the world of the other requires a patient attitude, as revealed by Lugones’ 
description of cracking open rocks by the river. A mindset bent on efficiently sorting and 
managing persons is not conducive to effective world-travelling. In the case of ACT we 
see that while workers had a long history with many clients, many were familiar with 
client’s broader context in having contact with family members, spouses and landlords. 
The following exchange nicely encapsulates the extent of the social network to which 
workers were exposed. Jason, a client, had broken up with his girlfriend and was 
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reportedly harassing her, which was especially problematic since the two lived in the 
same public housing complex. Workers had talked to the housing manager and the 
partner, and were even aware that their client’s girlfriend’s parents disapproved of the 
relationship.  
 
Peter: In the long term can these two people live in the same building? 
 
Guy: No. his big thing is he is showing no insight. ‘It’s not my problem.’ She is crying, saying 
‘I’m going to kill myself.’  
 
Otto: It’s like we’re treating two people. 
 
Because they are entering into patients’ most intimate space, or travelling into 
clients’ worlds, as it were, over time, workers were bound to be exposed to multiple 
dimensions of clients’ personalities. Jason had a history of violence, having torn his 
refrigerator from the wall socket, punched holes in his walls because he thought he heard 
Gail talking in them, and exhibited other forms of aggressive behaviour. In spite of the 
problems between Jason and his girlfriend Sonya, they would eventually reconcile and 
move in together. Then, the following incident occurred when Peter, who did not usually 
visit clients at home, went to Jason’s in order to assess whether the team should enact the 
client’s community treatment order (CTO).9 
 
Peter: We saw him. He was naked behind the door. I did an assessment about the CTO. I think he 
was having an intimate time. Candles were lit and there was a fragrance in the air. 
 
Trevor: Sexy time! 
                                                 
9A CTO is a legal mandate signed by clients specifying that they will remain compliant with treatment, 
which typically includes psychiatric medication. Decompensating patients who are not taking their meds 
can then legally be brought into hospital, but only after a psychiatrist has assessed them.  
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Talia: Oh no! And a psychiatrist is at the door.  
 
A gentler side to Jason was thereby revealed in this encounter, which may be 
likened to the world travelling recommended by Lugones. In visiting their clients at home 
workers need not imagine the world of their clients, but are directly exposed to the 
unfamiliar environment inhabited by the another. Due to this, caregivers could not help 
but be made immediately aware that they were working with multidimensional persons. 
Moreover, given the team’s longstanding history and familiarity with clients’ particular 
contexts it is possible that they achieve a deeper understanding of patients and are thus 
more responsive to individuals’ particular personalized needs. 
 
Pretty in Pink: Attentiveness to Clients’ ‘Me-ness’  
ACT workers are also better acquainted with various aspects of a patient’s life 
than those dealing with admissions to inpatient wards. One further aspect of ACT work 
worth remarking upon is team members’ attentiveness to the smallest details of their 
clients’ particularities and how these observations stand to reconfigure certain 
conceptions of clients. There is something to be said for likening this attentiveness to 
loving attention described by Murdoch in Chapter Three, which is a form of attentiveness 
that is open to a reconceptualization of a person. We can also see how this paves the way 
for workers’ to appreciate clients’ particular “me-ness,” which as Dillon argues, is a 
crucial step in conferring care-respect onto another.  
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It would appear, moreover, that attention to detail was expected of workers. For 
instance, during the weekly review, something, anything, had to be said about each client 
whose name came up, as the following exchange reveals. Henry, who is chairing, has 
been going through the list, and called out Greg Wallis’ name. Trevor, who was still 
fairly new to the team and perhaps unfamiliar with the norms around the weekly review 
merely responded “he is ok.” 
 
Henry [laughing]: That is all you have to say Trevor?  
 
Talia: He is far away and the team doesn’t see him much. 
 
Trevor: He was really collected when he came in with the chicken pox. 
 
Henry: There is a study here. The virus changes the brain. 
 
After this, the team went on to discuss another patient. Admittedly, on some occasions 
workers would simply report that “John is John” in relation to some long-time client who 
was much the same. However, it was more common to see something more informative 
offered up. For example: 
 
Tammy: Lisa Walters. 
 
Talia: She came to the BBQ and her dog looked like a llama. She shaved her dog to look like a 
llama.  
 
Trevor: See a little alpaca looking around   
 
Diane: I was sitting at Pride10 and someone said ‘cute dog.’ She was in her pajamas at Pride with 
a shaved poodle. Totally strange.  
 
 
                                                 
10 Gay Pride parade 
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Demanding high levels of attentiveness from ACT workers makes sense when 
one recalls that part of an ACT worker’s role is to monitor clients for signs of 
decompensation. Personal hygiene, behaviour and other telltale signs particular to 
individual patients can therefore represent important data as demonstrated by Henry’s 
observation of Stephan that “he went out had a fight with Julia [his girlfriend] and came 
back in his red pants and his cravat. It’s a sure sign he is more manic when he is wearing 
his red pants.” Such observations were not intended to efficiently classify patients in the 
computational manner recommended by Goodman and Guze. In fact, it is worth 
emphasising that diagnoses were rarely mentioned in the context of team meetings. With 
new clients, the psychiatrists would provide a diagnoses while describing a patient, and 
occasionally, there might be speculation about “mood components” or personality 
disorders in existing patients but this was brief and infrequent. Hence, clients were not 
reduced to little more than a diagnosis, rather, attention to clients’ particularities was to 
raise awareness of their individual dispositions, preferences and situations in order to be 
alert to sign of relapse in clients and to find ways of tailoring their care. 
Nevertheless, observations of particular details pertaining to clients could take on 
a far more commonplace flavour, such that they could have been made by anyone 
concerning a mutual acquaintance for whom the speakers might share a certain amount of 
fondness, i.e. 
 
Stephanie: FYI, Linda is back from Florida. She looked great. She was wearing a nice pink suit 
and pink lipstick.  
 
Otto: Was she pretty in pink? 
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Stephanie: Yes, I told her that yesterday.  
 
Otto: Was she tanned?  
 
Stephanie: No 
 
As both the observation above and team members’ predilection for practical jokes 
demonstrates, many appeared to delight in the unexpected. Hence, they tended to be 
aware of, and eager to share, seemingly incongruous traits they noted in patients. That is, 
they have not necessarily neatly categorised their patients, but have, perhaps by 
happenstance, become alert to details that tend to alter preconceptions they may have 
formed about the other. Describing such perceptions in meetings, moreover can serve to 
reinforce clients’ me-ness, or the sense that each one is not like all the rest. For example, 
Maria was a client whose “ADLs were never great,” about whom there had been reports 
of her in the streets with food stains running down her clothes. Rose also tells a story of 
having to help Maria clean herself when the patient left her menstrual flow unchecked. 
Not surprisingly then, certain female staff members seemed to take pleasure in the fact 
that Maria enjoyed having her nails and hair done. Meanwhile, on a couple of different 
occasions, Talia remarked of Tim, another patient, that “he is the cleanest hoarder I have 
ever met” adding that she was struck by his level of organization he showed in 
maintaining his vast collection of items.  
Henry’s observations of Frank help to further illustrate how this attention to and 
appreciation of the unexpected can lead to a reconceptualization of a client that aligns 
well with Murdoch’s notion of loving attention. Frank was a gruff man, which I knew 
because Guy would often mimic his manner of speaking, Otto remarked in one meeting 
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that Frank was “rough around the edges” and many commented upon his frequent 
cursing. As Talia reported in one meeting “he told me he likes it in hospital. He actually 
said “yeah, it’s really fucking good in here.” I never heard the f-word used so many times 
it’s just punctuation, it’s not an adjective.” The reason Frank was in hospital in the first 
place was to have several frostbitten toes removed. For, as much as the man loved 
hospital, he appeared to despise the housing available to him and had thus chosen to live 
outside for 6 years. “I’m not going to a fucking boarding home,” Frank had stressed to 
Guy, and only hoped that no one had taken over his “cubbyhole in the park,” to which the 
client longed to return. 
A special relationship, moreover, seemed to exist between Henry and Frank. 
When Frank was receiving foot care, Henry went on vacation and Peter started to see him 
in hospital and was poorly received by the patient. “He’s become more cranky,” noted 
Peter adding that Frank had said to him “I don’t want to talk to fuckin’ anybody except 
for Murphy! You are terrorizing me.” Shortly after Henry returned from vacation he went 
to see Frank and was enthusiastic to learn that in spite of the client’s reluctance to be 
housed, Frank had agreed to move to a rehabilitation facility that would provide him with 
a few more months of foot care.  
Henry: He was sitting there all packed up ready to go. When I spoke to him the day before he was 
like ‘ok.’ It was amazing.  
 
Peter: when you were away he was saying ‘I am not talking to anyone, just Murphy.’11 
                                                 
11 The theme of Peter’s comparatively poor relationship with the client re-emerged a few weeks later during 
a discussion of Frank’s post-operative experiences. 
 
Guy: He told me “everything is beautiful. The surgeons did a beautiful job’ 
Peter: with me he was saying “I don’t want to talk about it. You’re a terrorist.” 
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Henry’s fondness for the client was made evident when he would sympathetically 
click his tongue during earlier discussions of the state of Frank’s feet and would later 
made similar noises in later discussions of Frank’s reluctance to accept housing. 
Something that seemed to stand out for Henry when visiting Frank, was the patient’s use 
of an elliptical trainer while in hospital. In light of Henry’s fondness for the patient, it is 
easy to see how the following observation might have delighted him. On February 6th 
Henry noted 
I came in yesterday and it was the sweetest sight. Frank was on the 
elliptical. He was going up and down and it was really cute. We should get 
him to the Y. Monday we should get him to infirmary and I hope he goes. 
He might go. It’s a similar environment but nicer than the hospital.  
 
Henry, it would appear, was sufficiently surprised at seeing the gruff and temperamental 
homeless man enthusiastically using an elliptical, that this particular detail stuck with 
him. Two weeks later, during a discussion of rehabilitation programs for Frank, Henry 
remarked, “if we sell this as another hospital, especially if they have an elliptical trainer, 
he will be happy.” Then again on March 6th, Henry briefly reported on Frank saying that 
“his left foot is healing nicely. It’s just the right foot. He is happily using the elliptical 
and enjoying himself.” 
Guy, the recreational therapist, also picked up on this enthusiasm for the cross 
trainer. When Henry asked Guy to see Frank in the rehabilitation facility to which he’d 
been moved, Guy agreed adding “actually Henry, I want to make sure they have an 
exercise machine there for him. His sister said he would never go, but he has defied those 
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expectations.” What this illustrates is how workers might key into one small, surprising 
detail so that it persists through time and becomes interconnected with shifting 
perceptions of a particular person, helping get past preconceived categories and closer to 
perceiving another person’s uniqueness.12 This is especially true given the infrequent use 
of diagnostic categories for description, so that workers were instead absorbed in clients’ 
present contexts and situations as these pertained to that person’s wellbeing.  
 
The Polite Thing to do: Enacting an Ethos of Care-Respect 
An awareness of individualized dispositions, needs and context also increases the 
responsiveness team members can show clients. This aspect of the work came out during 
a discussion of whether to visit a client in jail. There was some uncertainty at the time as 
to whether the team would continue working with the man in the future, hence the 
indecision. The client had also recently assaulted Guy, so not all team members were 
enthusiastic about visiting the imprisoned man. However, his concerned, but faraway 
parents, described by Talia as “elderly and frail,” had requested that someone visit the 
patient. Otto pressed for one last visit.  
 
Otto: it is a polite kind of gesture. In the day when people are breaking up over email.  
 
Henry: text him. It’s not you it’s me.  
 
Otto: I’ll go. 
 
                                                 
12 Not all team members took the same delight as Henry at the sight of Frank on the elliptical, however. 
While he was caring for Frank in Henry’s absence Peter, who as noted, was at the time making little 
headway relating to Frank, remarked during one meeting that the patient “has no intention of going 
anywhere but here or the cubbyhole. He spends hours at the treadmill. He has a very autistic existence”. 
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Peter: I think it’s great if Otto goes. I really respect that. It’s a good thing to do.  
 
Henry: you know you get a total body cavity search.  
 
Otto: I want to tell him ‘what you did wasn’t right’ … I think he has had a lot of traumatic loss. 
His son passed away of cancer. This adds to that. There has been a lot of loss. This is just a polite 
way of doing things.  
 
It is worth remarking here that Otto’s work role also provided him with the space to 
respond to his client’s particular needs as is evidenced by his ability to volunteer for a 
visit mainly because, as he and Peter saw it, it was the right thing to do, especially given 
the client’s situation.  
 Team discussions saw no lack of examples of a certain responsiveness to patients 
crafted in accordance with their particular traits and dispositions and thereby enacting an 
ethos of care-respect. “We have to be human about this” Peter recommended to staff in 
communicating with a client who was on the verge of eviction. “We can tell him. 
Normally people appreciate some honesty. He’s not a child either; he’s worse than the 
average person because he has paranoia he can sense insincerity.”  A similarly nuanced 
approach was recommended with a client who was reportedly coming into the office 
“dripping with bedbugs.” Workers were aiming to give him medication in his home or on 
a day other than weekly open clinics because as Talia noted “if we can’t protect our 
space, we can at least protect our [other] clients.” Many were concerned, however, with 
how to relay this message to the client without upsetting him. “He still has the capacity to 
feel ‘hey, I’m being helpful’ noted Peter who went to suggest that workers present their 
request in such a vein. Hence, not only was there much evidence of a general sensitivity 
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to patients’ particular responses to the team members’ approach, but workers also showed 
a willingness to adapt themselves in accordance with a client’s preferences.13 
 
Storytelling 
As I have shown in Chapter Three, Nussbaum contends we all should strive to 
become persons “on whom nothing is lost,” and it seems that workers approached this 
ideal in their practice. It would appear, moreover, that in virtue of efforts at patient 
attentiveness and inescapability of world travelling, workers tended to enact an attitude of 
care-respect for patients. That is, ACT workers did more than merely strive to respect 
their patients’ autonomy, but actively sought to recognise patients’ particularities in order 
to provide personalistic and individualised care. However, one further element of 
workers’ practise I would like to emphasise here, because it was such a prevalent theme 
in my observations, was the potentially positive impact of the very storytelling medium 
itself on workers’ attitudes towards their clients.  
Although workers saw the morning meeting primarily in professional terms, that 
is, as a venue to exchange information and to strategize around patient care, as many of 
the exchanges above reveal, more went on in these meetings than this. As we’ve seen 
with the small anecdotes that were shared, professional discourse could morph into a 
more common human activity, which was storytelling. Although I would never meet 
most of the clients discussed, I came to care what happened to many purely by virtue of 
                                                 
13 Of course sometimes some needed a reminder of this, as with a patient who wanted to take a particular 
medication after regular work hours, but which workers were mandated by a CTO to observe. In response 
to those suggesting the patient was being rigid Peter replied “part of the rigid people are us. We are saying 
we don’t do 9 o’clock. There is rigidity on both sides. This is one of the only powers they have left. She is 
saying my body is saying 9 o’clock. That is why we have to talk to her and say we can come at 7.”  
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hearing their stories play out in team meetings. After expressing this sentiment to Talia, 
she replied “as a person who has gone away for a few weeks and come back, you see that 
the stories just go on and on. I’d say it’s like the morning soap opera, but it’s obviously a 
lot more serious than that.” 
  The storytelling engaged in by team members has three potentially beneficial 
outcomes. Firstly, in relying upon a narrative form of communication, storytellers 
effectively emphasise the agential nature of story’s subject. This is because a story is not 
a story unless it involves an agent, or an individual with motivations, beliefs and desires, 
as opposed to representing a causal description involving neurotransmitters, firing 
synapses and subsequent observable behaviour. It should perhaps not be surprising that a 
team of workers bent on maintaining relationships, and who are therefore sensitive to 
clients’ attitudes and preferences, should tend towards a narrative modality in discussions 
of clients. However, it is worth asking if the very medium they are employing to 
communicate also helps to reinforce clients’ statuses as persons with whom one interacts 
and negotiates rather than objects one manages and processes.  
Secondly, the public sharing of a story also invites participants to add their own 
observations to the narrative being shared. Doing so effectively stands to cause 
alternative interpretations, or a variety of perspectives to be aired. As a variety of 
viewpoints find expression, moreover, there is a good chance that one will find her own 
perspectives and presuppositions challenged. Hence, similar to Nussbaum’s 
recommendations regarding the importance of the imaginative reconceptualization of 
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others, such an activity can cause certain participants to expand their understanding of a 
particular client, or stretch their preconceptions about that person.  
Thirdly, there is an affective component to storytelling. As noted, mere exposure 
to another person’s story can make a listener concerned about the wellbeing of the 
subject. I was also left with little doubt that workers were empathetic and cared for their 
clients. This is not to suggest that all workers were especially fond of all clients, but most 
workers appeared to have affection for at least some of their clients. This was evident 
from say, an off-handed remark about being up half the night ruminating over a 
decompensating client, comments such as, “I’m feeling for Steven right now,” or the 
mention of bringing by a mini cake for one client’s birthday which also evoked workers’ 
affection and care.  Such affect also came through by way of nonverbal cues elicited 
during discussions of clients such as smiles, affectionate tones, sympathetic clicks of the 
tongue, or leaving the room when feeling overly distressed. Such expressions, moreover, 
not only communicate a speaker’s attitude, but also relay the more subtle message that 
the subject of the story is a person is worthy of care.  
Meanwhile, as anyone who has sat around a table at a large family dinner knows, 
storytelling serves as a way of building community. Take for example, the following 
exchange about a particular client’s pride over his new job  
Guy: He said to me ‘working is the best drug.’ He also talked about how proud he is walking 
down the street in the morning on his way to work. He brought himself a 40” LCD TV and a 
laptop. He’s saved $150 a week. 
 
Stephanie: He also bought his nieces and nephews a Wii.  
 
Otto: He likes to eat lunch in his uniform so people can see that he is working.  
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The telling of this story garnered a collective “aw” from team members, which suggests 
that it helps to build camaraderie among those present for the telling. However, it is also 
possible that sharing lore, so long as it is not done maliciously, also helps to reinforce the 
sense that the subject of the story belongs to the community sharing the story: he is one 
of theirs. In this way, storytelling as a medium could serve to cultivate a genuine 
experience of care, and thereby move one beyond the mere demonstration of an attitude 
that is merely consistent with care.  
 
 
III. From the Narrative of Progress to a Sense of Futility 
The Institutional Context of ACT Stories 
As Talia’s comment about the seriousness of clients’ stories reveals, however, 
ACT discourse has certain distinctive features that sets it apart from the kinds of stories 
people tend to tell in domestic, or community settings. Probably the most important 
element that distinguishes ACT stories from other types of narratives is that there appears 
to be an implicit injunction against telling a story merely in order to entertain those with 
whom one is sharing. Rather, ACT stories are purposeful in that their telling tends to 
have a therapeutic focus. As Polletta et al argue, in relation to the sociology of 
storytelling, within organizations research suggests that “power comes less from knowing 
the right stories than from knowing how and when to tell them: what to leave out, what to 
fill in, when to revise and when to challenge, and whom to tell or not tell” (2011, p, 115). 
For instance, as one might recall, Henry reinforced a certain prohibition against sharing 
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stories at Tom’s funeral due to the team’s professional status. If we understand the term 
“power” above as professional prestige, we can see how the status of team members as 
professionals within an institution shapes their stories.  
 
Just The facts: The Instrumentalization of Relatedness 
If knowing when to share an anecdote is what distinguishes team members from 
regular members of Tom’s community, or worse, mere gossips, knowing what to share 
has a similar function within the context of the team meeting. That is, in order to remain 
professional, workers by and large stuck to details that were therapeutically relevant and 
there appeared to be an implicit requirement to maintain this focus. The following 
exchange helps to reveal this.  
Talia: she didn’t run screaming and permitted me to get her a cola. On returning James – who 
seems well – was sitting beside Maria and she was like ‘get away from me.’ James was ‘Talia is 
great I have known her for years.’ This escalated Maria and she ran down the ward and I could 
hear her screaming for 4 minutes. I noticed she was walking and holding onto the rails.  
 
Henry: I didn’t notice. She could be dizzy with the increase in dose.  
 
Diane: Is she on the ward?  
 
Henry: she has been for a while. She is not participating in ward activities.  
 
Tammy: [smiling] she got her nails done.  
 
Henry: but she is not participating in group therapy.  
 
Tammy was one of the team members who seemed to find Maria’s love of beauty salon 
services endearing. However, Henry’s dismissal of her remark demonstrates that this 
observation carries little weight and is perhaps not worth mentioning.  
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Workers overall appeared aware of the implicit requirement to reconfigure all the 
delightful idiosyncrasies they may have been prone to notice into therapeutically relevant 
information. For instance during a service report for Maria, Rose noted affectionately that 
“when she goes to get her hair or nails done, she just glows. She has this look like a 
Princess being taken care of.” Rose also strove, however, to cash out such observed 
dimensions of Maria’s personality as therapeutically relevant information. As charming 
as Maria’s love of pampering might have been, Rose was careful to add that perhaps 
Maria’s enjoyment of being cared for explained her hospital admissions, while noting 
that that “salon visits and manicures are inroads for us,” or means of establishing contact 
and coaxing the client’s cooperation. “Treats and a good hamburger” were other means 
that Rose suggested could be used to win Maria over. The manner in which Henry 
immediately parlayed Frank’s enjoyment of exercise equipment into a therapeutic goal 
such as getting him to the Y, also helps show the appropriate response to such 
observations.  
Hence, we can see that the knowledge of clients accrued tended to have a specific 
purpose, and this was to get them on board with treatment plans. Understanding a person 
merely for the sake of coming to appreciate another and how they see the world is not a 
worthwhile goal in this context. Peter, in fact, was the only speaker in meetings who 
made regular attempts to actively explore and share the manner in which clients 
perceived their world and constructed meaning for themselves. As we’ve seen, the 
psychiatrist wondered aloud at the meaning of St. Patrick’s Day for Tom and in another 
meeting I saw him pondering the significance of Frank’s refusal to accept housing. “It is 
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fascinating” said Peter. “It is like he has been testing the goodness of housing. He said ‘I 
tried this housing thing, and it’s not for me.’”  In the case of the aforementioned client 
with extraordinarily dangerous levels of methane building up in her apartment, it was 
Peter who explained that “she grew up in the Caribbean where people believe these [the 
urine and feces collected] are fertilizers. She believes she is returning things to a natural 
cycle. That’s why she does things in twos. It’s all about balance and symmetry and 
balance with nature.”  
The following exchange reveals when and how such observations of Peter’s 
tended to be taken up by the rest of the team 
Peter: [Frank] spends hours at the treadmill. He has a very autistic existence.  
Talia: is he autistic? 
Peter: many schizophrenics present as autistic.  
Guy: should we apply for housing? We can get him into a place.  
Talia: sure if he would take a place.  
 
Other meetings had revealed that special housing existed for clients with a dual diagnosis 
of autism and mental illness, and the facility seemed to be underused. Hence, Talia 
appeared alert to remarks concerning autism. If then, there were practical and concrete 
implications that stemmed from Peter’s observations, other team members would be more 
apt to pursue this line of thought.  
 This is not to suggest that Peter was unaware of the practical implications that 
could stem from understanding a patient’s inner world. For example, during one meeting 
Peter had what seemed to be an epiphany regarding Sophie 
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Peter: One last fascinating observation of Sophie. I would see her as a combination of delusions 
changing in front of you adapting to the moment as well as a 7 to ten-year-old style of interaction 
with shifting delusions and psychotic background. Some interesting things: ‘I am moving to 10th 
Street. You are going to be happy that I am moving there.’ [which the client was reported to have 
said after having refused housing at this particular location the day before]. Suggests she 
understands the options she has even though at the time we delivered the news she was saying ‘I 
am your doctor, I own St. Mike’s,’ but the next day she incorporates what you have told her.   
 
Other times, there has been a shifting playful but I would say antagonistic youngster who takes no 
responsibility or future planning. I think how that will affect our interaction. You have to be firm 
and sometimes challenge her stuff but the effect might not be immediate. Yesterday she said to Di 
‘you don’t work for me.’ But she was interested in hearing what you said ‘because my lawyer is 
going to court to sue you all.’ We used that to say to Di that ‘housing is really important to 
continuing treatment and her only options were shelter or long-term care.’ 
 
Peggy: Were you talking to her?  
 
Peter: No. Diane and I were talking in a compassionate and supportive way in front of her. This 
allows her to incorporate this information in a face-saving way. 
 
Guy: They don’t want her to take any furniture.  
 
Relationally speaking, configuring Sophie’s behaviour according to the very 
human need to save face represents a valuable meaningful insight about another. Guy did 
not follow up on Peter’s observation, but returned to more concrete matters at hand, 
helping to illustrate the very pragmatic orientation of the ACT team. Peter’s musings, 
however, were not merely idle, and, as with the rest of the team, he found a way to parlay 
this insight into a therapeutic tool. Six weeks after he made the comment above, Peter 
reported how his understanding of Sophie’s need to save face helped him to convince her 
to accept an IM. Before the meeting began, Peggy had been excitedly questioning Peter 
about the incident. Later, when the item came up on the agenda Peter reported.  
She didn’t want the IM. I made it clear we could do it here or the hospital. 
The fact that I could point to the hospital [which was visible from the 
Sophie’s window] probably helped. Before I left I said we are going to 
wait for 4 minutes. Knocked on the door and she was ‘oh hi, come on in’ 
like a totally changed person. Classic Sophie. So typical, she can change 
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on the spot and is able to absorb things but is oppositional right at the 
moment. Every two weeks [the patient’s IM schedule] is a struggle … 
 
 
The Quantification of Progress 
It is becoming clear then that ACT team members had longstanding and detailed 
knowledge of their clients in all their particularities, as well as a focus that was 
undeniably relational. However, the value of building relationships and learning clients’ 
stories was largely instrumental and represented the means to achieving therapeutic goals. 
Such goals at times meant little more than adherence to a pharmaceutical regimen. 
Anecdotal or narrative accounts that emerged in team meetings then were framed more 
broadly by what Paul Brodwin describes as a “narrative of progress,” or a master 
narrative that imbues workers’ professional training as well as the intuitional demands 
placed upon them in the workplace. This narrative, Brodwin notes further, is etched into 
the very fabric of ACT work by virtue of bureaucratic documents such as the 
aforementioned service plan delivered by Rose.  
Drawing on his observation of an American ACT team over two years, Brodwin 
notes that “simply to get their job done, clinicians must produce a mandatory story of 
progress and continually measure, update, and reinscribe it every six months” (Brodwin, 
2011, p. 205). The treatment plan includes various sections to be filled out by a primary 
including background information on the client, client’s strengths, present problems and 
goals. According to Brodwin, each goal requires a specific intervention that is then 
entered into the weekly schedule. As he points out,  
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The model treatment plan sets the state for everyday clinical routines and 
supplies them with an orderly, almost transparent rationale. The client’s 
diagnosis, problems, goals, and services line up in a single logical chain, 
each link justifying the next. The plan unfolds according to an intuitive – 
and intuitively appealing—clinical logic. The suffering in [the client’s] life 
gets transformed into a list of discrete problems, each problem linked to a 
concrete, attainable goal; and each goal calls for a bundle of visits, 
relationships, “support,” assessments, medications, and monitoring (p. 
195).  
 
Hence, while standardized methods do not dominate practice, workers are still 
expected to produce quantifiable results. Moreover, the view of a client’s life as a series 
of problems to be solved was echoed in the ACT team I observed, primarily through the 
use of the term “piece.” “Piece” was commonly used to refer to critical aspects of a 
client’s wellbeing. Talia, for example, would talk of the “medication piece” or the 
“housing piece” which gave the impression that these were discrete aspects of a puzzle 
that if appropriately modified and reassembled in the correct manner, would result in a 
picture of progress and recovery. Piece is “a word I used to hate,” Greg told me in his 
interview 
But I think it’s just ingrained into my vocabulary now. A lot of social 
workers use the word ‘piece.’ I think it’s how we describe and 
compartmentalize the things that we do … there’s the housing piece, 
there’s the socialization piece and there’s the finances piece and the 
community engagement piece.  
 
Greg was less sure why he once disliked the term 
 I think it was just one of those words that I think was used so often and by 
everybody, I found myself asking … why that word? And I think over time 
it becomes incorporated in your vocabulary and it kind of makes sense.  
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It is worth asking, however, whether experience within a bureaucratic context is 
what is required for this term to become meaningful. For as Brodwin notes, given that the 
ACT team he observed was publically funded, an auditor came in every two years to 
insure that goals were being quantified and that these lined up with progress reports.14 
Incomplete reports threatened the agency’s funding. Hence, “the pervasive “audit 
culture” of public sector health services powerfully affects how people fill out these 
forms,” notes Brodwin  (p. 195). It is no small wonder then that individuals might, over 
time, come to perceive their work as an aggregate of rationally manageable parts, if their 
continued status as professionals relies upon their ability to cash out their interventions in 
terms of quantifiable units that are amenable to categorization and which can be pieced 
together to construct a logical story of progress.  
 
The Mandate for Progress Obscuring the Face of the Other 
In her paper, The City is My Mother anthropologist Anne Lovell (1997) tells a 
story that vividly demonstrates how the drive to produce objective and quantifiable 
results can clash with the values and worldview of someone who experiences psychosis 
thereby hindering worker/client relationships. In her research, Lovell came across a 
young homeless man named Rod who was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Little was 
known of Rod’s actual history, beyond a few sparse biographical details. However, he did 
                                                 
14 Over the course of my research, the ACT team I observed was also undergoing an institutional evaluation 
that occurred every 3 years. This, however, was part of an institution-wide accreditation process that the 
hospital underwent in order to retain its status as a teaching hospital and research institute. Canadian 
hospitals, as I explain in Chapter Six do not see funding relying on the kinds of audits described by 
Brodwin. Nevertheless, team members did tend to emphasise the importance of therapeutic progress. 
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like to tell how his mother provided for him by leaving food and other necessities in 
various parts of the city for him to find.  
In Lovell’s view, Rod’s delusions provided a means of setting himself apart from 
the other “indiscriminate scavengers” and “bums” who shared the city streets with him, 
while she further describes Rod’s existence, somewhat romantically, as “a quest that 
never ends” bent as it was on the discovery of self. A well-intentioned social worker,15 
however, appeared to take Rod to be expressing a desire to reconnect with his family, and 
went to great lengths to track down his biological mother. When she informed him of her 
accomplishment, Rod became angry, accused her of attempting “a false reconciliation” 
and was never heard from again. “Were the plot to reach a climax,” explains Lovell. 
“Were he to find his mother, his travels would terminate. His homelessness would 
become banalized, stigmatized, his voyage meaningless” (p. 360).  
Unlike the anthropologist, however, the social worker probably did not have the 
luxury to engage in the painstaking hermeneutic analysis of meaning Lovell recommends. 
For, to put it simply, the social worker would have nothing to show for her work. This is 
because doing so would not cohere well with the mandates of healthcare systems bent on 
quantifiable results, especially since, if Lovell is right about Rod’s worldview, the social 
worker had very little to offer him. As noted, a worker’s job is to map a narrative of 
progress over a story such as Rod’s, so that certain concrete steps towards recovery are 
made visible. Reconnecting a client with estranged family members is just the sort of 
                                                 
15 Based on Lovell’s description, this social worker may well have been an ACT worker, but it is not 
explicitly stated. 
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tangible and concrete step that can be noted in a chart to demonstrate that real progress is 
being made with a client.  
As Lovell describes it, the social worker was genuinely attached to Rod. It would 
seem, however, that she was unaware of the extent to which her ability to adequately 
respond to his Otherness ran counter to the demands of her work. Contacting Rod’s 
mother was not merely an example of good intentions gone wrong. Rather, it would 
appear that the requirement that his story follow a logical progression towards recovery 
precluded her very ability to appreciate his unique self-narrative on his own terms. Rod’s 
angry response and withdrawal then, represents the moment at which two intertwined but 
competing narratives clash and come grinding noisily to a halt.  
As Rod’s story demonstrates, one problem with the overarching drive towards 
therapeutic progress is that clients themselves are not swept up in the narrative to the 
same degree as caregivers. For instance, as Gail remarks during a service plan for Louis, 
who smokes heavily, is obese and whose highlight of the year appears to be his annual 
running shoe purchase, “Louis presents a lot of negative symptoms. He lacks the 
motivation to do the things he says he would like to work on … I should say that Louis’ 
only goal is not to change.” Most clinicians, however, want to help move patients along 
the trajectory of wellness, have received years of training to achieve competence in this 
effort, and, as Brodwin notes, see the goal as a moral enterprise. According to him, 
“futility is produced by the mismatch between one’s professional training and the current 
opportunities to apply it” (2011, p. 192). Given the necessary cooperation of clients for 
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the achievement of therapeutic progress, workers seem destined to fail when, as one case 
manager, puts it, “they don’t want anything we have to give” (p. 201). 
. 
IV. Further Sources of Suffering among ACT Workers 
Clients’ lack of cooperation will not be the sole source of a sense of defeat among 
workers. Practitioners exposed to clients’ contexts and often working towards a rich and 
nuanced understanding of them witness other conditions apt to give rise to a sense of 
moral failure due to their inability to answer the felt call of the Other. As Trevor said in 
relation to clients resistant to help, 
There is only so much that we can do … we can’t just pick somebody up 
and throw them in a hostel or in a house and that sort of stuff just really 
wears on you after a time. There are just those times when you pretend to 
be calloused and just do your thing and whatever. You can’t help but bear 
some weight or at least feel like you are bearing it. Be it either 
responsibility or just feeling sorry for the person 
 
Although ACT workers do not seem to be persistently constrained by workplace 
regulations that preclude them from responding to the call of the Other, as with nurses 
described in Chapter Three, they still may tend to suffer from sense of responsibility for 
circumstances they cannot change. As Trevor notes, “it’s a very emotional job and you 
often see people [fellow workers] get overwhelmed by their emotions.”  
 
Like Taking a Garden Hose to a Forest Fire: Material limitations 
Given the sheer lack of resources available to clients, and other factors they are 
powerless to address, the odds are stacked against efforts to improve the client’s life. For, 
it would appear that the actual course of clients’ lives rarely match any carefully plotted 
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trajectories towards improvement and recovery. This will be especially true in large 
urban centers, where, as noted earlier, living conditions leave much to be desired and 
many clients are reportedly living at subsistence levels.  
It is doubtful, in fact, that much has changed since Sue Estroff conducted her two-
year-long ethnography of ACT clients in the late 1970’s (1981). In her time with ACT 
service-users Estroff noted dismal living conditions, and a lack of any real integration 
into the broader community. At least half of Estroff’s subjects lived in the downtown 
YMCA and for the most part the only work available to them involved mindless 
repetitive tasks carried out in sheltered workshops alongside developmentally delayed 
people. “It makes you feel like you’re retarded too, or at least somebody thinks you are” 
notes Doc, one of Estroff’s subjects. “How do they expect me to feel when they tell me I 
should work there? Man, it’s just too depressing, looking around at who’s there and 
knowing you are too” (p. 137). Estroff notes 
As time passed I began to realize that maybe a house in the suburbs, a 
family, a car, credit cards, and a full-time job might not be part of the 
present or foreseeable future for the people from whom I was learning. The 
lofty goals of reintegration into the community, satisfactory quality of life 
(or one like the general population’s), and lessening of personal distress 
and isolation put forth in the community psychiatry literature seemed far 
removed from what I was observing. At this point, I became very 
disheartened—all seemed gloomy and destined to fail. These people were 
not changing significantly in predictable and reliable ways. And then I 
began the recurring cycle of pessimism and hope that is probably perpetual 
if one does work in this area (or so I am told by the staff). Little alterations 
seem like major successes—a spontaneous smile, a good day, a new 
apartment. Yet, the creeping hopelessness always comes back. (p. 18). 
 
Not all are cut out for the enduring patience necessary to stave off the suffering a 
worker is apt to experience when placed in close proximity to hopelessness and despair 
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that he is helpless to alleviate. As one disillusioned worker remarked to Brodwin shortly 
before leaving the ACT team 
If I woke up tomorrow as Vicky Inger [his client with active delusions, a 
lifelong cocaine habit, and no family or friends], I would simply say, “Go 
ahead. Shoot me.” This is not a life worth living. Is just living, sheer 
biological survival worth it? … it’s an exercise in futility. You’re going 
keep them psychiatrically stable until they die. But where do you go with it 
then? Just line’em up in a ditch? (Brodwin, p. 203).  
 
As we can see, intimate knowledge of clients’ contexts is a double edged blade. Although 
the familiarity with their broader context can bring about a more intimate understanding 
of a client, workers are still mandated to stand by and watch some die impoverished, 
addicted and alone.  
 While no one I spoke with expressed a sense of futility to quite the same degree as 
Brodwin’s subjects, Otto did liken working in community mental health to “taking a 
garden hose to a forest fire.” He named minimal housing options, discrimination against 
clients and a lack of the basics required for daily living as contributing to the tide of 
factors that overwhelmed workers’ efforts to improve the lot of the people they strove to 
help. Meanwhile Rose admitted that after four years doing assertive outreach, her days 
with ACT were numbered due to the frustrations and obstacles she encountered in her 
efforts to help clients. Gail expected to leave the team soon, Tammy had already left, and 
Beth and Trevor also expected to move on one day. Moreover, the summer before my 
research began, Rose noted that six positions had turned over. Two of the eleven workers 
interviewed, moreover, mentioned that they had turned to counselling in order to deal 
with work-related stress. Many others had family members or partners who were either in 
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healthcare or a helping profession and reported that this supportive understanding from 
their inner circle was essential for their ability to deal with the most trying aspects of the 
work. 
 
Cuts and Chemicals: the Dominant Therapeutic Approach 
Apart from bearing witness to dismal living conditions, moreover, sometimes 
workers must also bear witness to harms effected by psychiatric drugs. In her interview 
Rose emphasised the need for not only better housing, but also better drugs, possibly due 
to the numerous clients struggling with diabetes and other side effects. Otto also showed 
concern about cases in which medication appeared to worsen, rather than improve, a 
client’s wellbeing. He relayed a story of a client who had very florid psychotic symptoms 
and limited insight, but who was paying his bills, cooking and functioning in the 
community. Otto explains 
We convinced him to take the medications and within 18 months he 
developed type 2 diabetes because of the medication. So what’s better? 
Was it better if he was just left the way he was or when he went from a size 
36 pants to a size 48 in 18 months? He gained excessive amounts of weight 
and type 2 diabetes and now he is struggling ... Now … he doesn’t take any 
antipsychotic medication. He still lives in the community. He eats, lives, 
gets on with his life. Yeah, he’s got some beliefs, but everyone does have 
some sort of odd beliefs. Be he’s able to function, so I’m wondering. 
That’s an ethical thing. 
 
Otto further maintains that “cuts and chemicals are what is important” in the current 
healthcare environment, hence there is continuous emphasis on medication. However, 
this is not a factor in patient care over which regular workers have much control even if 
their job is to deliver drugs and convince patients to stay on board with treatment.  
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This is not to suggest, however, that all workers questioned the value of 
medication. Non-medical staff such as Rose and Trevor seemed to defer to psychiatrists’ 
expertise around medication, while Peter acknowledged that side-effects problematized 
treatment, but that the benefits mostly outweighed the costs. Interestingly, Diane’s 
reaction when she heard about her colleague’s doubts helps to reveal the well-entrenched 
nature of the medical model described by Otto. “Wow” said Diane incredulously during 
her interview. “What are they even doing here if they are going to start questioning that 
kind of stuff? Wow, I’m really blown away by that.” For those left questioning the 
cost/benefit value of antipsychotics, however, the sense of futility attached to this kind of 
work can only deepen when hearing clients complaints or witnessing adverse reactions to 
drugs that non-medical staff have little power to address beyond informing the doctors.  
 
They Are Not Your Friends: Limits to Emotional Support 
While many would agree that they cannot provide their clients with material 
support, at least, some might suppose, workers are providing social support. The reality 
is, however, that an implicit demand for professional detachment limits what an ACT 
worker can offer a client in terms of community and connectedness. For one thing, the 
relationship between a worker and a client is part of the job, and ends when a worker 
leaves that role. Rose, for example, pointed out that in spite of wanting to know about 
clients from the first ACT team she worked on, she did not see it as appropriate to look in 
on them. “I only entered their lives through professional care, so I’m not a friend.” She 
also said she found it difficult “teasing out mental health care from just wanting to know 
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[about clients personally],” then added “I’m terrible about that,” minimizing the 
importance of concerns for clients stemming from her care for them. Rose is left with the 
sense that she must foreclose upon whatever attachments she has formed when her job 
comes to an end.  
 Such an expectation, however, creates a conflict for workers. As Trevor notes, 
worker turnover is something clients find difficult. “They often struggle with people 
coming and going a lot and I think that is just a testament to just how important that 
consistency is for a lot of our people.” He admitted that he expects to feel guilty when 
and if he decides to move on from ACT. Rose, similarly seemed conflicted about the 
prospect of quitting the job. She wondered aloud, for example, about workers who have 
known their clients for 20 years  
What happens when they retire? What happens to all that information? … 
How do you just forget about them or not wonder how they are doing? …  
and I wonder, what’s that called? That worry, or care, or something, where 
it goes. 
 
Even within the scope of their jobs, ACT workers cannot function as regular 
members of their clients’ communities, as Henry’s comment about the impropriety of 
sharing stories at Tom’s funeral helps to show. Rose, moreover, relayed a story of a co-
worker on another team who invited several long-term clients to her wedding. 
She thought this will be such a nice day for them, and it was. They got 
dressed up and they were just beaming and they couldn’t believe that they 
got invited to a wedding … She got in so much shit for that. She was told 
‘you have crossed a line here, they are not your friends.’  
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Hence, while there is an impetus to help clients become integrated into ‘the community,’ 
this term becomes something of an abstraction given the implicit injunction against this 
being a community of which a worker herself is a part.  
There are also limitations upon the kind of emotional support workers should 
provide clients. This became evident in a discussion involving Steven, a client who was 
calling the pager 6 or seven times every night. The issue being brought forward at two 
different meetings was how to set boundaries with Steven so that he would stop paging 
the on-call staff members just so he could have someone to talk to. The psychiatrists’ 
suggestions were as follows 
Henry: That was totally inappropriate to tell you he got a can of sardines … He does say ‘I’m 
lonely.’ We should encourage the use of other relationships.  
 
Later in the meeting 
 
Peter: what is he doing at night? We should look at his sleep schedule. It’s also an opportunity to 
do therapy.  
 
Although many in this meeting seemed to agree that the client was calling out of 
loneliness, during the long discussion that followed, the possibility that anyone should 
chat with the client to alleviate this feeling never emerged. Arguably, doing so is simply 
not an ACT workers job. It is not anyone’s job in fact.  
Rather, engaging with someone who is lonely is the act of a friend, but a key 
problem for the clients of ACT seems to be that many lack a supportive community. As 
Trevor notes “in a lot of ways we might be [clients’] only social contact.” Estroff’s work, 
moreover, revealed a subculture of “Crazies,” or people who identified as mentally ill. 
Most of these people were cut off from, and even actively avoided, so called “Outside 
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Normals” such as policemen, business owners, landlords and other members of the 
community. Of the 43 individuals with whom Estroff interacted, only five had friends 
that were not receiving psychiatric treatment. She notes “many clients had difficulty 
understanding why I would spend time with them, or would even like them, 
demonstrating how unaccustomed they were to interaction with Inside Normals who were 
not somehow treating or advising them” (1981, p. 183).  
Workers, however, are barred from crossing over the professional divide to 
provide clients with genuine friendships and community, and are thus no better situated 
to provide social support than the material resources their clients so desperately need. 
Mandated to achieve observable progress, yet often powerless to do so, workers are often 
left merely bearing witness to a multiplicity of devastatingly lonely lives. In other words, 
workers are brought face-to-face with many who have been abandoned and forsaken, and 
due to this proximity, will be acutely aware of their needs. In spite of being mandated to 
form relationships with those people, they are still restricted in how this is achieved.  
As a result of this contradiction, some will second-guess and calculate every act 
of generosity or kindness called forth by such encounters, given that in many instances 
they are being required to reach out to, and ignore the call of the Other simultaneously. 
As Beth describes it 
you build your relationship with them, you build rapport. It’s just like you 
know, it would be so nice if, they have no friends, they have no anything 
and sometimes you think it would be nice to go out and have a coffee or 
something. But you have to kind of weigh, what is it for? Is it so they will 
like me more? Is this going to build rapport? If I already have rapport what 
is this doing? It’s sort of reinforcing that we’re friends and it shouldn’t be 
like that. When buying the client stuff you have to be careful. At the same 
time they have absolutely nothing, what is it for you to give them a dollar? 
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For them it would make their day. So it does get, yeah some of those 
professional boundaries are difficult. 
 
The point I am making here is not that ACT workers ought to be friends with their 
clients, but rather that they are regularly faced with a call from the Other which they are 
either obliged to ignore, or must ignore for the sake of their own wellbeing. Moreover, 
this is not to suggest that all clients will issue such a call for forms of engagement that 
exceed a worker’s professional role. One ACT patient interviewed for a different study, 
seemed to prefer a relationship circumscribed by professional boundaries 
It’s one relationship that isn’t entangled like all my other relationships are, 
whether it’s family or friends, there’s that professional boundary. I can 
trust that it’s more … like normal. I can check things out with them. It’s a 
cleaner, safer, healthier relationship for me (Stull, et al, 2005, p. 20).   
 
Meanwhile, few would argue against a worker’s right not to bring her work home with 
her, or to avoid having it permeate other aspects of her life. However, this will often 
create contradictions for and perhaps feed into the sense of futility experienced by 
workers. For, knowing that one possesses certain rights or is obliged to maintain certain 
boundaries, might do little to stave off the experience of failure or guilt occasioned by 
resisting the felt call for more involved engagement and connectedness.  
 
V. Tactics for Resisting Futility 
There is reason to suppose that workers’ own distress has not made them inured to 
their charges, and this may well be due to certain tactics they’ve developed. As we shall 
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see, however, the fact that workers have the time and the space to conduct their work as 
they see fit provides them with the means to push back against pessimism and despair. 
 
He Made an Omelet: The Importance of the Recovery Board 
In spite of certain previously mentioned difficulties, the team I observed 
consciously strove to stave off a lingering sense of futility. The aforementioned 
“Recovery Board” was one method this team in particular had found to remind 
themselves of the small successes Estroff mentions in the passage cited above. For 
example, on February 2 a note appeared on the recovery board that “Gerald has a new 
bed! Cooked an omelet! (independently).” Three months later, Beth reported that Gerald 
was not eating, and was becoming increasingly emaciated. He was also covered in 
bedbugs but was resisting a move into a more supportive group home. Hence, team 
members decided to give Gerald a trial period of three weeks during which he would get 
more frequent home visits before a more concerted effort was made to move the client. 
As Beth noted, “we know he is capable. He made an omelet. Let’s not take that from him 
until we see it in play. We are saying ‘this is your opportunity to show us.’” The fact that 
such a seemingly trivial detail would stick with a worker for three months speaks both to 
the lack of improvement caregivers were apt to witness as well as the meaningfulness of 
items appearing on the recovery board. It is worth noting, that such an attitude and patient 
attentiveness to change can only be accomplished when arbitrary time limits have not 
been placed on the duration of work with a client. Clients here are allowed to change in 
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their own time and workers are not rushed to hasten their recovery before some pre-
determined deadline. 
 
Boiling Blood and ACT advocacy 
In spite of such efforts, however, it would be very difficult not to experience a 
sense of defeat in the face of an overwhelming number of systemic barriers limiting what 
a worker could hope to achieve with a client. Workers, it would appear, are relatively 
powerless to confront or solve such broader issues, hence it does not seem to be the case 
that those who are closest to ACT clients are participating in broader policy decisions 
regarding their care. As Rose said in her interview, “there is a bigger system at play and it 
is hard to navigate against the system when you are in the system … Unless you take it as 
your life and do it in your evening and off-times.”  
As noted, workers’ time during their shifts is largely occupied with medication 
drops, paperwork, phone tag, helping clients maintain their personal hygiene and living 
conditions, among other things. Little time will be left over to address systemic barriers 
to their work with clients, and even if one has the drive, it is difficult to assess when one 
has achieved a tangible win. Perhaps it is not surprising then, that workers so genuinely 
involved in their patients’ lives were quick to dive in and champion those who’d been 
clearly wronged by less personally involved agencies and institutions. However, it is only 
because they have the space to devise spontaneous solutions to problems, that workers 
were able to engage in such forms of advocacy. 
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The care for clients evidenced in meetings did, on occasion, translate into 
indignation on their behalf. For example, Talia’s remarked “he paid all that money. Wow, 
my blood is boiling! They said they would chop it up and remove it and we bought him a 
new bed.” Talia mentioned this on at least two meetings in relation to a mishap that 
occurred after a company treated a client’s apartment for bedbugs. It was probably the 
case that team members’ richer and more nuanced and detailed understanding of clients’ 
particularities served to exacerbate the frustrations they experienced on seeing clients 
mistreated by impersonal agencies implementing standardized procedures with no regard 
for clients’ particularities or context.  
However, given the number of obstacles team members were powerless to 
overcome, any chance to effect clear and concrete change should represent a golden 
opportunity for those bent on progress. Not surprisingly then, I witnessed no small 
number of cases in which workers not only expressed clear indignation, but also avidly 
leapt to the defence of wronged clients. “That is a very unethical way of doing things,” 
remarked Stephanie in one meeting while discussing a case in which a housing program 
was holding back $1,600 from a client, allegedly to cover expenses after she moved. 
Money, the discussion revealed, had only accrued because the client had accidentally 
paid double her required rent for several months. “We should champion this,” Peter 
replied.  
A case that vividly illustrated workers’ indignation on behalf of a client, and their 
rapid mobilization to right a wrong against him, involved James. Although many team 
283 
 
members had conflicts with James,16 an enduring fondness for him appeared to abide. 
“He’s a strange guy,” Henry once remarked. “Strangely likeable.” When James was 
awarded $100,000 in a back-dated lawsuit, the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) 
representative managing his money deemed it unnecessary to inform the mental patient of 
his windfall. Rose, who was James’ primary, had been engaged in an ongoing struggle 
with James’s trustee, when the administrator had offhandedly mentioned the money. 
Rose was in contact with the trustee because she’d been working on getting $500 
released to buy a new bed. The next morning during their daily meeting Rose stressed 
that it was a complete “fluke” that she learned about the award at all, and reported on the 
conversation with the PGT worker to other team members. According to Rose, the trustee 
was on the verge of locking away James’ money in order to preserve his disability 
support payments. When Rose said that James should be involved in this decision, the 
trustee had replied “we don’t usually do that.” 
  
Rose: The issue is, can’t we spend some of this money? He [the trustee] said ‘better do it quickly 
because we will lock the money away in a registered disability account. It is locked in for 10 
years.’ 
 
Peggy: He is 55, he might not be alive in 10 years. 17 That is very cruel!  
 
Rose: That is so wrong. So I have started a paper trail. Does James even know [it was later 
determined that he had not been informed]? I expressed the concerns [to the PGT] is this the right 
thing to do? Is this in James’ best interests?” 
 
Stephanie: And he might not be alive in 10 years!  
 
                                                 
16 Especially over medication, which he believed gave him schizophrenia. James was also inconsistent in 
his reception of workers. Some said he opened the door to them and pointed to the threshold stating 
“there’s a line, and you do not cross it.” Meanwhile, the same week, he told Peggy that “angels like you are 
always welcome.”  
17 During her interview, Rose explained that James was “extremely unhealthy, extremely frail. He doesn’t 
eat properly, he’s got emphysema.” 
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Peggy: They are about to lock away the money. Is there a patient advocacy office we can call? 
 
Henry: We need a face-to-face meeting 
 
Peter: They also have what they think are James’ best interests in mind. We can say he is not 
well, his quality of life is low. We need to bide our time.  
 
Henry: I propose an emergency meeting on the ward. He needs to know about this. He has to be 
notified. The other option is to encourage him to get himself a lawyer. 
 
Peggy: Right now he is so sick, calling the patient advocacy office will be hard. He’ll just yell. 
 
Otto: We have to get the PGT to wait on this.  
 
Rose: The trustee said he has to get this done. 
 
Stephanie: You were so lucky to have called. 
 
Rose: It was just a fluke.  
 
Peter: Part of the reason he is so unwell is the struggle with the PGT for 3 years. This could be 
very therapeutic for him.  
 
Guy: That insight is not far off. He would get rid of that box and mattress. For 2 or three weeks 
he’s been saying ‘this is not what I want.’ 
 
Peggy: It’s good we connected this to our team. 
 
Otto: I’m sure he will blame us.  
 
Rose: For today I can place a preliminary call. It might be more effective if a physician speaks to 
them.  
 
Peter: Good clinical situation. 
 
Henry: Interesting. Too bad more of our clients don’t have $100,000.  
 
A clear action plan emerged from this discussion such that in the end, Peggy would 
phone the trustee and explain James’ broader health concerns and put a temporary hold 
on the trustee’s plans.18 
                                                 
18 This case also provides an example of the manner in which the narrative of progress shapes team 
members perceptions, as was evident when Peter noted in relation to James’ settlement that “another 
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The othering of patients that occurred with other less personally involved 
healthcare providers sparked further acts of advocacy from ACT workers. These were 
cases in which hospital workers were too quick to dismiss ACT patients’ very legitimate 
medical concerns. Diane, for example, told the team about a trying time she had in the 
ER trying to convince a “cocky and condescending” doctor, that her client Danny was not 
suffering from a cocaine overdose, but was exhibiting the symptoms of a more serious 
health problem. Peter’s best guess, as revealed in the meeting, was that Danny had had a 
heart attack.  
Diane: I have been struggling with emerge’s attitude towards our clients with either discharging 
them too quickly or wanting to discharge them too quickly. With Danny they thought he took 
drugs and it wasn’t about him doing that at all. I dealt with some real attitude problems with one 
physician and became paralyzed by my anger and was glad Talia was there to debrief … I wanted 
to tell you that the paramedics that picked Danny up said, ‘ah, it’s drugs.’ Val told the paramedic 
off in her abrupt way. She said ‘no way it is not drugs, no way it is. Take him, he is really sick’ 
…  
 
Peter: what worked in the end? 
 
Diane: Talia being there because I was so angry.  
 
Later in the meeting 
 
Talia: You could really see how someone could really fall through the cracks. A lot of it is ruling 
things out. I can imagine if I was a family member. Danny’s brother Sam was told it was a 
cocaine overdose. A kind of narrative is created when you are at the point of ruling out things, 
when you are disclosing to family members but there are no tests saying that is what happened. 
Sam was saying “I don’t know my brother to do this.”  
 
Diane: so I saw the nurse. 
 
Peter: in the end, how did he get the CT and admission? 
 
Diane: the nurse told me that the next shift did it. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
possibility is that we have the duty to assess his competence regularly. If we propose a more stable 
treatment plan, see how well his financial competence becomes. If he gets organized enough to manage 
money, he could regain control of his $100,000. Set up a lawyer until he runs out and he can go back on 
[disability]. It would be a win-win to get him onboard with good treatment.” 
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Peter: so you guys left in frustration? 
 
Diane: no, no, we asked ‘please do it.’ And the nurse said ‘I will tell the doctor.’ I went to crisis 
and gave them the heads up. The emerge nurse saw me and said ‘I have never seen anyone come 
to emerge to advocate, that is fantastic.’ The other doctor did all the CT scan and the tox. The 
next shift was more proactive. In general our involvement and presence is very important. We do 
need to advocate. Our clients can’t advocate for themselves.19 
 
In all such cases20 team members had a chance to make a real difference, which 
was to correct a tangible and clear cut wrong committed against one of their own. 
However, had her day been highly structured, replete with predetermined tasks, Diane 
would not have had the ability to camp out at the ER. Moreover, the spontaneous, 
collaborative space of the team meeting was what enabled workers to come together, 
share their indignity and then creatively brainstorm together to arrive at a unique solution 
tailored to James’ situation. 
 
If You Don’t Laugh, You’ll Cry 
                                                 
19 Such a drive to advocate on behalf of patients was not unmitigated, however. As Beth noted later in this 
meeting 
I feel that emerge in general is a chaotic place and everyone is going there for a crisis. If you are not able 
to articulate why you are there, then there is no one else to do it for you. We should definitely make it a 
priority if it’s between the hours of 8:00 am and 8:00 pm [time when the team had active members on shift 
20 Otto told me about another case involving a patient who had just been discharged from hospital and Otto 
and Guy went to see the man and found him a little disoriented. Otto showered the man, got him some 
food, and returned the next day to see the food still on the table and Mike slouched on the sofa in his boxer 
shorts exactly as they’d left him the day before. Emergency response workers, however, refused to take 
Mike to the hospital assuming that he had just been drinking. I said ‘this is not his presentation, this is not 
what he looks like. This is not him’. Otto even pointed out that there were no evidence of alcohol in the 
apartment, but to no avail. According to Otto, the EMT worker had replied that ‘he doesn’t want to go, he 
knows what day it is,’ and left. Otto and Guy’s only recourse then, was the have the client arrested under 
the mental health act, and brought to hospital by a team consisting of a nurse and a police officer. They 
brought him in and the guy went onto a respirator and went up to the ICU, that’s how bad it was. Mike, 
was suffering from liver failure. It was true that patient had a history of drinking. as Otto notes, however, 
mental health is a stigma, even for people coming into the emerge, then with addictions attached to that 
mental health, it make it even worse. People will dismiss what they see as addiction. They’ll boot them out.  
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The more relaxed atmosphere of the team meeting also enabled workers to engage 
in spontaneous forms of humour that many found essential for coping. The concept of 
‘gallows humour’ was explained to me early on in my research process by Stephanie, 
who appeared concerned that I might take things the wrong way. Many team members 
seemed to share a dry sense of humour and otherwise agreed that laughter represents a 
coping device. When asked if a sense of humour was crucial to do the job Rose replied, 
I think so, just on Sunday I was cleaning Maria’s female area and she 
farted right in my face. I just burst out laughing and she started giggling 
and [later] I was telling Otto, ‘ew, guess what happened to me?’ I was 
laughing. If you are like, ‘ew, that is so revolting,’  I don’t know. I think 
we laugh a lot and in that office [communal office space] there are pranks 
on a daily basis. There are a few of us that are like that and I am one of 
them. I think that is our way of coping. We say you’ve got to laugh …  
 
It was then noted that Henry jokes regularly in team meetings 
And that’s why he does it too.  I consider myself pretty sensitive but if you 
are sensitive in that way, or getting offended easily then I think you would 
find it hard because that is how a lot of us cope. 
 
Stephanie put it a little more succinctly when explaining the importance of humour in the 
workplace. If you don’t laugh, you’re going to cry [Stephanie laughs]. And sometimes we 
cry too, but probably [laugh] more so.” Because workers were not severely monitored 
they could indulge in the occasional practical joke in the backroom, as I noted previously. 
Such behaviours, and regular quips were for many an important source of team cohesion 
and helped to make their jobs more bearable.  
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VI. Relationships and Stories as Ends in Themselves: A Tonic for 
Futility? 
The most obvious way to alleviate the suffering in the lives of SPMI patients, and 
by proxy, their care workers of course is to provide more in the way of material resources 
for the patients, many of whom, as has been made evident, are effectively disabled and 
thereby shut out from a decent standard of living. When and if such changes occur, they 
will not happen overnight. In the meantime, there is something of a moral imperative to 
ease the demand for quantifiable forms of progress from workers in light of suffering this 
causes them. Moreover, there is much to be said for taking care-ethics seriously and 
endorsing the work of forming relationships as valuable, meaningful and praiseworthy in 
and of itself so that workers in close proximity to such patients might fully appreciate one 
of the most worthwhile aspects of their work.  
 As Ivan Illich writes  
 
We are creatures that find our perfection only by establishing a 
relationship, and that relationship may appear arbitrary from everybody 
else’s point of view, because we do it in response to a call and not a 
category (Illich, cited in Baldwin, 2005, p. 1024).  
 
In other words, the mere existence of a singular relationship founded upon a sensitivity 
and responsiveness to another is valuable in and of itself. Although I have argued that 
there are serious limitations to what an ACT team can provide in terms of community and 
connectedness, there is little doubt that the care and attention that ACT teams show their 
clients certainly counts for much among people abandoned by so many. Christensen, a 
psychiatrist who has been doing street-based outreach to mentally ill people for ten years, 
sees the formation of strong social connections as central to his work.  Christensen 
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stresses the importance of building relationships with people living at the margins of 
society over and above issuing diagnoses, creating treatment plans or dispensing 
medication. “At the risk of sounding blasphemous in this era of evidence-based medicine, 
[meaningful outreach work] is not solely about measurable clinical outcomes” (2009, p. 
1034), argues Christensen. 
According to Christensen, his team does not aim to discuss treatment plans when 
they meet people on the streets. “We provide food, water, and clothing, offer a shelter 
bed and, above all else, listen deeply.”  According to the psychiatrist the sole outcome he 
has in mind is that individuals are receptive to a conversation next time he meets them. 
Christensen relies on an anecdote from his early days doing outreach work to explain 
how this turnaround in his thinking was effected. 
On one of our team’s initial forays years ago we made contact with a 
woman living on the street who was floridly psychotic, filthy from head-to-
toe, malodorous, and fairly agitated. After telling her who I was, and what 
I did, she totally and completely ignored me. Staring off into the distance, 
she pressed on with a monologue that made sense only to her. I remember 
being flustered because I was unable to interrupt or otherwise get her 
attention. Looking for any hook to engage her, I said something along the 
lines of, “You know, Ms. Virginia, I could give you medications that 
would make you feel better.” At that moment, she stopped her psychotic 
soliloquy in mid-sentence, looked me full in the eyes, and replied, “Hmmm 
. . . Ya’ think? Well, I think giving me medication would make you feel 
better, but it sure as hell won’t make me feel better!” 
 
Those who have become estranged from society, noted Christensen, often become 
suspicious and distrustful. One might suppose that a skepticism about the motivations of 
others would be something of a natural response in people who have been marginalized 
and discarded by their society, but that this response also results in a vicious circle, such 
that their wariness keeps people with SPMI at a distance from available caring 
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communities. Although relatively few ACT clients were homeless, comments such as 
“she keeps telling us to get lost, like most of our clients” as uttered by Stephanie in one 
team meeting, suggest that at least some of those served by the team were unreceptive to 
visits.21 Likely it is true that merely connecting with such individuals, gaining their trust 
and as Christensen puts it, “the promotion of a reconnection to a community of 
welcoming compassion and overt caring,” stands to be the most important service a 
caregiver could provide.  
As Christensen’s notes, ‘listening deeply’ is essential for building such 
relationships, and I would suggest that what needs to be listened for is the story of the 
person one encounters. For, mandated as they are to come to know their clients well over 
an extended period of time, ACT team members are well-positioned to spare the 
marginalized and forgotten people with whom they work “the terror of being deprived an 
any story whatsoever” (Crapanzano, cited in Lovell, 1997, p. 364). It is mainly within the 
framework of a narrative conception of the self that such a deprivation can be understood 
as a terror. Various thinkers (Baldwin, 2005, MacIntyre, 2007, Taylor, 1989), hold that 
we are essentially narrative beings in that our sense of self is contingent upon the stories 
we tell of ourselves. Given such a view, Baldwin (2005) argues that mental health care 
practitioners are implicitly entrusted with the co-authorship of patients’ narratives, given 
that SPMI often leads to fractured and incoherent stories of the self. Excavating a client’s 
story then, and sharing it with him on his own terms is to help him find himself. This 
                                                 
21 During a ride along with Guy, I witnessed a client who wordlessly came to the door, extended her hand 
for medication but otherwise refused any further form of interaction. As we returned to the car, Guy 
informed me that this behavior was fairly typical for this particular woman. 
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position of trust, argues Baldwin, entails a certain onus to help patients re-establish both 
narrative integrity and narrative agency, while also resisting the imposition of master 
narratives upon clients’ stories (p. 1024). In other words, it is important to help clients to 
make sense of their lives in a way that coheres with their own conception of meaning.  
There are at least two ways in which the narrative of progress works against the 
kind of project of reconstruction recommended by Baldwin, however. Firstly, there 
appears to be an implicit injunction against exploring the content of patients’ delusions 
and the meaning such fictions hold for clients. That is, the narrative of progress interferes 
with a careful mapping of the world of someone who experiences psychosis due to the 
concomitant biomedical discourse that construes delusions as the mere signifiers of a 
diseased brain. On this view, progress demands the elimination of such aberrant neural 
processes rather than representing beliefs and utterances that one might seek to 
understand, or even engage with.  
As I noted earlier, the content of delusions and their meaning from the perspective 
of patients was rarely a focal point of discussion in team meetings. A brief joking 
exchange among team members helps to bring to light the taboo against participating in a 
patients’ delusions. Sophie, who was particularly difficult-to-place at the time, had 
recently gotten two offers for housing. In a quick aside during the meeting, Trevor joked 
that perhaps the team ought to connect the offers with the fact that the client accepted 
medication the day before. 
 
Trevor: You know, look you took your IM yesterday. It’s magical. 
 
Peggy: [laughing] That is evil! Delete that! [to me].  
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Peggy’s animated outburst in response to Trevor’s suggestion along with her comments 
and laughter helped to fully reveal the impropriety of his comment. Although the 
coerciveness of such an act would account for the taboo against it, a reluctance to engage 
in a client’s delusionary schemes may also be at play here. According to one study in 
fact, patients with psychosis will often try to discuss their symptoms. Psychiatrists 
however, mostly hesitated in their responses, laughed, or answered patients questions 
with a question rather than engaging with patients’ concerns (McCabe et al, 2002, p. 
1148). As Bracken and Thomas point out, health practitioners who might be tempted to 
participate in their clients’ delusions stand to be “accused of colluding with madness” and 
that the reluctance they show “may be institutional … the professional view is that it is 
unhelpful to dwell on psychotic material” (2005, p. 58).22 
 Yet resisting these aspects of a client’s story can create isolation and loneliness 
for a client. As Louise Penbrooke, who suffers from delusions, says about friends who 
pick invisible hissing snakes off her body for her  
It helped that someone believed me. Someone was taking me seriously 
enough and doing something. It did not necessarily help the snakes 
disappear, but I did not feel totally alone (Penbrooke, cited Bracken and 
Thomas, 2005, p. 58). 
 
                                                 
22 This was not always the case. In Madness and Civilization, Foucault describes a treatment for a man with 
the delusion that he was dead and who would therefore not eat. Various individuals painted their faces to 
make themselves appear pale and dead, and ate dinner at his bedside in order to convince the man that the 
dead do, in fact, eat. From Foucault’s account, they successfully persuaded the patient to share in their 
dinner (1961/1988, p. 188). 
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For someone who experiences psychosis, moreover, the content of her delusions cannot 
help but factor into her story and thereby become an essential part of her identity. Hence 
ignoring such experiences and what they mean to an individual limits one’s ability to 
arrive at a rich understanding of another person. 
Moreover, the work of anthropologists such as Lovell and Alex Cohen (2001) 
suggests that exploring the content of delusions is important to understanding the 
personhood of a someone who experiences psychosis. Cohen, for example, suggests that 
one can see delusions “as fictions representing behaviour by which individuals sought to 
infuse their lives with meaning and to present positive images of themselves and others” 
(p. 292). Delusions of grandeur, then for instance, are best understood against a backdrop 
of boredom, brutality, disenfranchisement and marginalization and are tactics for 
achieving that same sense of self-worth that so many people crave. Cohen’s work helps 
to demonstrate how being aware of an individual’s particular delusions can help us to 
recognize his basic humanity, and thereby identify him. Meanwhile, as we saw earlier, 
Lovell similarly sees delusions suffusing an otherwise banal existence with meaning, but 
her work brings out the importance of understanding and responding appropriately to 
differences we encounter in the Other while cautioning us not to reduce him to 
“sameness.” 
If one truly hopes to achieve an understanding of a person who experiences 
psychosis, the perspective that Lovell calls for is a “hermeneutic” approach that 
appreciates the intricately connecting symbolic parts of Rod’s experience, and which 
neither imposes a temporal framework onto his story nor deprives him of his narrative 
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agency. According to Baldwin, moreover, “chronologically fragmented stories or 
repetitions of stories by a person with mental illness may be understood as unaddressed, 
misunderstood, reoccurring meaning rather than simply the result of the impact of 
impairment” (2005, p. 1026). One might then supplement Lovell’s recommendations 
with Baldwin’s notion of “narrative quilting” whereby stories are joined together to 
“build up a narrative map both with and for the person with severe mental illness, a map 
that may have little immediate meaning or use for that individual, but which is essential 
for us in understanding the landscape of that person’s experience.”  
 The second way in which the emphasis on objective and quantifiable markers of 
progress in clients bars this rich comprehensive understanding of the Other’s story is in 
virtue of the narrow focus evident in meetings. For, in such discussions workers  
persistently zeroed in on clients while bracketing their own responses out of the 
discursive field. As Baldwin argues, providers of psychiatric care “have a tendency to 
approach people with severe mental illness, because of their vulnerability and 
dependence, as recipients of our care, service and narrative constructions rather than 
contributors to our own narrative constructions” (p. 1027). The discussions of Tom 
relayed at the beginning of this chapter were unique in that workers were permitted, 
perhaps even encouraged, to reflect on the manner in which Tom impacted their own 
lives and what meaning his life may have had more broadly speaking. It is just such an 
attitude, that, according to Baldwin, is necessary to preserve a client’s narrative agency. 
This is because in his view, “narrative ethics involves reciprocal claims that bind together 
listener and teller in a relationship in which both find fulfillment.” 
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Achieving this state of reciprocity requires listeners of a narrative to open 
themselves up to, and become aware of, the manner in which a client’s story impacts 
their own self-narrative, or shows them, as listeners, something about their own lives. For 
instance, Christensen’s story above effectively demonstrates this openness. The client he 
describes, and his interaction with her, has become an intrinsic component of his own 
story. The client not only appeared to teach Christensen a certain amount of humility, as 
perhaps Tom did to ACT workers when they learned he really was friends with the 
mayor, but Christensen’s encounter was also a formative experience that would shape his 
view of the world, and his practise for years to come. 
 
Living Eulogies 
As I indicated early on in this chapter, assuming the attitude of a eulogizer is what 
stands to bring about this sense of openness to which Baldwin hearkens, and perhaps 
from there, onto greater appreciation of the relationships formed with clients. A good 
eulogy does more than provide a flattering picture of a person’s life; it describes what 
was meaningful to a particular person, what was meaningful about his life, while also 
remarking upon both his struggles and accomplishments. Most importantly, however, 
eulogies function as a mutual exploration and public testament to the manner in which a 
person’s existence impacted the lives of those gathered to share these stories. A good 
eulogy tells us why we should care that a particular individual once lived. Hence, 
assuming such an attitude towards the living will tend to cultivate care for the person so 
described. 
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A break from the relentless therapeutic focus in meetings, however, would be 
necessary for this sort of perspective to gain traction. That is, there would need to be 
room simply to reflect on a client’s personhood above and beyond any instrumental 
focus, so that workers might share in the pleasure of an ever deepening collective 
understanding of the people with whom they engage. They would also need to take time 
to reflect together upon the manner in which their clients and they themselves have, in 
concert, changed over time. Encouraging workers to acknowledge the meaning that 
particular clients’ lives hold for them in the semi-public setting of the team meeting could 
perhaps help to further combat the sense that some workers harbour, which is that the 
lives they work so hard to preserve are meaningless existences. For there is no better 
evidence for the conclusion that clients lead valuable lives than a first-hand recognition 
of the impact they have had on one’s own life, while also hearing about the 
meaningfulness of clients’ stories for other members of one’s team. 
As this chapter comes to a close, I would like to call to mind how in Chapter One 
I demonstrated how reified productive, administrative or scientific systems, and their 
associated values – which include objectivity, quantification, efficiency and economism, 
and replication, prediction and control –  structures the provision of professional care in 
ways that is detrimental to human relatedness. So far, in this last section of the present 
chapter, I have shown how the value placed upon objective and quantifiable data serves 
to structure ACT work in ways that are detrimental to workers, and possibly clients. I 
have argued that giving ACT workers even more latitude and discretionary time than they 
are currently allowed would make for a more ethical working environment.  
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In my next chapter I shall return to the themes of reification, economism and 
efficiency and standardization in healthcare. This is because I will be looking at a 
growing trend now underway that could entrench these values more deeply into the ACT 
work, while the ACT model may well be in the process of becoming reified. This trend 
raises the disturbing possibility that the relational values that make ACT work morally 
distinctive will succumb to rationalistic priorities over time. Once again the spectre of 
Agamemnon will be raised to remind readers of the potentiality of workers inured to the 
Face of the suffering Other.  
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Chapter Six 
From Fidelity to Persons to Program Fidelity: Future 
Directions for ACT 
 
 
“Having them in my life has kept me out of hospital … if you did not have all those 
appointments and rules and regulations you’d probably be hanging yourself with a rope 
and getting in hospital.” 
~ACT client, cited in McCall and Wakefield, 2012, p.33 
 
As I noted in Chapter Four, Christensen, a street-based psychiatrist, has argued 
that fidelity ought to figure as a prominent value in community psychiatry. Certainly, 
members of the Sunnydale ACT team demonstrated this value through their willingness 
to stand by persons abandoned by society so as to advocate for them, offer ongoing 
support and to patiently attend to minute changes seen in clients over time. However, 
while Christensen and others stress the importance of fidelity to persons, fidelity to an 
abstract model of ACT is seeing far greater play in the clinical literature of late. The fact 
that this model was designed primarily to guarantee cost-savings achieved by early ACT 
teams, only underscores the inappropriate colonization of a concept that many might 
otherwise presume signifies a particularly caring type of outreach work.  
According to researchers the second kind of fidelity can be measured using scales. 
The most established fidelity scale is the Dartmouth ACT scale (DACTS), and a second 
up-and-coming construct is the Tool for Measuring ACT (TMACT). Although fidelity 
scales have been developed to quantify elements of ACT most closely correlated with 
cost savings from decreased hospital use, they fail to capture the importance of relational 
values that originators saw as central to their project. TMACT also encourages 
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standardization, while its designers also promote the scale as means of streamlining the 
ACT model. Hence, we may be witnessing the reification of ACT with the values of 
objectivity, quantifiability, economics and efficiency and standardization all coming to 
bear upon the emerging model. In this chapter I shall argue if ACT becomes thoroughly 
reified along such lines, some of the moral qualities described in the previous chapter are 
at risk of being eroded. Currently, ACT work in Ontario, the site of the Sunnydale 
hospital, is not closely monitored by funding agencies, at least not using the kinds of 
fidelity scales which I shall be describing shortly (Randall et al, 2012).1 Given the 
potential to lose morally important aspects of ACT work, the introduction of fidelity 
scales is a trend that should make practitioners, clients and proponents of care-based 
ethics wary. 
In my first section I will show that ACT has largely been understood as a tool to 
effect predictable decreases in hospital use. In Section II I describe fidelity scales and 
show how criteria has been selected for based on ACT’s functional role in achieving 
these cost-savings. In Section III I note that current sets of criteria do not necessarily 
correlate with the kinds of improvements in patients’ lives that might alleviate workers’ 
empathetic suffering, and may even undercut some of morally valuable aspects of the 
work I remarked upon in Chapter Five. Finally, in Section IV I argue that if fidelity scales 
are used to produce a leaner, more streamlined program, we risk seeing work structured 
in ways that inure caregivers to clients’ suffering. Overall then, in this chapter we shall 
                                                 
1 I shall describe Ontario assessment practices in more detail on p. 310-311, along with the current push to 
employ more stringent quantitative assessment tools to insure that programs comply with program 
standards, and thereby achieve predictable outcomes.  
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see the theory presented in Chapter One, the moral arguments from Chapter Three and 
my moral ethnography of ACT converge to warn against a potentially bleak future for the 
program. 
 
I. The Trajectory from Non-Conformism to Status Quo 
In Chapter Four we saw that the creators of ACT – a program now described as 
“the Cadillac” of community mental health programs by Stephanie – once saw 
themselves as going against the grain and upsetting conventional approaches to 
psychiatric treatment. Meanwhile they report they were striving primarily to help patients  
“to achieve a stable life of decent quality and to become involved in activities that 
promote meaningful community living” (Stein and Santos, 1996, p. 1). The value placed 
upon fidelity to clients, in so far as this amounts to efforts to connect with 
disenfranchised people, the commitment to folding them into a supportive community 
certainly strengthens conceptions of ACT work as an morally worthwhile enterprise.  
It is not clear, however, that the ethical dimensions of ACT work account for the 
increasingly widespread adoption of the program. For, while Stein and Santos may have 
been motivated by humanistic concerns in the development of their treatment model, they 
were by no means naïve idealists. Rather, given that ACT had been presented to 
administrators as a way to save money since day one, they showed themselves to be 
savvy enough to understand that their program needed not only moral justification, but 
that it also had to be efficacious and economical.  
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To demonstrate the former, ACT originators conducted randomly controlled 
studies comparing outcomes for ACT clients versus a control group of patients with 
equally severe symptoms. As Brodwin notes, ACT was taking root around the same time 
the DSM III was published, and in which illnesses were clearly defined and discretely 
catalogued for the purposes of research and treatment. 
 
The academic clinicians who scaled up ACT applied the same logic [evident 
in the DSM] of standardization and verification to mental health services. 
They measured outcomes in a way that invited further refinement, with 
validated instruments that quantified community adjustment, self-esteem, 
family burden, etc. With these outcome measures in hand, researchers across 
the country could replicate the program and test it against other treatments 
(Brodwin, 2010, p. 135). 
 
Meanwhile, a cost-benefit study was undertaken to demonstrate that ACT was not any 
more costly than whatever care was being provided to psychiatric patients at the time. 
The financial study was undertaken since, as the researchers note, even in the event of 
positive outcomes, they expected to hear “it all sounds so well and good, but aren’t the 
costs prohibitive?” (p. 22). In spite of any such concerns, ACT was determined to be a 
cost effective treatment, with savings achieved by virtue of reduced hospital stays. As the 
originators of ACT note 
 
The hospital is the most expensive cost center in mental health budgets. The 
cost-effectiveness of the ACT model is directly linked to its ability to reduce 
hospital use; therefore, using the hospital as efficiently as possible is a major 
objective of the ACT program. These outcomes are consistent with the goals 
of modern health-care administrators because the cost of inpatient treatments 
has become prohibitive (Stein and Santos, 1996, p. 53).  
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Stein and Santos’ stated aims for ACT were to reduce patients’ symptoms and 
subjective distress, increase community tenure, increase levels of satisfaction with life 
and improve their psychosocial functioning. As the authors note, however, “some of 
these outcomes are easier to measure than others. For example, community tenure is 
reflected both by a reduced number of hospitalizations and shortened lengths of hospital 
stay … it is not surprising that community tenure is the one outcome domain most 
consistently reported by ACT programs as a measure of their success” (p. 135).2  
Decreased hospital admissions, in fact, typically tops the list of notable outcomes 
for ACT cited in the literature. Since its inception, ACT has become the most researched 
community mental health program such that even in 1998, there were more than 40 
empirical studies in the literature (Drake, 1998, p. 173). Apart from a voluminous number 
of randomized controlled studies, there are also numerous literature reviews or meta-
analyses, which further help to demonstrate a keen interest in the program. There is also 
reason to suppose that economic outcomes have a higher priority than clinical ones. For 
instance, one well-cited review is a cost-benefit analysis of ACT achieved in virtue of 
reductions in hospital use (Latimer, 1999).3  
Moreover, Bond et al identified 14 reviews that had been conducted before 2001 
all of which agreed that the most robust outcome for ACT studies was reduced hospital 
admissions. After conducting their own analysis of 25 randomly controlled studies, Bond 
et al note “in agreement with most other reviews, we conclude that ACT substantially 
                                                 
2 In other words, long or frequent hospitalizations may well jeopardize clients’ living situations, so that 
decreasing hospital admissions could mean fewer evictions for instance.  
3 Google Scholar shows 138 citations of the article, and Web of Knowledge shows 67.  
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reduces psychiatric hospital use, increases housing stability and moderately improves 
symptoms and subjective quality of life, but has little impact on social functioning” 
(2001, p. 149). However, the authors of an earlier review note “we are unable to draw 
conclusions about effects such as quality of life, family well-being, and involvement with 
the criminal justice system in part because these outcomes have been less studied and 
also because the few studies that have examined these domains have produced conflicting 
results” (Scott and Dixon, 1995, p, 663 – 664).   
The fact that there have been fewer studies looking at these domains suggests that 
these factors hold less significance for researchers than economic outcomes. However 
sparseness of evidence has done little to deter recommendations to implement the 
program more broadly. For example, reviewers of the oft cited Cochrane report4 
recommended wide-scale implementation of ACT in the US, noting 
 
ACT is an effective way of caring for severely mentally ill people in the 
community. It maintains contact with severely mentally ill people, 
dramatically reduces the use of in-patient care, and improves some aspects 
of outcome … Policy makers, clinicians and consumers should therefore 
encourage the setting up of ACT teams.  
 
Nevertheless, the authors also note that “there was no significant difference between 
ACT and traditional case management on imprisonment, mental state, social functioning 
and self-esteem” (Marshall and Lockwood, 2011) an observation that does not seem to 
have undercut interest in the program worldwide. 
                                                 
4 Google Scholar shows 512 citations in the literature.  
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 Due in part to ringing endorsements such as the Cochran Review,5 within 20 
years of its inception, ACT had been adopted in over 30 US states (Drake, 1998). It has 
also been adopted or trialed in various countries including Denmark (Aagaard  and 
Müller-Nielsen, 2011) the Netherlands (Systema et al, 2007), and Japan (Nishio et al, 
2012), Germany (Karow et al, 2012) and New Zealand (Abas et al, 2003). Meanwhile, 
Canada (Lafave et al, 1996), Australia and Sweden (Philips et al, 2001), and the UK 
(Hussain et al, 2011) have more established programs. Part of the appeal of ACT is that it 
is now broadly recognized as “evidence-based practise”  (Munroe-DeVita et al, 2012, p. 
743). However, the evidence in ‘evidence-based’ is not a replicable decrease in disease or 
disability due to a given treatment, but is rather a reduction in the consumption of 
hospital resources due to a particular program structure. In other words, the program’s 
primary site of action, as demonstrated in the literature, appears to be healthcare budgets 
rather than mental illness. The fact that patients are not necessarily getting much better, 
living better lives or staying out of jail is seemingly insignificant so long as their care is 
costing less.  
 
II. From fidelity to clients to program fidelity 
In some ways, moreover, it may be that ACT falls victim to its own success. This 
is because as it enters into mainstream practice, researchers become increasingly bent on 
devising ways to guarantee the program’s original outcomes. The way to do this, it would 
                                                 
5 The first Cochrane review was published in 1998 by the Cochrane Collaboration, an independent, non-
profit organization that conducts systematic reviews of the literature as part of its activities. The initial 1998 
review was often cited in earlier literature in support of the efficacy of ACT. The updated 2011 version is 
cited here.  
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appear, is by insisting on program fidelity, which amounts to a standardized model of 
ACT work that places reduced hospital use at the pinnacle of the program.  
Program fidelity refers to methods employed to structure teams in a way that 
guarantees the earliest successes of the Madison ACT teams. As I have shown, however, 
such successes largely amount to cost savings. Meanwhile program fidelity is explicitly 
correlated with reduced hospitalizations. Hence, it is not surprising that the concept of 
fidelity and the scales used to achieve it have seen much discussion in the literature these 
days (Monroe-DeVita et al, 2012, Monroe-DeVita et al, 2011, Harvey et al, 2012, Kidd et 
al, 2010).  
 
The Development of Fidelity Scales: Standardizing the Program Structure 
Initially, calls for ways to measure program fidelity were driven by the 
requirements of comparison-based research. It is very difficult to assess ACT in relation 
to other kinds of programs if a researcher cannot say whether all ACT teams studied are 
relevantly similar. As reviewers Marshall and Lockland note 
 
From the point of view of this review, an obvious direction for future research 
is to find a more systematic way of classifying ACT and case management 
trials. The way forward is likely to be through the application of a validated 
ACT fidelity scale … it remains a long-term aim of the reviewers to base our 
classification of ACT and case management trials on some form of fidelity 
scale (Marshall and Lockwood, 1998).  
 
Fidelity scales, however, were already in the works in the mid 1990’s but were not 
merely generated to meet the need to replicate findings and permit comparisons across 
programs. Researchers’ needs for a scientifically valid, i.e. replicable, construct coalesces 
306 
 
with funders’ needs for predictable economic outcomes. As some researchers note, the 
scales developed are also useful in assisting “funding organizations in determining if they 
are receiving value” (Randall, et all, 2012, p. 138).  
Given the emphasis placed on economic outcomes as evidenced by the 
preoccupation with reduced hospital use, it is possible to see fidelity scales as also 
representing something of a value for money (VFM) form of audit as opposed to merely 
representing a tool to assess the quality of particular programs. As Michael Power notes, 
 
VFM demands that effectiveness be quantifiable. It does this by 
standardising measures of effectiveness (on the one hand) and/or by 
reducing effectiveness to standardisable measures of economy and 
efficiency. Either way, there is a necessary drift towards ‘managing by 
numbers’ which enables a drift towards centralised forms of control and the 
displacement of concerns about good policy by concerns about good 
management. Where the measurement and attribution of outputs from a 
service are ambiguous, or the preserve of the service expert, there is a 
tendency to concentrate upon inputs. For example, in the case of child care 
it may be that social workers themselves are unable to agree about whether 
fostering or residential care is most effective in nurturing the balanced 
development of children. In this case, it is natural to focus on unambiguous 
measures of input, primarily cost. It follows that efficiency in this context 
may come to be seen in terms of cost saving for existing levels of service 
provision rather than an improved relationship between inputs and outputs, 
which in industrial contexts represents productivity (Power, 26 - 27). 
 
This type of assessment tool aids funders because the criteria selected for in 
assessing the structure of a high fidelity ACT team are those features most closely 
correlated with reduced hospital use. In fact, in one of the earliest studies aiming at 
isolating the critical ingredients of ACT teams, reduced hospital use was the only 
outcome examined in relation to characteristics deemed essential for a paradigmatic ACT 
team. What is interesting is how easily the authors slide from notion of community 
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integration, the stated purpose of ACT, to reduced hospital use when they explain that 
“the effect size of reduction in number of days hospitalized was used as a measure of 
program impact. This criterion is appropriate in that it is central to the mission of ACT 
programs” (McGrew et al, 1994 p. 674).  
While McGrew et al’s study showed a correlation between certain characteristics 
and reduced admissions, Latimer et al note that more generally ‘‘higher-fidelity programs 
appear to reduce hospital days by about 23 percentage points more than lower-fidelity 
programs’’ (Latimer, 1999, p. 443). Informed by the work of McGrew et al, another 
group of researchers started work on DACTS. Teague et al consulted with experts and 
also looked to the early Madison teams to contribute to their development of exemplary 
model of the program (Teague et al, 1998, p. 219). Shortly thereafter, DACTS in 
particular was found to correlate positively with reduced hospital use (McHugo et al, 
1999). Soon, DACTS became a standard measurement of ACT, at least for the purposes 
of research (Philips et al, 2001). Effectively, then the paradigm that prioritizes economic 
outcomes is in the process of crystallizing into a reified model of ACT by virtue of 
fidelity scales that both inform those establishing new teams and are used to evaluate 
existing ones.  
 
DACTS Items: Quantifying Program Elements 
The 26 point scale features the three areas with which to test a program’s fidelity. 
These areas are team structure and composition, organizational boundaries, and nature of 
services (Teague et al, 1998, p. 218). The first area specifies the staff-to-client ratio, and 
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includes criteria such as a daily meeting, a nurse on staff, etc… The second area includes 
the requirement that ACT workers be involved with hospital admissions and discharge 
planning, while also specifying careful client screening, as well low intake rates, 24-hour 
coverage and time-unlimited services among others. Criteria in the third area includes 
offering services in-vivo, assertive engagement systems, high numbers of contacts, and 
having peer support workers (consumer survivors) on the team.  
 
 
(Teague et al, 1998, p. 218). 
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Teams can achieve a maximum score of 5 with the Dartmouth scale, so that high fidelity 
ACT teams score 3.8 and above, while traditional case management will receive a score 
of around 2.3 (Teague et al, 1998, p. 226).   
 
Towards a Reified Model of ACT 
It  is fairly obvious how items such as frequent client contacts (S5) and 24 hour 
crisis support (O4) will tend to reduce hospital use. Not only are clients under regular 
surveillance for relapse, but trips to the ER are likely to plummet if members of the team 
are on hand to respond to outbreaks of havoc that might occur day or night. Being 
involved in discharge planning (O6), moreover, stands to reduce time patients spend in 
hospital since inpatient staff would likely be more inclined to release patients earlier if 
they are in the hands of a team of 10 or more professional caregivers. It is perhaps less 
obvious how explicit intake criteria (O1) might have economic consequences. However, 
as Eric Latimer notes for ACT programs to break even, clients must typically be those 
who are hospitalized for 50 days per year or more. Reducing admissions for clients with 
fewer inpatient days becomes less cost-effective relative to the costs of implementing 
ACT programs (Latimer, 1999). This finding most likely informs Lockwood and 
Marshall’s observation that “ACT, if correctly targeted on high users of in-patient care, 
can substantially reduce the costs of hospital care whilst improving outcome and patient 
satisfaction” (2011).  
Therefore, the model itself is coming to be shaped and delineated in accordance 
with administrative concerns so that those aspects of ACT most closely correlated to 
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lower rates of hospital use are codified so as to emerge as central defining features of the 
model. Generally speaking, however, DACTS only captures elements that can be 
observed objectively and tallied up in a straightforward manner. Hence, it is evident that 
both the bureaucrat’s and the scientist’s need for objective and quantifiable data are 
influencing the structure of the program being communicated in the literature.  
As quantifiable elements of the program move into the foreground, however, what 
recedes from on this model are the relational values associated with ACT. For example, 
DACTS provides no way of assessing the quality of the “trusting relationship” that Stein 
and Santos see as so crucial for ACT work and “a vehicle for change in and of itself” 
(1998, p.50). Personal traits that Stein and Santos note are key for good team members 
such as “patience, empathy, optimism, persuasiveness, pragmatism, flexibility, good 
judgement and “street smarts” (p. 55) cannot be measured and fall to the wayside. The 
authors also note that ACT teams should aim to recruit workers who show “a high level 
of commitment to clients and their families to ameliorating their problems” (p. 132). 
Otherwise, the team should have a “close team spirit.” Given DACTS emphasis on 
operational and quantifiable outcomes, however, none of these elements are captured by 
the scale. 
 
TMACT: Standardized Interactions 
The creators of TMACTS, an up-and-coming assessment tool, see their product as 
superior to DACTS because further aspects of the ACT work are made measurable. 
DACTS items, as we have seen, mainly refer to the structure and composition of the ACT 
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team rather than assessing “processes (e.g., interactions, procedures)” (Monroe DeVita et 
al, 2011, p. 19). Hence, while DACTS might be useful in assessing the set-up of a team, 
it has less utility for evaluating how the team interacts with clients. TMACT seeks to 
rectify this oversight by including subscales for evidence based practices. Monroe et al 
proceed to cite the 2009 Schizophrenia Patient Outcomes Research Team (PORT) review 
to provide examples of suitable evidence based practices for ACT teams (Dixon, et al, 
2010). The PORT recommendations provide a list of evidence based practices found 
efficacious for people diagnosed with SMPI, such as cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT), skills training, supported employment, family-based therapy, use of a token 
economy (in long-term inpatient care) and psychosocial interventions for alcohol and 
drug abuse as well as weight loss.  
The drive to create a standardized program, it would appear, begets yet further 
standardization so as to encroach upon work extending all the way down to the ground 
floor level of interactions taking place between workers and clients. Including subscales 
for evidence based practices, moreover should appear quite natural to the developers of 
TMACT given administrators’ preferences for standard processes with guaranteed 
outcomes. As noted in Chapter One, what evidence based practices have in common is 
they have demonstrated statistical efficacy on given measures as shown through the use 
of RCT’s. Apart from promising predictable outcomes, such procedures are also ideal for 
producing the objective assessments favored by the RTS paradigm. As Power notes 
regarding assessment tools 
What is audited is whether there is a system which embodies standards and 
the standards of performance themselves are shaped by the need to be 
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auditable. In this way, the existence of a system is more significant for 
audit purposes than what the system is; audit becomes a formal ‘loop’ by 
which the system observes itself (Power, 1997, p. 28).  
 
Given that evidence based practices are routinized standard interventions, observing 
whether or not such processes are being carried out by an ACT team is a fairly 
straightforward affair requiring either the observation of work in the field, or as seems 
more likely the case, an analysis of documentation produced by workers demonstrating 
that prescribed interventions were enacted.  
Another reason TMACT is seen as a superior assessment tool by Monroe-DeVita 
et al, moreover, is because it expands upon certain items and operationalizes them further 
so as to “create more explicit instructions to minimize rater subjectivity” (2011, p. 20). 
The creators of TMACT, moreover, are not only interested in assessing the quality of 
interaction between workers and clients this way, they also zero in on interactions 
between team members by operationalizing the team meeting for assessment purposes. 
Unlike DACTS, then, which only assesses whether a daily meeting occurs, with 
TMACTS, the team meeting is assessed for ‘quality’ in virtue of being broken down into 
distinct quantifiable elements which are 
 
the review of all consumers each day, documentation of relevant clinical 
information, and development of a daily schedule that is driven by the 
consumer’s treatment plan, emerging needs (e.g., crises, or medical 
appointments) and proactive contacts to divert future crises. Also assessed is a 
mechanism to determine whether scheduled contacts were completed (2011, p. 
20). 
 
While the requirement to produce objective and quantifiable data determines the selection 
of elements worthy of assessing here, the drive for efficiency appears to be shaping this 
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manner of assessing the team meeting. That is, the most rationalistic and business-like 
aspects of the team meeting, namely those tasks lending to the most effective 
management of clients, are those which are emphasized in this item of TMACTS. Just as 
the evidence based practices subscale on TMACT potentially moves ACT teams towards 
more standardized interventions, managerial concerns are also likely to encroach further 
upon the space of the daily meeting due to the expansion of this item.  
 In light of the relationship between fidelity scales and economic outcomes, there 
is reason to suppose that these will become a tool that funding bodies use to assess teams. 
However, such a change has yet to happen. Currently, for instance, ACT teams like the 
Ontario-based Sunnydale Hospital team are not assessed using such instruments.6 
According to Randall et al, in fact, the most current set of standards that apply to the 
Sunnydale team are  
written in narrative fashion and lacked details regarding: (1) the 
identification of individual standards by number; (2) whether or not all 
standards are of equal importance or weight; (3) standardized measurement 
scales to use to assess fidelity to standards; and, (4) expected (or acceptable) 
levels of compliance for each standards (2012, p. 139). 
 
 
Meanwhile, the researchers note that ACT teams are not required to report annually to 
the provincial government, while the data that teams do submit “only superficially 
collects information related to the fidelity to some individual program standards” (p. 
147). Hence, funding of the Sunnydale team is currently not contingent on complying 
with such standards. 
                                                 
6 The only external evaluation Sunnydale Hospital currently sees is a hospital accreditation process requires 
to retain a special level of ranking among hospitals by maintaining a set of standards across the institution. 
Funding for operations however, relies on the reporting of statistics to the Provincial Ministry of Health.  
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However, in response to this perceived failure to monitor teams “more 
aggressively” the researchers themselves developed The Ontario ACT Program Fidelity 
Tool©, which is a 33 point fidelity scale similar to DACTS, and derived from the 
“narrative document” (p. 140).7 Recently, moreover, DACTS itself was employed by 
another set of researchers to assess all 79 of the ACT teams currently operating in 
Ontario (George et al, 2010). Given that DACTS scores are now routinely reported in 
ACT research literature and in light of calls from researchers for more rigorous attention 
to fidelity, there is reason to suppose that more quantitative forms of assessment are in 
the pipeline for Ontario ACT teams. However, as I will show, there are reasons to be 
wary of any such trends. 
 
III. Assessing the Assessment Tools: Beyond the RTS Paradigm 
It is evident that the fidelity scales described align well with the RTS paradigm’s 
suppositions about what matters and what constitutes evidence. As Power notes, 
moreover, many forms of audit involve a “displacement from first order experts, such as 
teachers, social workers, police and so on to second order experts, such as accountants 
and managers” (1994, p. 26).  Given the emphasis on reduced hospital use as the 
predominant outcome measure, the creators of fidelity scales have had little need to 
consult those at the ground floor, or rely upon their special brand of knowledge as to 
what clients either need or what they are owed. Unsurprisingly, during their interviews 
                                                 
7 Randall and Wakefield’s instrument lacks the requirement that ACT workers play a role in hospital 
admissions and discharges, while adding items requiring internally produced program evaluations and 
fidelity assessments. 
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none of my informants pointed to the reduction of hospital admissions as the reason they 
entered the work.8 Rather, many said they came to ACT work out of a desire to help 
better the lives of people who have been unjustly stigmatized and disenfranchised by 
society. Hence, the goals of practitioners in the field  (not to mention those of clients) are 
likely to be at odds with the priorities set by funders.   
 
A Dubious Measure of Success 
It is open to question whether fidelity scales can significantly improve the quality 
of patients’ lives and in this way reduce the sense of futility practitioners experience in 
the course of their work. Although reduced hospitalizations and less homelessness are 
clear and unambiguous measures, these do not automatically translate into a markedly 
better life. As Estroff’s work demonstrated, and my own observations confirm, the 
quality of housing offered to ACT clients does not seem to be a primary concern for 
policy-makers. That is, if what is assessed are percentages of patients housed over a 
particular period, then a measure for community tenure will be satisfied whether a client 
inhabits a bedbug-infested dwelling in an area rife with crack dealers or if she is housed 
in a clean, well-kept facility run by caring and dedicated workers.  
Moreover, even those clients in supportive housing are not necessarily seeing any 
real integration into the community and may instead be largely experiencing the 
segregation, or separateness Estroff describes (Estroff, 1981). As one client recently put it 
                                                 
8 As my own research indicated, in fact, a major point of contention between other team members and the 
psychiatrists, and which from all reports frequently arose, stemmed from psychiatrists’ reluctance to admit 
certain patients to hospital. Rose at one point even left a meeting in tears because doctors refused to 
hospitalize a homeless client whose condition she found particularly distressing. 
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“we all know we’re sick, so we’re sick and tired of sickness. I guess some of us get sick 
and tired of talking about it. If we could find somebody to socialize with who isn’t a 
patient, I believe that’s a breath of fresh air” (Krupa et al, 2005, p. 22). Hence, those 
difficult conditions that clients endure, and to which workers are helpless to do other than 
bear witness, do not stand to be significantly impacted by administrators’ unrelenting 
focus on reduced hospital use.  
What is interesting, moreover, is Gomory’s suggestion that since hospital 
admissions were discouraged or even disallowed as a caregiving strategy in early ACT 
work, a decrease in admissions was largely accomplished by fiat rather than representing 
an independent clinical outcome. Gomory writes 
 
reduced hospitalization is not the result of assertive community treatment 
but simply the tautological result of administrative decisions to treat all 
assertive community treatment patients in the community regardless of 
symptoms and their severity while patients in the control group are not 
subject to such a rule and are thus hospitalized frequently. If such an 
administrative rule were adopted for any other treatment approach, similar 
results would be obtained (Gomory, 2001, p. 1394). 
 
If Gomory is right, the take-home message from ACT research is that hospital stays are 
not necessary for the maintenance of the population targeted by the program. Even if 
patients are not necessarily getting much better, they do not seem to be getting worse, and 
this can be achieved with less funding. The real problem, however, is that reduced time in 
hospital then becomes the raison d'être for ACT programs, so that programs that fail to 
show such outcomes become jeopardized.  
In fact, currently in the UK there is a certain amount of debate concerning the 
value of ACT. This is due to the large, multisite REACT study demonstrating that ACT 
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was no better than traditional case management at reducing hospital use (Killaspy et al, 
2006). Debates about the viability of the program help to demonstrate the importance of 
reduced hospital usage as a key indicator of ACT’s success. In the aftermath of the 
REACT study, lead researcher Helen Killaspy noted  
The problem for assertive community treatment in England is that reducing 
the use of inpatient services is seen as the main measure of success. This 
correlates with the cost of the service, but its great success in enabling staff 
to work with clients that community mental health care teams had failed to 
engage for years seems to be being ignored. The model is popular with 
staff working in assertive community treatment and with clients (Killapsy, 
2007a, p. 312). 
 
As it turns out, other research shows that “engagement” alone does not correlate with 
reduced hospital use (Meaden, et al, 2004), making its value difficult to articulate in 
terms the RTS paradigm can understand.  
 
Standardized Responses to Clients’ Call for Connectedness  
Although fidelity scales fail to capture the importance of interpersonal 
relatedness, clients understand its value. Currently, having someone “be there for me” is 
an outcome of ACT that research across multiple sites shows to be most meaningful for 
clients (Buck and Alexander, 2006, Hughes et al, 2006, Krupa et al, 2005). As one client 
puts it, one of the best qualities of his case manager is “his dedication to my wellness … 
he’s there for me when I need him” (Buck and Alexander, 2006, p. 477). Many clients, in 
fact, seem to yearn for more social interaction with their workers reporting to researchers 
for instance that “I wish she could spend a whole day with me. I’d like us to go out to 
lunch and go shopping.” Alternatively, another explained “I’d like him to take me out to 
eat to get a milkshake or something,” while a third finds it meaningful that his case 
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manager “takes me for breakfast. That’s something I’ve never had before” (Buck and 
Alexander, 2006, p. 476). The authors of this last study cash out such expressions as a 
longing for social inclusion and connectedness (p. 478) outcomes that it would appear, 
are valued highly by many clients.  
 Workers themselves, it would appear, also have a desire to respond to such calls 
for connectedness. As Beth said to me during her interview 
I wish there was more client interaction, could have longer visits. Usually 
on a day I have roughly about 5 – 6 visits depending on if there is an 
appointment or not. It would be nice to spend a bit more time with the 
clients. To do other things, even to do impromptu visits. I wish there was 
more, I thought there would be more going out into the community and 
kind of, accompanying clients to different community centres and other 
services. 
 
Gail also noted that the importance of such visits for building rapport 
 
You really need to take the time [to go for coffee with a client] but it’s very 
rewarding. You learn so much from your client, you really engage well, 
you are able to build a better relationship, a better therapeutic relationship. 
The clients sees you as someone they can trust and talk to. So those kind 
of, those times are difficult to get. You need to get them when you can but 
they are invaluable to the relationship. 
 
 Both workers and clients here express a desire for the time and space for 
unstructured spontaneous forms of social interaction with their clients. If TMACT was 
adopted more broadly, workers would likely feel pressured to respond to such calls with 
standardized interventions. This is because teams that employ such methods garner 
higher scores on the TMACT. As the creators of TMACT themselves note, “feedback 
from fidelity measures can affect programs by focusing greater attention on features that 
are assessed” (Monroe-DeVita et al, 2011, p. 10). In addition, Powers argues, “systems-
based audits can easily become a kind of ritual, concerned with process rather than 
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substance, and governed by a ‘compliance mentality’ which draws organisations away 
from their primary purpose” (Power, 1994, p. 16). 
As Brodwin’s work demonstrates, often treatment initiatives take the form of 
questionnaires and checklists for use by clinicians. For example, when faced with a 
worker frustrated by a client’s lack of engagement, one supervisor Brodwin observed was 
handed over a document containing 29 “recovery questions” published by the Bureau of 
Community Mental Health (Brodwin, 2011, p. 199). The client interacting with a 
practitioner working off a predetermined set of questions may find the interaction 
impersonal and even alienating. As one community psychiatric nurse explains, “just 
going down a checklist of psychiatric and mental status assessment questions is de-
humanizing and interferes with developing a therapeutic rapport. While the assessment is 
the task of the visit, the relationship is what matters to the patient” (Sturm, 2009, p. 20). 
As I have shown, a worker focussed on carrying out standardized tasks cannot always be 
present and responsive to the person with whom he is working.  
It is perhaps such a mode of engagement that one client complained of when he 
said “why don’t they just hang loose and unbutton their tight collars, just treat you like 
you are having a sociable time, rather than I’m the staff and you’re the patient” (Krupa et 
al, 2005, p. 23). Yet, if the more formalized exchanges governed by the evidence based 
practices protocol produce documents that can be filed away as evidence to earn higher 
fidelity score on the TMACTS, then these are likely to dominate whatever brief intervals 
of time are allotted to individual clients. Workers in such cases may well experience a 
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distressing tension between their institutional obligations and what they feel they owe to 
clients.  
As I noted in earlier chapters, standardized forms of treatment call for patient 
compliance, which in turn forces workers to assume an authoritative, and hence 
disciplinary role, which can also hinder the development of a trusting relationship. As 
Gail remarked during her interview, this role already interferes with the development of 
rapport.  
If you are constantly with your client signing these forms, take these 
medications, it’s not the kind of relationship I thought I would be building 
within a community setting. It’s a very medical model relationship where 
you can see the power dynamics between yourself and your client. You’re 
the one delivering the medication, you’re the one asking to sign these 
forms. You need to do that but you don’t want to become so authoritative. 
 
Workers already require patients to comply both with standardized requirements of other 
agencies (forms) and ACT’s own pharmaceutical regimens and hence must exert some 
level of  control over clients’ behaviour. Requiring patients to also participate in various 
types of rote procedures can only intensify the disciplinary nature of the relationship 
between worker and client 
 A final way that fidelity scales could serve to frustrate clients’ and workers’ 
desire for connectedness is in virtue of increased demands for paperwork, which means 
time away from clients. During her interview Beth brought to light the administrative 
duties that compete for time with clients 
I know for any job you have to chart. But as a nurse you have to chart all 
the time. But their method, even the system is different. It’s computerized, 
there’s a lot of things to keep updated. There’s the service plans … there is 
a lot of documentation and charting and everything. Sometimes you forget. 
Like we have to change their cardex which is their blueprint. It’s kind of 
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their snapshot: where they live, how old they are, what they look like, what 
meds they’re on, how many times they’ve been hospitalized. So every time 
they’re hospitalized you have to keep that updated. So yeah there’s a lot of 
charting and faxing. 
 
It would appear that the sort of biographical details that are prioritized by the institution 
are those required by disciplinary apparatuses to locate, identify, monitor and control 
individuals as opposed to those details that are more meaningful to both clients and 
workers. As Rose notes, this is simply part and parcel of working in a bureaucratic 
environment: “that’s just the nature of being a regulated mental health professional and 
having to document your ass all the time.” As Talia and Diane informed me ACT work 
requires far less paperwork than other organizations. However, a side effect of more 
intensive monitoring of team members’ every move and the associated requirement for 
objective evidence in evaluations, could be an increase in work aimed at meeting 
administrative needs rather than those of clients themselves.  
 
Encroachments on the Space to Meet, Laugh and Learn 
The creators of TMACT, as has been shown, are not merely satisfied with efforts 
to exert more control over work done in the field, but they also aim to operationalize the 
team meeting. As was evident in Chapter Four, discussion during the morning meeting is 
often influenced by the need for narratives of progress, and this tendency becomes all the 
more mandatory within the framework provided by TMACT. In the previous chapter I 
also suggested that the daily team meeting is about much more than a mere exchange of 
information and the straightforward management of clients. Regular quips help to ease 
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tension and build team cohesion, as do celebrations of small successes. Meanwhile 
collective expressions of indignation at injustices suffered by clients helped to mobilize 
advocacy measures. Frustrations and disappointments are also shared, creating 
opportunities for mutual support in the face of inevitable setbacks.  
Finally, as my observations in the previous chapter demonstrate, sharing the most 
minute details of their clients’ lives as workers do shows affinities to loving attention as 
endorsed by Murdoch. That is, we see workers demonstrating a willingness to 
reconceptualise a person to do her justice, as it were. Workers also cannot help but 
recognise a client’s “me-ness” or her own unique affective dispositions, and particular 
tendencies in light of such attentiveness. Conversations in meetings where “world 
travelling” is evident moreover, can further reveal clients as multifaceted individuals, 
while all such factors may help to keep othering tendencies at bay.  
If the team meeting becomes increasingly structured and determined by pressures 
to adhere to assessment protocol, invariably, what stands to get squeezed out are these 
relationally meaningful aspects of the meeting along with the non-therapeutic dimensions 
of the talk that lead to deeper, more nuanced and richer understanding of clients. Instead 
there is an explicit requirement to stick to “clinically relevant” data, scheduling and the 
containment of havoc or future “crises.” Not only do TMACTS’ detailed and explicit 
criteria fail to capture the elements mentioned above, but the model of ACT that is being 
constructed reinforces the conception of these other unsanctioned facets of meetings as 
being secondary to the real work of ACT, perhaps even to the extent that they come to 
represent an inappropriate use of time.  
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At the more general level, as workers’ particular practices are increasingly 
monitored and scrutinized, it is possible to see some of the ill effects that Foner’s 
alienated nursing home workers suffered. A reader might recall how the strict regulation 
of their activities caused many to adopt a compliance mentality while coming to work 
“routinely and without feeling ” due to the strict disciplinary apparatus that constituted 
their workplace. Likely, the special relationships workers form with clients, combined 
with the ability to arrive at unique and creative interventions based on their localized 
understanding of the Other, is a source of job satisfaction for at least some workers. In 
order for work to be meaningful, a worker needs to be able to invest part of herself into it, 
and see her own special investment reflected in the outcome, rather than simply carry out 
rote, predetermined tasks at behest of some external authority.  
 
IV. Streamlining ACT: Possible Future Directions 
 While elements of the RTS paradigm such as economism, objectivity, 
quantification, and standardization are evident as factors shaping the emerging model, the 
drive for more efficient processes is not as obvious. The use of fidelity scales, however, 
may well extend beyond evaluating current teams to help shape future directions for the 
model as well. As the creators of TMACT note of their construct 
 
The more comprehensive TMACT may provide a useful tool to evaluate 
not only overall effectiveness over the broad range of outcomes now 
expected of services for this population but also the extent to which 
specific ingredients are critical for specific outcomes (Monroe-DeVita et al, 
2011, p. 27). 
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In other words, a further function of fidelity scales may be to streamline ACT by 
eliminating those aspects of the program that fail to impact on cost-savings. As the 
creators of TMACT note, ACT is among the most costly community health programs but 
“questions remain regarding exactly which features and what dose are most critical to 
desired outcomes” (2011, p. 26). According to the authors TMACT can potentially 
provide, “more specific feedback to guide ongoing performance improvement efforts” (p. 
27). In other words, one function Monroe DeVita et al see for TMACT is as a means of 
streamlining and refining the ACT model in order to achieve maximum yield at the 
minimum expense. 
However, if economic priorities already serve to determine the outputs for ACT, 
then it seems unlikely that workers will have any more say in determining future 
directions than they did in devising current assessment protocol. Based on Power’s 
claims that funders will tend to focus on unambiguous inputs such as cost in value for 
money audits, one could expect more refined measurements and more precise 
correlations between the cost of services and reduced hospital use resulting in a stripped 
down model of ACT. This would be one that only preserves those quantifiable elements 
of the model that correlate with keeping patients in the community.  
Medication and community surveillance would likely top the list here given that, as 
I noted in Chapter One, there is currently no limit to the medications that Canadian 
physicians can prescribe. No doubt the distribution of medications is the most cost-
effective use of human resources so long as it effectively suppresses the outbreaks of 
havoc that so often bring a psychiatric patient to hospital. It is not uncommon, moreover, 
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to see housing agencies or landlords requiring that a person be medicated before housing 
will be offered (Robbins et al, 2006). Hence correlations between medication and 
community tenure can be accomplished by decree rather than necessarily representing the 
existence of any causal relationship between these two factors.  
Any drive for greater efficiency moreover means that one aspect of the program 
likely to fall under scrutiny is the lack of limits placed on the duration of treatment with 
ACT. For, if clients can be parcelled off to cheaper forms of service such as case 
management, then ACT teams can admit a greater number of clients. As Peter noted in 
his interview “there is a big debate in the field of ACT how to graduate people.” Such 
research includes calls to examine outcomes of the continuous care strategy (Burns and 
Santos, 1995), and research demonstrating that certain patients can be transferred to other 
providers after a period of time without an increase in hospital use or reduction in mental 
health status (Rosenheck and Dennis, 2001). The moral and practical importance of the 
kind of nuanced and contextually rich understanding that members of an ACT team can 
acquire of person over time, a person moreover who generally lacks any other enduring 
forms of social support, does not usually enter into such discussions.  
Pressures to shorten terms for treatment could also undermine the relaxed attitude 
the Sunnydale team displayed regarding patient progress, as well as their openness to 
experimentation to achieve optimal results over extended periods of time. Meanwhile 
team members’ tactic to stave off futility by attending to minute signs of improvement 
over the “long-haul,” as it were, crucially relies on maintaining long-term relations with 
clients. Instead we may find workers’ focus shifting to the implementation of methods 
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aimed at quickly achieving a sufficient level of stability so as to quickly process one 
batch of clients and, in this way make way for “all those other” patients waiting for 
services. The sort of trial and error approach that the Sunnydale team employed could 
also come to be seen as less acceptable under such circumstances, if the ambition is to 
hasten treatment instead of patiently waiting to see what works for particular individuals.  
If fidelity scales effectively entrench a conception of the real work of ACT as 
keeping clients out of hospital, many kinds of activities are reduced to Kujala et al’s 
category of “superfluous time,” or those non-value adding activities that, we as saw in 
Chapter One, tend to be abolished in the name of greater efficiency. One such activity 
might be taking some extra time to actively engage with and listen to a clients’ story in 
order to achieve a better understanding of how she sees herself and understands the 
trajectory of her personal narrative. If, as research suggests, “engagement” does not 
reduce hospital use, then under the RTS paradigm, there is sufficient justification for 
eliminating time for non-productive activities such as sharing a laugh, providing a 
shoulder to cry on or simply catching up on a clients’ life. Meanwhile workers who suffer 
because they have neither the time, nor the space to offer such forms of support to their 
clients end up reduced to nothing more than mere sources of error.  
A final aspect of the work that is both difficult to codify on a fidelity scale, or to 
correlate closely with reduced hospital use is the time and space workers require to 
advocate effectively for clients. “It makes you feel good sometimes advocating for 
someone who does not have anyone advocating for them,” notes Gail, demonstrating the 
importance of this aspect of the work for both practitioners and clients. Part of what 
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seemed to make a difficult job bearable was the possibility of insisting on a farewell visit 
to a jailed client, and insuring that others, such as trustees and ER doctors alike treat ACT 
clients fairly. As we have seen workers require a certain amount of unstructured time to 
act on behalf of clients this way. The importance of this time, however, is difficult to 
justify to those whose overarching concern is the development of a leaner, more efficient 
system that produces guaranteed outcomes. This is because workers probably do not 
advocate for clients to keep the latter out of hospital, workers act as they do in such 
instances because it is the morally right thing to do 
 
Raising the spectre of Agamemnon 
 Yet if such aspects of the work are dismissed or overshadowed by quantifiable 
items determining the shape of ACT, we risk altering the very face of teams. Already, 
patients’ seemingly inescapable and dismal living conditions are difficult for workers to 
bear. There is a question, then, as to who would remain in the profession were the model 
to drift towards a stripped-down version with only enough resources to keep clients 
medicated in the community and out of hospital. It is worth recalling that although its 
sample size was small, one study cited in Chapter Three noted that individuals who saw 
ethics as care-based tend to leave nursing due to moral distress. If genuine care for clients 
is only apt only to create hardship, then as with Agamemnon in Chapter Three, we may 
find that only workers capable of inuring themselves to their clients’ suffering staying in 
the profession. As has been shown, the end result of this can be complete dehumanizing 
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of the suffering Other, which is especially problematic given that the others in question 
are already stigmatized and living at the margins of society.  
Probably our best first step in averting such any such future scenarios is carefully 
attending to workers’ complaints in the present, especially those which stem from care or 
empathetic suffering. As I noted in Chapter Three, according to Nussbaum, a reciprocal 
relationship ought to exist between compassionate individuals and social institutions with 
each contributing to the formation of the other. While frontline ACT workers appear to 
have a great deal of compassion for those they work with, it is not clear that either their 
vision of clients’ needs, their understanding of what it required to do their job well, or 
even clients’ own desires are shaping ACT as it crystallizes into a standardized form of 
practice. Rather, fidelity scales appear tailored to meet the needs of second-order experts 
such as accountants and managers.  
There is a real danger then that workers’ voices will remain outside the field of 
discourse, especially if their concerns are largely grounded in affective care. Due to the 
well-entrenched RTS paradigm among the administrators and funding agencies most apt 
to rely on fidelity scales, there may be a tendency to dismiss certain individuals as overly 
sensitive, insufficiently rational, or even harbouring “rescue fantasies” as in the APU. 
One ought to take pause in the face of such assumptions however, and ask if those who 
succumb most easily to the face of suffering are not akin to canaries in a coalmine. Far 
from being mere “sources of error,” they may call our attention to forces hostile not only 
to another person’s wellbeing, but to our very humanity.     
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Conclusion 
 
“People nowadays think that scientists exist to instruct them, poets, musicians, etc. to 
give them pleasure. The idea that these have something to teach them-that does not 
occur to them.”   
 
         ~Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1984, p. 127. 
 
“Good bye” said the fox. “Here is my secret. It’s quite simple: One sees clearly only 
with the heart. Anything essential is invisible to the eyes”  
 
 ~Antoine De Saint-Exupery, 2000, p. 63 
 
“Nature loves to conceal herself”  
 
 ~Heraclitus, Fragments. 
 
 
 
Avenues for Further Inquiry 
 
For much of this work I have been stressing that workers in caring professions 
need the time and the space to get to know clients, to cultivate a caring attitude and to 
respond adequately to patients’ particularities. To this end, I have taken care to highlight 
occasions where small cracks in a highly rationalized system have allowed such 
connections to form in order to look at their effects. I have also suggested that it is 
important to take the suffering of workers seriously, especially that which stems from 
care for their clients. Not doing so risks perpetuating workplace conditions that cause 
workers to become blind to the Face of vulnerable Others, and thereby inured to their 
suffering. Unfortunately, the workers who command the public’s attention tend to be 
those who have already arrived at this place, and who neglect or abuse patients as a 
matter of course. 
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However, we really ought to be attending to the calls of those who have not yet 
given up and who continue to suffer on behalf of their charges. It is worth noting that 
there are workers who do care a great deal about their clients. Rose, for example, found 
Alexandria’s story meaningful enough to tack it up on the wall at work where it hung for 
six months. As Rose recalled it, Alexandria’s ACT team was dutiful but perhaps remote. 
“They had meticulously delivered her labeled medication, but beyond that, they couldn’t 
do that much with her,” she said to me. The fact that these particular details stuck with 
her hearkens, perhaps, to her own sense of futility about the value of her work. However, 
the act of calling attention to the story also operates as a suggestion that perhaps she and 
her team mates could be doing more.  
Certainly it is true that indifferent, conflicted and emotionally exhausted care 
workers are a concern for us all. However, the need for caring and sensitive workers is all 
the more crucial for people diagnosed with severe mental illness. Those individuals who 
show especially severe symptoms are effectively invisible when out in the world. 
Passersby are careful to avert their gaze, and few people will ever reach out to such a 
person in the street. They are people such as Alexandria, who die in a housing facility full 
of people but are not missed for days. There are few rationalistic disciplinary apparatuses 
or productive structures to which such people can adapt. As I have shown, this inability is 
apt to cause workers adhering to such schemes to distance or “other” those who don’t fit 
the plan.  
For this reason, connecting with people diagnosed with SPMI is all the more 
important, but it can also be the most difficult work. This is because relations with such 
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individuals are rarely easy, due in part to clients’ idiosyncratic forms of communication, 
cognitive deficits or just the residue of distrust they’ve built up after a lifetime of 
discrimination. While Allemang’s use of personal details about Alexandria and her 
predilection for Madonna and showy jewellery might be enough to kindle the sympathies 
of a distant reader, it wouldn’t be enough for a person working with her day in and day 
out. As Allemang tells it, Alexandria had once rubbed her naked breasts on a car window 
while a mother and her three children sat inside afraid. She’d uttered death threats, started 
fires and “had a tendency to strip off her clothes and defecate when landlords complained 
about her loud music or her defiance of smoking bans” (Allemang, 2009, F1). Only a 
sensitive, patient and responsive worker, namely, one who is morally wise, will be 
capable of drawing a person such as Alexandria into a community of care.  
 Once we strip away the façade of professionalized discourse that distinguishes 
therapists and patients and thereby drives a wedge into their social relations, the central 
importance of of a strong relationship between the two becomes all the more evident. 
There may be those who position workers as interchangeable tools functioning in rational 
and predictable ways to help clients along the road to recovery and reintegration into 
some abstract conception of ‘the community.’ Given, however, that workers interact 
regularly with clients, enter their homes and become involved in multiple aspects of their 
lives, ACT workers are as much a part of a client’s own immediate and concrete 
community as any local storekeeper, pastor or family doctor. In other words, far from 
being separate from ‘the community,’ ACT workers are the vanguard of that which 
reaches out to draw clients in.  
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Workers’ less formalized role as frontline members and representatives of the 
broader community carries with it obligations that rank as highly any set of professional 
responsibilities that might dictate their practice. This is because workers provide an 
example of the persons a client might expect to encounter as she becomes reintegrated 
more deeply into society. As Stein and Santos note, the relationship between the team and 
clients is a vehicle of change in and of itself and this may be because connections with 
workers give the client hope of potential relations with others with whom she might build 
relationships. A relationship with a worker also helps to show a client that she is worth 
caring about. As Sturm argues regarding the importance of relationship-building with 
vulnerable psychiatric patients, 
A consistent, interpersonal, therapeutic relationship with a [worker] has 
the potential to foster trust and to make guidance acceptable, while 
demonstrating respect for the rights of the patient. This relationship 
allows patients to experience themselves as persons whose particular 
needs are worthy of both acceptance and individualized approaches 
(2009, p. 24).  
 
Only the patient cultivation of trust, something most people only extend to those who 
acknowledge and care about their personal ‘me-ness,’ might bring an excluded person to 
believe that a community worth connecting to actually exists for them and in which they 
might achieve a sense of belonging. “Meaningful community living” in other words, 
requires meaningful relationships with workers who are the frontrunners of a client’s 
community.  
Viewing the client/worker relationship from this perspective then is to admit that 
psychiatric patients deserve to be accepted by someone who cares about them, and that 
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mental health practitioners are well-positioned to provide this. Although I have suggested 
that at minimum an attitude “consistent with care” must be shown to such clients, it is 
possible that patients receiving this are still left wanting for love. However, a question 
remains which is how to genuinely come to love people who are very difficult to love. As 
I have stressed on a number of occasions, psychiatric patients are difficult to connect with 
in any meaningful way. It is one thing to rail against the notion that we owe such persons 
nothing more than dutiful respect in Kant’s sense. However, if we admit that such 
individuals deserve to be loved, how is one to achieve this state? 
Even if this last question had an easy answer, however, it would merely give rise 
to another which is, who should be the ones to provide those loving supportive 
relationships that so many psychiatric patients seem to lack?  If we are to admit that paid 
workers are not the ones to offer such persons love, then what level of closeness is both 
reasonable and appropriate to ask from practitioners? Whether or not the situation is an 
ideal one, workers are in a position of rationing in the face of scarcity. They are the ones 
to recommend particular services, advocate on behalf of a client, or decide in the moment 
how much precious time to dedicate to an individual patient. Hence, beyond the problems 
associated with endeavoring to care about another person “on demand,” as it were, there 
are also difficulties that arise when special attachments are formed with particular clients, 
attachments that might encourage preferential treatment. A finely tuned balance is 
perhaps required to determine what level of care is sufficient to adequately nurture one 
person, without allowing for the development of special bonds that result in the 
deprivation of others.  
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As my arguments in Chapter Three suggest, cultivating the moral wisdom of 
workers themselves should go some way in determining where such relational boundaries 
lie. However, because it entails a responsiveness to changing circumstances and knowing 
when the rules are more harmful than helpful, moral wisdom is itself a necessarily 
ambiguous concept. If moral wisdom is always changing, how do we know when we’ve 
arrived? By what standard do we judge a worker’s level of moral understanding and how 
are workers to train their moral sense, if not in virtue of simply learning a set of rules? If 
one agrees that workers can only achieve moral wisdom through practice, and this in turn 
requires mistakes, then what level of error ought we allow for among workers who hold 
the lives of others in their hands, and who decides what level of risk is acceptable?  
 Within work environments that beget a seemingly ever-increasing number of 
specializations, drawing workers into such talks so that discourse is not dominated by 
bioethicists will require a concerted effort. It is not easy to communicate the concerns 
raised here to practitioners, administrators and academics. The results of a recent project, 
“Leadership in Ethical Policy and Practice” (Shick Makaroff et al, 2010), suggest that 
barriers already exist when it comes to discussing ethics with practitioners. The project 
saw academic researchers collaborating with “nursing practice leaders” interested in 
conducting ethical talks in their particular workplaces while also contributing to the 
broader three-year project. According to authors, academics were surprised to see that 
nursing practice leaders showed reluctance to explicitly discuss ethics, or even to clarify 
what the term meant. The authors reporting on the process reproduced the exchange to 
show differing perspectives about the topic. 
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Practice leader: I actually sometimes find [the language of ethics is] almost a barrier. People don’t 
understand it; they just think it’s very soft. It’s language they’re not comfortable or familiar with. 
It’s too ‘mom and apple pie’. 
 
Interviewer: All right. [Are] there other ways then to convey the same ideas that you find you 
use? 
 
Practice leader: Yeah. There’s all kinds of ways. It’s all around influencing agendas and decisions 
made by a variety of decision makers within the health authority using whatever language they 
understand most effectively (p. 572).  
 
 If ethics alone is viewed as “soft” any such dismissive tendencies could only be 
compounded if the ethics in question takes seriously questions of appropriate forms of 
love between practitioners and clients. Recalling Michael Hardt’s observations  quoted in 
the Introduction, such discourse even makes academics squirm in their seats during talks. 
However, does a researcher or philosopher not weaken her own position, or dilute 
discourse on the importance of relatedness, if she buys into the dominant paradigm and 
couches her reflections in terms of, say, quantifiable markers of health, or perhaps even 
economics in order to be taken seriously? Taking such an approach to such subject matter 
appears merely to reproduce, and hence reinforce the very logic that this work has sought 
to challenge. And yet if this is the only way to be heard by policy makers or even front-
line practitioners, perhaps such a compromise is necessary.  
 
Closing Words: The Hidden promise of “Strange Flowers”  
As the RTS paradigm touting efficiency and economy has gained increasing 
influence over the life of institutions, and as forms of technological rationality dominate 
virtually all aspects of our lives, a deceptively simple truth retreats from view. This is that 
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relatedness is so fundamental for human flourishing that all our ingenious technological 
advances, efficient productive systems and accumulation of wealth are rendered 
meaningless if individuals are consigned to a social vacuum devoid of relational ties. It is 
possible, however, that the very same dehumanizing paradigm associated with rational 
technologies may also hold its cure.  
It is only when kindness and compassion retreat from view that we begin to fully 
appreciate the conditions necessary for their cultivation. It is only when we are barred 
from spontaneous interaction that we come to see its critical importance in laying the 
groundwork for trust and care. Depriving workers of the time to care, moreover, helps 
bring to light just how precious are those moments spent comforting or nurturing a 
vulnerable Other. A workplace environment that restricts personal relations has the 
paradoxical effect of making such relations all the more precious.  
Although the ethos of efficiency and central control erodes relatedness, “strange 
flowers” always seem to manage to take root, just as they did in the austere setting of the 
APU. Their very rarity helps to reveal their rarified and transcendent nature and the very 
darkness of their circumstances is what allows the value of relatedness to shine forth in 
all its resplendent light. Relationships that take root under stifling conditions are the 
daisies sprouting up in cracks in the sidewalk, helping to remind us of the beauty and 
importance of those parts of the natural world that a rationally managed and highly 
technological society serves to keep, however unwittingly, at bay.  
While science will never show us why these relationships are so precious, and 
how it is that they can spark entire paradigm shifts, legal philosopher Joseph Raz 
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illustrates the fundamental value of human connectedness with a simple children’s story. 
Raz readily admits that a milestone in any moral agent’s development is achieving the 
maturity to recognize that one’s own claims and the claims of those she loves hold no 
special merit above and beyond anyone else’s. By the same token, however, our partial 
relationships confer meaning to our lives and make them worth living. To show this, Raz 
cites a section from The Little Prince where a fox offers the Prince an explanation of why 
he would like the boy to “tame” him 
“My life is monotonous”, he said, ‘I hunt chickens; men hunt me. All the 
chickens are just alike, and all men are just alike … I am a little bored. But 
if you tame me it will be as if the sun came to shine on my life. I shall 
know the sounds of a step that will be different from all the others … 
Yours will call me,  like music … and then look: the grain fields … You 
have hair … the colour of gold. Think now how wonderful that will be 
when you have tamed me. The grain, which is also golden, will bring me 
back the thought of you and I shall love to listen to the wind in the wheat” 
(de Saint-Exupéry cited in Raz, 2001, p 15).  
 
Emotional attachments enrich our worldview by infusing it with meaning, and drive us 
forward with a purpose otherwise lacking in a world of objects where none matters more 
than any other. For Raz personal meaning, or people’s reason for living, derives at least 
in part from our relationships, and this sense of meaning gives us the will to live. He 
notes, 
 
If you doubt that, try and revive the spirits of a depressed or suicidal 
person by pointing out how much of value there is in the world: mention 
the beauty of nature, treasure of supreme art filling the museums, the 
wealth of sublime music, the great number of lovers, etc. One is more 
likely to drive a person further into gloom. Their problem is not the 
absence of value in the world but meaning in their lives (p. 15). 
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Raz’s insight finds an echo in Viktor Frankl’s epiphany about the importance of 
relatedness, which came to him under extremely adverse conditions in a Nazi 
concentration camp. As he tells it, every day before sunrise prisoners stumbled for miles 
in the cold, in shoddy clothing, their worn out shoes slipping on icy spots along the way 
to arrive at their work site. During one of these marches someone beside Frankl remarked 
“if our wives could see us now!”, adding that he hoped the women were faring better 
wherever they were. Visions of Frankl’s wife came to him then as the sun came up. “My 
mind clung to my wife’s image, imagining it with an uncanny acuteness. I heard her 
answering me, saw her smile, her frank and encouraging look. Real or not, her look was 
then more luminous than the sun which was beginning to rise.” Frankl continues, 
 
A thought transfixed me: for the first time in my life I understood the truth 
as it is set into song by so many poets, proclaimed as the final wisdom by 
so many thinkers. The truth—that love is the ultimate and highest goal to 
which man can aspire. Then I grasped the meaning of the greatest secret 
that human poetry and human thought and belief had to impart: The 
salvation of man is through love and in love. (Frankl, 1997, p. 49).  
 
 
No surprise, then, to hear Saks tell us that “what those of us with suffering from mental 
illness want is what everyone wants: in the words of Sigmund Freud, ‘to work and to 
love’” (Saks, 2012).  
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